Tag: Iran war

  • Iran’s Retaliatory Strikes Against U.S. Bases in the Region, August 31, September 1-2

    Iran’s Retaliatory Strikes Against U.S. Bases in the Region, August 31, September 1-2

    Below is a breakdown of the attacks by country:

    Jordan:
    — IRGC strikes on August 31 targeted technical/maintenance facilities and fighter aircraft parking areas at Prince Hassan and Al-Azraq (Muwaffaq Salti) bases.
    — On September 1, the IRGC hit Camp Titin, striking U.S. Marine positions, assault helicopters, and supporting infrastructure.
    — Additional IRGC strikes on September 1–2 focused on Prince Hassan Air Base, destroying technical infrastructure and hangars housing RQ-4 and MQ-9 drones.

    Iraq:
    — On September 2, joint Army and IRGC operations struck U.S. troop positions at Al-Harir Base, as well as technical facilities and a surveillance balloon at the Erbil Airport base.

    UAE:
    — Army strikes on August 31 hit helicopter staging areas and U.S. personnel positions at Al-Minhad Air Base.
    — Army operations on September 1–2 further targeted radar installations and troop facilities at both Al-Dhafra and Al-Minhad Air Bases.

    Bahrain:
    — Army attacks on September 1–2 hit radar infrastructure and U.S. troop positions at Sheikh Isa Air Base, along with a logistics depot serving the U.S. Fifth Fleet’s naval installation.

    Kuwait:
    — Joint Army and IRGC operations on September 1–2 struck satellite communications gear, supply depots, and fighter hangars at Ahmad Al-Jaber Base, as well as personnel housing, drone hangars, and drone ramps at Ali Al-Salem Base.

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  • Security Reconfiguration of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council

    Security Reconfiguration of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council

    The Fragile Shadow of Neutrality

    In recent years, GCC countries had adopted a strategy based on neutrality, balancing, and mediation between Iran and the United States. Despite extensive security ties with Washington, they avoided direct involvement in military conflict, with countries like Oman and Qatar playing key mediating roles. However, doubts regarding the effectiveness of the U.S. security umbrella gradually increased—from Washington’s limited response to the 2019 attacks to the erosion of deterrence following the events of 2025, when even the presence of major U.S. bases did not prevent Qatar from being targeted in a Zionist strike. At the same time, Iran framed the presence of these bases as part of the justification for its own attacks. These developments prompted a reassessment of the costs versus benefits of hosting U.S. security assets, and three key divides within the GCC—over trust in the U.S., the role of the Zionist regime, and the approach toward Iran—became entrenched as the main lines of strategic disagreement.

    The Hormuz Shock

    During the war, GCC states found themselves directly at the center of the conflict, with 83% of Iran’s missile and drone strikes directed at them. Regional energy and logistics infrastructure were also targeted, and the Strait of Hormuz was effectively transformed into a geopolitical pressure tool. The war demonstrated that despite economic diversification efforts, the region’s structural dependence on hydrocarbons (approximately 30% of GDP and up to 85% of government revenues) and food imports (85% of food needs) remains intact. Disruption in Hormuz could trigger severe recessions (up to 14% GDP decline in some countries). Politically, GCC unity appeared more fragile than ever; member states’ responses to Iran, the U.S., and the Zionist regime were not uniform, and strategic rifts widened. The outcome has been the coexistence of multiple divergent approaches within a shared crisis: some moved toward limited security cooperation, others toward balancing with Iran, and still others toward closer alignment with the U.S. and the Zionist regime.

    The Future of the Persian Gulf

    In future scenarios for the Persian Gulf following the Iran war, three main trajectories are conceivable: In a pessimistic scenario, the pressure of war pushes GCC countries toward more genuine cooperation—creating practical convergence in areas such as joint air defense, arms production, and the interconnection of economic infrastructure like rail and energy networks—while raising the likelihood of direct confrontation with Iran. In a more probable scenario, cooperation remains confined to crisis management and limited security coordination, with disagreements over the roles of the U.S., the Zionist regime, and Iran—as well as Saudi–Emirati rivalry—preventing strategic integration. In an optimistic scenario, regional rivalries, particularly between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, intensify, and countries move toward separate strategies toward Iran and the U.S., resulting in increased intra-GCC fragmentation, an arms race, and political divergence. It is likely that the UAE will enter direct conflict; Oman will adopt a strong stance against the regime and a critical posture toward U.S. intervention; Kuwait and Bahrain will passively follow U.S. directives; and Saudi Arabia will maintain neutrality, awaiting the right moment to strike at Iran’s and the UAE’s interests and those of their allies.

