Tag: US

  • SIGAR Report on U.S. Spending in Afghanistan

    SIGAR Report on U.S. Spending in Afghanistan

    Despite this massive investment, Afghanistan’s security structures collapsed against the Taliban, and much of the equipment fell into Taliban hands after the fall of Ashraf Ghani’s government in 2021.

    SIGAR’s mission is to provide accurate statistical data, and its figures closely reflect realities on the ground. These findings have had a significant impact on shaping U.S. policy, pushing leaders to avoid large‑scale military entanglements and instead pursue cheaper, less costly strategies in future conflicts.

  • United States Deployed Suicide Drones Similar to Shahed‑136 in West Asia to Counter Iran!

    United States Deployed Suicide Drones Similar to Shahed‑136 in West Asia to Counter Iran!

    According to CENTCOM’s commander, the purpose of TFSS is to provide American forces with affordable and effective drone capabilities as a deterrent against “bad actors” in the region. Obviously, by bad actors he means first Iran and then other components of the resistance axis.

    We had previously warned that given America’s access to all active battle fronts around the world including Iran, combined with mass production of these suicide drones, could pose serious risks if used directly by U.S. forces or its allies against adversaries. This concern is now openly acknowledged by U.S. officials and military experts.

    As reported by The War Zone, a U.S. official described the establishment of TFSS as a “major development”, calling it a way to reverse the game against Iran. He stated: “We’ve reached the point where not only are we mass‑producing these drones, but for the first time we’ve deployed them in the Middle East. In effect, we’ve turned the tables on Iran.”

    He added: “We’ve seen what Russia has done in Ukraine, how Iran destabilized the region with drone technology, their 12‑day war threats against Israel, and how partners had to spend vast resources to defend against such attacks. Now we’re taking a page from their playbook and turning it back on them. Iran gained an advantage through sheer volume of drone strikes, which are difficult to defend against at scale.”

    He continued: “We are strengthening our defenses, and sometimes a strong defense can also be a good offense. We’re adding offensive firepower that has already proven effective—especially now that the country which once wreaked havoc with this technology has become vulnerable itself.”*

    The official further noted: “We have no problem targeting Iran‑backed Houthis in Yemen and can use this capability against them as well. With the Houthis, the challenge is finding targets, unlike Iran where there are plenty of targets available!”

    As seen, U.S. officials explicitly speak of using these drones against Iran in future war scenarios. Over the past year, Washington has heavily invested in this category of low‑cost suicide drones, with mass production underway. Experiences from recent conflicts—such as the war in Ukraine and the 12‑day war—have demonstrated how these simple systems can decisively alter the course of battle.
    During the 12‑day war and the True Promise operations (1 and 2), the U.S. and its allies spent enormous resources and deployed vast aerial assets to effectively neutralize Iranian drone attacks on Israel. Yet, unlike America and its partners, Iran lacks comparable large‑scale aerial and defensive assets, which poses a significant challenge. Iran, however, retains asymmetric options for deterrence, as seen in the Aramco attack. At this stage, the U.S. has not yet tested these drones in real combat, but future use against Yemen is considered likely.

  • Joint Syrian–U.S. Coalition Operation: 15 ISIS Hideouts Destroyed

    Joint Syrian–U.S. Coalition Operation: 15 ISIS Hideouts Destroyed

    According to CENTCOM, the operation involved a series of airstrikes and controlled ground demolitions. Among the destroyed stockpiles were more than 130 mortars and rockets, several small arms and machine guns, anti‑armor mines, and materials used for improvised explosive devices.

    The elimination of these ISIS ammunition depots by CENTCOM and Syrian authorities comes only weeks after the al‑Joulani government joined the U.S. coalition, carrying a clear political message. Washington seeks to demonstrate that this alignment is not merely symbolic but has already led to joint field operations—aimed at consolidating Syria’s new security framework and reinforcing the legitimacy of the transitional government in partnership with the United States.

  • Al-Qaeda Motorcyclist Taken Out by U.S. Drone in Marib

    Al-Qaeda Motorcyclist Taken Out by U.S. Drone in Marib

    American drones targeted a motorcycle near the Bin Mu’ili station in the al-Husoun area of Wadi district, east of Marib, on the evening of December 8. The strike killed Munir Bajali al-Ahdal, also known as Abu al-Hijaa al-Hadidi, a field commander of al-Qaeda, along with one of his companions. The assassination occurred shortly after al-Ahdal left the home of Mabkhout bin Aboud al-Sharif, head of the Islah Party organization in Marib.

