These operations mark the 165th to 167th air operations by the Yemeni Armed Forces against Israeli positions in Occupied Palestine.
The increase in attacks by the Yemeni Armed Forces is a response to the escalation of the Israeli regime’s crimes in the Gaza Strip, particularly the obstruction of humanitarian aid and the severe conditions of hunger and thirst faced by the population. Additionally, the Yemenis have initiated the fourth stage of the naval blockade and have imposed further restrictions on shipping to Israeli ports.
Life-detection equipment (such as seismic sensors or specialized radars) is typically defined as tools used to locate living victims under rubble following earthquakes or other disasters. These devices can detect: • Vibrations (like tapping or scratching) • Sounds (such as shouting or breathing) • Extremely subtle movements (like heartbeat or respiration) However, the focus of this article is on the military application of these technologies in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), developed by the Israeli company Camero-Tech and sold to military and rescue units around the world.
About Camero
Camero Tech LTD logo
Camero Tech LTD was founded in 2004 in the city of Netanya and is a pioneer in the development and production of imaging systems based on 3D radar technology. The products of this company are widely used by the military and police forces of the Israeli regime, as well as by other military and law enforcement bodies worldwide. All of their systems require approval from the Israeli Ministry of Defense.
Camero specializes in the development and design of radio-frequency (RF) imaging systems and signal/image processing circuits for “Sense-Through-The-Wall” (STTW) applications. This includes all products in their “Xaver” series. The company’s CEO, Amir Beeri, is an experienced electrical engineer who graduated with a master’s degree in electronics from Tel Aviv University in 1986. In 2020, the Zionist regime’s defense giant Elbit Systems acquired Camero. Beeri, a seasoned technologist with military background, has known connections to Unit 8200.
Camero’s CEO Amir Beeri
Camero’s systems are widely used by Israeli security forces and their military allies. The deployment of this technology in conflict zones such as Gaza and the West Bank has raised significant ethical concerns.
Xaver Series Products The Xaver series is a diverse collection of advanced through-wall imaging systems that, using portable radar technology, allow military, law enforcement, and rescue forces to detect and track individuals in real-time through walls, doors, and other obstacles. Below is a breakdown of each model.
1. Xaver 100
This portable and rugged device enables military, law enforcement, and rescue teams to detect the presence and distance of individuals behind obstacles (like walls) in real-time. This capability enhances tactical decision-making during various operations. By providing accurate and reliable information about the presence of individuals in enclosed spaces, the device significantly improves tactical decisions across different operational scenarios. The device uses the same advanced technology found in other systems within this product family. A unique “micropower Ultra-Wideband” (UWB) sensor, which operates on an extremely wide frequency band with minimal energy consumption, ensures reliable detection and unmatched imaging clarity in the industry.
2. Xaver 400
This advanced system enables rapid identification of individuals behind walls and obstacles, allowing operational teams to act with full awareness of their surroundings and gain critical mission intelligence. The device features a sophisticated system architecture that integrates several cutting-edge technologies:
Multi-channel, low-power UWB sensor
Algebraic image reconstruction algorithms
User-friendly design
3. Xaver 1000
This device is the successor to Camero’s Xaver 800 model, which was the world’s first full 3D imaging system. Key features of this model include:
Ability to differentiate between adults, children, and animals, making it suitable for tactical missions requiring accurate and vital information gathering
The first full 3D imaging system in the world
Equipped with AI-based smart tracking for live target patterns
Real-time 3D imaging through walls, capable of detecting both stationary and moving living objects behind structural barriers
Unprecedented resolution of body parts and postures, including sitting, standing, lying down, and height of living targets
4. Xaver LR40 / LR80
The radar in this powerful gadget can detect living beings behind walls at distances up to 50 meters—and for the LR80 version, over 100 meters. Optimized for both urban and rural operations, the system collects real-time and critical data on living entities hidden behind obstacles, all while keeping the operator at a safe distance. Additional notable features include:
Accurate detection of living beings behind common wall materials
Simultaneous detection of both moving and stationary targets
Control via a 10-inch touchscreen with an intuitive interface
Integrated data recording with playback capability for post-mission review, analysis, and training
Proprietary and patented algorithms and signal processing
Lightweight and portable for enhanced mobility and operator effectiveness
Weight: between 10 and 12 kilograms
5. XaverNet
The “XaverNet” system is a rugged wireless tablet that works with Xaver 100 and Xaver 400 systems. It allows users to receive imaging data in real time and remotely control up to four Xaver systems simultaneously. The system includes a Panasonic “ToughPad” tablet, a USB dongle for wireless connectivity, and proprietary software. The software can also run on Windows-based platforms. Using this technology, users can control Xaver systems from a distance of up to 200 meters in line of sight and switch between systems without exposing themselves to the target zone—making operations safer for field teams. This network-based system is built on a rugged wireless command and control platform based on the Panasonic FZ-M1 commercial model.
Key Features
Compatible with various Windows-based platforms
Supports both Xaver 400 and Xaver 100 systems
Data recording capability
Wireless communication based on Zigbee protocol (a low-power wireless communication standard for sensor networks and smart devices)
Optional tactical housing
Capability to mount Xaver systems on unmanned vehicles
According to the latest reports, Druze militants successfully took control of the strategic “Hadid” hill in western Sweida after engaging in clashes with Julani forces. During these confrontations, one Druze armed element was killed. There is currently no information regarding the casualties among Julani forces; however, several wounded members of the Syrian internal security forces have been transported to medical centers in Daraa province.
