Category: Saudi Arabia

  • Yemeni Army Advances Toward Ras al-Arah; Saudi Coalition Forces on the Brink of Encirclement

    Yemeni Army Advances Toward Ras al-Arah; Saudi Coalition Forces on the Brink of Encirclement

    Yemeni armed forces are currently 25–30 kilometers from the coastal road and the waters of the Gulf of Aden.

    If Yemeni armed forces succeed in securing the three aforementioned points, Saudi coalition forces in the Ras al-Arah area and the eastern front of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait will be completely encircled, with no option but to surrender or flee to the sea!

    The Saudi coalition is not in a favorable position on the western axis of Lahj Governorate. This dire situation stems from successive defeats in the Kahbub heights, effective missile and drone strikes on military gatherings and equipment, and the wounding of Major General Hamdi Shukri, commander of the Fourth Military Region of the forces of the resigned government, in a Yemeni Army missile attack on the Madariba district administration building in the Ras al-Arah area. In one of the Yemeni Army’s drone attacks, Bilal Shakir Shukri, one of the commanders of the Al-Amalika forces and nephew of Hamdi Shukri, was also killed. Therefore, the collapse of this front in the coming days is certain, and we will soon witness another victory for the resilient people of Yemen.

  • Destruction of a Saudi F-15 fighter jet by the Yemeni army’s air defense

    Destruction of a Saudi F-15 fighter jet by the Yemeni army’s air defense

    Brigadier General Yahya Saree, in a statement on this operation, announced that Saudi fighter jets this week carried out more than 450 airstrikes using F-15 and Typhoon fighter jets from the Khamis Mushait and Taif bases against the areas of Taiz, Lahij, Al-Jawf, Hajjah, Marib, Saada, and Al-Bayda, which led to the martyrdom and wounding of civilians.

    The Yemeni armed forces, in the face of this brutal aggression, succeeded in downing an F-15 fighter jet in the skies over Marib province, which was carrying out hostile operations to support the enemy’s military movements in Taiz and Marib. This fighter jet was downed using a Yemeni surface-to-air missile.

    Also, the Yemeni armed forces, during an air defense operation, targeted two groups of Saudi fighter jets that were searching for the wreckage of the downed fighter jet and drove them away from the skies over Marib.

    Brigadier General Yahya Saree also rejected the false claims of the Saudi regime regarding targeting Mecca, and stated that it is the Saudis who have polluted this holy site with corruption and immorality, and there is no danger from Yemen to the holy sites, because Yemen’s operations only target oil facilities and military bases.

    According to statistics collected by the IWN, this fighter jet is the third F-15 of its kind to be downed during the Yemen war. Therefore, the number of aircraft destroyed by the Saudi-American coalition during the Yemen war has reached 133.

  • Missile and Drone Attack on Sharorah Military Base in Saudi Arabia

    Missile and Drone Attack on Sharorah Military Base in Saudi Arabia

    Yahya Saree, spokesman for the Yemeni armed forces, stated that in this operation, weapons depots and command-and-control rooms that were managing the aggression against Yemen and its people were targeted at the Saudi military base in the Sharorah area with a large volley of ballistic missiles and combat drones, and—thanks to God—the strikes were precise and direct.

    The Al-Wadiah crossing and the Sharorah area north of it, in northern Yemen, constitute the primary land route for logistical supply of Saudi coalition forces in the occupied areas of Yemen. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Yemeni army has, through precise monitoring of coalition force movements and gatherings, delivered accurate and effective blows to the enemy’s rear. These targeted strikes undermine the operational capability of Saudi mercenaries to conduct any offensive operations.

  • Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline Stations Shut Down Until Further Notice; Riyadh Points Finger at Iraqi Groups!

    Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline Stations Shut Down Until Further Notice; Riyadh Points Finger at Iraqi Groups!

    Newly released satellite imagery of the targeted facilities reveals extensive damage. The damage is so severe that repairs and reopening will require a considerable amount of time. Therefore, the Saudi Energy Ministry’s claim attributing the shutdown to precautionary measures is fundamentally incorrect!

    For example, the imagery you are viewing pertains to Al-Dhukra station and Al-Masba’ah station southeast of Medina. In the image, Al-Masba’ah station has sustained very heavy damage.

    ‼On the other hand, in a surprising move, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement accusing Iraqi groups of attacking the East-West pipeline! In the released statement, it is claimed that the East-West pipelines in the Riyadh and Medina regions were attacked by drones launched from Iraqi territory. It is also claimed that the Saudi kingdom will currently not respond to the attacks by Iraqi groups, in order to give the Iraqi government an opportunity to deal with these groups.