  • Aircraft losses of US-Israeli, European, and Arab countries in the Iran War

    Aircraft losses of US-Israeli, European, and Arab countries in the Iran War

    The U.S. and Israeli aircraft:

    Iran Front – Including 178 drones (official statement), 9 fighter jets, 8 aircraft, 11 helicopters, and 16 cruise missiles and bombs

    Destruction of 2 C-130 transport aircraft and 4 MH-6 helicopters during a U.S. special operation in southern Isfahan, on April 5.

    Drones:
    — MQ-9 Drone: At least 28 units
    — MQ-4C Drone: 1 unit (April 9)
    — MQ-1 Drone: 2 units (April 4, May 31)
    — RQ-21 Drone: 1 unit (March 30)
    — LUCAS Suicide Drone: Undisclosed number
    — Hermes 900 Drone: At least 8 units
    — Heron Drone: At least 2 units (March 31, April 5)
    — Harop Suicide Drone: Undisclosed number
    — Orbiter Drone: Undisclosed number

    Fighter jets:
    — Destruction of three U.S. F-15E fighter jets over Kuwait (March 2)
    — Destruction of one F-15 fighter jet in central Iran (April 1)
    — Destruction of one A-10 fighter jet over the Strait of Hormuz (April 2)
    — Destruction or damage to one F-35 fighter jet in central Iran (March 19)
    — Destruction or damage to one F-16 fighter jet in central regions (March 21)
    — Damage to one U.S. F-15E fighter jet over Hormuz Island (March 22)
    — Destruction or damage to one U.S. F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jet in southern Iran (March 25)

    Tanker aircraft and AWACS:
    — Destruction or damage to 5 KC-135 refueling aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, March 1-3
    — Destruction of 1 E-3G AWACS aircraft and damage to several other KC-135 refueling aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base, March 27

    Helicopters:
    — Damage to 1 CH-47 helicopter in Kuwait, April 3
    — Destruction or damage to 1 Black Hawk helicopter, April 3
    — Destruction or damage to 1 CH-47 helicopter at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, date unspecified
    — Destruction or damage to 1 CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, date unspecified
    — Destruction of an AH-64E Apache helicopter in the Strait of Hormuz, June 8

    Cruise Missiles and Bombs:
    — Interception and destruction of 15 AGM-158 JASSM or Tomahawk cruise missiles
    — Shooting down 1 GBU-39 bomb

    Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen Fronts – Including 14 drones, 3 aircraft, and 2 helicopters

    Drones:
    — 3 U.S. MQ-9 drones: in Jabal Maraqsha, Abyan Governorate (March 3), the desert of Marib (May 17), and north of Marib city (May 29) – by Yemeni Armed Forces
    — 1 U.S. MQ-9 drone: north of Basra (March 10) – by Iraqi Resistance
    — 8 Israeli Hermes 450 drones: Bint Jbeil (March 16), Al-Ayshiyeh region (April 1), Aynatha (April 2), Siddiqin (April 12), Adloun (April 17), Al-Hawsh (April 24), Nabatieh (April 30), Al-Khardali (June 10) – by Hezbollah
    — 1 Israeli Hermes 900 drone: southern Lebanon (April 28) – by Hezbollah
    — 1 Israeli Heron 1 drone: Nahla in Baalbek (June 11) – by Hezbollah

    Tanker aircraft, transport planes, and Helicopters:
    — Destruction of 1 KC-135 refueling aircraft and damage to another KC-135 in western Iraq (March 21) – by Iraqi Resistance
    — Destruction or damage to 1 U.S. UH-60 helicopter at Camp Victory, Iraq (April 5) – by Iraqi Resistance
    — 1 Iraqi Army Antonov-32 transport aircraft (April 10) – by Iraqi Resistance
    — Destruction or damage to 1 Israeli helicopter in the Yaroun area of southern Lebanon, type unknown (April 11) – by Hezbollah

    European countries aircraft:
    — One Italian Army MQ-9 drone (March 15)

    Arab countries aircraft:
    — 1 UAE Army helicopter, type unknown (March 9)
    — 1 Qatari Army helicopter, type unknown (March 22)
    — 2 Wing Loong drones belonging to Saudi or the UAE: in Shiraz (April 1) and Bushehr (April 3)

    The statistics presented are based on official statements by the armed forces of Iran, Iraqi resistance groups, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, as well as admissions by the United States, the Zionist regime, European, and Arab countries.

