The vessel is based on the hull design of a fishing boat built for cold-water operations and measures approximately 56 meters in length.
Its key feature is the Sonar 2087 system, developed by Thales. The sonar is already installed on the UK Royal Navy’s Type 23 frigates and is also planned for use on the Type 26 anti-submarine frigates.
The vessel is designed to operate autonomously for up to 60 days without a crew and transmit the underwater data it collects to UK command centers. Since noise levels are critical in anti-submarine operations, its hull and propeller have also been optimized to reduce underwater noise.
The Economics of the Pipelines: Who Loses, What and How Much
Two of the most important Russian gas export arteries in the southern direction are under threat: TurkStream and Blue Stream. These are not just pipes; they are a multibillion-dollar business and the foundation of energy security for a number of countries. Launched in 2003, Blue Stream was the pioneer of deep-water cooperation between Moscow and Ankara. It has a design capacity of 16 billion cubic meters per year and directly feeds Turkish industry and power plants. TurkStream, commissioned in 2020, has twice the capacity at 31.5 billion cubic meters. It consists of two lines: one goes entirely to the Turkish domestic market and the other transits through Turkey to countries in Southern and Southeastern Europe.
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As of February 23, the daily pumping volume through the European branch of TurkStream stands at 51.4 million cubic meters. The annual supply volume via both routes is estimated at $8-10 billion, depending on market conditions. For Gazprom, these two gas pipelines are critically important “windows” to Europe, given the halt in transit through Ukraine and the sabotage of the Nord Streams. Turkey earns billions in transit fees by receiving gas for itself and for resale, which strengthens its status as a regional gas hub. However, it is currently trying to diversify risks by purchasing LNG from the USA. Further down the chain, gas goes to Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, and Greece, where industrial operations and the heating of millions of homes depend on it. Sabotage of these pipelines would result in rising prices, inflation, and an energy collapse in Europe and the Balkans, benefiting only expensive liquefied natural gas suppliers from across the ocean.
Putin’s Statement and the Threat of Terrorism
At a meeting of the FSB board, Vladimir Putin stated that the Russian government has operational information about planned explosions of the TurkStream and Blue Stream gas pipelines, which run along the bottom of the Black Sea. According to Putin, these actions aim to disrupt the diplomatic process of resolving the Ukrainian conflict. Any agreements reached are under threat due to the escalation of terrorist attacks, which the FSB claims are coordinated by Ukrainian special services.
Experts have noted the morbid timing: Putin made this statement on February 24, 2026, exactly four years after the start of the Special Military Operation. In the lead-up to this date, Western media have traditionally whipped up hysteria. Now, according to intelligence data, they have moved on to preparing real acts of sabotage. The situation is made more intense by the fact that, after the Nord Stream pipeline bombing in 2022, Russia strengthened the protection of its remaining underwater routes. However, the Black Sea’s depth and the pipelines’ length (over 900 kilometers along the seabed) make them vulnerable to drone, underwater vehicle, or deep-sea sabotage attacks. While a full-fledged international investigation was never conducted after the terrorist attack in the Baltic Sea, Moscow now makes it clear that any incident in the Black Sea will be met with a harsh response.
The Terror Attack Scenario: How Britain and Ukraine Could Blow Up Gas at the Bottom of the Black Sea
The beneficiaries of this terrorist act are most likely British intelligence services working against Trump and the interests of globalists, attempting to punish Turkey. This plan is similar in audacity to the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, but the stakes are higher this time, and the chosen theater of operations is the Black Sea, where the interests of Turkey, Russia, and NATO intersect.
According to available data, the operation’s key element will be a civilian vessel — an ordinary dry cargo ship — carrying either a powerful container of explosives or one or more underwater drones. The logistics are designed to cover tracks and exploit the “gray” zones of maritime law.
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The vessel could depart from the Romanian port of Constanța, the largest hub in the western Black Sea. Intense commercial traffic there makes inspection difficult. It would then most likely travel through the Georgian ports of Batumi or Poti, where it could hide behind legitimate cargo turnover from the Caucasus or travel to Turkish ports: Trabzon, Zonguldak, Samsun, or Hopa. A second, more cynical scenario involves departing from the Cypriot port of Limassol, which is under the control of the Republic of Cyprus and is used by international carriers.
