Tag: Syria

  • Julani Forces Intensify Pressure on Residents of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh Neighborhoods in Aleppo

    According to a Jolani-affiliated officer stationed at the Sheikh Maqsoud checkpoint, these actions are part of a “new directive” issued in response to recent tensions between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Qamishli.

    Residents of Qamishli recently reported armed clashes and arrests carried out by Syrian army units and SDF-affiliated internal security forces (Asayish). Since the beginning of the month, SDF forces have encircled the Tayy and Halko neighborhoods, which are under Jolani’s control.

    The recent pressure in Aleppo reflects an indirect escalation between Damascus and the SDF. Jolani’s military and security apparatus appears to be imposing restrictions on SDF-controlled areas in Aleppo as a retaliatory move for the siege of Damascus-held neighborhoods in Qamishli. These developments highlight the deepening mistrust between Damascus and the SDF. Despite previous attempts at cooperation and agreements, the latest tensions reveal that the political and security divide between the two sides remains significant.

  • Turkey Extends Military Presence in Syria and Iraq for Three More Years

    Turkey Extends Military Presence in Syria and Iraq for Three More Years

    Turkey aims to solidify its influence in post-war Syria by establishing strong ties with the emerging power structure in Damascus. Multiple meetings between Turkish commanders and senior officials with leaders of the al-Jolani-led administration, along with military support in the form of weapons, training, political backing, and security cooperation, are part of this strategic effort.

    The situation in Iraq, however, remains more contentious. Iraqi factions have consistently opposed the presence of Turkish forces on their soil. Resistance groups have launched repeated attacks on Turkish military positions in northern Iraq over recent years. If tensions escalate, further strikes against Turkish bases in the region are likely.

  • Latest Israeli Military Movements in Syria’s Quneitra Province – October 19, 2025 (Map)

    Latest Israeli Military Movements in Syria’s Quneitra Province – October 19, 2025 (Map)

    Yesterday, Israeli forces set up a temporary checkpoint on the road connecting the towns of Jabatha al-Khashab and Ofania, inspecting several vehicles and blocking the route for several hours.

    Simultaneously, Israeli engineering units began excavation work in Jabatha al-Khashab, supported by four vehicles and 20 soldiers.

    Local sources also reported that Israeli troops, backed by Merkava tanks, entered the Khan Arnabah–Jabatha al-Khashab road and proceeded to inspect residents in the town of Eastern Samdaniyah.

    In southern Quneitra, a convoy of 10 Israeli military vehicles entered the village of Ruwayhina, establishing a temporary checkpoint near the mosque and inspecting individuals.

    These movements are taking place amid the conspicuous silence of the Jolani government, which has repeatedly stated in interviews that it does not seek confrontation with Israel. This stance has effectively enabled Tel Aviv to expand its military and intelligence footprint deep into Syrian territory. The establishment of checkpoints, entry into border towns, and engineering operations are not merely tactical maneuvers—they signal Israel’s intent to solidify a sustained operational and intelligence presence in southern Syria.

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  • Assassination of Former Prisoner Exchange Mediator in Aleppo

    Assassination of Former Prisoner Exchange Mediator in Aleppo

    Khazami, approximately 55 years old and originally from Maarrat al-Numan in southern Idlib province, was a prominent figure in prisoner exchange negotiations between the former Syrian regime and opposition forces throughout the civil war. One of his most notable roles was mediating the December 26, 2016 exchange deal between the Assad government and Ahrar al-Sham fighters.

    Local sources allege that Khazami had ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). His assassination is believed to be part of a broader pattern of targeted killings against individuals affiliated with the former Syrian regime or resistance-linked figures in Aleppo. Several similar incidents have been reported in recent months.

  • U.S. Military Movements in Palmyra Spark Speculation of New Base in Central Syria

    U.S. Military Movements in Palmyra Spark Speculation of New Base in Central Syria

    Simultaneously, U.S. drones flew over the area, conducting aerial reconnaissance and imaging operations. After the visit and drone activity, the forces returned to the Al-Tanf base in Homs.