    According to Western media statistics, over the past two decades the U.S. military has carried out more than 385 air operations against al-Qaeda members across Yemen.

  • US Demands Lebanon Hand Over Unexploded Missile!

    US Demands Lebanon Hand Over Unexploded Missile!

    The weapon in question is a GBU-39B glide bomb manufactured by Boeing, considered one of the advanced munitions that Washington supplies only to a limited number of allies.

    According to Maariv, eight missiles were fired in the Beirut strike, seven of which detonated while one failed to explode. This prompted Washington to press Lebanon to quickly return the bomb to the US to prevent it from falling into the hands of rival states.

    The primary reason for this urgent request is America’s deep concern that the weapon’s technology could be transferred to competitors such as Russia, China, or Iran.

  • SDF Affirms Decade-Long Partnership with U.S. Coalition

    SDF Affirms Decade-Long Partnership with U.S. Coalition

    He emphasized that cooperation between the SDF and the coalition has lasted for nearly a decade; there has been no withdrawal and no compromise, but rather the partnership has been consolidated in a stronger form. He described the continuation of this cooperation as a strategic necessity both domestically and internationally, rooted in mutual trust and sacrifice in the fight against terrorism.

    Shami’s recent remarks about the ongoing presence of the U.S. coalition in Syria are a clear indication of Washington’s entrenched strategy in the north and east of the country. Contrary to some analyses suggesting a gradual American withdrawal, the reality on the ground points to reinforced military bases, increased joint patrols, and continued arms support for the SDF.

    His comments show that, despite political pressure and security threats from Turkey and the Julani-led administration, the SDF still defines itself firmly within the framework of international coalition support.

  • U.S. Drone Strike on al-Qaeda Members in Shabwah Province

    U.S. Drone Strike on al-Qaeda Members in Shabwah Province

    The American drone first dropped a bomb on a house, and minutes later launched a second strike on a civilian car. Both attacks resulted in casualties among civilians as well as the suspected individual.

    Based on statistics from Western media regarding U.S. air operations in Yemen over the past two decades, more than 383 strikes have been conducted against al-Qaeda members in the country.

  • United States Conducted A Test Launch of An Unarmed Minuteman III ICBM As Part of Its Nuclear Deterrence Reliability Program

    United States Conducted A Test Launch of An Unarmed Minuteman III ICBM As Part of Its Nuclear Deterrence Reliability Program

    The launch, designated Glory Trip 254, was carried out while airmen from the 625th Strategic Operations Squadron out of Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, were aboard the U.S. Navy E-6B Mercury aircraft to demonstrate the reliability and effectiveness of the ALCS system.

    The missile traveled approximately 6,750 kilometers and was directed toward the Reagan Test Site in the Marshall Islands.

    According to U.S. officials, the purpose of the test was to conduct a routine evaluation of the reliability and readiness of the country’s nuclear deterrence capabilities.

    This comes as the U.S. military prepares to phase out the Minuteman III system and replace it with the next-generation LGM-35A Sentinel missiles, marking a significant step in modernizing its strategic arsenal.

  • Baghdad at a Historical Crossroads: Examining the Future of the Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq

    Baghdad at a Historical Crossroads: Examining the Future of the Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq

    The future of this situation can be envisioned through three scenarios. First, gradual integration and institutionalization within the state framework, provided there is political will and financial transparency. Second, the continuation of its semi-institutional status with sporadic conflicts, which appears to be the most likely path. Third, a deterioration into greater instability triggered by regional developments or a deepening financial crisis.

    A risk-reduction strategy should be built on three pillars. Auditing and restructuring the PMF’s personnel system. Gradual reform of legal and political frameworks to enable structured integration. Activation of regional diplomacy to reinforce security boundaries. What remains vital is preserving the PMF’s social legitimacy and operational capacity during the integration process so it can continue to serve as a stabilizing and deterrent force within Iraq’s security architecture during times of crisis.

