During the exercise, a single Sayyad 3-G missile was launched from the catamaran warship Shahid Sayyad Shirazi, the third vessel of the Shahid Soleimani class. This combat vessel, considered among the IRGC Navy’s most advanced platforms, is equipped with large vertical launch silos and has the capacity to carry up to six of these missiles.
The moment Shahid Sayyad Shirazi catamaran warship launched Sayyad-3G missile
With an operational range of around 150 kilometers and vertical launch capability from vessels, this missile can independently detect and track targets while also connecting to an integrated command-and-control network. As such, it forms part of the country’s naval air defense umbrella.
This marks a fundamental transformation in the sea-based air defense capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran—one that shows the nation’s combat vessels have progressed beyond point-defense systems and, for the first time, have been equipped with long-range, vertically launched air defense systems at sea.
With this tactical missile, the Iranian Navy has significantly enhanced its control over the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s southern waters. It serves as a warning to adversaries!
The moment Shahid Sayyad Shirazi catamaran warship launched Sayyad-3G missile
58% opposed: including 38% “strongly opposed” and 20% “somewhat opposed.” Party breakdown among opponents: 68% of supporters of the Green Party, 48% of Labour Party voters, and 47% of Liberal Democrats supporters.
These figures come as the British government has also expressed hesitation about authorizing potential operations against Iran, amid recent disagreements with Washington over sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago and the status of the Diego Garcia base.
According to these unnamed sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, the plans would only be implemented if authorized by the U.S. president. The options are reportedly being developed as part of a broader strategy to increase pressure on Iran, amid a deadlock in potential negotiations.
Reuters further reported that the U.S. military is preparing a plan for a multi-week operation that could target security objectives and sensitive infrastructure, including sites associated with Iran’s nuclear program. However, no precise details have been disclosed regarding how these scenarios would be executed or which specific targets might be involved.
Meanwhile, Donald Trump has publicly raised the possibility of regime change in Iran, describing it as a “positive development,” though he has not provided details about alternative options or the mechanism for achieving such an outcome.
The release of such a report at this juncture can be viewed as part of a broader media and psychological pressure campaign against Iran. Highlighting options such as “targeting officials” or “regime change” may be less an indication of a definitive decision and more an attempt to increase political and psychological pressure on Tehran. The report can thus be interpreted as part of the current tense climate and escalating media confrontation between the two countries — a climate shaped largely by efforts to influence public opinion and strengthen bargaining leverage in political calculations.
Britain’s opposition to the use of Diego Garcia is reportedly linked to its prior plans to return sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to the Mauritius. Keir Starmer, the British Prime Minister, pledged in May 2025 to hand over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius in accordance with a ruling by The Hague court. However, Donald Trump has opposed the move, citing the strategic importance of the Diego Garcia air base and its 100-year lease arrangement.
Consequently, launching attacks on Iran from Diego Garcia would effectively signal British support for military action and could carry significant repercussions. Such consequences could jeopardize British interests in West Asia, particularly maritime shipping routes in the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea. For this reason, London is currently opposed to any potential move by Trump to strike Iran.
It is worth noting that Diego Garcia lies approximately 3,800 kilometers from Iran and about 3,400 kilometers from Yemen. The island has served as a primary base for U.S. strategic bombers during previous operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen, and it could play a central role in any potential confrontation between Washington and Tehran.
The Leader of the Islamic Revolution said today in a meeting with the people of East Azerbaijan province: : It seems that the US President also regularly claims that our army is the strongest in the world. The strongest army may sometimes be so badly hit that it cannot get up! They keep saying that we sent warships to Iran. Sure, a ship [aircraft carrier] is a dangerous device, but more dangerous than a ship is the weapon that can sink it to the bottom of the sea!!”
He added: “In one of his recent speeches, the US President said that for 47 years, America has not been able to destroy the Islamic Republic; he has complained to his own people. “For 47 years, America has not been able to destroy the Islamic Republic.” This is a good confession. I say: You will not be able to do this either!”
He considered the US’s interference in Iran’s right to benefit from the peaceful nuclear industry for running the country and for medical, agricultural, and energy purposes as another example of their irrationality, addressing the Americans: “This matter concerns the Iranian nation. What does this have to do with you?”
Imam Khamenei recalled that the right to possess nuclear facilities and enrichment is recognized for all countries in the treaties and regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and he emphasized that American interference in national rights reflects the disorderly approach of their officials over time.
The Leader of the Islamic Revolution described an even more astonishing example of American irrationality as the way they invite negotiations, noting: “They say, ‘Come, let’s negotiate about nuclear energy,’ but the outcome of the negotiation must be that you have no nuclear energy!”