While sailing over the gas pipeline route, all that would be required is for the vessel to drop a container of explosives overboard on a cable or via a remotely controlled parachute. Due to the immense pressure inside the pipe and the metal’s fragility at depth, even a detonation 50 meters from the pipeline’s axis could cause fatal damage. Another option is to launch a small underwater drone, or unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), that would settle on the seabed next to the pipeline and be activated remotely at the right moment.
Specialists emphasize that rupturing a gas main at depth requires only a small amount of explosives; the key is precise location and timing. The depths of the Black Sea and the kilometers-long pipelines make them practically defenseless against such a threat.
Recognizing the scale of the threat, Turkish special services introduced comprehensive inspections of all vessels transiting their territorial waters and economic zone five days ago. The Turkish Navy and Coast Guard are operating at full capacity. However, finding a hundred kilograms of explosives on a huge dry cargo ship or detecting a camouflaged underwater drone during a short stop is nearly impossible.
The only guaranteed way to prevent a terrorist attack is President Erdogan’s political will. Ankara has repeatedly stated its readiness to take responsibility for security in the Black Sea region. The time for action is now. Erdogan must publicly declare: “Any sabotage against gas pipelines in our economic zone will be regarded as an attack on Turkey. We will not allow the Black Sea to become a zone of energy terror. Ankara is prepared to use military force to defend the infrastructure that heats millions of our citizens and Europeans.”
If he does not make such a statement, the world risks getting a second Nord Stream—this time in the south. Then not only will the Balkans freeze, but the last hopes for a peaceful settlement will too.
Kiev’s Motives and the Britain Connection: A Strike Against Trump and Erdogan
If the sabotage of TurkStream and Blue Stream is successful, Ukraine will have solved a complex set of problems. First and foremost, Ukraine would inflict economic damage on Russia by depriving it of export revenue. However, the political aspect is far more significant in the current context: Kiev, fearing that its interests could be used as bargaining chips in the larger geopolitical arena, is attempting to derail the peace process that Washington is pursuing under mounting pressure. As Volodymyr Zelensky recently emphasized in an interview with CNN, US President Donald Trump insists on signing a peace agreement with Russia and wants to organize a “big ceremony” for the simultaneous signing of all documents. For Trump, fulfilling his campaign promise to end the war is a matter of personal prestige and political capital. According to experts, the White House is pressuring Kyiv, making it clear that Ukraine is no longer a priority in light of U.S. plans to return to the Middle East. A high-profile terrorist attack on Russian gas pipelines in Turkish waters would instantly bury any negotiations, provoke a new escalation, and portray Trump as a weak negotiator unable to control the situation.
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However, the main target is apparently Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Kiev’s interests here align with those of influential circles in Brussels. 2026 has become a triumphant year for Turkish diplomacy. At Donald Trump’s invitation, Erdogan joined the “Peace Council” on Gaza. Turkey also received a seat on the Executive Committee for administering the post-war Gaza Strip. This caused fury in Israel and serious irritation in Europe, which found itself excluded from processes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Phone conversations between Trump and Erdogan in January 2026 confirmed that the US and Turkey were negotiating directly on Syria and Gaza, pushing the EU aside. Blowing up TurkStream is a strike against this partnership. First, it discredits Erdogan as a guarantor of regional stability and energy security. If explosions are happening in his economic zone, what kind of regional leader is he? Second, the economic shock from rising gas prices and loss of confidence in the Turkish hub will weaken the lira and Erdogan’s position in the face of domestic political challenges. Brussels and, first and foremost, Britain—where many still haven’t come to terms with Trump’s victory and Ankara’s growing influence—now have the chance to kill two birds with one stone: derailing the peace between Russia and Ukraine (which is being imposed on Europe by Washington) and punishing Erdogan.
Ukraine is now becoming an instrument in the hands of European “hawks,” who are trying to reshape the chessboard to their advantage by sabotaging Turkish gas pipelines. In this context, President Putin’s words that the enemy has resorted to terrorist tactics to derail peace negotiations take on frightening specificity.