    Some Syrian sources suggest that the U.S. may be planning to establish a new military base in Palmyra. This comes despite the American-led coalition already maintaining several active bases in eastern Syria—particularly in Deir ez-Zor and Hasakah—under the pretext of combating ISIS.

  • ISIS Releases Infographic Detailing Recent Operations in Eastern Syria

    ISIS Releases Infographic Detailing Recent Operations in Eastern Syria

    According to the group, it carried out 38 operations—including direct assaults, assassinations, IED attacks, and ambushes—between August 7 and October 16, 2025, targeting Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Deir ez-Zor, Hasakah, and Raqqa provinces.

    The data suggests an average of one attack every two days, highlighting the group’s continued insurgent presence in the region despite territorial losses.

    While these claims remain unverified, they reflect ISIS’s ongoing efforts to project strength and maintain relevance through its media apparatus.

  • Meeting Between Al-Sharaa and Putin in Moscow

    Meeting Between Al-Sharaa and Putin in Moscow

    Ahmed Al-Sharaa, head of Syria’s interim government, stated:
    “Today, we are in a new Syria, and we are rebuilding our relations with all nations, especially the Russian Federation. We honor all past agreements and this great history, and we strive to redefine and present the nature of these ties in a renewed way. We respect our shared history, and our goal is to strengthen relations based on Syria’s sovereignty, unity, and stability.”

    The Kremlin meeting between Putin and Ahmed Al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani) marks a clear effort by Moscow to preserve and redefine its role in Syria’s political landscape following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government. Having supported Assad as a strategic ally for years, Russia now seeks to maintain its traditional influence within Syria’s new power structure through pragmatic diplomacy. The revival of the joint cooperation committee signals Russia’s intent to secure long-term economic and security presence in Syria.

    Putin also stressed joint economic projects, food supply support for Syria, and collaboration in energy and infrastructure. This shift indicates Russia’s strategy to transition from direct military involvement to sustainable economic engagement—leveraging its political influence for strategic gains without incurring the costs of past military operations.

  • The Puzzle of Baghdad–Damascus Relations in the Al-Sudani–Al-Julani Duality

    The Puzzle of Baghdad–Damascus Relations in the Al-Sudani–Al-Julani Duality

    Security considerations

    1. Population Link Between Anbar and Deir ez-Zor

    The first point to consider is the deep demographic, familial, social, and cultural ties between residents of Iraq’s Anbar province and Syria’s Deir ez-Zor. Historically, the border towns of Al-Bukamal and Al-Qaim were one city until the Battle of Maysalun split them, forming the Iraq–Syria border. Over a century later, these ties remain strong. In Syria, the “Eastern dialect” differs significantly from the “Levantine dialect,” and Deir ez-Zor’s accent closely resembles Iraqi Arabic—so much so that it’s considered part of the Iraqi dialect family. Similarly, Iraq’s “Western dialect,” common in Anbar, is more similar to Deir ez-Zor’s speech than to Baghdad’s or northern Iraq’s.

    Moreover, there’s near consensus across Iraq that national security depends on stability in Anbar. The past 22 years (post-Saddam era) show that whenever Anbar is secure, Iraq enjoys relative calm; when unrest or terrorism hits Anbar, instability quickly spreads nationwide.

    These factors suggest that Deir ez-Zor can directly impact Iraq’s overall security, making it essential for Baghdad to pursue security cooperation with Damascus to prevent the province from becoming a source of threat.

    2. From the Syrian and Jazira Desert to Anbar and Lake Tharthar: A Terrorist Playground

    Another issue is the terrain and continued limited presence of ISIS militants in the region stretching from the Syrian desert to Lake Tharthar near Samarra. This area is characterized by desert landscapes, scattered villages, low population density, and cities built along main roads or the Euphrates River. These vast, empty deserts offer ideal conditions for terrorist activity. Managing such terrain requires unavoidable security coordination. Even during tensions, the Assad government and the SDF cooperated on this front, recognizing ISIS as a mutual threat.

    a) Shared Border Strip

    It’s worth noting that the Iraq–Syria border spans roughly 600 kilometers, yet the number of border towns is fewer than five. Except for a small section north of Rabia, the entire border is desert, with only the northern Sinjar area being mountainous. Near the Syrian border, these mountains flatten into plains and hills—meaning over 90% of the border is desert.

