Category: West Asia

  • How Many Israeli Drones Were Shot Down Over Iran During 12-Day War?

    How Many Israeli Drones Were Shot Down Over Iran During 12-Day War?

    Based on visual documentation, the downed drones are as follows:

    A Hermes 900 drone was shot down on June 18 in eastern Isfahan province. Images of the wreckage show a rocket pod and smart guided munitions.

    Read more about Hermes-900 drone: Military Knowledge: Hermes 900 Drone

    A Hermes 900 drone was downed on June 18 near Isfahan city

    Heron drone with serial number 298 was downed on June 19 near Iran’s western borders in Ilam province. It was destroyed by the short-range Majid air defense system. Analysis of the wreckage and archival images revealed that this Heron lacked a satellite communication antenna and had to be guided by ground stations, giving it a range of about 300 km. This suggests it was likely operated from a ground station in Iraqi Kurdistan or a U.S. base in Iraq.

    Read more about Heron and Heron TP drones: Military Knowledge: Eitan (Heron TP) Drone

    Destruction of a Heron drone on the country’s western borders in Ilam province

    Another Heron drone with serial number 248 was shot down on June 19 in the mountainous areas of Lorestan province. Visual evidence shows this drone was equipped with a satellite antenna.

    Destruction of a Heron drone in the heights of Lorestan province

    An Orbiter-5 drone with serial number 8312 was downed on June 21 in Kashan.

    An Orbiter-5 drone with serial number 8312 downed on June 21 in Kashan

    A Hermes 900 drone with serial number 939 was shot down on June 22 in Markazi province.

    Another Hermes 900 was downed on June 23 in Khorramabad, Lorestan province.

    The moment a Hermes 900 drone was targeted and downed over Lorestan province
    Wreckage of Hermes 900 drone downed on June 23 in Khorramabad. The Rotax 914 engine is visible in the footage.

    An Orbiter-5 drone with serial number 8373 was shot down on June 24 in Zanjan. Interestingly, this drone featured a satellite communication antenna—something not previously seen in Orbiter-5 models. Drones of this class, due to their size and weight, are typically used as tactical drones on the front lines. However, the Orbiter-5 downed in Iran had extended capabilities thanks to its satellite link, overcoming the usual 100 km range limitation of ground control stations. This enhancement gave it a role beyond that of a tactical drone, allowing Israel to extend its surveillance deeper into Iranian territory.

    Read more about Orbiter-5 drone: Military Knowledge: Orbiter-5 Drone

    The video released by the IRGC regarding the shot down of a Orbiter-5 drone in Zanjan province

    Source: Iranian Defensive Power

  • Gradual Fragmentation of Syria: Examining the Most Likely Governance Scenario for Syria’s Future

    Gradual Fragmentation of Syria: Examining the Most Likely Governance Scenario for Syria’s Future

    The “mini-state” model has emerged in several post-Ottoman Arab countries. Yemen, Libya, Lebanon (especially before the recent war), and to a large extent Sudan and Somalia, have all experienced this form of governance. The Trucial States (now the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain) prior to 1971, and the territory of present-day Saudi Arabia before King Abdulaziz’s wars and the founding of the third Saudi state, are other examples. A diluted version of this model can be seen in present-day Iraq, though it has weakened since the first post-Saddam decade. Syria itself experienced a similar situation between 1946 and 1963.

    Preconditions for Mini-State Formation

    This situation arises when three conditions are met:

    1. The central government lacks sufficient hegemony.
    2. Nation-building efforts are severely disrupted, leading citizens to prioritize other identity factors over national identity.
    3. Economic resources are no longer monopolized by the state, forcing it to rely on influential actors for funding and security.

    If the central government is either in the “state-building phase” or has a system where political competition is institutionalized—especially if public opinion plays a role—this fragmentation intensifies. It’s crucial to distinguish between the legal structure of power and its actual distribution. None of the examples mentioned earlier are legally federal systems.

    Key Groups Likely to Form Mini-States

    This section identifies powerful domestic actors that may evolve into influential entities, forcing the central government to engage with them. In Arabic political discourse, such groups are said to form a “mini-state” (a state within a state).

    A) Kurds
    They are the most likely to establish a mini-state, possibly limited to northeastern Syria or areas like northern Hasakah and Ain al-Arab (Kobani). All four conditions mentioned earlier apply strongly to the Kurdish context.

    B) Druze
    The Druze are the second most likely group to form a mini-state. In broader governance comparisons, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are pursuing semi-secession, and one of the main Druze factions recently reached an agreement with the central government. Under this deal, the Interior and Justice Ministries in Suwayda province will be staffed exclusively by locals, while Druze groups will retain their weapons. This arrangement lays the groundwork for a mini-state in Suwayda.