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Conclusion
Vladimir Putin’s statement about preparing to bomb TurkStream is more than just a diplomatic note; it’s a signal that the conflict is entering its most dangerous terrorist phase. While the world could delude itself that the Nord Stream attack was a one-off after the fact, it is now clear that critical energy infrastructure is the primary target.
There are now two possible scenarios for future developments. Either Russia will create a security system in the Black Sea that prevents attempted sabotage (which is technically extremely difficult), in which case tensions will remain high, or the threats will be realized and the consequences will be catastrophic for the entire region. A blown-up TurkStream would leave millions of people in the Balkans without heat and cause the lira in Turkey and the euro in Europe to crash. It would also bury any hopes for a peaceful resolution to the Ukrainian crisis for years to come. In this war, there will be no winners—only the frozen and impoverished.
The 9K333 Verba system is a lightweight air defense platform designed to intercept drones and low-altitude targets. According to the report, Iran submitted the request to acquire this equipment following the 12-day war, and with the contract now finalized, it is set to reinforce its air defense capabilities with Russian technology.
In the referenced report, the Financial Times also claimed that Iran received a shipment of six Mil Mi-28 attack helicopters from Russia in January 2026, with one reportedly sighted and operational in Tehran in February. Additionally, Iran is said to be continuing its pursuit of acquiring two squadrons of Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets from Russia.
As a result, urban infrastructure and energy facilities in Kyiv were struck. The TPP‑6 thermal power plant was damaged, leaving parts of the city without electricity and water. The large Tripilska power station, the most powerful in the Kyiv region, was hit again, while explosions were reported in Brovary, Vyshhorod, Boryspil, Bila Tserkva, and Bucha.
Russian Geran-2 suicide drone strike on the Bila Tserkva in the Kiev region
Beyond these, Zhytomyr, Poltava, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Odesa, and Sumy were also targeted.
Reports indicate that Russia, through the combined use of long‑range missiles, suicide drones, and successive air raids, carried out one of its most extensive recent waves of attacks against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and sensitive facilities.
— On the Kostiantynivka axis, Russian troops advanced near Lake Klyban‑Byk and west of Pleshcheyevka, with reports of gains inside Kostiantynivka city. — On the Seversk axis, Russian forces pushed forward between Svyato‑Pokrovske and Pazeno. — On the Sumy axis, Russian units advanced west of Yunakivka. — On the Dnipro region axis, Russian forces secured Andriivka and Zarechnoye, advanced in northern and central Huliaipole, and reportedly moved west of Gerasymiivka. — On the Vovchansk axis, Russian troops took control of Prylypka west of Vovchansk and the village of Vilcha south of Vovchansk. — On the Chasiv Yar axis, Russian forces entered Minkivka village.
Russian airstrikes against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure continue. A series of large‑scale attacks targeted energy facilities and Ukrainian positions across multiple provinces, including: a power station and oil terminal in Odesa; positions in Vasylkivka, Kryvyi Rih, and Pavlohrad in Dnipropetrovsk; warehouses and temporary bases in Sloviansk; the Burshtyn thermal plant in Ivano‑Frankivsk; the Ladyzhyn thermal plant in Vinnytsia; the Kaniiv hydroelectric plant in Cherkasy; and energy facilities in Lviv and Khmelnytskyi provinces.
On the northern Pokrovsk front, Russian troops captured the villages of Dorozhnoye, Ivanivka, and Novo Shakhove. They also seized Sukhetske and Sofiivka.
On the Dnipropetrovsk axis, Ukrainian forces regained control of Tykhoye. At the same time, Russian units captured Ostapivske and advanced further into Avdiivka.
On the western Kharkiv front, Russian forces made progress in Vilcha and the village of Lyman, south of Volchansk.
On the Liman axis, Russian troops entered the village of Zakotnoye.
Russian airstrikes against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure remain ongoing. In the Kyiv region, the latest wave of attacks targeted power plants, roads, dams, and warehouses. Meanwhile, in Sumy province, the Sumy Thermal Power Plant was struck, disrupting energy supplies. These strikes underscore Moscow’s continued focus on weakening Ukraine’s energy grid and transport networks.