    Regardless of who carried out these attacks, the reality of the matter is that there is no difference between the Yemeni army and Ansar Allah, Iraqi resistance groups, Iran, and others. They all stand together as a single hand on one front, jointly fighting against their enemies. Wherever necessary, tactics change, and each component will carry out its duties as required. It is not acceptable for Saudi Arabia to be a partner and accomplice with America in oppressing the people of Iran and Yemen, and on the other hand, escape this war unscathed! If it diverts the Strait of Hormuz to serve America, then it should expect the missiles and drones of the Resistance—no matter from which direction they come, it makes no difference. The tactics of war have changed!

  • Infographic: Saudi Coalition And US Aircraft Losses In Yemen War

    Infographic: Saudi Coalition And US Aircraft Losses In Yemen War

    The details of the downed aircraft are as follows:

    1- Saudi F-15S fighter jet – March 27, 2015 – Gulf of Aden
    2- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – May 7, 2015 – Al-Baqa’, Saada Governorate
    3- Moroccan F-16C fighter jet – May 10, 2015 – Wadi Nashur, Saada Governorate
    4- Saudi Seeker 400 drone – July 3, 2015 – Al-Baqa’, Saada Governorate
    5- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – August 5, 2015 – Jizan
    6- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – August 21, 2015 – Jizan
    7- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – August 25, 2015 – Mukayras, Abyan Governorate
    8- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – October 25, 2015 – Al-Abdiyah, Ma’rib Governorate
    9- Bahraini F-16C fighter jet – December 30, 2015 – Jizan
    10- UAE MQ-1 Predator drone – January 19, 2016 – Sana’a
    11- Saudi Selex ES Falco drone – February 3, 2016 – Midi, Hajjah Governorate
    12- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – February 27, 2016 – Dhubab, Taiz Governorate
    13- UAE Mirage 2000 fighter jet – March 13, 2016 – Al-Burayqah, Aden
    14- UAE AH-64D helicopter – June 12, 2016 – Gulf of Aden
    15- UAE NSA407 helicopter – June 13, 2016 – Al-Burayqah, Aden
    16- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – July 25, 2016 – Bir al-Maraziq, Al-Jawf Governorate
    17- Saudi Seeker 400 drone – August 16, 2016 – Kataf, Saada Governorate
    18- UAE Wing Loong drone – September 26, 2016 – Khawlan, Sana’a Governorate
    19- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – December 30, 2016 – Najran
    20- U.S. V-22 Osprey helicopter – January 29, 2017 – Al-Bayda Governorate
    21- Saudi SA 365F helicopter – January 30, 2017 – Al-Hudaydah coast (aboard the Al-Madinah vessel)
    22- UAE MQ-1 Predator drone – February 14, 2017 – Al-Munin, Ma’rib Governorate
    23- Jordanian F-16A fighter jet – February 24, 2017 – Najran
    24- Saudi S-70A helicopter – April 18, 2017 – Ma’rib
    25- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – June 21, 2017 – Dhubab, Taiz Governorate
    26- UAE AH-60L helicopter – August 11, 2017 – Wadi Amqin, Shabwah Governorate
    27- Saudi Seeker 400 drone – August 15, 2017 – Al-Baqa’, Saada Governorate
    28- U.S. UH-60M helicopter – August 25, 2017 – Gulf of Aden
    29- UAE AT-802U aircraft – September 11, 2017 – Gulf of Aden
    30- Saudi Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet – September 13, 2017 – Abyan Governorate
    31- U.S. MQ-9 drone – October 1, 2017 – Sana’a city
    32- UAE AH-64D helicopter – October 17, 2017 – Khabb wa al-Sha’af, Al-Jawf Governorate
    33- Saudi S-70A helicopter – November 5, 2017 – Abha
    34- Saudi Panavia Tornado fighter jet – January 7, 2018 – Kataf, Saada Governorate
    35- Saudi F-15S fighter jet – March 21, 2018 – Saada
    36- Saudi CH-4B drone – July 12, 2018 – Al-Rabu’ah
    37- Saudi Panavia Tornado fighter jet – July 12, 2018 – Asir
    38- Saudi CH-4B drone – August 30, 2018 – Jizan
    39- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – September 2, 2018 – Al-Jah, Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    40- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – September 14, 2018 – Al-Mahrah
    41- UAE Seeker 400 drone – November 26, 2018 – Al-Jubayliyah, Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    42- Saudi CH-4B drone – December 23, 2018 – Saada
    43- U.S. MQ-9 drone – June 6, 2019 – Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    44- Saudi CH-4B drone – April 11, 2019 – Hadramawt Governorate
    45- UAE Wing Loong drone – April 19, 2019 – Saada
    46- UAE MQ-1 Predator drone – May 15, 2019 – Bani Matar, Sana’a Governorate
    47- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – June 2, 2019 – Hays, Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    48- U.S. MQ-9 drone – August 21, 2019 – Dhamar Governorate
    49- U.S. MQ-9 drone – March 23, 2021 – Ma’rib Governorate
    50- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – November 1, 2019 – Ras Isa, Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    51- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – November 29, 2019 – Asir
    52- Saudi Wing Loong drone – November 30, 2019 – Hayran, Hajjah Governorate
    53- Saudi Luna X2000 drone – December 4, 2019 – Baqim, Saada Governorate
    54- Saudi Karayel drone – December 30, 2019 – Al-Salif, Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    55- Saudi CH-4B drone – January 7, 2020 – Khabb wa al-Sha’af, Al-Jawf Governorate
    56- Saudi Panavia Tornado fighter jet – February 14, 2020 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    57- Saudi RQ-20 drone – August 2, 2020 – Haradh District, Hajjah Governorate