Imam Khamenei emphasized that if any negotiation is to take place, pre-determining its outcome is a wrong and foolish act which is carried out by the American administration, the President, and some senators, and they do not realize that this path will be a dead end for them
During the year before the 2025 parliamentary elections, Muhammad Shia al-Sudani’s government introduced a new form of role-playing in Iraq’s technology and information sectors. It awarded sensitive telecom and communication contracts to companies linked with resistance forces and granted Axis of Resistance views this trend through several strategic lenses.
Increasing Iraq’s strategic independence in the field of communications and reducing the country’s dependence on structures under Western influence
Stabilizing the soft power and social influence of the resistance movement against separatist or destabilizing projects
Reducing the scope of US surveillance and espionage by limiting Western-dependent information and technology tools
Economic and technological synergy between Iran and Iraq, especially in the field of communications, data, and electronic infrastructure
Preventing Iraq from becoming a base for intelligence operations against Iran and the countries of the Axis of Resistance
Background Iraq’s telecommunications sector, after oil, has become a key strategic area for the Axis of Resistance. Expanding influence here not only enhances the Axis’s economic and technological capabilities but also plays a crucial role in fortifying Iraq’s internal security, supporting its legitimate government, deterring foreign interference, and managing information. From Iran’s view, control in this sector helps protect Iraq’s vital communications from Takfiri terrorism, foreign intelligence eavesdropping, and infiltration, while also countering psychological warfare and perception operations against the Resistance axis. Therefore, any US attempt to label Iraq’s telecommunications as a “threat” or a “sanctions circumvention tool” aligns more with a renewed maximum pressure strategy and limiting Iran-Iraq cooperation. This approach has been recently reinforced by the US National Security Council’s Memorandum No. 2.
Infiltration of telecommunications infrastructure The effort to effectively infiltrate the telecommunications infrastructure of allied countries is not aimed at “control,” but at safeguarding national security, countering Western cyberattacks, and establishing information deterrence. There are two strategic reasons for this from the Resistance Axis perspective; first, in nations facing external threats, Takfiri terrorism, and Western intelligence operations—such as Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq—digital telecommunications are seen as crucial to national security. Foreign interference in this sector can lead to perception wars, political instability, and fake protests, which Iran and other Resistance Axis members have repeatedly experienced. Therefore, enhancing the Resistance Axis’ role here means shielding regional countries from cyber infiltration and foreign sabotage. second, managing data traffic and information routes enables governments to protect critical networks and keep internal communications secure during crises or widespread cyberattacks. Temporarily slowing internet speeds or restricting platforms is not meant to suppress society but to prevent misuse of digital tools like encrypted messaging or video calls during security crises. Many countries, including Western ones, recognize such measures as protective. From this view, what some call “Iranian dominance of the telecommunications sector” is actually a legitimate effort to achieve digital independence, bolster cyber sovereignty, and reduce reliance on Western-controlled infrastructure—an essential step for collective security based on resistance and regional stability.
Key Findings and Analysis
1- The Growth of Resistance and Iran’s Influence in Iraq’s Tech Sector Iran leverages advanced telecommunications, whether from allies like Russia and China or domestically produced, as part of a strategy to boost digital sovereignty and cyber defense. These tools enable Iran and regional allies to monitor, safeguard, and strengthen critical networks against cyber threats from hostile nations, primarily targeted by Western intelligence, especially the U.S. and Europe. Controlling telecommunications regulators in allied countries allows Iran and resistance groups to introduce secure, compatible technologies aligned with security needs while blocking systems that could cause dependency or data leaks. This acts as a sovereign security measure rather than anti-competitive behavior, as regional nations face widespread electronic espionage, making unregulated market access to key infrastructure risky. Additionally, establishing and managing independent, encrypted networks helps Iran and resistance forces secure their strategic communications from cyber attacks, eavesdropping, and sabotage by foreign adversaries. This creates an information defense shield crucial for regional stability during crises and curbing foreign influence. Economically, overseeing telecommunications infrastructure in allied nations can bolster an independent digital economy. Price and bandwidth controls serve not to create monopolies but to prevent Western dominance, protect sensitive data, and ensure sustainable government revenue. Leveraging unused network capacity or international links might also generate legitimate income under sanctions, helping regional actors earn foreign currency and lessen economic vulnerabilities.
2- Resistance-oriented capabilities in Iraq’s telecommunications industry A) Single Internet Gateway: A single Internet gateway centralizes the management of global connectivity, serving as a tool for digital sovereignty. By routing international connections through a single, government-controlled point, countries like Iran, Iraq, or Lebanon can protect themselves against cyber threats from foreign entities such as NSA, Israeli operations, or Western tech firms that transfer data abroad. This approach does not isolate them from the global network but ensures data flows are regulated according to national laws and security protocols. Unregulated private options, including some Western satellite Internet services, could threaten a country’s cyber sovereignty. Therefore, nations have the authority to establish their own legal frameworks to uphold security.