    Iraq’s Current Position in Relation to the PMF

    In the second half of 2025, Iraq’s domestic politics depend more than ever on how the government engages with paramilitary actors while managing regional and economic pressures. The experience of the past few years shows that the PMF is no longer a temporary partisan force. It has embedded itself into Iraq’s political, social, and economic fabric and has become a key player in Baghdad’s power dynamics.

    From the perspective of local governments and many domestic observers, acknowledging this reality is the first step toward any pragmatic solution. Attempts to rapidly dismantle or marginalize the PMF are not only unfeasible but risk undermining stability and deepening social divides.

    Understanding the PMF’s current status requires a composite view of three elements. Its military and security role during the fight against ISIS, which earned it local legitimacy. The political and economic structures surrounding it, which have turned some brigades into influential actors in local institutions and markets. Its regional ties, which shape and sometimes direct its behavior.

    For example, in the summer of 2014, when ISIS rapidly captured parts of Iraq and threatened the collapse of the local government and sacred sites, Iran’s Quds Force intervened directly. Intelligence support, military advising, weapons shipments, and field presence were mobilized to organize and strengthen local resistance groups. These efforts, officially framed as protecting holy sites and preventing security collapse, forged deep operational links between certain PMF brigades and Iranian security institutions.

    Baghdad’s Balancing Act in Domestic Politics

    From the perspective of internal political dynamics, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani’s government operates cautiously in a middle-ground position. On one hand, it must assert sovereignty and demonstrate legal control over national affairs. On the other, it faces pressure from Shiite coalitions and local leaders with divergent interests and expectations. The Coordination Framework of Shiite factions exemplifies this complexity. Some groups maintain close ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran, while others pursue more nationalist or conservative agendas. These differences have created friction in strategic decision-making and pushed the government toward a policy of “patience and passivity.” This cautious approach, especially when compounded by financial strain, reduces the likelihood of gradual compromise and instead opens space for symbolic gestures and localized bargaining.

    What Shapes Iraq’s Political Future?

    Iraq’s political future is shaped by its engagement with regional actors, particularly Tehran and Ankara. Structurally, Iran maintains deep and networked influence over segments of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and its preference has often been to preserve communication channels and pursue gradual influence rather than direct confrontation. In critical moments, Tehran has opted for a “keep the channels open” tactic to safeguard its long-term interests in Iraq. Meanwhile, Turkey’s military presence and operations in the north and Kurdish regions exert additional pressure on Baghdad’s ability to assert control, narrowing the government’s strategic options. From Baghdad’s standpoint, managing simultaneous pressure from Iran and Turkey requires active diplomacy and balanced policies. It must also secure guarantees for territorial integrity and decision-making independence without undermining local deterrent mechanisms.

    Three Scenarios for the PMF’s Political Trajectory

    Given current conditions, three plausible scenarios can be outlined for the future of the PMF and its political role. These scenarios are shaped not by ideological goals or idealistic plans, but by the actual behavior and patterns of current actors.

    In the realistic scenario, the PMF remains in a “semi-institutional” state. This means that some units and leadership structures gradually integrate into official military and security institutions, while others retain local influence and continue to play political and economic roles at regional and national levels. This model allows the central government to maintain a degree of control over the national security framework, while delegating some operational authority to paramilitary forces at lower levels. The likely outcome is continued local competition, increased political bargaining on the margins of government, and the emergence of a multi-layered field where Iraq becomes a battleground for regional influence.

    In the second scenario, which becomes more likely with rising regional tensions or a financial collapse of the government, certain units may break away from the political process and intensify independent military actions or symbolic operations. This could provoke reactions from foreign actors and rapidly push Iraq into a level of instability from which recovery would be difficult. Field reports of such behavior and attacks on infrastructure suggest that this scenario is not far-fetched.

    The third scenario involves structural institutionalization and the transformation of the PMF into a “national asset,” achievable under three conditions. First, Baghdad must demonstrate political will and draft clear legislation. Second, transparent financial mechanisms must be established. Third, regional dialogue must prevent Iraq from becoming a theater of foreign confrontation. Lessons from other regional countries and analytical recommendations suggest that a phased plan—including financial audits, formal personnel registration, revised appointment protocols, and reasonable incentive packages for moderate commanders—could enable a smooth integration into Iraq’s political and legal system. This path requires time, patience, and overlapping political guarantees, but from Baghdad’s perspective, it is both rational and achievable.