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  • From Classical Confrontation to Geoeconomic Deadlock; Dissecting the Second Phase of the Iran-U.S. War

    From Classical Confrontation to Geoeconomic Deadlock; Dissecting the Second Phase of the Iran-U.S. War

    Iran’s Naval Blockade in the Strait of Hormuz: From Economic Pressure to Global Crisis Contagion

    The naval blockade against Iran—which has effectively already begun—can, at the tactical level, swiftly target the main flow of Tehran’s foreign currency revenues, given that over 90% of its foreign trade and the bulk of its oil exports pass through the Persian Gulf. Disruption along this route could generate daily losses of up to roughly $435 million and, in the short term, even lead to a halt in oil production due to limited storage capacity. However, at the strategic level, the core issue is not the “initial effectiveness” but rather the “sustainability and management of consequences”—since this blockade is being imposed at a global chokepoint through which about 20% of the world’s energy flow transits. Any disruption there would directly translate into higher energy prices, global inflation, and pressure on energy-importing economies, particularly in Asia.

    This interdependence transforms the blockade from a unilateral leverage tool into a “crisis contagion mechanism,” whose costs are transferred to third parties and gradually generate reverse political pressure on Washington. On the other hand, effective implementation of the blockade demands a continuous and extensive naval presence, preparedness to intercept non-Iranian vessels, and acceptance of the risk of confrontation with major powers such as China—a fact which, as analyses explicitly state, turns this operation into an open-ended military commitment that is, in the medium term, “unsustainable.” Furthermore, legal constraints arising from the transit passage regime in the Strait of Hormuz effectively rule out the possibility of complete closure, and any effort to extend the blockade to third-party ships would raise the threshold of conflict from a bilateral to a multilateral level. Consequently, in the current situation, the naval blockade should be analyzed not as a definitive solution, but rather as a pressure instrument with short-term functionality and long-term uncontrollable repercussions—one that, while capable of severely pressuring Iran’s economy in its initial phase, will in all likelihood, over a longer horizon, lead to the erosion of America’s strategic capacity and credibility due to the networked nature of the energy economy and operational limitations. In any case, the issue of the naval blockade of Iran and its feasibility in strategic terms is analyzed as follows:

    Attrition in the “Endless” Mission: Pentagon experts warn that a full blockade of Iran’s ports and coastlines would constitute a massive military operation with no time ceiling. America’s geographic distance and the need for a permanent naval presence render this mission “unsustainable” logistically in the medium and long term, to the point that the U.S. military would effectively lack the capability to fully cover all trade exchanges across such a vast geographical area.

    The Industrial Self-Sanction Trap: Contrary to initial assumptions, this blockade targets the U.S. defense industry even more than Iran. The obstruction of sea lanes halts the trade of critical mineral commodities such as sulfur, which is essential for copper and cobalt extraction. This crisis severely diminishes America’s ability to “repair battle-damaged equipment” and “produce jet engines and drones,” while driving up input prices by as much as 165%.

    Economic Deadlock and Shifting Objectives: A daily cost of $2 billion, with a projected total expenditure of up to $1 trillion, coupled with the inability to eliminate Iran’s underground military capabilities, is pushing Washington toward a strategy of “graceful exit.” In practice, America’s geographic distance and the vulnerability of allied supply chains have minimized Washington’s resilience in the face of a war of attrition.

    Return to Direct Clash between Iran and the United States: From Tactical Pause to the Likelihood of a War of Attrition

    A return to direct confrontation between Iran and the United States depends less on sheer political will than on the disruption of the fragile balance now established between the costs of continuing the war and the costs of retreating. From the American perspective, the main precondition for resuming hostilities is that the naval blockade, economic pressure, and limited airstrike threats fail to compel Tehran to accept Washington’s preferred arrangements—particularly given that, according to available sources, Iran, despite enduring heavy military blows, has not collapsed; rather, it has emerged from the first phase with more uncompromising leadership, buried reserves of enriched uranium, and greater political cohesion. Conversely, from Iran’s standpoint, the condition for re-entering direct war is that Washington or Israel crosses the line from deterrence and pressure into infrastructure warfare, high-level assassinations, intensified blockade, or attempts to impose “unconditional surrender”—because, based on field data in Tehran, the prevailing assessment is that any ceasefire without credible guarantees would merely be a pause for a renewed attack within a shorter interval. For this reason, Iran’s planning horizon is not focused on a quick end to the war, but on readiness for a months-long, attritional conflict. Under such circumstances, the second phase of the war will most likely manifest not as a large-scale ground invasion, but as a hybrid, escalating form of combat.