    58- Saudi CH-4B drone – December 21, 2020 – Ma’rib Governorate
    59- Saudi Karayel drone – January 6, 2021 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    60- Saudi CH-4B drone – February 12, 2021 – Ma’rib Governorate
    61- Saudi Karayel drone – March 7, 2021 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    62- Saudi CH-4B drone – March 23, 2021 – Sirwah, Ma’rib Governorate
    63- Saudi Wing Loong drone – May 21, 2021 – Najran
    64- U.S. MQ-9 drone – May 23, 2021 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    65- Saudi ScanEagle drone – June 19, 2021 – Ma’rib Governorate
    66- Saudi ScanEagle drone – June 21, 2021 – Ma’rib Governorate
    67- Saudi ScanEagle drone – August 14, 2021 – Madghal, Ma’rib Governorate
    68- Saudi Wing Loong drone – September 13, 2021 – Kataf, Saada Governorate
    69- Saudi ScanEagle drone – September 27, 2021 – Madghal, Ma’rib Governorate
    70- Saudi CH-4 drone – October 6, 2021 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    71- Saudi RQ-20 drone – October 7, 2021 – Jizan border
    72- Saudi ScanEagle drone – November 9, 2021 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    73- Saudi ScanEagle drone – November 13, 2021 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    74- Saudi CH-4 drone – December 1, 2021 – Al-Umashiyah, Amran Governorate
    75- Saudi ScanEagle drone – December 4, 2021 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    76- Saudi ScanEagle drone – December 8, 2021 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    77- Saudi CH-4 drone – December 8, 2021 – Al-Wadi, Ma’rib Governorate
    78- Saudi ScanEagle drone – December 10, 2021 – Sirwah, Ma’rib Governorate
    79- Saudi CH-4 drone – December 14, 2021 – Asaylan, Shabwah Governorate
    80- Saudi ScanEagle drone – December 16, 2021 – Al-Wadi, Ma’rib Governorate
    81- Saudi ScanEagle drone – December 25, 2021 – Al-Yatamah, Khabb wa al-Sha’af, Al-Jawf Governorate
    82- UAE Wing Loong drone – January 5, 2022 – Asaylan, Shabwah Governorate
    83- UAE Wing Loong drone – January 11, 2022 – Ain, Shabwah Governorate
    84- Saudi ScanEagle drone – January 29, 2022 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    85- Saudi CH-4 drone – February 10, 2022 – Haradh, Hajjah Governorate
    86- UAE MQ-1 drone – February 25, 2022 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    87- Saudi ScanEagle drone – February 25, 2022 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    88- Saudi ScanEagle drone – February 28, 2022 – Haradh, Hajjah Governorate
    89- Saudi ScanEagle drone – March 8, 2022 – Haradh, Hajjah Governorate
    90- Saudi ScanEagle drone – March 29, 2022 – Al-Wadi, Ma’rib Governorate
    91- Saudi CH-4 drone – May 4, 2022 – Haradh, Hajjah Governorate
    92- Saudi Karayel drone – May 21, 2022 – Hayran, Hajjah Governorate
    93- Saudi CH-4 drone – May 23, 2022 – Sana’a Governorate
    94- Saudi Wing Loong drone – May 24, 2022 – Kataf, Saada Governorate
    95- U.S. MQ-9 drone – November 8, 2023 – Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    96- U.S. MQ-9 drone – February 19, 2024 – Northern Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    97- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 25, 2024 – Saada Governorate
    98- UAE Wing Loong 1 drone – April 29, 2024 – Al-Rawdah District, Shabwah Governorate
    99- U.S. MQ-9 drone – May 16, 2024 – Al-Wadi District, Ma’rib Governorate
    100- U.S. MQ-9 drone – May 21, 2024 – Al-Bayda Governorate
    101- U.S. MQ-9 drone – May 29, 2024 – Ma’rib Governorate
    102- U.S. MQ-9 drone – August 4, 2024 – Saada
    103- U.S. MQ-9 drone – September 7, 2024 – Ma’rib
    104- U.S. MQ-9 drone – September 10, 2024 – Saada
    105- U.S. MQ-9 drone – September 30, 2024 – Saada
    106- U.S. MQ-9 drone – November 8, 2024 – Al-Jawf
    107- U.S. MQ-9 drone – November 28, 2024 – Al-Bayda
    108- U.S. MQ-9 drone – December 2, 2024 – Ma’rib
    109- U.S. F/A-18F fighter jet – December 21, 2024 – Red Sea
    110- U.S. MQ-9 drone – March 3, 2025 – Al-Hudaydah
    111- U.S. MQ-9 drone – March 31, 2025 – Ma’rib
    112- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 3, 2025 – Al-Hudaydah
    113- Saudi Giant Shark F-360 drone – April 5, 2025 – Saada
    114- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 9, 2025 – Al-Jawf
    115- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 13, 2025 – Hajjah
    116- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 18, 2025 – Sana’a
    117- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 19, 2025 – Sana’a
    118- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 22, 2025 – Hajjah
    119- U.S. F/A-18E fighter jet – April 29, 2025 – Northern Red Sea
    120- U.S. F/A-18F fighter jet – May 6, 2025 – Northern Red Sea
    121- U.S. MQ-9 drone – March 3, 2026 – Maraqishah Mountains, Abyan Governorate
    122- U.S. MQ-9 drone – May 17, 2026 – Ma’rib Desert
    123- U.S. MQ-9 drone – May 29, 2026 – North of Ma’rib city
    124- Saudi Wing Loong drone – July 14, 2026 – Al-Bayda Governorate
    125- Saudi Bayraktar Akıncı drone – July 26, 2026 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    126- Saudi Karayel drone – July 29, 2026 – Saada Governorate
    127- Saudi ScanEagle drone – August 23, 2026 – Hajjah Governorate
    128- Saudi Wing Loong drone – September 6, 2026 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    129- Saudi Wing Loong drone – September 6, 2026 – Maqbanah District, Taiz Governorate
    130- Saudi Wing Loong drone – September 7, 2026 – Al-Bayda Governorate
    131- Saudi CH-4 drone – September 7, 2026 – Al-Jawf Governorate