B) Preventing Foreign Infiltration Controlling key organizations to prevent foreign infiltration of critical infrastructure is vital. Countries vulnerable to terrorist threats, cyber sabotage, and extensive information infiltration—especially those under pressure from the United States or the Zionist regime—must maintain an integrated and secure telecommunications management system. From the resistance axis perspective, coordination among the head of state, the ministry of communications, the regulatory authority, and the national operator is crucial, not to stifle competition but to shield critical infrastructure from infiltration by Western companies and security agencies. This strategy aims to protect fiber optic cables, submarine cables, microwave stations, and data centers from unauthorized access by foreign or malicious entities. Such access is not meant to control society but to prevent cyberattacks, delay targeted attacks, avoid network breaches, and safeguard data traffic. In volatile regions like Iraq and Yemen, lacking these controls often facilitates infiltration by the Zionist regime, the United States, or Takfiri groups.
C) Cyber Defense and Preventing Covert Attacks Deep inspection technologies play a crucial role in cyber defense and thwarting covert attacks within the resistance-oriented framework. They enhance protection against electronic espionage, multi-layered cyber assaults, and networks of digital terrorists. These tools enable governments to detect attack patterns, suspicious data flows, infiltration methods, and attempts to bypass national laws. Monitoring IP addresses, devices, and suspicious activities is standard practice worldwide—from China and Russia to the United States. When combined with intelligent management of network traffic speed and routes, these technologies defend citizens and critical infrastructure from malware, data theft, deception, and foreign espionage. From the resistance axis perspective, these measures aim to create a secure internet, establish independent digital governance, and prevent foreign influence—not to restrict people, but to shield nations that have long been targets of hybrid warfare and cyberattacks.
3- The Role of Iraqi Resistance Groups in the Telecommunications Industry and the US Confrontation A contract in the Iraqi telecommunications sector highlights a critical aspect of communication security: the Popular Mobilization Forces’ access to Western, particularly American, satellite internet technology. This access, which enables the forces to utilize advanced communication systems, is part of Iraq’s broader effort to bolster defenses against terrorism, cyber attacks by the Zionist regime, and American influence in regional communication networks. Although the US has not officially sanctioned the Popular Mobilization Forces, it has made extensive efforts over the years to restrict their access to strategic technologies. A notable example is the prolonged US campaign to recover M-1 Abrams tanks held by some PMF units, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, during the fight against ISIS—an effort that achieved only partial success. This demonstrates that the US aims to limit Iraq’s self-defense capabilities. In late 2024, US-sanctioned Faleh al-Fayyadh signed a contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Communications to supply strategic satellite communication systems to the PMF headquarters. The contract, titled “Contract for the Supply of Strategic Satellite Communications Systems to the PMF Committee,” was signed by Nabil Abdul-Baqi, then director general of Al-Salam Company, a state-owned entity affiliated with the Ministry.
In late 2024, Faleh al-Fayyadh, who is sanctioned by the US, signed a contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Communications to supply strategic satellite communications systems to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) headquarters. The contract, officially titled “Contract for the Supply of Strategic Satellite Communications Systems to the PMF Committee,” was signed by Nabil Abdul-Baqi, then director general of the state-owned Al-Salam Company affiliated with the Ministry of Communications.
Although the contract is relatively small at 1.09 billion Iraqi dinars (around $832,000), it involves advanced equipment, including VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) systems of the US-made Kymta U-8 type. Most of the equipment listed is produced in the US and Europe. Analysis suggests that this equipment was initially sold to the Iraqi Ministry of Communications, likely with the understanding that they were the end user. However, it appears to have been later transferred to the PMF by the Iraqi government, aligned with national security needs. From Baghdad’s and the resistance axis’s viewpoint, such a transfer is a legitimate, defensive action within Iraqi sovereignty, though it might trigger a response from Washington.
4- Engineer Company; the infrastructure arm of the resistance The “General Engineer Company” is part of Iraq’s effort to strengthen its sovereignty and stabilize its economy and security. These forces played a crucial role in protecting territorial integrity and regional security during tough years fighting Takfiri terrorism. Founded in 1401, the company aims to organize the economy of popular organizations and reduce reliance on foreign firms, similar to Iran’s large construction entities like Khatam al-Anbiya. Its structure allows legal activities across sectors such as industry, agriculture, infrastructure, communications, and equipment, leveraging government resources to boost Iraq’s rebuilding efforts. U.S. sanctions are not driven by concern for Iraq’s economy but by a desire to hinder the development of independent, domestic infrastructure that could weaken Western dominance. Washington fears Iraq developing a resistance economy—one based on local power and popular support—reducing Western economic influence and contractors. Sanctions against the company and its affiliates are thus a form of political pressure aimed at limiting Iraq’s popular forces and regional allies. In communications, the company’s involvement in fiber optic and telecom projects is seen by Iran as essential to prevent Iraq’s dependency on Western systems.