    3. Iraqi Residents in Syria and Vice Versa

    Another factor is the significant number of citizens from each country living in the other. Tens of thousands of Iraqis reside in Damascus’s Sayyidah Zaynab district, while hundreds of thousands of Syrians have entered Iraq over the past 15 years. This population holds undeniable strategic weight, compelling both governments to maintain a level of engagement.

    a) Intersection with Sectarianism and Civil War

    Notably, both Iraqi and Syrian communities abroad tend to follow the majority religion of their home country, making them religious minorities in their host nation. Most Iraqis in Syria are Twelver Shia living near the shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab, while most Syrians in Iraq are Sunni—heightening security sensitivities.

    This becomes more complex when considering that these communities are tied to each country’s civil war. Most Syrians in Iraq are war refugees who entered via Deir ez-Zor and settled in Anbar and beyond. Meanwhile, Iraqis in Sayyidah Zaynab are accused by neighboring districts like Babbila and Yalda of having fought alongside Assad’s forces during the war.

    4. Prisoners and the Three Issues of Judicial Cooperation, Prisoner Exchange, and Rehabilitation

    Another issue is the large number of Iraqi prisoners in Syria and Syrian prisoners in Iraq—mostly security offenders and ISIS members. Additionally, tens of thousands of their family members are undergoing rehabilitation in special camps, with the goal of reintegration into society. This situation calls for cooperation on three levels: judicial coordination, prisoner exchange, and rehabilitation of terrorist families.

    The Kurdish Issue

    The second factor prompting Baghdad to accelerate its outreach to Damascus is the “Kurdish issue” in both Iraq and Syria. On one hand, Damascus is dealing with the challenge of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and on the other, Baghdad faces ongoing competition with Erbil. This shared “single issue” encourages both Arab governments—Baghdad and Damascus—to engage with one another. Baghdad, due to security concerns, is compelled to cooperate with the SDF, but fears that strengthening the group could destabilize Syria and threaten Iraq’s territorial integrity. Therefore, Baghdad seeks to structure its relationship with the SDF through coordination with Damascus to minimize negative repercussions.

    At another level, Baghdad faces a complex triangle in its dealings with the SDF. This triangle consists of:

    • Local militias in Sinjar, which have deep ties to the SDF and maintain operational and organizational support within SDF-controlled territory. Additionally, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the security-military network in Sulaymaniyah province are closely linked to the SDF.
    • The second side of the triangle is the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Erbil maintains ideological and strategic rivalry with the SDF, viewing it as a PKK offshoot. Yet, in the Syrian context, it supports the SDF to present a united Kurdish front against Damascus.
    • The third side is Turkey. No country can shape its relationship with the SDF without considering Turkey’s position.

    This triangle forces Baghdad to accept engagement with the SDF as inevitable, while remaining cautious. In this context, cooperation with Damascus can help regulate Baghdad’s ties with the SDF and reduce its regional and international risks.

    Foreign Policy and Its Imperatives

    In analyzing Baghdad’s motivation to engage with Syria’s new government, foreign policy considerations—beyond security concerns—must be taken into account. Three overarching factors are relevant here:

    1. The United States

    The next factor is the role of the United States. Two specific issues push Baghdad and Damascus toward cooperation: the U.S. military presence and the repatriation of ISIS detainees and their families.

    a) U.S. Military Presence

    Regarding the U.S. military presence, CENTCOM forces have effectively linked eastern Syria and Iraq. Even in Baghdad–Washington negotiations over troop withdrawal from Iraq, the timeline for exiting Syria was part of the discussion. From Washington’s perspective, military presence in Iraq and eastern Syria is interdependent, and the two files cannot be separated.

    b) Repatriation of ISIS Detainees and Families

    On the issue of repatriating ISIS detainees and their families from camps like Al-Hol, Iraq—home to a large portion of these individuals—is compelled to cooperate. This makes coordination between Damascus and Baghdad essential for Iraq.