    C) Alawites
    The coastal Alawite community has a moderate chance of forming a mini-state. Despite widespread sensitivity toward this group, internal cohesion, restrained ambitions, effective foreign support, and smart strategy could enable them to establish control over coastal areas.

    D) Free Syrian Army (Jaysh Suriya al-Hurra)
    This group, formed under direct U.S. guidance in the al-Tanf region, now controls territory from al-Tanf to Qaryatayn and Palmyra. Their strengths include foreign backing and a dual identity—Arab opposition to Assad with some advantages similar to the SDF. Their semi-autonomous presence within the Syrian army structure positions them as a potential mini-state.

    E) Daraa
    Daraa also has high potential for mini-state formation, but internal divisions among southern factions pose a major challenge. The population is split into four or five groups with serious rivalries, and at least half look to external powers for support. These internal fractures reduce the likelihood of a unified mini-state.

    F) Others
    Beyond these five, other regions also show potential for mini-state emergence. Due to space constraints, only their names are listed:

    • Arab tribes of Deir ez-Zor
    • Arab tribes of Raqqa
    • Turkmens of northern Aleppo
    • Salafists of Idlib
    • Smaller minorities

    Signs of This Scenario Emerging

    What are the indicators of this scenario unfolding in Syria? Both political and security developments offer clues. The clearest sign is Damascus’s concession to Suwayda’s Druze elders, allowing them to control the Interior and Justice Ministries—an arrangement even more extensive than the SDF-Damascus agreement. Another sign is the central government’s efforts to alter the situation in Afrin, which may lead to demographic changes.

    On the security front, armed groups in many areas refuse to surrender their weapons or integrate into a unified national army. Continued activity by pro-Assad militias (known as “Shabiha”), casualties inflicted by Tahrir al-Sham, and Damascus’s lack of control over all Syrian territory—effectively dividing the country into three or four zones—are further indicators.

    Politically, the most telling signs are how local elites influence governance. In provinces like Daraa and Suwayda, governors are chosen based on local power brokers’ preferences. In Daraa, Deir ez-Zor, Hama, and Aleppo, senior military commanders are appointed by external forces, not the president. Suwayda still lacks a military commander, and in coastal provinces, competition between official ministries and the newly formed “National Reconciliation Committee” is intensifying. In eastern Euphrates regions, no governors or military commanders have been appointed at all.

  • Intense Israeli Airstrike on Yemen’s Capital (Video)

    Intense Israeli Airstrike on Yemen’s Capital (Video)

    The strikes hit multiple sites including the presidential palace, the Haziz power station in Sanhan district, a facility referred to as the Assar power station (not identified in Yemeni sources), and a fuel depot. So far, six fatalities have been reported, with 86 others injured.

    Simultaneously, Yemeni air defense forces engaged the Israeli aircraft, launching interceptor missiles that successfully repelled some jets and disrupted the operation.

    According to Israeli statements, the airstrikes were a retaliatory measure against ongoing missile and drone attacks by Yemeni forces. The Israeli regime claims the targeted sites were being used militarily by Ansar Allah.

    The attack drew widespread condemnation from regional actors, including the Yemeni Foreign Ministry, the Political Bureau of the Ansar Allah Movement, Iran’s Foreign Ministry, Oman, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and various Palestinian resistance groups, all of whom issued statements denouncing Israel’s actions.

    Israeli Airstrike on Yemen’s Capital

    This marks the 15th aerial assault by the Zionist regime on Yemen since the escalation of hostilities.

    Analysts suggest that by targeting civilian infrastructure and energy facilities, Israel aims to weaken Yemeni military pressure and shift focus away from internal challenges. The Israeli security apparatus is allegedly prioritizing the elimination of key figures within the Yemeni armed forces and the Ansar Allah political leadership, though these efforts have failed. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy and Air Force are actively working to intercept Yemeni missile and drone attacks, utilizing regional airspace, including that of Saudi Arabia, to prevent strikes from reaching Israeli territory.

  • Yemeni Missile and Drone Strike on Israel (Video)

    Yemeni Missile and Drone Strike on Israel (Video)

    The Yemeni Armed Forces launched an attack on Israeli positions in Tel Aviv and Ashkelon using one hypersonic missile and two suicide drones. A video from the occupied territories captured the moment of impact.

    As part of their continued support for the Palestinian people and resistance, the Yemeni Armed Forces targeted Lod Airport (Ben Gurion) near Tel Aviv with a hypersonic ballistic missile named “Palestine 2.” Israel’s missile defense systems failed to stop the missile, and the operation reportedly hit its target successfully. The strike caused millions of Israelis to flee to shelters and suspended airport operations.