Tal Hadid SuweidaTal Hadid SuweidaTal Hadid Suweida
Meanwhile, as the clashes erupted in Sweida province, Israeli army aircraft were observed flying over both Sweida and Daraa provinces.
Israeli warplanes
It is important to note that Hadid Hill, located in the west of Sweida province, overlooks vast areas, including Al-Thaala and the roads leading to the center of Sweida. This strategic position underscores its significance in the ongoing conflict.
Even before Assad’s fall, Syria’s power grid was in poor condition, but the decade-long civil war made things much worse. Power plants and transmission lines were severely damaged, and Syria, once an oil exporter, became dependent on imports. Following Assad’s downfall, the flow of Iranian oil—which had previously met Damascus’ energy needs—was halted, and most of the country’s oil resources came under the control of Kurdish-led forces (SDF).
Omar Shukrouk, Syria’s Minister of Electricity, stated that the country’s oil production capacity in government-controlled areas has dropped from 360,000 barrels per day to just 10,000.
Although there have been reports of oil supply resuming from Kurdish-controlled areas, the future of this arrangement remains uncertain due to tensions between Turkey and the Kurds, as well as the unclear U.S. policy toward these forces.
Temporary and Ineffective Solutions To escape the current energy crisis, Syrian officials have been offered various solutions:
1. Use of private generators and solar panels Advantages: • Can provide localized power for households and small businesses. • Solar energy is a sustainable and environmentally friendly option. Disadvantages: • High cost of purchase and installation, which many Syrians cannot afford. • Lack of proper infrastructure for large-scale deployment. • Limited electricity generation, especially during seasons with low sunlight.
2. Import of LPG from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Jordan Advantages: • A quick short-term solution to meet some energy demands. Disadvantages: • Mainly suitable for domestic uses like cooking, with limited impact on electricity generation. • High transportation costs and dependency on foreign suppliers reduce sustainability. • Limited volume of imported gas does not meet Syria’s wide-scale energy needs.
3. Use of floating power plant ships Advantages: • Can generate large amounts of electricity. • Quicker deployment compared to building new land-based power plants. Disadvantages: • Connecting these ships to the domestic power grid can take several months. • High operational and fuel supply costs requiring external financial support. • Difficulty transmitting electricity from coastal ports like Baniyas and Tartus to inland areas due to extensive damage in the transmission network.
Overcoming the Crisis with Zionist Gas? One option now under consideration is using natural gas from the Israeli regime to supply electricity in Syria. Currently, the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP), which was originally built in 2003 to deliver Egyptian gas to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, is now operating in reverse.
Instead of transporting gas from Egypt northward, the pipeline now delivers gas from the occupied territories southward into Egypt. This gas is extracted from the Leviathan field off the Israeli coast and sent to Jordan, where it supplies 70 percent of the country’s electricity.
There is now a proposal to redirect part of this gas, via Jordan and the AGP, to Syria. However, the plan faces not only technical hurdles but also significant political challenges.
Political Barriers and Operational Challenges The Syrian government would find it politically difficult to officially accept gas from Israel, as any open cooperation with Tel Aviv is unacceptable for Damascus. Therefore, officials may label the gas as “Egyptian” or “Jordanian” to minimize domestic and regional backlash.
In the occupied territories, some hardline factions oppose such a deal as well, arguing that Syria should not be aided. Nonetheless, relative stability in Syria could benefit Israeli security, as a power vacuum in the country enables extremist and militant groups to thrive.
Another major hurdle is the cost of project. Syria lacks both the infrastructure to transfer the gas and a reliable system to make payments. International energy companies, including Chevron, which has a stake in the Leviathan project, are reluctant to enter contracts without financial guarantees. If Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or the UAE agree to finance the project, the chances of its implementation would increase.
Syria Awaits Major Decisions As Syria’s energy crisis worsens by the day, its government is exploring different options. In the coming days, negotiations between Syria and Jordan are expected to take place, and the European Union has announced that it will lift certain energy sanctions on Syria.
Syria now stands at a major crossroads: it must either continue with temporary and ineffective measures or navigate political and financial obstacles to accept gas that may be labeled “Egyptian,” but originates from elsewhere. In the end, this path may well tie Syria’s future to the broader project of a new Levant.
These drone attacks illustrate the complex political, economic, and security issues stemming from the ongoing tensions between Baghdad and Erbil. One significant attack occurred near Erbil International Airport, which prompted a response from American defense systems stationed in the area, resulting in the destruction of the attacking drone.
In addition to the incident near Erbil Airport, drone strikes targeted oilfields operated by Norwegian companies DNO and American Hunt Oil in the Zakho and Sheikhan regions. These attacks led to the temporary halting of oil production in some fields, reportedly reducing the region’s overall production by 145,000 barrels per day—approximately half of its daily output.
Origins and Reasons for the Attacks
Although no specific group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, many Iraqis believe they are rooted not only in internal disputes among various Iraqi political factions but also stem from broader conflicts concerning the region’s economic and strategic interests. Some analysts suggest that these drone strikes may be part of a strategy aimed at pressuring the Kurdistan Region to accept new oil agreements with the central Iraqi government.