    The characteristics of this conflict can be outlined as follows: expansion of strikes on Iran’s economic and energy infrastructure by the U.S. and Israel, and in response, reciprocal Iranian attacks on energy facilities, refineries, ports, shipping routes, and American and allied interests in the region—a pattern whose early signs have already been observed in strikes on Assaluyeh, disruptions to Qatar’s LNG capacity, and threats to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. The decisive point, however, is that the U.S. also faces serious deterrent obstacles to re-entering an unlimited war. In other words, according to some estimates, the cost of war has reached approximately $2 billion per day and could exceed $1 trillion, while the blockade of Hormuz itself places pressure on America’s own defense supply chain, with West Point assessments even describing it as a “pre-logistics crisis” for replenishing equipment and munitions. Hence, the most probable scenario is that, if negotiations fail again, the second phase of the war will not be a lightning offensive, but a multi-level war of attrition, in which the U.S. seeks, without engaging in ground occupation, to incrementally raise the economic and infrastructural costs for Iran, while Iran, relying on the survival of its missile capacity, the Hormuz leverage, and its ability to generate regional insecurity, raises the costs of continued conflict for the U.S., its allies, and the global economy. Thus, the central issue in returning to direct hostilities is not the mere feasibility of initiating war, but each side’s capacity to endure the consequences of its second phase.

    Validating NATO’s Confrontation with the U.S.: Genuine Rupture or Structural Dependency?

    The claim of “NATO confronting the U.S.” reflects, more than an operational scenario, a transition from a value-based alliance to an asymmetric and “transactional” security order. The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy, with its absolute prioritization of homeland defense and deterrence of China in the Indo-Pacific region, has reduced NATO to a secondary instrument, placing the main burden of conventional defense against Russia on European allies. This paradigm shift, combined with Washington’s pressure to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, has deepened the rifts inherited from the first Trump era to the level of a “crisis of strategic trust,” where analysts at think tanks such as Brookings and the IISS regard unilateral U.S. actions as undermining the foundations of Western deterrence.

    The February 2026 war in Iran and the crisis over the proposal to annex Greenland have acted as key accelerators of this operational divergence. The joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, conducted without sufficient consultation with Brussels, triggered a bipolar reaction across Europe. While countries such as Spain, deeming the war illegal, refused to provide their bases (Rota and Morón) or airspace to U.S. forces, Washington threatened to suspend their membership or sever trade relations entirely, thereby challenging NATO’s cohesion. Simultaneously, the U.S. insistence on acquiring Greenland and the threat of imposing 25% tariffs on European goods have been legally interpreted as violations of Article 1 of the Washington Treaty, and for the first time, intelligence services of long-standing allies such as Denmark were compelled to factor the United States in as a “potential security risk” in their calculations. Despite these unprecedented tensions, structural limitations preclude an outright institutional confrontation, since the 1949 treaty lacks a mechanism for expelling or counteracting members, and Article 13 only provides for voluntary withdrawal. As a result, Europe’s reaction is proceeding not through direct confrontation within NATO, but through the “gradual Europeanization of security” and the activation of parallel structures now taking shape. The “Readiness 2030” plan—with its €800 billion budget and the SAFE financial instrument for joint arms procurement prioritizing European industries—alongside the drafting of the EU’s “Article 42.7 Handbook” as a substitute for NATO’s Article 5, signals a serious effort to manage dependency on America and prepare for the scenario of a potential U.S. exit from the alliance. This process, rather than collapse, has given rise to a “realist NATO,” in which raw power and European defense autonomy replace earlier idealism.

