Security Reconfiguration of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council

The Fragile Shadow of Neutrality

In recent years, GCC countries had adopted a strategy based on neutrality, balancing, and mediation between Iran and the United States. Despite extensive security ties with Washington, they avoided direct involvement in military conflict, with countries like Oman and Qatar playing key mediating roles. However, doubts regarding the effectiveness of the U.S. security umbrella gradually increased—from Washington’s limited response to the 2019 attacks to the erosion of deterrence following the events of 2025, when even the presence of major U.S. bases did not prevent Qatar from being targeted in a Zionist strike. At the same time, Iran framed the presence of these bases as part of the justification for its own attacks. These developments prompted a reassessment of the costs versus benefits of hosting U.S. security assets, and three key divides within the GCC—over trust in the U.S., the role of the Zionist regime, and the approach toward Iran—became entrenched as the main lines of strategic disagreement.

The Hormuz Shock

During the war, GCC states found themselves directly at the center of the conflict, with 83% of Iran’s missile and drone strikes directed at them. Regional energy and logistics infrastructure were also targeted, and the Strait of Hormuz was effectively transformed into a geopolitical pressure tool. The war demonstrated that despite economic diversification efforts, the region’s structural dependence on hydrocarbons (approximately 30% of GDP and up to 85% of government revenues) and food imports (85% of food needs) remains intact. Disruption in Hormuz could trigger severe recessions (up to 14% GDP decline in some countries). Politically, GCC unity appeared more fragile than ever; member states’ responses to Iran, the U.S., and the Zionist regime were not uniform, and strategic rifts widened. The outcome has been the coexistence of multiple divergent approaches within a shared crisis: some moved toward limited security cooperation, others toward balancing with Iran, and still others toward closer alignment with the U.S. and the Zionist regime.

The Future of the Persian Gulf

In future scenarios for the Persian Gulf following the Iran war, three main trajectories are conceivable: In a pessimistic scenario, the pressure of war pushes GCC countries toward more genuine cooperation—creating practical convergence in areas such as joint air defense, arms production, and the interconnection of economic infrastructure like rail and energy networks—while raising the likelihood of direct confrontation with Iran. In a more probable scenario, cooperation remains confined to crisis management and limited security coordination, with disagreements over the roles of the U.S., the Zionist regime, and Iran—as well as Saudi–Emirati rivalry—preventing strategic integration. In an optimistic scenario, regional rivalries, particularly between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, intensify, and countries move toward separate strategies toward Iran and the U.S., resulting in increased intra-GCC fragmentation, an arms race, and political divergence. It is likely that the UAE will enter direct conflict; Oman will adopt a strong stance against the regime and a critical posture toward U.S. intervention; Kuwait and Bahrain will passively follow U.S. directives; and Saudi Arabia will maintain neutrality, awaiting the right moment to strike at Iran’s and the UAE’s interests and those of their allies.