    (Last updated: September 8, 2026)

    Casualties of Saudi and American Coalition Aircraft in the Yemen War
  • Yemeni Armed Forces Destroyed Two More Saudi Drones

    Yemeni Armed Forces Destroyed Two More Saudi Drones

    With these downings, the number of drones destroyed by the Yemeni army during the recent clashes has reached 11 units. This tally includes four Wing Loong drones (Chinese-made), three MQ-9 drones (U.S.-made), one CH-4 drone (Chinese-made), one Karayel drone (Turkish-made), one Akıncı drone (Turkish-made), and one ScanEagle drone (U.S.-made).

    Furthermore, according to estimates by Islamic World News (IWN), the total number of aircraft downed during the Yemen war has reached 131 units, of which 13 are Wing Loong drones and 17 are CH-4 drones.

  • Digital Infrastructure Diplomacy in West Asia

    Digital Infrastructure Diplomacy in West Asia

    Saudi Arabia is considering replacing the Zionist regime route with a Syrian route for the fiber optic cable connecting the kingdom to Greece via the Mediterranean Sea—a decision that goes beyond a mere technical or economic choice, reflecting a shift in the region’s geopolitical alignments. Riyadh’s insistence on routing the cable through Syria indicates its intention to bolster Damascus’s regional standing while simultaneously politically distancing itself from Israel in the wake of the Gaza war developments.

    Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has adopted a tough stance against Israel, which has provided the political groundwork for this shift. At the same time, the growing disagreements between Riyadh and the UAE over issues such as Yemen, Sudan, and Red Sea security have added a new competitive dimension to this decision.

    The selection of Syria could contribute to the country’s economic reintegration into the region and enhance its geo-economic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, while Israel’s exclusion from this potential corridor would weaken its standing in the race to become an energy and data hub. On the other hand, Greece—particularly Athens—is striving to position itself as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East in the fields of energy, real estate, and artificial intelligence, and this project could strengthen its role in the new regional connectivity architecture. Overall, this plan symbolizes the transition from traditional energy geopolitics to data geopolitics and digital infrastructure, and could influence the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arab world.