    The Role of the United States in Iraq’s Future

    From a strategic standpoint, U.S. policy toward Iraq in recent years has shifted from a model of direct, large-scale military presence to a more flexible, multi-layered approach. This new framework emphasizes reducing field deployments, maintaining deterrence capabilities, and combining targeted pressure with conditional support. Two key factors have driven this shift: first, Washington’s desire to reduce the political, financial, and human costs of prolonged engagement in the Middle East; and second, its increasing reliance on diplomatic, economic, and security tools as indirect yet effective instruments of influence. As a result, this evolving strategy carries several important implications for Iraq’s political and security architecture—understanding these is essential for grasping the balance of power in Baghdad and the interplay of domestic and regional forces.

    The first dimension of these implications relates to the mechanism of “conditional aid” and its role in shaping reform incentives. The United States typically ties its economic and military assistance to progress in governance reforms, financial transparency, and the containment of irregular paramilitary forces. In theory, such conditionality can accelerate the registration, regulation, and integration of armed groups, paving the way for a more cohesive institutional structure. However, Iraq’s field experience shows that imposing conditions without offering credible and sustainable alternatives—especially for moderate local commanders—often backfires. It intensifies political resistance and deepens internal divisions, polarizing the decision-making environment.

    The second dimension involves “strategic ambiguity.” The reduction of direct foreign military presence creates deterrence gaps that local actors may exploit to expand their operational autonomy. In this context, U.S. threats of military action or sanctions may serve as crisis deterrents, but repeated or unilateral use—especially without regional coordination or viable economic alternatives—can provoke domestic backlash and erode the legitimacy of Baghdad’s reform efforts.

    The third dimension highlights the constructive potential of U.S. assistance. When conditional pressure is paired with investment in institutional capacity—such as technical support for personnel registration systems, strengthening financial institutions, and managerial training—the likelihood of successful reforms increases. This model of pressure combined with structural support can lower the political cost of implementing reforms in Baghdad and facilitate gradual integration of armed groups, provided these programs are designed in coordination with regional stakeholders and domestic beneficiaries.

    Assessing the Risk of Early Conflict in Iraq

    In recent months, a convergence of political, security, and economic developments in and around Iraq has signaled a shift toward a more fragile phase compared to the relative stability of the past. The overlap of internal pressures with regional movements has significantly increased the risk of scattered tensions escalating into a broader crisis. Domestically, the central government’s chronic financial crisis, unresolved disputes over the PMF legislation, and the lack of transparency in resource allocation and payments have eroded Baghdad’s decision-making structure. This erosion has not only weakened the state’s capacity for rapid response to security incidents but also fostered institutional instability in the relationships between the government, political factions, and paramilitary forces—a reality confirmed by multiple field reports and analytical assessments.

    At the same time, several concrete incidents suggest that Iraq’s previously stable security landscape is becoming increasingly fragile. Drone attacks on oil fields in Duhok Province and damage to companies operating in the Kurdistan Region—such as Hunt Oil, which was recently forced to suspend and then conditionally resume operations—are examples of economic-security pressure points that could swiftly alter the local balance of power.

    In terms of foreign relations, transnational actors play a critical role. Official and unofficial statements from Iraqi officials have pointed to overt and covert pressure from the United States and Israel regarding the passage of the PMF law, along with warnings about the economic and political consequences of opposing their interests. These developments indicate that Iraq’s internal political actions are rapidly becoming entangled in regional rivalries. Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, Speaker of Parliament, recently spoke publicly about threats and pressure, signaling that disputes over the PMF law are not merely domestic matters—they could become pretexts for external leverage with long-term economic and political consequences for Baghdad.

    The Risk of Escalation in Iraq: A Strategic Assessment

    In a recent interview, Iraqi parliamentarian Mahmoud al-Mashhadani emphasized that the wave of reports and claims circulating in outlets like Al-Akhbar—regarding the possibility of Iraq being targeted by Tel Aviv-led operations—while alarmist in tone, may in practice serve a deterrent and regulatory function in regional security dynamics. Even when not grounded in verified intelligence, such narratives tend to heighten caution, surveillance, and coordination among actors, prompting them to reassess power balances and operational readiness. In this sense, these discourses, beyond their media role, indirectly activate components of regional deterrence.