    Yemeni missile impact in occupied territories

    The Yemeni Air Force also carried out two military operations using suicide drones against critical Israeli military targets in Tel Aviv and Ashkelon. According to Brigadier General Yahya Saree, both missions successfully reached their objectives.

    In his statement, Brigadier General Yahya Saree expressed Yemen’s deep appreciation for the heroism and sacrifices of the steadfast Palestinian fighters in Gaza. He described them as the embodiment of resistance against the enemies of the Muslim nation, selflessness in the path of God, and defenders of the dignity of the Ummah. He affirmed that Yemen—with its loyal people, devoted army, and faithful leadership—will stand by them until the aggression ends and the blockade is lifted.

    According to Islamic World News statistics, these operations mark the 178th to 180th aerial strikes by the Yemeni Armed Forces against Israeli positions in occupied Palestine.

  • Digital Conflict Intensifies: Yemen Strikes Back Against Cyber Aggressors

    Digital Conflict Intensifies: Yemen Strikes Back Against Cyber Aggressors

    In retaliation, Yemen has targeted the Absher platform, which is affiliated with the Saudi Ministry of Interior. This platform connects all Saudi government departments electronically and serves 21 million users, offering 200 electronic services, including online services for passports, traffic, and civil affairs.

    The cyber attacks on Yemeni sites suggests that Israel has organized a comprehensive operation involving air, cyber, intelligence, security, and economic strategies to strike Yemen. Following the failure of a US military naval operation in Yemen, it appears that Israeli officials now recognize that disabling the Yemeni front will require a large-scale, coordinated effort over an extended period.

  • Latest Updates on Southern Syria (Map)

    Latest Updates on Southern Syria (Map)

    In the latest movements, 10 Israeli military vehicles departed from Tel Ahmar and headed toward the Bariga-Kudna road, establishing a checkpoint there.
    Additionally, another convoy of 10 vehicles entered Ruwaiheena village before proceeding toward Rasm al-Halabi in central Quneitra.
    Five Israeli vehicles also entered Rafid village.
    An Israeli patrol, supported by two tanks, moved from Adnaniyeh to Ruwaiheena, with the tanks positioning themselves on the village outskirts.

    It appears that the regime’s movements in southern Syria are now directly influenced by ongoing Syrian-Israeli-American negotiations, and until the parties’ agreements are clarified, significant changes in frontlines are unlikely.

  • Syrian Foreign Minister Meets with Israeli Delegation in France

    Syrian Foreign Minister Meets with Israeli Delegation in France

    The United States facilitated the meeting. The talks focused on reducing tensions and preventing Israeli interference in Syria’s internal affairs(!), monitoring the ceasefire in Sweida province, and implementing the 1974 agreement.

    The goal is to foster regional understanding to enhance security along Syria’s southern borders and prevent conflicts in areas under Julani government control.

    Additionally, on August 21, 2025, during a visit to Amman, the Syrian Foreign Minister met with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Al-Safadi and US Special Envoy Thomas Barak to discuss trilateral cooperation aimed at stabilizing Syria.

  • Israeli Defense Minister Approves Operation Gideon’s Chariots 2 in Gaza

    Israeli Defense Minister Approves Operation Gideon’s Chariots 2 in Gaza

    This meeting occurred amid Hamas’s recent announcement of a ceasefire proposal! If an agreement is finalized to release hostages and establish a ceasefire, the plan to attack Gaza City might be canceled.

    Hours after the meeting, Hebrew media reported that Yisrael Katz approved Operation Gideon’s Chariots B plan on Wednesday. The plan was approved after Eyal Zamir and senior commanders presented operational details to Katz.

    The goal is to fully capture Gaza City, continuing Israel’s efforts to pressure Palestinian resistance groups into negotiating a prisoner exchange.

    As part of this plan, the Israeli army is calling up 60,000 reservists. Additionally, the defense minister approved relocating about one million Palestinian civilians from Gaza City to the southern parts of the strip.

    This new phase of Operation “Gideon’s Chariots” underscores Israel’s resolve to diminish Hamas’s military influence in Gaza. With the large reserve call-up and focus on controlling Gaza City, Israel seems intent on shifting the battlefield dynamics. Future developments, including diplomatic efforts and military actions by Palestinian resistance groups, will significantly influence the outcome of this military operation.

  • Israel is bolstering its air defenses in preparation for potential conflict with Iran!

    Israel is bolstering its air defenses in preparation for potential conflict with Iran!

    This strategy includes new laser and radar technologies, along with classified systems. The Iron Dome protects against short-range rockets and drones; David’s Sling intercepts cruise and tactical ballistic missiles; Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 handle long-range and extra-atmospheric missiles, with Arrow 4 still under development for advanced missile threats inside and outside the atmosphere.