This theory gained traction following the announcement of a new oil agreement between Baghdad and Erbil, which significantly reduces the region’s share of oil revenues. After this agreement, the frequency of drone attacks on oilfields decreased, indicating that the groups behind the attacks might have targeted these fields to coerce Erbil into accepting the new terms.
Political Reactions and Consequences
In response to the attacks, Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani initiated a comprehensive investigation and urged security authorities to identify the perpetrators as quickly as possible. He also stated that decisive measures would be taken against those responsible, reflecting the Iraqi central government’s strong concern for the security and stability of the region, which is one of the country’s primary sources of income.
Conversely, the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, which consists of various resistance groups, claimed that these attacks are a “settling of internal scores” between the Kurdistan Regional Government and oil companies. The committee denied any involvement in the drone attacks, asserting that their operations have never harmed the interests of the Iraqi people or security forces. They advised the Kurdistan Regional Government to concentrate on improving citizens’ livelihoods and addressing economic challenges instead of transferring its internal crises onto the central government.
Economic Concerns and the Future of Oil Production
The significant decline in oil production in the Kurdistan Region, along with extensive damage to its oil infrastructure, has led officials to call for more robust defense measures to protect these fields. The head of the Kurdistan Region’s Foreign Relations Office has stated that the United States is deeply concerned about these attacks. Consequently, various requests have been made to strengthen the defense systems of both the Kurdistan Region and all of Iraq.
The drop in oil production and the damage to the region’s strategic oil fields have adversely impacted its revenues and raised concerns about the economic future of the Kurdistan Region. Reports indicate that the monthly oil revenue, which is approximately $297 million, is at serious risk due to the production being cut by half. This revenue constitutes a significant portion of the region’s budget. If the attacks and continued decline in production persist, the economic situation in the Kurdistan Region may be severely affected.
Iran: A Possible Reason for These Attacks
The recent drone attacks on oil fields in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region may also serve a strategic purpose for Iran. These security pressures could be Iran’s way of signaling that if the Kurdistan Region becomes a base for military and intelligence operations conducted by Israel and its proxy groups—particularly the Kurdish groups that act against Iran’s interests—then Erbil’s oil and economic resources will be subject to significant attacks and restrictions. This stance reflects Tehran’s concern regarding the increasing anti-Iranian influence in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and suggests that any alignment by the Kurdistan Region with U.S. and Israeli objectives could lead to severe economic and security repercussions.
Given the region’s heavy reliance on oil revenues, the escalation of drone attacks on oil wells and infrastructure not only poses a grave threat to Erbil’s economy but also sends a clear warning to regional and international actors: Tehran can use oil as a leverage tool to limit the influence of Israel and its Western allies in northern Iraq.
In summary, this warning from Iran indirectly calls on the Kurdistan Regional Government to reconsider its regional policies. It emphasizes that to maintain economic stability and security, the Kurdistan Region should refrain from engaging in or facilitating anti-Iranian activities within its territories. Otherwise, the oil economy of the Kurdistan Region could sustain serious damage that would be difficult to repair.
The drone attacks on the oil fields of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region should be viewed not only through the lens of military and security motives but also as part of a broader conflict in domestic and international politics. These attacks are clearly connected to the oil agreements between Baghdad and Erbil, as well as political developments within Iraq. Thus, the Iraqi central government should closely monitor the security and economic situation in the Kurdistan Region to prevent escalation. Simultaneously, the Kurdistan Region should avoid exacerbating internal tensions and crises to safeguard its security and interests while pursuing diplomatic and economic solutions to its ongoing challenges.
— One hundred thousand children in the Gaza Strip are at risk of starvation, and 40 thousand children are suffering from a lack of milk. Babies have become targets in the operations of the Israeli enemy. The number of martyrs due to hunger is increasing every day.
— The brutality and crimes of the Zionists have reached extremes, including targeting women during childbirth and bombing humanitarian aid. The recent act of a group of Israeli citizens celebrating and cooking kebabs near the Gaza border illustrates the extent of the Israeli enemy’s barbarity.
— The notion of air aid is misleading and ineffective; no one should be deceived by it.
— Israeli tanks and planes, which drop American bombs on the Palestinian people, are fueled by Arab oil. The United States has provided $22 billion from Arab nations to facilitate the invasion of the Gaza Strip. While Palestinian infants are starving, substantial shipments of hundreds of thousands of tons are being sent from Arab and Islamic countries to support the Israeli enemy. Arab and Islamic governments are even looking to compensate the enemy for the losses it incurred due to the blockade of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
— Considering those who oppose Zionist oppression to be terrorists indicates a willingness to cooperate with the Israeli enemy. The oppression faced by people under Arab and Islamic governments does not justify inaction; individuals can pressure their governments to adopt a collective and unified stance. It is deeply regrettable that some Arab and Islamic governments have yet to decide to impose sanctions against the enemy. Instead, some continue to collaborate with Israel, thereby exacerbating the oppression and crimes.
— The Palestinian Authority does not protect its people; rather, it collaborates with the Zionists authorities, even participating in the abduction of resistance fighters.
— The actions of the Zionist regime in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Yemen reflect its dependence on the United States and its involvement in the ongoing conflict.
— Anyone who believes that the Zionist regime will cease its aggression and crimes without our intervention is mistaken.
— If the positions of England, France, and Germany are genuine, then why do they continue to provide military support to Israel? The United Nations recognized Israel and granted it membership but has failed to adequately support the Palestinian cause. Therefore, these entities cannot be trusted, as they do not adhere to the principles of justice and human rights.