    2. Neutrality

    Since the tenure of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, Iraq’s foreign policy has been based on two principles:

    • Maintaining distance from all regional power blocs, ensuring Iraq is not categorized under any.
    • Maintaining good relations with all neighboring countries.

    This approach, known as “neutrality,” has guided Iraq’s foreign policy throughout the last decade of Bashar al-Assad’s rule and continues to do so.

    Currently, all regional countries except Iran recognize Al-Jolani’s government in Damascus. If Iraq refuses to do so, it risks being classified under Iran’s bloc and the Resistance Axis. Therefore, Baghdad is likely to recognize the new Syrian government de facto.

    3. Geopolitical Projects and Access to the Mediterranean

    Iraq’s geography offers a strategic opportunity to access the Mediterranean via Syria. Its most significant current project is the Development Road, connecting the port of Faw to the city of Fishkhabour and Turkey. Fishkhabour borders both Turkey and Iraq, allowing the Development Road to potentially open a direct route from Syria to the Persian Gulf.

    Historically, Iraq has pursued several geopolitically significant projects tied to Syria, such as the Tehran–Beirut/Lattakia corridor, which offered Iraq a valuable east–west transit route. Iraq also had an oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Baniyas. Additionally, the M4 highway could play a role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

    By leveraging these projects, Al-Sudani’s government can justify relations with Syria’s new leadership and even claim that future Syrian governments will become economically dependent on Iraq. This way, even if Al-Jolani’s administration doesn’t last, any future authority in Damascus would be less likely to act against Iraqi interests.

    Internal Political Dynamics of Iraq

    Previously, we outlined three foundational drivers behind Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani’s pursuit of cooperation with the Al-Jolani-led government in Damascus: security concerns, the Kurdish question, and foreign policy imperatives. In this section, we examine how Al-Sudani’s domestic political interests also motivate his push to establish or expand ties with Damascus.

    1. Building Leverage for Post-Election Politics and Distancing from the Coordination Framework

    Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani aims to distinguish himself from rivals within the Shia Coordination Framework ahead of Iraq’s elections. One key differentiator is his effort to cultivate strong relations with Arab Gulf states.

    This strategy also applies to Turkey. One reason the “Development Road” project tops Iraq’s geopolitical agenda is its potential to deepen partnerships with Turkey and attract investment from Doha and Abu Dhabi. Al-Sudani is focused on post-election dynamics, particularly the race among political factions to form the largest parliamentary bloc. He hopes that favorable ties with Gulf states and Turkey will prompt Sunni groups to support him over his Shia rivals.

    In essence, Al-Sudani seeks to build political and social capital outside the Shia Coordination Framework to leverage during both the popular vote and the parliamentary bloc formation stages. One of the political costs he may accept in return is the swift recognition of Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani’s government.

    2. Appealing to Iraq’s Shia Base Through Support for Syrian Shia

    Given the above, Al-Sudani must also address widespread concern and resentment among Iraqi Shia over Al-Jolani’s militant past. To win over this voter base, he needs compelling justifications.

    One attractive option is to frame the outreach as support for Syria’s Shia community. Damascus’s ruling faction welcomes this approach, as it helps neutralize potential Shia opposition, integrates this segment into the national fabric, and boosts religious tourism revenue. Meanwhile, Al-Sudani can present this as a success to Iraqi society—claiming he has reduced pressure on Syrian Shia and secured the safety of holy sites in Damascus and Aleppo.

    Conclusion

    In analyzing Baghdad–Damascus relations, four key factors must be considered: security concerns, the Kurdish issue, Iraq’s diplomatic posture, and the domestic political interests of the Iraqi Prime Minister. The intersection of these factors has pushed Al-Sudani toward formal engagement with the Al-Jolani government, despite strong internal opposition. However, his approach remains cautious—focused on minimal political interaction rather than full-scale bilateral expansion.

  • Latest Updates on Israeli Movements in Southern Syria (Map)

    Latest Updates on Israeli Movements in Southern Syria (Map)

    Israeli troops established a temporary checkpoint between the villages of Al-Ma’laqa and Sayda, where they inspected vehicles and verified the identities of passengers.