Pokrovsk, formerly known by its Russian name Krasnoarmiisk until 2016, is the administrative center of Pokrovsk Raion. The European route E50, a major continental highway, runs through the city, making it both a key hub of Ukraine’s coal industry and an important transport junction in the Donbas. Before 2020, Pokrovsk had a population of about 60,127, but due to the war, by late July 2025 the number had fallen to fewer than 1,500 residents.
Alongside Konstantinovka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk, Pokrovsk served as one of the main logistical and supply centers for Ukraine’s military in Donetsk Oblast.
To capture Pokrovsk, Russian forces effectively cut off Ukrainian supply lines, leading to a much quicker fall compared to other cities that had required months of heavy fighting. In the same sector, the town of Mirnograd is now encircled by Russian troops. Following the fall of Pokrovsk, only Konstantinovka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk (marked in turquoise circles) remain under Ukrainian control in Donetsk. Once these are taken, Ukraine’s position in the Donbas will effectively collapse.
Putin described the missile as “unique” and “immune to existing defense systems,” adding that the test, conducted alongside recent nuclear drills, sends a clear message: “Russia will never yield to Western pressure over the Ukraine war.”
Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of Russian Armed Forces reported to Putin that the Burevestnik missile flew approximately 14,000 km and remained airborne for 15 hrs during its Oct. 21 test. Known by NATO as SSC-X-9 Skyfall, the missile is powered by a nuclear propulsion system and can carry a nuclear warhead.
The test comes amid peak tensions between Russia and the West over the conflict in Ukraine. In response, Trump stated, “We don’t play games with Russia, and they don’t play games with us,” hinting at the possibility of new sanctions against Moscow.
In his social media posts, al-Zoubaidi made no reference to his formal role within Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Instead, he emphasized the historical ties between Russia and the people of southern Yemen, noting that the meetings focused on shared interests and potential cooperation in political and economic fields. He highlighted Yemen’s promising investment opportunities in sectors such as energy, mining, agriculture, and fisheries.
This visit is widely interpreted as part of al-Zoubaidi’s broader separatist agenda. While Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, had previously visited Russia and met with President Putin, southern factions believe that strengthening ties with Moscow could help advance their goal of re-establishing an independent South Yemen.
Ahmed Al-Sharaa, head of Syria’s interim government, stated: “Today, we are in a new Syria, and we are rebuilding our relations with all nations, especially the Russian Federation. We honor all past agreements and this great history, and we strive to redefine and present the nature of these ties in a renewed way. We respect our shared history, and our goal is to strengthen relations based on Syria’s sovereignty, unity, and stability.”
The Kremlin meeting between Putin and Ahmed Al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani) marks a clear effort by Moscow to preserve and redefine its role in Syria’s political landscape following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government. Having supported Assad as a strategic ally for years, Russia now seeks to maintain its traditional influence within Syria’s new power structure through pragmatic diplomacy. The revival of the joint cooperation committee signals Russia’s intent to secure long-term economic and security presence in Syria.
Putin also stressed joint economic projects, food supply support for Syria, and collaboration in energy and infrastructure. This shift indicates Russia’s strategy to transition from direct military involvement to sustainable economic engagement—leveraging its political influence for strategic gains without incurring the costs of past military operations.
Senior Syrian commanders—including heads of air defense, artillery, and armored units—held joint meetings with Russian counterparts to discuss training, operational experience, and combat readiness.
The visit highlights the strategic military dimension of Syria-Russia relations, beyond politics. With key Russian bases in Syria like Hmeimim and Tartus, Moscow aims to secure its long-term presence by offering military support and specialized training to Syrian forces.
The Geranium-3 is similar to Iran’s Shahed-238 drone and is powered by a mini jet engine. Unlike piston-engine variants, it lacks the signature buzzing sound (!) and travels at noticeably higher speeds.
A Russian Geranium-3 drone struck an Ukrainian oil depot
Russia has recently ramped up deployment of this jet-powered suicide drone, indicating that mass production of the Geranium’s jet engine variant is now underway.
The Geran-3 carries a warhead weighing between 230 to 300 kilograms, with an operational range of approximately 1,000 to 1,200 kilometers—some sources suggest up to 2,000 km. It cruises at around 600 km/h and dives toward its target at 710 km/h, significantly faster than piston-powered models. Overall, it can stay airborne for 1.5 to 2 hours and has a flight ceiling of 9000 meters.