    With the breakdown of negotiations, the likelihood of NATO’s formal entry into war remains near zero, owing to the firm opposition of countries such as Spain and Italy and the lack of consensus over the legal legitimacy of operations. The economic costs arising from $106 oil and a monthly financial burden of €3 billion for Europe, coupled with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, severely constrain the allies’ financial capacity for a protracted conflict. Militarily, the rapid depletion of U.S. interceptor missile stockpiles (e.g., THAAD and SM-3)—which would take up to six years to replenish—has confronted Washington with a “munitions gap” and weakened NATO’s readiness to defend other fronts. Under these conditions, the most plausible scenario is the continuation of unilateral U.S. intervention with limited support from certain specific allies, alongside the acceleration of European defense independence plans (such as Readiness 2030) to decouple from Washington’s security orbit.

    The Bab al-Mandab Strait and Its Impact in the Second Phase of the Conflict

    In the second phase of the war, the Bab al-Mandab Strait could function as a “complementary chokepoint” and Iran’s most significant strategic leverage mechanism, since Tehran is capable of transforming a regional crisis into an international geoeconomic blockade by affecting 12% of global trade and 22% of container traffic.

    This map shows how two vital energy bottlenecks in the world, the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, can become tools of geopolitical pressure and disrupt the flow of global trade due to regional tensions.

    Based on analyses from think tanks such as the Israeli regime’s National Security Studies Institute and Al Jazeera, Iran—through its allied proxy Ansarallah—possesses not only the capability to block alternative energy export routes—such as the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia that delivers oil to Yanbu port, which still requires passage through this strait to reach Asia—but also, by forcing vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, it has increased shipping companies’ operational costs by up to $50 million per week and created the risk of oil prices spiking to $150–200 per barrel.

  • Maven in the Iran War

    Maven in the Iran War

    In late February 2026, the United States and the Zionist regime launched coordinated military operations under the names “Epic Fury” and “Roaring Lion” against Iran—operations considered the largest U.S. military action since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During this conflict, CENTCOM struck over 11,000 targets, while Iran responded with thousands of missiles and drones. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was martyred in the initial attacks. However, these statistics alone do not capture the historical significance of this war; rather, what distinguishes this conflict is the central role of artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and commercial technologies—which no longer serve merely as support tools but have been placed at the core of operations.

    The “Maven” project had been initiated back in 2018. Prior to the emergence of large language models, this unit, in collaboration with several companies, was supporting the Maven project to advance “computer vision”—an AI capability that enables the detection and differentiation of objects in satellite imagery, assisting analysts in reviewing visual data.

    The Maven project helped accelerate the deployment of machine learning in the fields of reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence analysis, and geospatial intelligence. This legacy ultimately led to the development of the “Maven Smart System” by Palantir Technologies, which today has become the cornerstone of AI-driven U.S. military operations.

    Background

    The U.S. Department of Defense has designated Palantir as the “sole responsible supplier” for the Maven AI system—a system used for field data analysis, target identification, and military decision support. The author emphasizes that this contract marks the transition of the Maven project from the experimental phase to a permanent U.S. military infrastructure level. According to the sources cited, the system is capable of analyzing satellite data, drone footage, sensor inputs, and field intelligence in real time, generating a “unified operational picture” for military commanders. A notable point is the direct link between Palantir and America’s broader strategy in the domain of “AI-enabled warfare,” which itself indicates that the U.S. government is gradually outsourcing its intelligence analysis and targeting infrastructure to private Silicon Valley companies—a trend that, in his view, blurs the boundaries between government, military, and tech firms.