— Ignoring responsibilities will expose the Islamic Ummah to serious consequences in this world. Many individuals and regimes may believe that inaction will secure their safety, but divine intervention is inevitable. When people and governments face repercussions in this world, they will understand that their inaction has not yielded security.
— O Muslims, do not assume that accountability and punishment are confined to matters of prayer and fasting. Evasion and negligence constitute complicity with the enemy. Your inaction contributes to one of the greatest crimes in the world and will subject you to severe divine punishment.
— The position of the United States regarding the complete denial of Palestinian rights is clear. Trump has effectively gifted the Syrian Golan Heights to Israel as if it were his personal possession!
— Jihad in the way of God is a means of resisting calamity and oppression and promoting the values of truth, justice, and goodness. It is obligatory to enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong, as the actions of the Zionist regime represent one of the greatest evils on earth.
— The voices of those who promote Takfirism and incite hatred and sectarian divisions remain silent when it comes to supporting the Palestinian people!
— The Palestinian people are primarily Sunni Muslims, and their suffering has been recognized globally. So why is there a lack of support for them? Israel is hostile to Islam, Muslims, the Prophet, his companions, and the children of Islam in general. Why do we not stand against these oppressors?
— Those who advocate for jihad must recognize that Palestine is the greatest and holiest battlefield for this cause. Why do you only perceive jihad in the context of the sectarian conflicts that America and Israel have orchestrated?
— The nation must awaken; we must take action rather than waiting for others. Look at the resilience of our Mujahideen brothers in the Gaza Strip, who have been courageously fighting for God’s cause for 22 months with limited resources, demonstrating unparalleled steadfastness and patience.
— Unfortunately, instead of receiving support and assistance, the Mujahideen of Gaza are labeled as terrorists by many of the most oppressive governments, and their struggles are misrepresented in the media. The Arab media continually distorts and disparages the Mujahideen brothers in the Gaza Strip.
— This week, we conducted ten missile and drone operations, including an attack on Lod Airport.
— Undoubtedly, the divine promise will be fulfilled, and the outcome will favor those who are patient and believe in God. We hope that the march tomorrow will be widespread across the capital and other provinces.
The Israeli think tank INSS has published an article outlining the 2025–2026 Israeli security doctrine. Within this document, confrontation with Iran stands out as a fundamental issue and a major threat, with the name of Iran appearing nearly 60 times. Prominent elements in the document include: Iran’s nuclear program, the future of the Axis of Resistance, the nature of cooperation with the United States on Iran-related matters, and potential nuclear agreements. Notably, Iran’s relationships with Russia and the Resistance Axis are highlighted as strategic points. The doctrine presents various scenarios, followed by actionable strategies.
Battlefronts In the introduction of the doctrine document, Israel defines its surrounding adversaries and adopts an aggressive, security-driven approach toward regional states. Iran and Syria emerge as primary concerns. Regarding Iran, three potential scenarios are outlined:
1. A New Iran–U.S. Nuclear Deal: Tel Aviv should not oppose the agreement outright but rather seek a role in shaping it to ensure Tehran is prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons.
2. Iran Achieves Nuclear Capability: Immediate military action is required, preferably in coordination with the United States.
3. A Prolonged Stalemate: Continuous economic pressure and covert operations should be applied to weaken Iran steadily.
One noteworthy feature in this document is the grouping of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea under the acronym “CRINGE”, portraying them as a united front opposing the liberal-democratic world order. According to Israeli analysis, despite deep ideological differences and conflicting interests, these states are cooperating to challenge Western hegemony. The doctrine paints a dire global picture—dominated by authoritarianism, communism, and rising Islamic sentiment in liberal societies—while warning of rising extremist factions reshaping political landscapes. Ultimately, Iran is described as the leader of the Axis of Resistance, an integrated coalition that seeks Israel’s destruction.
A Shifting Strategic Environment Over a year into a multi-front war, Israel claims it has increased its strategic flexibility and gained greater maneuvering space in the short term. Before assessing Israel’s core national security challenges, the doctrine reviews broader changes in its strategic outlook.
1. Undermining Iran’s Security Doctrine From Israel’s viewpoint, Iran’s military capabilities are insufficient to deter a direct attack, and even reaching nuclear threshold status has not produced the expected deterrence. Israelis believe Iran’s resistance strategy has failed to contain Israel’s actions, and the resistance network is collapsing. The fall of Assad, they argue, has further weakened Iran’s regional strategy, eliminating Syria’s role. In this altered landscape, Iran will struggle to restore Hezbollah’s prior threat level against Tel Aviv. Opportunity: Iran is perceived as being at an unprecedented point of weakness, offering Israel expanded freedom of action. This opens opportunities to push for a tougher nuclear deal, reduce Iran’s regional influence, and even pursue military options to halt its nuclear program. Threat: If Iran concludes that nuclear threshold status is insufficient for deterrence, it may accelerate its nuclear weapon development, thereby altering the regional balance of power in its favor.
2. Shifting Regional Power Dynamics
Opportunity: Advancing the Abraham Accords can curtail Iranian influence. Potential diplomatic moves include: securing Israel’s northern border by leveraging Hezbollah’s weakness, forming a non-aggression pact with a new Syrian government (which may also ease tensions with Turkey), and finalizing normalization with Saudi Arabia. Close coordination with the United States would aid in realizing these goals.
