The recent war deepened the internal rifts within the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), revealing that its member states hold divergent approaches toward Iran, the United States, and the Zionist regime. Simultaneously, the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz and energy infrastructure exposed the limitations of the U.S. security umbrella. Consequently, the future of the Persian Gulf will be shaped less by strategic integration and more by rivalries, divergences, and individual states’ efforts to secure their interests through different pathways.

The Iran war and the Strait of Hormuz crisis served for China as a practical test in the use of strategic chokepoints, demonstrating that disruption to vital global trade routes can impose heavy costs on rivals without direct warfare. This experience is likely to push Beijing toward reinforcing a strategy of encirclement and gradual control over Taiwan—an approach in which the world’s dependence on Taiwan’s semiconductor industry becomes a geoeconomic leverage point. Consequently, the Taiwan conflict may shift from a deterrence model based on military power toward one grounded in control over supply chains and critical global economic chokepoints.

According to IWN assessments, the armed forces of Iran, Iraqi resistance groups, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah have destroyed or damaged over 241 aircraft and cruise missiles belonging to the United States, the Zionist regime, European, and Arab countries since the beginning of the war.

Recent developments in West Asia signal a transition from traditional confrontations to multi-layered rivalries unfolding across strategic energy chokepoints, where straits such as Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab have become focal arenas for the projection of power and pressure. Within this framework, the scenario of a U.S.-led naval blockade of Iran—employed as a tool for maximum pressure—alongside the possibility of a return to direct conflict between the two sides, has reinforced the prospect of escalating tensions. At the same time, Europe’s growing skepticism toward Washington’s unilateral approaches has cast uncertainty over the future of NATO cohesion. On another level, the involvement of Tehran-aligned actors such as the Houthis (Ansarallah) in Bab al-Mandab has highlighted the potential for expanding the maritime theater of competition and enabling Iran to leverage this asset indirectly. Taken together, these developments indicate that regional maritime security is increasingly becoming the primary arena for redefining the balance of power. Accordingly, this study aims to assess the feasibility, consequences, and sustainability of these scenarios, while elucidating their impact on the regional balance of power and the international security order.

The Ramadan War demonstrated that artificial intelligence and systems like “Maven” have been moved to the center of U.S. military operations, aggregating field data to dramatically accelerate targeting and decision-making. At the same time, Silicon Valley’s role in modern warfare has become more prominent, with parts of the military’s intelligence and operational infrastructure being outsourced to technology companies. This transformation, alongside increased efficiency, has raised questions about targeting accuracy, civilian casualties, and the dependence of national security on private-sector actors.

By simultaneously leveraging energy tools, transit corridors, and its influence in post-Assad Syria, Turkey seeks to transform Iraq into a component of its own geoeconomic architecture while reducing Iranian influence in Northwest Asia. The “Development Road” project, the redesign of energy cooperation with Baghdad, and efforts to position itself as a regional energy and trade hub constitute the main pillars of this strategy. The success of this policy could strengthen Turkey’s standing in European and West Asian energy equations; however, persistent political, security, and legal disputes among Baghdad, Erbil, and Ankara remain the most significant obstacles to the full realization of these objectives.

While Tehran and Washington have reached a preliminary memorandum of understanding after months of tension, and this understanding is set to be officially signed on Friday, June 19, 2026, US military movements around Iran suggest that the region has still not moved beyond the stage of a fragile ceasefire. The daily monitoring of US Army reconnaissance, refueling, and transport aircraft over the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, and near the Strait of Hormuz reinforces the question of whether Washington, alongside the diplomatic path, is maintaining or even increasing its field readiness for subsequent scenarios.

The shift of Saudi Arabia’s fiber optic cable route to Greece from the Zionist regime to Syria is part of Riyadh’s new strategy to redefine the regional order and reduce dependence on the UAE–Israel axis. By investing in Syria’s infrastructure, Saudi Arabia aims to transform Damascus into a connectivity hub between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, thereby strengthening its geo-economic influence. This development also reflects the intensifying rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, as well as the region’s gradual transition from energy geopolitics to data geopolitics and digital infrastructure.

The Ramadan War exposed and deepened hidden rifts within the Gulf Cooperation Council — to the extent that Oman and Qatar focused on de-escalation and mediation, the UAE and Bahrain on intensifying pressure against Iran, while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait concentrated on a strategy of insulation and risk management. The persistence of these divergences could weaken the Council’s strategic cohesion and push its members toward different security and political coalitions. As a result, the GCC is becoming less of a cohesive security bloc and more of a collection of actors with varying perceptions of threat and regional interests.

The Ramadan War demonstrated that despite intense military pressure, the Axis of Resistance has transitioned from a centralized model to a more flexible, multi-layered network, and has managed to preserve its deterrence by distributing capacity among various actors. The simultaneous activation of the Lebanese, Iraqi, and Yemeni fronts, while increasing pressure on the Zionist regime, also reflected a strategy of “controlled escalation” and avoidance of an all-out regional war. In the post-war period, the future of the Axis of Resistance will oscillate between three paths: rebuilding and strengthening its networked structure, continuing a semi-coordinated crisis management mode, or gradual erosion and diminished operational cohesion. However, current trends suggest that maintaining a networked structure and multi-front deterrence remains the most likely path forward.

In the early hours of June 11, the Iranian Armed Forces launched retaliatory strikes against U.S. military installations across the region in response to American aggression on various locations in Iran.

On the morning of June 10, the Iranian Armed Forces, in response to U.S. aerial aggression against southern Iran, struck four American bases across the region with at least 20 ballistic missiles, including Qadr, Emad, and Kheibar Shekan types.