    Analysis and Findings

    A. The Role of Silicon Valley in the U.S. War Department

    Silicon Valley’s role in the U.S. Department of Defense has expanded significantly in recent years; this collaboration has moved beyond limited research projects in cybersecurity over the past decade and has now become a central pillar of the U.S. military’s digital transformation. Recognizing the rapid pace of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big data analytics, the Pentagon has increasingly turned to partnerships with Silicon Valley tech companies to enhance decision-making, combat effectiveness, and intelligence superiority. A prime example of this trend is the massive contracts with firms like Palantir Technologies, Google Cloud, and Microsoft, which are involved in projects such as Maven and the Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability. The U.S. Department of Defense now has over 200 active contracts with companies based in the San Francisco Bay Area, a large portion of which are directly linked to digital warfare operations. This extensive partnership, however, has not always been without challenges. Today, the bulk of AI system development for the Department of Defense is managed by private contractors based in Silicon Valley. From the Pentagon’s perspective, collaboration with Silicon Valley is a strategic necessity. The engineers and researchers in this region are among the world’s foremost experts in areas such as image processing, data analysis, and deep learning platform design. By establishing the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in 2018, the Pentagon effectively opened a gateway for direct engagement with tech companies. This body is tasked with adapting emerging civilian technologies for military applications and setting ethical and technical standards for the use of AI in warfare. Through this model, the U.S. military can innovate at a pace close to the private sector, without being bogged down for years in bureaucratic procedures. Silicon Valley has become a vital component of America’s modern warfare infrastructure, where the line between commercial technology and military application is increasingly blurred. Companies like Palantir, Anduril Industries, and SpaceX now play pivotal roles in combat data analysis, autonomous drones, and military satellite communications. By September 2024, the share of commercial technology firms in the U.S. Department of Defense’s research budget had risen from 11% in 2015 to over 37% in 2024. This extensive partnership, while enhancing military efficiency, has also raised new concerns about transparency, social oversight, and the over-reliance of national security on the private sector and tech investors.

    Image of part of the terms of the US Department of Defense contract with Palantir

    B. The Role of Maven in the Attack on Iran

    The Maven system combines satellite imagery, drone videos, radar data, and signals intelligence into a unified interface, allowing operators to identify targets, recommend weapon types, and generate attack plans almost simultaneously. The results have been remarkable: over a thousand targets were struck in the first 24 hours of operations—a pace unimaginable if relying solely on human analysis. This process has continued using only 10% of the analysts that would previously have been required for such a level of operations.

    However, the system’s limitations are equally notable. Maven’s overall accuracy is estimated at around 60%, compared to roughly 84% for human analysts. Despite this, Palantir’s Chief Technology Officer has described it as “the first large-scale AI-enabled combat operation”—a characterization that raises serious questions about the ethical considerations of AI-based targeting and the adequacy of civilian protection mechanisms. These very concerns about protective safeguards have also led to the recent controversy between Anthropic and the Department of Defense.

    C. The History of Maven

    Project Maven is one of the U.S. Department of Defense’s programs in the field of applying artificial intelligence to military data analysis, launched in 2017. Its official name was the “Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team,” and its primary objective was to use machine learning for the automated analysis of images and videos from reconnaissance drones. The project was initially designed to accelerate the processing of vast battlefield data, particularly in Middle Eastern operations. Early sources about the program’s inception were published in Department of Defense statements in 2017. Project Maven focused specifically on drone imagery analysis—using machine vision algorithms to detect individuals, vehicles, and suspicious objects in aerial footage. Previously, such imagery had to be analyzed manually by human personnel, a highly time-consuming process. The project’s goal was to reduce the workload on analysts and increase the speed of operational decision-making. Pentagon official reports emphasized that the system played a “decision-support” role and was not a complete replacement for human personnel. The name Palantir Technologies has frequently been associated with U.S. defense data analysis projects. Palantir is a major government contractor in the fields of big data analytics and intelligence software, with its products such as “Palantir Gotham” used in defense and security agencies. Although Project Maven was broadly executed with the participation of multiple contractors, media attention was largely focused on Google’s initial partnership with the Pentagon, while companies like Palantir were also active in the defense technology ecosystem related to data analysis and AI.

    According to statistics released by the White House on April 8, the U.S. military struck over 13,000 targets in Iran during the first 38 days of the war—including more than 2,000 command-and-control centers, 1,500 air defense targets, and 1,450 targets related to industrial infrastructure.

    The White House emphasized that “all these targets were legitimate and military in nature.” However, the New York Times and other media outlets, through reports and images, have documented the destruction of civilian facilities. These reports have sparked a wave of criticism and raised the question of whether over-reliance on AI systems has led to targeting errors and increased civilian casualties.

    During operations against Iran, the Maven Smart System—a Palantir product—played a central role in gathering and analyzing battlefield intelligence. According to Cameron Stanley, the Pentagon’s senior official for digital and artificial intelligence, the system collected data on enemy force positions from various sources, including radar signals, satellite and drone imagery, electronic communications, and other intelligence feeds, combining them all into a unified operational picture of the battlefield.

    Stanley, who presented these remarks at Palantir’s “AIPCon 9” conference on March 12, stated that Maven is not limited to target identification. According to him, the system can also determine the most suitable friendly unit to engage each target and provide U.S. combat units with specific operational options—including attack routes, required munitions types, and other relevant information for mission execution. He explained that previously, commanders had to consult eight or nine different systems simultaneously to make battlefield decisions, but Maven now aggregates all this information into a single visual interface. In this way, a commander can identify a target, select the appropriate attack package, and initiate the operational process with just a few clicks.