Threat: Assad’s fall could produce unpredictable consequences, including jeopardizing Israel’s peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt. The emergence of a radical Sunni axis—led by a resurgent Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and beyond—could present a formidable new threat, potentially as dangerous as the former “Ring of Fire” led by Iran.
Iran’s Nuclear Threat: Three Strategic Scenarios
1. If an Agreement Is Reached: Tel Aviv should actively influence any potential nuclear deal. The agreement must ensure the following:
A) Immediate Halt to Nuclear Progress B) Comprehensive Threat Mitigation:
Fissile Material: Caps on uranium enrichment levels and stockpile quantities; dismantling of advanced centrifuges installed after 2018; intrusive and comprehensive inspections.
Delivery Systems: Restrictions on ballistic missile range and technology; limits on missile stockpiles; nonproliferation enforcement.
Weaponization: Oversight of nuclear research institutions and bans on any weapons-related nuclear activity.
These steps are deemed essential for safeguarding Israel’s security and preventing Iran’s military nuclear capability.
2. If No Agreement Is Achieved: Israel must ensure stringent enforcement of sanctions and maintain close intelligence and diplomatic ties with the United States. Enriching uranium to 90 percent should be declared a red line that justifies military action—with or without U.S. support. Since Iran aims to outlast the Trump presidency and anticipates policy shifts under a new administration (especially a rollback of maximum pressure), this period should be used to weaken Iran via covert operations, while avoiding visible foreign fingerprints. These actions are considered vital to blocking Iran’s nuclear advancement and preserving Israeli security.
3. If Iran Builds a Nuclear Weapon: This scenario involves Iran withdrawing from the NPT, enriching uranium to 90 percent, and conducting nuclear weapon tests. Israel believes that Iran’s nuclear facilities must be destroyed immediately in response. The U.S. should be urged to issue a decisive warning to Iran before any military action. To prevent a regional arms race and nuclear terrorism, Israel must act decisively. While coordination with the U.S. is essential, Israel’s independent military capabilities must be fully developed to ensure mission success.
New U.S–Israel Relations: Opportunities and Challenges
Opportunities: A second Trump term could strengthen U.S.–Israel relations through appointments of pro-Israel officials. This would provide Israel with greater regional autonomy, bolster deterrence against Iran, and establish a credible military threat to Tehran’s ambitions.
Challenges: Rising criticism within the Democratic Party—especially due to Israel’s internal policies—could erode bipartisan U.S. support. Israel must pursue a defense agreement as part of a broader regional strategy to counter isolation efforts. Such an agreement would also enhance deterrence against Iran’s nuclear threat and maintain U.S. military and technological support. Shaping future Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with Washington to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge is crucial.
Economic and Diplomatic Strategies
To counter Iran’s influence and boost economic ties, Israel must strategically expand its relations with Europe. This may require taking a firmer stance on Russia, while preserving key diplomatic channels. Such a strategy could undermine the Iran–Russia axis and curtail Tehran’s regional clout.
The Iran–Israel War Doctrine
According to Israel’s security doctrine, the October 7th attack was the moment when Tel Aviv finally awakened to the nature of the war Iran has been waging against it. The more Israel focused on Iran’s nuclear threat, the less it recognized that Iran’s strategy also hinges—perhaps even more—on its Axis of Resistance as a weapon against Zionism. Although Tehran’s “proxy war” strategy had long been discussed in Israeli defense circles, Tel Aviv failed to develop a suitable strategic or operational response. Thus, the October 7th war caused a dual disruption to Israel’s long-standing strategic thinking. The war represents a collision between two visions: one meticulously prepared by Iran’s axis, and the other rooted in Israel’s outdated military conceptions shaped by its belief in “wars with clear endings.” This outdated doctrine failed to address new types of threats. The fact that Israel was caught off guard, despite having prior intelligence, underscores its misjudgment of enemy strategies. The doctrine concludes that the war’s gains and failures must be analyzed through the tension between counterterrorism approaches and military-war theory—two frameworks that are not interchangeable.
USAID alone manages tens of billions of dollars annually and, in coordination with the CIA, is involved in designing and executing “regime change” operations around the world. However, the overall management of these regime change organizations lies with the U.S. Department of State. Here, we take a look at the budgets and programs defined and implemented by these organizations.
The U.S. Department of State manages a wide range of programs. It is the primary civilian agency of the United States responsible for security and refugee-related assistance, and it holds full responsibility for administering the accounts for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), as well as programs for nuclear nonproliferation, counterterrorism, demining, and related initiatives under Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR).
Additionally, it oversees two migration and refugee accounts: the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) funds. Among the Department’s stated policies is ‘countering Iranian influence,’ which is explicitly mentioned in its budget documents.
Another focus area is preventing Iran’s nuclear development, for which specific funding has been allocated. For example, in 2022, $95 million was allocated to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor the nuclear activities of countries such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea, ensuring that such activities do not pose a threat to U.S. interests. The U.S. Department of State, along with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), funds programs such as the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and AEECA assistance in this regard.
Budget Allocations The U.S. Department of State has taken positions through several programs against Iran and has allocated funding to these initiatives. Iran is mentioned in six instances of funding allocations by the State Department in the year 2025.
Imposing sanctions on Iran and other actors considered threats to so-called international security, with a budget of $26 million allocated for 2025—an increase of $4 million compared to 2024.