    Background
    Within the framework of the broader “East-to-Mediterranean Data Corridor” strategy, a joint fiber optic cable project between Saudi Arabia and Greece has been designed. The project is being pursued with the participation of major companies, including STC, PPC, OTA, and TTSA. The aim of this initiative is to establish a high-capacity data transmission route between the Persian Gulf and Europe via the Mediterranean, providing complementary digital infrastructure for energy and technology cooperation between the two regions.

    The key development in this project is Riyadh’s shift from the proposed route through Israel to the alternative option via Syria. This change is not merely technical or economic, but rather a reflection of the geopolitical realignment in Saudi Arabia’s peripheral environment. In recent years, growing rifts have emerged between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over issues such as Yemen, Sudan, and Red Sea security.

    From a Saudi perspective, the increasing convergence between the regime and the UAE could shift the regional influence balance against Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the selection of a new route for the fiber optic cable is seen as part of a strategy to reduce dependence on the Israel–UAE axis. This decision also carries multi-layered implications for Greece. Athens has established close strategic ties with Israel in recent years and has pursued extensive cooperation in energy and Eastern Mediterranean security. However, Greece is simultaneously seeking to position itself as a hub connecting Europe and West Asia in the fields of energy, real estate, logistics, and artificial intelligence. Thus, whether Athens accepts or rejects Riyadh’s proposed new route could affect the balance of its relations with the Zionist regime and place Greece in a geopolitical dilemma. From a technical perspective, fiber optic cables—transmitting data in milliseconds via optical pulses—form the backbone of the global digital economy. With the expansion of artificial intelligence and the growing need for big data processing, Gulf countries are making substantial investments in data centers and communication infrastructure to transform themselves, beyond their traditional role as oil and gas exporters, into key players in Europe’s data and digital services market.

    Overall, the rerouting of the cable is not merely an infrastructure decision but part of the geo-economic and geopolitical competition in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. This development could affect coalition formations, digital connectivity routes, and even regional security equations, serving as an indicator of a new phase in Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with the UAE–Israel axis over strategic data infrastructure.

    Analysis and Findings:

    • Strategic Shift: Saudi Arabia’s efforts to include Syria in major infrastructure projects—particularly in telecommunications and data connectivity—are part of Riyadh’s broader strategy to reshape the regional order. By leveraging its financial capacity and foreign investment, Saudi Arabia aims to turn Damascus into a hub for road, rail, and digital transit between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. This approach pursues two simultaneous goals: strengthening potential allies and rebuilding Syria’s geopolitical position, while creating a balance against the growing influence of the UAE and the Zionist regime around the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, the announcement by Saudi Arabia’s Investment Council of approximately $800 million in telecommunications infrastructure investment in Syria carries an important geopolitical message. According to Saudi Arabia’s official news agency, the project involves establishing a fiber optic network spanning over 4,500 kilometers aimed at “regional and international connectivity for Syria.” Such a project is not merely an economic endeavor but a redefinition of Syria’s role as a connectivity node in the new regional connectivity architecture. Trend analysis shows that from Riyadh’s perspective, Damascus lies at the heart of a “connectivity-oriented” strategy—roads, rail lines, and fiber optic cables must pass through Syrian territory to solidify the link between the Persian Gulf and Europe. This perspective transforms Syria from a security dossier into a geo-economic asset. In other words, Riyadh is seeking to revive Syria’s role in the regional value chain by investing in both hard infrastructure (roads, rail, cables) and soft infrastructure (data networks). From a regional competition perspective, the inclusion of Syria in these projects comes at the expense of excluding or downplaying the Zionist regime’s role in data connectivity routes. This signifies a tangible shift in Saudi Arabia’s strategic calculations. In 2022, discussions on normalizing relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv were at their peak, but subsequent regional developments—particularly escalating geopolitical rivalries and shifting coalition alignments—have moderated this approach. Today, Saudi Arabia’s priority is not symbolic convergence with Israel but consolidating its independent position in the regional connectivity architecture.
    • Widening Saudi–UAE Rift: According to narratives close to decision-making circles in Riyadh, including statements by Al-Tuwaijri, the rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is not a transient disagreement but the result of accumulated strategic grievances across several regional files. From a Saudi perspective, Abu Dhabi—through its financial power and proxy networks—has sought to become a small state with outsized influence in its immediate environment, which has conflicted with Riyadh’s geopolitical interests. In the Yemen file, the Saudi narrative holds that the UAE’s presence within the Arab coalition began with Riyadh’s invitation, but Abu Dhabi gradually deviated from declared objectives and supported separatist movements in the south. This perception is echoed in Sudan, where documented UAE military support for the Rapid Support Forces is seen as an effort to deepen internal divisions and consolidate Abu Dhabi’s influence. Likewise, in Somaliland, UAE support for quasi-state structures in northern Somalia is viewed by Saudi Arabia as another indication of a policy of environmental influence independent of Arab coordination. In Tunisia, concrete instances include the provision of armored equipment to opposition movements to undermine democratic processes. This narrative, within the Saudi framework, portrays the UAE as an interventionist actor in the internal affairs of Arab countries—an approach Riyadh considers contrary to the principles of Arab solidarity. In terms of identity and relative power, this narrative depicts the UAE as a smaller actor geographically, demographically, and economically that has at times sought to punch above its weight. This perspective is linked to recent economic developments in Saudi Arabia, where major economic transformation programs have led to a gradual shift of capital and international companies from Dubai and Abu Dhabi to Riyadh. In this context, economic competition is said to have fueled geopolitical rivalry and heightened mutual sensitivities. Regarding the relationship between the two leaders, recalling Mohammed bin Zayed’s role in bolstering Mohammed bin Salman’s standing in Washington prior to his crown prince status points to a period of strategic convergence. However, according to this narrative, divergence intensified when Mohammed bin Zayed found the rapid growth of Saudi economic power and capital concentration unacceptable. From Al-Tuwaijri’s viewpoint, this shift in the economic balance became a psychological-political factor in intensifying personal and strategic rivalry between the two leaders.
    • The Role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Saudi Arabia’s New Architecture: Saudi Arabia is redefining its regional orientation—a shift that not only involves distancing from Abu Dhabi but also includes strengthening ties with Turkey and maintaining the détente process with Iran. This realignment should be analyzed within Riyadh’s broader efforts to consolidate its independent position in regional security equations and avoid becoming entangled in costly scenarios of direct confrontation with Tehran. On the international level, speculation about the possibility of renewed U.S. military action against Iran under the Trump administration has heightened uncertainty. The deployment of U.S. naval and military capabilities in the region sends a clear deterrent message; however, reports simultaneously indicate that at least nine Arab leaders have contacted Washington to allow more time for ongoing negotiations in Muscat. This diplomatic movement suggests that a significant portion of the Arab world views a full-scale war scenario as a threat to regional stability and its economic interests. In this framework, Al-Tuwaijri’s narrative emphasizes that Iran is a different actor than examples like Venezuela and, if faced with an existential threat, would employ extensive and potentially destructive deterrence tools. From this analytical perspective, Iran’s capacity to target U.S. bases in the region, disrupt Persian Gulf energy security, and even block the Strait of Hormuz is assessed as Tehran’s “strategic cards.” Such a scenario could have far-reaching economic and security consequences for the Gulf Arab states. The findings indicate that Saudi Arabia’s pivot toward Turkey and the continuation of détente with Iran are part of an active balancing strategy against three simultaneous variables: competition with the UAE, U.S. pressure for full alignment against Iran, and the risk of widespread instability in the event of military conflict. Riyadh seeks to avoid being drawn into a comprehensive confrontation that could target the region’s energy infrastructure and economy by diversifying its regional partners and maintaining diplomatic channels. This approach reflects Saudi Arabia’s move from rigid alliances toward a more flexible, multi-balancing foreign policy.
  • U.S. Central Command Releases Images of Joint Exercises in Saudi Arabia and Qatar

    U.S. Central Command Releases Images of Joint Exercises in Saudi Arabia and Qatar

    At the same time, at Al Udeid Air Base, U.S. and Qatari personnel participated in a parade and a 25-kilometer endurance exercise hosted by the U.S. Army’s 25th Strategic Signal Battalion.

    CENTCOM stated that the purpose of these activities is to strengthen operational capability and joint readiness with regional partners.

  • The Role of Yemen in the Competition in the Horn of Africa

    The Role of Yemen in the Competition in the Horn of Africa

    In the 21st century, Persian Gulf countries have set ambitious geopolitical objectives, heavily relying on their rich oil revenues. As this trend continues and the oil market remains volatile, diversifying income sources becomes essential. Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030,” which focuses on expanding the non-oil sector and investing in foreign assets, aligns with this goal.
    Consequently, as oil resources decline, the Persian Gulf nations are aiming to diversify their economies and safeguard key assets like ports and farmland. The 2008 global financial crisis further accelerated this effort, prompting the Gulf countries to make significant investments in the Horn of Africa to broaden their economic bases.