  • Statistics of US-Israeli, European, and Arab aircraft losses in the war with Iran and the Axis of Resistance

    Statistics of US-Israeli, European, and Arab aircraft losses in the war with Iran and the Axis of Resistance

    USA/Israel:

    Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen Fronts – Including 12 drones, 3 aircraft, and 2 helicopters

    — Two U.S. MQ-9 drones: in Jabal Maraqsha, Abyan Governorate (March 3), the desert of Marib (May 17), and north of Marib city (May 29) – Yemeni Armed Forces
    — One U.S. MQ-9 drone: north of Basra (March 10) – Iraqi Resistance
    — Seven Israeli Hermes 450 drones: Bint Jbeil (March 16), Al-Ayshiyeh region (March 31), Aynatha (April 1), Siddiqin (April 11), Adloun (April 16), Al-Hawsh (April 24), Nabatiyeh (April 30) – Hezbollah
    — One Israeli Hermes 900 drone: southern Lebanon (April 28) – Hezbollah

    — Destruction of a KC-135 refueling aircraft and damage to another KC-135 in western Iraq (March 12) – Iraqi Resistance
    — Destruction or damage to a U.S. UH-60 helicopter at Victoria Air Base, Iraq (March 25) – Iraqi Resistance
    — Iraqi Army Antonov 32 aircraft (March 30) – Iraqi Resistance
    — Destruction or damage to an Israeli helicopter in the Yaroun area of southern Lebanon, type unknown (March 31) – Hezbollah

    Iran Front – Including 174 drones, 9 fighter jets, 8 aircraft, 10 helicopters, and 16 cruise missiles and bombs

    MQ-9 Drone: At least 25 units
    MQ-4C Drone: 1 unit (April 9)
    MQ-1 Drone: 1 unit (April 4)
    RQ-21 Drone: 1 unit (March 30)
    LUCAS Suicide Drone: Undisclosed number
    Hermes 900 Drone: At least 8 units
    Heron Drone: At least 2 units (March 31, April 5)
    Harop Suicide Drone: Undisclosed number
    Arbiter Drone: Undisclosed number

    — Destruction of three U.S. F-15E fighter jets over Kuwait (March 2) – reported as friendly fire
    — Destruction or damage to one F-16 fighter jet in central regions (March 21)
    — Damage to one U.S. F-15E fighter jet over Hormuz Island (March 22)
    — Destruction or damage to one F-35 fighter jet in central Iran (March 19)
    — Destruction or damage to one U.S. F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jet in southern Iran (March 25)
    — Destruction of one F-15 fighter jet in central Iran (April 1)
    — Destruction of one A-10 fighter jet over the Strait of Hormuz (April 2)

    — Destruction or damage to five KC-135 refueling aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (March 1-3)
    — Destruction of one E-3G AWACS aircraft and damage to several KC-135R refueling aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base (March 27)

    — Damage to one CH-47 helicopter in Kuwait (April 3)
    — Destruction or damage to one Black Hawk helicopter (April 3)
    — Destruction of two C-130 transport aircraft and four MH-6 Little Bird helicopters, south of Isfahan (April 5)
    — Destruction or damage to one CH-47 helicopter at Boeing Base, Kuwait (date unspecified)
    — Destruction or damage to one CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter at Ali Al Salem Base, Kuwait (date unspecified)

    — Interception and destruction of 15 AGM-158 JASSM stealth cruise missiles or Tomahawk cruise missiles
    — Shooting down one GBU-39 bomb

    European Countries:
    — One Italian Army MQ-9 drone (March 15)

    Arab Countries:
    — UAE Army helicopter, type unknown (March 9)
    — Qatari Army helicopter, type unknown (March 22)
    — Wing Loong drone belonging to Saudi Arabia or the UAE in Shiraz (April 1)
    — Wing Loong drone belonging to Saudi Arabia or the UAE in Bushehr (April 3)

    The statistics presented are based on official announcements and statements by the armed forces of Iran, Iraqi resistance groups, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, as well as admissions by the United States, the Zionist regime, European, and Arab countries.

  • War with Iran?!

    War with Iran?!