    Last month, Israel’s Defense Ministry agreed to ramp up Arrow missile production. These steps follow the recent 12-day conflict between Tel Aviv and Tehran, during which, according to Israeli claims, Iran launched over 500 ballistic missiles and 1,100 suicide drones, damaging residential areas, killing 29, and injuring over 3,000. Yemen’s Ansar Allah has also increased missile and drone attacks on occupied Palestine since March 18, with nearly 70 ballistic missiles and 20 drones fired.

    Read more: Operation True Promise 3: Which Locations Were Targeted In Occupied Territories?

    Meanwhile, IDF Chief Eyal Zamir warned that Israel might carry out new strikes against Iran if needed.

    The accelerated military buildup highlights Israel’s growing concern over its deterrent capacity against Iran and resistance groups, especially after recent attacks that exposed weaknesses in its defense systems, creating political and psychological pressure.

    Furthermore, the significant investment in layered defenses suggests preparation for a prolonged, multi-front regional conflict. The active presence of Yemen’s Ansar Allah fighting Israel and potential involvement of other resistance axis members indicate Israel aims to establish a broad defense umbrella against threats from Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, signaling that the region may be nearing a new round of conflicts.

  • Yemen Prepares Itself For Any Foreign Aggression

    Yemen Prepares Itself For Any Foreign Aggression

    During this meeting, senior Yemeni commanders discussed the military readiness of the Sixth Region forces, security and intelligence matters, the training process, and popular mobilization efforts in support of Palestine. They also addressed the organization of the annual ceremony commemorating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

    The Yemeni Armed Forces anticipate the possibility of the enemy launching ground or air attacks on the northern or northwestern fronts, particularly in the Al-Jawf and Sa’ada regions. In response, they have prepared themselves for all potential scenarios involving the United States and Israel against Yemen.

  • Hamas agrees to Egypt and Qatar’s ceasefire proposal

    Hamas agrees to Egypt and Qatar’s ceasefire proposal

    The Palestinian news agency Samaa also reported that Hamas and Palestinian groups fully support the proposal offered by Egypt and Qatar for a ceasefire.

    The proposal includes a pathway to reach a comprehensive agreement to end the war and will temporarily pause military operations for 60 days.

    It is reported that 600 trucks of humanitarian aid will enter Gaza each day, and 1,700 Palestinian prisoners, including 1,500 from Gaza, will be released. Discussions to end the conflict are also scheduled to start during the 60-day ceasefire period.

  • U.S. Forces to Withdraw from Baghdad and Ain al-Asad

    U.S. Forces to Withdraw from Baghdad and Ain al-Asad

    Official Iraqi government sources have announced the beginning of the withdrawal of the U.S.-led international coalition forces from Baghdad and the Ain al-Asad base in Anbar province. The first phase of withdrawal is scheduled for September this year, during which U.S. forces stationed at Baghdad Airport and the Joint Operations Command will be relocated to Erbil.

    An Iraqi official told Al Jazeera that this retreat is part of an agreement between Baghdad and Washington, and that foreign military trainers will remain in Iraq. Meanwhile, Hussein Alawi, advisor to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani, stated that the coalition’s mission in Baghdad and Ain al-Asad will end in September 2025, with the second phase—complete withdrawal—set to be finalized by September 2026.

    According to Alawi, the Iraqi government is committed to strengthening its armed forces and transforming its security relations with coalition countries into stable bilateral partnerships. These relationships will extend beyond military cooperation to include political, economic, and cultural dimensions. He also announced the formation of a high-level military committee to oversee the implementation of the agreement.

    Currently, around 2,500 U.S. troops are present in Iraq as part of the international coalition, primarily stationed at three bases: Ain al-Asad in Anbar, Al-Harir in Erbil, and Victory Base at Baghdad Airport.

    The phased withdrawal from Iraq marks a turning point in Baghdad’s efforts to reclaim full security and military sovereignty. This process not only responds to internal pressures but also reflects the Al-Sudani government’s intention to gradually transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and restore the traditional role of the army in maintaining national stability.

    However, the continued presence of military trainers and ongoing bilateral defense cooperation with the U.S. and other coalition members indicates that Iraq is not seeking a complete severance of security ties. Instead, it aims to shift these relations from the temporary and emergency framework established after the rise of ISIS to a more balanced and enduring strategic partnership.

    The withdrawal from Baghdad and Ain al-Asad can also be seen as a direct result of pressure from resistance groups and their repeated warnings against the continued presence of foreign troops in Iraq. This outcome was achieved through serious negotiations led by the Al-Sudani government. However, it remains unclear whether the plan will be fully implemented or merely symbolic. Past experiences show that the U.S. has previously promised to withdraw its forces from Iraq but failed to follow through, extending its presence instead—raising ongoing doubts about Washington’s commitment to the latest agreement.