    Recently, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Gateway Terminal (RSGT) signed a 30-year contract with Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA) to operate and develop the port of Tajoura. RSGT aims to turn Tajoura into a major multi-purpose terminal, expecting it to handle five million tons of cargo annually, strengthening its role as a gateway for Ethiopian imports and exports. However, there has been a shift from purely economic involvement to more direct political and military actions, with Gulf states establishing military bases and brokering peace in the region. Saudi Arabia’s strategy in the Red Sea focuses mainly on security, evident in its diplomatic and military moves such as a 2017 defense agreement with Djibouti and a 2018 peace treaty between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Its leadership in creating the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Council in 2020 underscores its commitment to regional security cooperation. Riyadh’s presence in the Horn of Africa appears aimed at controlling the Red Sea to counter threats, especially from Yemen’s Ansarullah. It’s noteworthy that Western media claim Yemen’s Ansarullah and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab are cooperating in arms shipments.

    UAE Movements
    While the UAE and Saudi Arabia often pursue Western strategies in various regions, this has occasionally caused rivalry, as seen in Sudan and eastern Yemen. Consequently, much of the UAE’s effort to expand influence in the Horn of Africa revolves around controlling western Yemen to attain its objectives in the oil-rich Hadramaut area. This region has recently become a conflict zone involving tribes near Saudi Arabia.
    The UAE has adopted a more assertive approach, establishing a strong military and economic footprint across the Horn of Africa. Over the last ten years, it has developed military bases in Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Its air base in Assab, Eritrea, symbolizes Abu Dhabi’s commitment to maintaining a lasting presence in the area. Although this base was later dismantled, the UAE’s control over port rights in Mukalla, Aden, and Berbera indicates its strategic goal of dominating maritime routes and influencing the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden regions.

    In fact, the events in Yemen and the Horn of Africa are closely linked. Growing influence in this region could enhance Yemen’s power by diminishing Ansar Allah’s influence. Interestingly, the Emirates’ ambitions appear more aggressive and far-reaching than Riyadh’s. They are even prepared to collaborate closely with the Zionist regime in this area.
    Recently, Western media have reported that Iran and Yemen’s Ansar Allah are gaining influence in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. This situation has prompted the Emirates and the Zionist regime to adopt a more coordinated strategy to address the issue. Some sources suggest that, along with Ethiopia, these two regimes have formed a secret alliance in the region.

    Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki recently made surprising statements, blaming the current Yemen crisis on the militarization of the country’s islands. He also emphasized that coastal nations should be responsible for securing the Red Sea, rather than relying on foreign military bases. His primary concern is the potential establishment of a military base on Yemen’s “Zaqr” island by the Emirates, which could pose a serious threat to Eritrea if completed. The presence of the Zionist regime via the Emirates on Yemeni islands threatens regional sovereignty and international interests. These actions form a dangerous shadow alliance that endangers Yemen’s sovereignty and risks transforming it into a shared military domain of the regime and Abu Dhabi.

    Another key point near the Emirates axis involves Somaliland, which is strongly supported by the Zionists and Ethiopia, each with different aims. Ethiopia sees Somaliland as a route to the sea to further its economic ambitions. Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv aim to establish a base there, possibly to target Yemen’s Ansarullah.

    Along with security concerns, the Emirates also aims to achieve its economic objectives, emphasizing food security. The region’s potential for agriculture and its proximity to the Gulf states make it appealing as a source of essential foods. The Horn of Africa plays a critical role in the Gulf states’ food security due to its fertile land and established trade routes. The Gulf region relies heavily on food imports, obtaining 85 percent of its staple foods from other countries.

    The Southern Transitional Council’s sinister plan for Ansar Allah
    Besides the explanations about the UAE’s regional influence, the Times reports that a delegation from the Southern Transitional Council recently visited Tel Aviv. They expressed willingness to recognize the “Israeli regime” (supporting the Zionist regime) and to sign the “Abraham Pact” in favor of Trump. However, this is conditional on the Zionist regime and the US participating in a joint ground (Southern Transitional Council) and air (Zionist regime and US) attack on Yemen’s Ansar Allah as a “common problem,” and on the Southern Transitional Council being able to establish the country of “South Yemen.”

    Conclusion
    Generally, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s roles in the Horn of Africa involve both competition and cooperation. While they share the goal of countering Iran and Yemeni AnsarAllah’s influence, they also have significant disagreements, as dominance in this region can boost their rivalry over Yemeni oil resources. The main reasons for their presence in the Horn of Africa can be summarized as follows:

    1- As the new global order emerges with multipolarity and diminishing US influence, Washington is delegating its objectives to other regions. Boosting the presence of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the Zionist regime aligns with US interests. Similarly, recognizing Somaliland in exchange for permission to establish a military base fits this pattern.