Controlling communication infrastructure locally ensures data security, privacy, and guards against foreign espionage. The U.S. fears Iraq becoming autonomous in this sector, as data networks are key points of dependence in the region. From this angle, U.S. hostility toward the company’s communication projects reflects efforts to preserve this dependence. For resistance groups, U.S. sanctions aim to prevent the formation of a coordinated, resilient resistance network within the broader resistance axis.
Companies involved in digital infrastructure, energy, and communications, when managed by popular Iraqi institutions, can enhance data exchange, secure communications, technology transfer, and regional economic cooperation. This process will eventually reinforce Iraqi sovereignty and diminish Washington’s influence, which is why the US aims to impede or slow it through sanctions. Additionally, US claims about Western communication equipment or technologies being transferred to popular forces are part of psychological warfare and media campaigns to undermine the reputation of legitimate Iraqi institutions. These allegations are largely based on political speculation and seek to delegitimize institutions crucial in fighting terrorism and maintaining stability. The supervision of the Iraqi Ministry of Communications should not be used as a tool of external pressure but should be conducted within the framework of Iraqi sovereignty by its legitimate institutions. Any Western intervention in this sector perpetuates the same approach that has long hindered Iraq’s political and economic independence.
Iraq’s fiber optic infrastructure, which is in the hands of resistance groups.
He added that Iran’s missile program is part of the country’s national security and is not subject to negotiation.
He further stated that Iran will continue nuclear negotiations and is prepared to cooperate in order to reach a constructive and lasting agreement. However, he stressed that the talks must be fair, realistic, and free from stalling tactics, and should not be used as a tool for other objectives.
Major General Seyed Abdolrahim Mousavi emphasized that if Trump intends to pursue war, entering such a conflict would serve as an eye-opening lesson for him, the outcome of which would prevent him from issuing threats and engaging in bluster on the global stage.
He also questioned why the U.S. president speaks of negotiations while simultaneously issuing threats!!!
Speaking after a meeting with Robert Fico, Prime Minister of Slovakia, he said: “We are focused on negotiations, and diplomatic efforts are ongoing.”
Rubio declined to comment on the possibility of any military action, but noted that U.S. representatives are traveling to hold meetings related to the Iran file, and that Washington will await the outcomes of these talks. He also stressed that the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf is aimed at defending American forces and interests.
According to official sources, indirect talks between Iran and the United States will be held on Tuesday. The discussions are being conducted with the mediation of Oman. The stated aim of this round of negotiations is to continue examining technical and political solutions to advance the dialogue process and reduce differences.
He added that the European Union is confused in its understanding of Iran’s domestic developments and, from a strategic standpoint, has lost its geopolitical weight in the region.
Araghchi also referred to the role of Germany, saying it has effectively handed over its regional policy to Israel, and emphasized that Iran’s regional allies (i.e. Arab countries) play a more effective role than the European troika.
Speaking during a meeting with a large crowd at the Imam Khomeini (RA) Hussainiya, Ayatollah Khamenei addressed recent U.S. threats and military rhetoric:
He said repeated references by U.S. officials to war, military aircraft, and naval deployments are not new, noting that Washington has long claimed that “all options are on the table,” including war.
Referring to former U.S. President Donald Trump, he said such statements about deploying warships are meant to intimidate, but stressed that the Iranian nation is not influenced or frightened by these threats.
Ayatollah Khamenei emphasized that Iran does not seek to initiate conflict, oppress others, or attack any country. However, he warned that any aggression against Iran would be met with a strong and decisive response from the Iranian people.
He added that U.S. officials should be aware that if they start a war this time, it would escalate into a regional conflict.
Addressing the roots of tensions between Tehran and Washington, the Supreme Leader said the dispute spans more than four decades and can be summarized simply: the United States seeks to dominate Iran, while the Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic stand firmly in opposition.
He stated that for more than 30 years prior to the Islamic Revolution, the U.S. exerted control over Iran’s oil resources, politics, security, and foreign relations. According to him, Washington now seeks to restore the conditions of the Pahlavi era, but faces resistance from a nation determined to remain independent. He dismissed U.S. references to issues such as human rights as pretexts, reiterating that Iran will continue to stand firm and thwart what he described as American hostility.