Increasing funding for programs related to Near Eastern countries and strengthening Jordan and Egypt to counter Iran’s so-called destabilizing activities and to engage in strategic competition with China and Russia, with a budget of $2.5 billion allocated for 2025—a decrease of $41 million compared to 2024.
Supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in efforts to compel Iran, Syria, and North Korea to adhere to their commitments and to prevent the development of their nuclear capabilities, with a budget of $95 million allocated for 2025—the same amount as in 2024.
Countering technological threats from Iran and several other countries, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, with a budget of $72.9 million allocated for 2025—a decrease of $17 million compared to 2024.
Providing counterterrorism assistance to confront Iran-aligned forces, including Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, with a budget of $271 million allocated for 2025—a decrease of $3.2 million compared to 2024.
Combating terrorism in the West Asia region by strengthening cooperation with Egypt and Jordan, countering alleged Iran’s destabilizing role and regional influence, and eliminating other terrorist groups, with a budget of $5.296 billion allocated for 2025—$12.2 million less than in 2024.
USAID: The Implementer of Influence Projects
Meanwhile, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) plays a central role in financing and supporting the implementation of U.S. programs in the Middle East. For more than six decades, USAID has been responsible for executing a major portion of the United States’ so-called bilateral development and humanitarian aid. Alongside the Department of State, the agency manages programs such as the Economic Support Fund (ESF), Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA), and the Democracy Fund, which primarily support development projects but in reality serve as tools to advance U.S. strategic interests in target regions.
Donald Trump recently described USAID as “run by a bunch of radical lunatics,” while Elon Musk called the agency “a nest of worms” and “a criminal institution” that “deserves to be dismantled.” Musk also criticized the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), referring to it as “a wicked, corrupt, and criminal organization” that “should be shut down.” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio explained that the budget cuts to these organizations were not due to a shift in foreign policy, but rather because of their failure to carry out their missions.
It appears that this budget suspension is not a shift in the United States’ diplomatic strategy, but rather a clear warning to USAID and NED to reassess their so-called “regime change” operations. Leaked documents and intelligence reports indicate that, in recent years, Washington has allocated tens of millions of dollars to opposition groups, Persian-language media outlets, and activists working against the Islamic Republic. According to a BBC report, more than 30 Iran-focused organizations and media outlets have been affected by the suspension, although the exact names of these entities have not been disclosed.
NED: A Covert Interventionist Organization
An examination of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which received $315 million from the U.S. Department of State in 2023, reveals that the organization allocated $2.01 million that year to 14 government overthrow projects in Iran.
The foundation openly acknowledges that recipients of its funding played a key role during the 2022 unrest in Iran, serving as primary sources of information for international media outlets. Moreover, the organization’s website explicitly expresses support for the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests. As early as the 1990s, Allen Weinstein, one of NED’s co-founders, openly admitted in an interview that many of the activities carried out by NED today were previously conducted covertly by the CIA.
Funds are often transferred through intermediaries or embedded within broader programs under the label of “promoting democracy,” making it difficult to trace direct connections. Public documents—later removed—indicate that the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) invested $4.6 million in 51 separate projects aimed at overthrowing the Iranian government.
Funding Iranian Opposition Media Recently, Kit Klarenberg, a journalist and researcher, published a confidential invitation from the U.S. Department of State that includes proposals from private contractors and intelligence-linked entities such as NED and USAID. The leaked documents reveal the true nature of these organizations’ activities and highlight the significant impact that the suspension of their programs has had on their global operations.
Klarenberg states that the flow of U.S. government funds—especially through organizations like NED and NERD—remains opaque. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to trace the final destinations of the funding and identify its beneficiaries. The details of these covert operations are systematically concealed, and mainstream media outlets claim the information is kept classified to protect activists from potential harm. Existing documents—later removed—indicate that the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) invested at least $4.6 million between 2016 and 2021 in 51 different counter-revolutionary projects in Iran.
However, only the names of seven recipient organizations have been disclosed. The Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, based in Washington, D.C., is one of the few known recipients, while the remaining 44 continue to remain unidentified. During the 2022 unrest in Iran, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) allocated nearly $1 million to projects officially labeled as “human rights advocacy.”
However, none of the participating organizations were identified. The funds were transferred to an unnamed entity tasked with “monitoring, documenting, and reporting human rights violations.” This entity collaborated with individuals inside Iran who referred to themselves as “activists,” aiming to enhance their digital security and propaganda efforts.
Anti-Iranian groups that particularly present themselves as media outlets—such as the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, Iranwire, BBC Persian, and others—are believed to be among the likely recipients of this covert funding from USAID. Analysts like Hamidreza Gholamzadeh also point out that organizations such as the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC), Tavaana, and the Boroumand Center have likely received funding from NED, while Iranwire is believed to have been funded directly by the U.S. Department of State.
A glimpse of financial support documents for sabotage projects in Iran
Hidden Networks; Repetitive Strategies Many recipients of foreign funding who may appear anonymous at first can be identified through their interactions with Western actors. Recent reports indicate that Western organizations continue to pursue government overthrow strategies in Iran. Shirin Ebadi, the head of the Defenders of Human Rights Center (DHRC), acted as an operative in destabilization projects targeting Iran and, after fleeing to London in 2009, openly expressed support for overthrowing the Iranian government. A joint report by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC Intelligence Organization in October 2022 explicitly identified the DHRC as a front for subversive activities backed by the United States under the NERD project.