    Simultaneously, a military convoy consisting of eight Israeli vehicles conducted patrols and area inspections along the route between the villages of Al-Asha and Al-Rafid.

    Another checkpoint was set up by Israeli forces using two Humvees and one Hilux vehicle between the villages of Al-Samadaniyah Al-Sharqiyah and Ajraf. Like the previous checkpoint, this one also involved vehicle inspections and identity checks.

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  • Verbal Agreement Between SDF and Damascus: New Steps Toward National Reconciliation

    Verbal Agreement Between SDF and Damascus: New Steps Toward National Reconciliation

    According to Abdi, these talks led to a verbal agreement on several sensitive issues, including a full ceasefire and the continuation of dialogue. Abdi emphasized that he held separate meetings with Syria’s defense minister and intelligence chief, reaching mutual understanding on certain topics.

    He also announced preliminary coordination regarding the integration of SDF forces into the Syrian army’s structure, noting that Damascus is interested in utilizing the SDF’s experience in security and military affairs. Accordingly, a military committee composed of representatives from the “Internal Security Forces” is expected to be dispatched to Damascus soon to discuss the details of this process.

    On the military front, Abdi revealed that the United States proposed forming a joint force between the SDF and the Syrian army to combat ISIS—a proposal welcomed by Syrian parties. He described this initiative as a unified national step against terrorism.

    Politically, discussions are underway to incorporate the terms of the “March 10 Agreement” into the draft of Syria’s new constitution. Abdi stressed that Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah will be part of the country’s future governance framework, and withdrawal from these areas is a red line for the SDF.

    On the humanitarian side, he called on residents of Afrin, Ras al-Ayn, and Tal Abyad to prepare for returning to their homes, and emphasized the importance of implementing the April 1 agreement concerning the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods in Aleppo.

    These negotiations may represent an initial step toward resolving the crisis between Damascus and the autonomous administration. The emphasis on a “Syrian-Syrian” solution without direct foreign military intervention reflects both sides’ desire to avoid a prolonged conflict. Integrating the SDF into the Syrian army could be a chance for national unity, but also poses practical challenges due to ideological, structural, and political differences between the two sides.

    Overall, recent developments signal the beginning of a new round of talks and a redefinition of the role of non-state actors within Syria’s political-military framework. While much remains before a final agreement is reached, the current verbal understandings could lay the groundwork for lasting peace in northern Syria—provided there is sufficient political will and enforceable guarantees.

  • Assassination of Former ISIS Commander in Northern Daraa Countryside

    Assassination of Former ISIS Commander in Northern Daraa Countryside

    Kanhosh who was known by the title “Emir al-Hisbah”, disappeared suddenly after ISIS’s defeat in southern Syria, and little information has been available about his whereabouts or activities since.

    It’s worth noting that Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Walid, during its control of the Yarmouk Basin in western Daraa, was considered one of ISIS’s branches in southern Syria.

    The group played a key role in enforcing strict religious rulings and internal regulations. As head of Hisbah (the body responsible for implementing ISIS’s religious laws), Kanhosh oversaw the group’s repressive policies in the region.

  • U.S. Senate Approves $130 Million to Support SDF and Free Syrian Army

    U.S. Senate Approves $130 Million to Support SDF and Free Syrian Army

    The new bill, estimated at around $925 billion, was approved with 77 votes in favor and 20 against. It allocates $65 million for salaries, $15.6 million for training and weapons, $32.4 million for logistical assistance, $15.3 million for maintenance of vehicles and facilities, and $1.5 million for operational services.

    The new funding for the SDF and Free Syrian Army indicates that the United States does not intend to retreat from its policy of support for non-state actors in Syria. The budget approval may be interpreted as a message to Turkey and the Syrian government. Turkey has consistently labeled the SDF as an extension of the PKK and criticized Washington’s military cooperation with the group.

    Direct funding for the SDF and Free Syrian Army reflects America’s effort to strengthen these groups as its allies in Syria. Overall, the Senate’s decision not only signals continued U.S. military presence in Syria but also shows Washington’s intent to maintain—and even expand—its influence in Syria’s political and battlefield dynamics in 2026. This path could bring new challenges for Syria and the broader West Asia region.