    2- The Persian Gulf countries’ involvement in the Horn of Africa and the broader Red Sea region is driven by security needs and economic ambitions. Heightened security concerns have increased the region’s importance, especially as Iran’s influence, supported by the “axis of resistance” and strengthened by the Yemeni war, extends to the Horn of Africa. Naval bases serve as strategic footholds, broadening the Persian Gulf’s influence over regional politics and economics. Recently, Western media have suggested cooperation between Ansar Allah and Somali al-Shabaab, despite their differing motives.

    3- Gaining control over the Horn of Africa allows influence into East, North, and even the Sahel regions of Africa. For instance, without Eritrean cooperation, access to trade routes leading to the Sudanese port would be difficult. Cooperation with Ethiopia could expand influence in Central and East Africa. However, Egypt, an Arab country typically aligned with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, often holds opposing views in this region, which may impact future political dynamics.

  • Where Is the Third Major U.S. Base in Saudi Arabia?

    Where Is the Third Major U.S. Base in Saudi Arabia?

    This base serves a logistical and supply role for U.S. forces in western Saudi Arabia and has recently undergone expansion. Development began in early 2025 and includes the construction of underground storage facilities, ammunition depots, new logistics and support infrastructure, as well as housing for U.S. personnel.

    Given its capabilities, the base could potentially serve as an alternative to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Qatar’s proximity to Iran and the presence of Iran’s short-range missile stockpiles have highlighted Al Udeid’s vulnerability, prompting the U.S. to consider substituting it with other bases. That said, the mission profile of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia is largely defensive and training-oriented. For instance, during the Saudi-Emirati coalition’s war in Yemen, these forces repeatedly took part in air defense operations, intercepting Yemeni missiles and drones and thereby indirectly engaging in the conflict.

    Overall, despite Saudi Arabia’s neutral stance in recent Iran–U.S. tensions, L.S.A. Jenkins could be considered a potential target of Iranian missile strikes. The base is approximately 1,300 km from Iran’s Ahvaz and 990 km from Saada.

  • Capture of Aden and Abyan by Saudi-backed government forces (Map)

    Capture of Aden and Abyan by Saudi-backed government forces (Map)

    After consecutive defeats of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra — and their withdrawal without fighting from the Balhaf gas facility and the strategic Marra base in Shabwah — the focus of pro-government forces shifted to southern Yemen. In initial negotiations, local authorities in Abyan agreed to hand over their positions to Al-Dara’ Al-Watan forces. Southern militants and allied tribes have not yet surrendered their positions, but they also have not shown resistance.

    In Aden, government and service facilities — including the Presidential Palace (Al-Ma’ashiq) and Aden Airport — had already been evacuated by STC fighters and handed over to representatives of the government-in-exile. Early this morning, Al-Dara’ Al-Watan forces entered Aden via the coastal road and Al-Anad base, taking control of military and security sites. Elements of the Giants Brigades also assumed control of parts of Aden at the order of the Saudi-led coalition. Their commander, Abu Zarah Al-Muharrami, officially split from the STC yesterday and pledged allegiance to Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman.

    The Saudi-backed forces captured Aden and Abyan provinces

    The disappearance of Aidarus al-Zoubaidi — head of the Southern Transitional Council — at dawn today, and his failure to travel to Riyadh, has angered the Saudis and escalated tensions between the STC and the government-in-exile. Rashad Al-Alimi has revoked his membership in the Presidential Leadership Council. This situation suggests instability will continue in the occupied regions of Yemen — and it is likely that Al-Dhale and Lahij will soon witness Saudi attacks and further Southern capitulations.

  • Aidarus al-Zoubaidi’s escape to Al-Dhale has angered the Saudis!

    Aidarus al-Zoubaidi’s escape to Al-Dhale has angered the Saudis!

    According to the Saudi-led coalition, the strikes came after the escape of Aidarus al-Zoubaidi — head of the Southern Transitional Council — from Aden, along with the movement of large numbers of STC forces toward Al-Dhalea with armored vehicles and military convoys. They claim al-Zoubaidi skipped his flight to Riyadh and avoided peace talks with the Yemeni government-in-exile, choosing instead to flee and prepare for renewed unrest.

    In response, Rashad al-Alimi revoked al-Zoubaidi’s membership in the Presidential Leadership Council and referred him to the attorney general on charges of forming an armed group and acting against the government.

    There’s little doubt al-Zoubaidi knew what awaited him in Riyadh — and that his fate would be no different from figures like Saad Hariri, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and others who ended up under house arrest or worse. That’s why he chose to retreat to his hometown, hoping Southern tribal backing might preserve his power. Yet this bet also seems to be failing: Saudi aircraft are reportedly hunting for his whereabouts, and although he may try to flee to the UAE, current conditions in Aden make escape by air or sea nearly impossible.