The report revealed how these networks act as proxies for U.S. government agencies, engaging in media infiltration and inciting social unrest to destabilize Iran.
Late Iranian Brigadier General Mohammad Kazemi provided further details about these operations, disclosing that one exposed project included $550,000 in media funding aimed at inciting ethnic and religious minorities in Iran’s border regions and expanding media coverage of riots. Narges Mohammadi, also a recipient of foreign support, followed a similar path—backing terrorists and separatists under the guise of human rights advocacy. Both Ebadi and Mohammadi received large sums to influence media narratives and support individuals convicted of violent acts.
Iranian security reports have confirmed that these individuals and their affiliated networks are involved in U.S.-backed subversive projects such as NERD. Leaked documents show that millions of dollars have been spent on inciting ethnic and religious minorities within Iran. Western tactics for provoking unrest include promoting fringe figures, portraying them as victims, and using them for geopolitical purposes. Iranian intelligence reports, as well as Western sources such as The Grayzone and The Cradle, indicate that organizations like NED and NERD play a central role in funding these operations. Despite repeated exposures, this pattern continues to repeat itself under new names and faces.
These findings align with Kit Klarenberg’s investigative report for The Cradle, which revealed leaked documents related to the NERD project— a U.S. initiative aimed at recruiting and training “emerging women leaders and ethnic minorities” to lead activist movements in Iran. The report also exposed how millions of dollars were funneled through NED between 2016 and 2021 to strengthen counter-revolutionary networks. One of the program’s key objectives was reportedly to “encourage lawyers and clerics to advocate for democratic reforms.” Despite the exposure of these tactics, the pattern continues to repeat itself—merely under new names and fresh media campaigns designed to stir discontent and destabilize independent nations.
Brigadier General Yahya Saree stated the operation achieved its goal, causing panic and forcing millions of Israelis to seek shelter. Several flights at Ben Gurion Airport were disrupted and halted.
He emphasized that Yemen, along with its people, leadership and military, will continue its operations until victory is achieved for the oppressed and hungry children of Palestine. He expressed support for their courageous resistance, highlighting that they have been left alone amid the siege and conflict. Addressing the Palestinian people, he stated, “Your brothers in Yemen stand with you and will exert all their strength to fulfill their religious, Arab, and humanitarian duty.”
According to information gathered by IWN, this operation marks the 160th strike by the Yemeni army against Israel.
Introduction In March 2024 WhatsApp, which is owned by Meta, announced that 90 journalists and members of the public who use the popular messaging app had been targeted by spyware developed by Paragon Solutions, an Israeli company specializing in hacking tools. These journalists and civil society members were notified about the possible compromise of their devices’ security. It remains unclear who was behind the attack. Like other spyware vendors, Paragon’s hacking software is used by government clients, and WhatsApp stated it had been unable to identify which clients ordered the alleged attacks.
Experts have reported that the attack was of the zero-click type, meaning the targets did not need to click any malicious link for their devices to be infected. WhatsApp has declined to disclose the locations of the affected journalists and civil society members, including whether any of them were based in the United States. Three of the hacking victims were Italian journalists.
According to reports in The Guardian and Haaretz, Paragon has since severed ties with its clients in Italy, which reportedly included an intelligence agency and a law enforcement organization. Paragon exclusively works with governmental entities. The company’s flagship product, called Graphite, allows users full access to a target’s phone. Paragon claims that the software is intended for criminal investigations. The company is seen as a competitor to the NSO Group, maker of the Pegasus spyware.
Additionally, Israeli media have reported rumors of Paragon being sold to a U.S. company, which were recently denied by Israel’s Defense Minister following Donald Trump’s return to the White House.
Paragon Solutions Paragon Solutions, founded in 2019 and currently employing 450 personnel, is a cyber company focused on offensive operations and security, utilizing digital intelligence to provide surveillance solutions for smartphones and the internet. The company claims to impose “strict ethical limitations” on itself, restricting data extraction from target devices solely to conversations within messaging apps. Paragon exclusively collaborates with law enforcement and intelligence agencies in what it defines as liberal democracies—a list that includes 39 countries.
As one of the two leading Israeli offensive cybersecurity firms alongside NSO, Paragon specializes in technologies classified as weapons and requires export approval from Israel’s Ministry of Defense. Unlike NSO, which faced international backlash and was blacklisted by the U.S. government for selling spyware to authoritarian regimes, Paragon was founded with a commitment to operate exclusively within democratic nations. This ethical positioning helped pave the way for future deals.
Founders and Key Figures Among the founders of this cyber company is Ehud Barak, the former Prime Minister of Israel, underscoring Paragon’s prominence and distinct position among other firms in the industry. Some media outlets have even referred to the company as “Ehud Barak’s startup”, highlighting his influence in its establishment. According to the image below, the founders of this Israeli company are identified from right to left in the following order:
– Ehud Schneorson
After decades of service in the fields of signals intelligence (SIGINT), cyber operations, and special operations in the occupied territories, he was appointed as the head of Unit 8200, Israel’s elite military intelligence unit. According to Richard Silverstein, commanders in Israel’s Unit 8200are appointed in a highly specific and deliberate manner, alternating between a “khnun” (a Hebrew slang term for a “computer geek” or “tech nerd”) and an individual who rose through the ranks via combat roles. Ehud Schneorson is considered a khnun, whereas his predecessor, Nadav Zafrir, was a combat officer who served in Sayeret Matkal, Israel’s elite special forces unit. This alternating approach, blending technical expertise with combat experience, reflects the military’s effort to strike a balance between technological proficiency and operational capability.
– Ehud Barak
Ehud Barak, the former Prime Minister of Israel, has been a prominent figure in the country’s cybersecurity landscape. He played a significant role in the founding of Paragon Solutions, co-establishing the company alongside retired Brigadier General Ehud Schneorson. Barak’s involvement in Paragon has been substantial, and he also holds a stake in the company, underscoring his direct interest and influence in its operations.
– Idan Nurick
Idan Nurick is the CEO and co-founder of Paragon Solutions, with a background in medicine and an MBA. He has led several successful companies in the fields of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, with a proven track record in team leadership, algorithm development, software engineering, and data analysis. Nurick founded Cyber Hunters in 2018 and Paragon in 2019, serving as CEO of both. In 2020, he stepped away from Cyber Hunters to focus on Nash and Paragon. He currently serves as a director at Alameda Ventures and a senior executive at Bloomberg Capital. Prior to his current role, he also held a senior leadership position within Paragon. Nurick completed his studies at Tel Aviv University, earning both a master’s degree and an MBA.
– Liad Avraham
Liad Avraham, a resident of the occupied territories, is currently the co-founder and Chief Research Officer (CRO) at Paragon Solutions. He brings valuable experience from his previous roles at Paragon and in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Avraham holds a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science from the Open University and possesses advanced skills in hacking iOS and Android operating systems. During his service in the IDF, he served as a team leader and cybersecurity researcher.
– Igor Bogdalov Igor Bogdalov, a lesser-known figure among the founders pictured, is one of the co-founders and serves as Co-Chief Technology Officer (CTO) at Paragon. He earned his Master’s degree from Tel Aviv University.
Graphite As previously mentioned, this spyware infiltrates devices electronically using a zero-click method, the operation of which is explained in detail below. Zero-click attacks are carried out secretly and do not require any direct user interaction or action. These attacks may seem simple because the attacker does not need to trick the user through phishing emails or clicking on malicious links. However, successfully executing these attacks is not easy. A critical aspect of performing a successful zero-click attack is sending a specially crafted piece of data to the target device via wireless communications such as Wi-Fi, NFC, Bluetooth, GSM, or LTE. This data is designed to trigger a previously unknown or lesser-known vulnerability in the target device. The vulnerability may exist at the software or hardware level of the device. This data might exploit the vulnerability when processed by the device’s system on chip (SoC), but in most cases, the attacker designs the data to be interpreted by specific applications such as WhatsApp, Telegram, Skype, calling services, or even SMS. Therefore, the attacker carefully crafts this data to be interpretable by such applications. This data can take the following forms: • MMS • Voicemail • Video conferencing sessions • Text messages • Authentication requests • Network packets • Phone calls
Conclusion In light of the foregoing detailed discussion, it seems imperative to strengthen the cybersecurity outlook of intelligence agencies with respect to the newest infiltration techniques and the methods for preventing and countering cyberattacks; for failing to recognize the infection of a messaging‑service server application under normal conditions can constitute part of the persistent risk and harm posed by such attacks. Gaining familiarity with and access to the know‑how for producing this type of spyware may, in the future, foster scientific self‑sufficiency—both software‑ and network‑wise, and in certain cases hardware‑wise—within the country’s sensitive institutions as well as among technology firms operating in the realm of social networks. Another matter that acquires significant importance in the wake of these international disclosures is the investigation of the assassination cases of prominent Iranian figures and members of the resistance front in recent years; since the use of messaging apps and social networks—especially domestic platforms such as Eitaa and Baleh—has become commonplace, the hacking of individuals’ accounts grants access to every component of their smartphones, including microphones and geolocation; consequently, the relevant authorities must exercise heightened vigilance.
The Israeli army claimed to have intercepted the missile. The attack triggered sirens in hundreds of locations across the occupied territories, causing settlers to flee to shelters. Additionally, several flights at Ben Gurion Airport were disrupted.
In a statement, Brigadier General Yahya Saree paid tribute to the resilient people of Yemen, describing them as loyal, dedicated, and dignified for their historical support of the oppressed Palestinian people and their resistance against enemy dominance over the Islamic nation. He also praised the sacrifice and bravery of the heroic Palestinian fighters in Gaza and the West Bank for their engagement in the struggle against the occupying forces.
Brigadier General Saree emphasized that the operations of the Yemeni armed forces will continue until the war ends and the siege of Gaza is lifted.
According to statistics collected by IWN, this operation marks the 155th strike by the Yemeni armed forces against Israeli positions in occupied Palestine.
In a statement, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, spokesman for the Yemeni armed forces, indicated that this operation was a response to the recent attack by the Israeli army on Hudaydah. He emphasized that the operation aimed to support Palestinian resistance against the Israeli regime.
He said, the Yemeni army executed a special military operation against Ben Gurion Airport, additional military targets in Tel Aviv, the port of Umm al-Rashrash (Eilat), Ramon Military Airport in southern occupied Palestine, and a significant target in the Ashdod area. The operation successfully achieved its objectives.
This operation marks the 154th strike conducted by the Yemeni armed forces against the Israeli regime positions.