    The PMF’s Role in Iraq’s Complex Security Equation

    The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), rooted in social legitimacy and its history of fighting ISIS, has evolved into a network of brigades and political-economic structures. In the absence of transparency and clear legislation, it retains the capacity to act based on local, economic, or ideological motives. Operational and logistical ties between certain brigades and regional actors—as seen in 2014—can justify responses that the central government may view as “outside official channels.” While this structural reality alone does not constitute a war trigger, when combined with financial shocks, external pressure, and attacks on critical infrastructure, it creates conditions for local reactions to escalate beyond the government’s control.

    Pathways to Crisis Escalation

    Several plausible pathways exist for crisis escalation, though they do not follow a simple cause-and-effect chain. These include:

    • A significant blow to the national economy, such as sanctions or widespread shutdowns in the oil sector, which would raise public dissatisfaction and strain both military and civilian budgets
    • Coordinated attacks on energy infrastructure or foreign bases, potentially provoking retaliatory military responses
    • Breakdown of diplomatic channels between Baghdad and key regional players (Tehran, Ankara, Washington), which would hinder regional crisis management and mediation

    The activation of any of these triggers—especially in combination—could substantially increase the likelihood of localized tensions evolving into a broader conflict. Recent developments suggest that some of these triggers are already active or on the verge of activation, including drone strikes in northern Iraq, political pressure surrounding the PMF legislation, and psychological-media tensions linked to allegations of foreign influence and threats.

    Strategic Summary and Outlook

    The report concludes that while a full-scale war in Iraq is not imminent, the country is exposed to a set of compounding triggers that, if not managed promptly and coherently, could push the situation toward widespread conflict within weeks or months. In other words, the risk of war is a real possibility—dependent on immediate domestic decisions and regional guarantees, not an inevitable outcome.

    Therefore, Baghdad’s current priorities must focus on rebuilding financial and personnel transparency within the PMF, passing clear legal frameworks, strengthening protection of energy infrastructure, and activating diplomatic channels with Tehran, Ankara, and Washington. Only through this integrated management approach—and not through unilateral solutions or external pressure—can Iraq avoid becoming a theater of regional confrontation.

    Conclusion

    In a broader evaluation, the prospect of a full-scale war in Iraq in the medium term is neither unavoidable nor implausible. What determines the outcome is a combination of internal and external triggers and the government’s ability to respond swiftly. If liquidity crises deepen, if the PMF’s semi-institutional structure persists without oversight, and if a strong regional trigger—such as direct attacks on bases or the collapse of diplomatic guarantees—emerges, localized clashes could rapidly escalate into a national conflict.

    Conversely, passing legislation, conducting financial audits, registering personnel, offering reasonable incentives to moderate commanders, and securing diplomatic guarantees from regional actors could pave the way for gradual integration and de-escalation. In short, the threat of war is real but entirely contingent on Baghdad’s immediate policies and the nature of regional and international engagement. Transparency, institution-building, and regional guarantees significantly reduce the risk of conflict—while neglecting these measures raises the likelihood of escalation.

  • U.S. drone strike targets senior al-Qaeda member in northern Marib

    U.S. drone strike targets senior al-Qaeda member in northern Marib

    Abu Muhammad al-Sanaani held a key security role within the group’s structure. No photos or detailed information about him have been published online. His only known physical trait was a noticeable limp.

    According to Western media statistics, the U.S. military has conducted over 380 aerial operations targeting al-Qaeda members across Yemen over the past two decades.

  • Yankees in Caucasus: Assessing the Security and Geopolitical Implications of U.S. Involvement in the Zangezur Corridor Project

    Yankees in Caucasus: Assessing the Security and Geopolitical Implications of U.S. Involvement in the Zangezur Corridor Project

    In recent years—particularly following the Second Karabakh War, which ended with Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia—the creation of the Zangezur Corridor through Armenia’s Syunik Province has sparked a new geopolitical contest in this vital region. Azerbaijan, capitalizing on its military strength and support from Turkey and Israel, is pursuing ambitious geo-economic goals that have met with strong opposition from Iran and Russia. The signing of a peace agreement in Washington, brokered by Donald Trump, which facilitated U.S. involvement in the project, has added another layer of complexity to the issue.

    According to the Washington agreement, the corridor has been renamed the “Trump Road for Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) and leased to an American company for a 99-year term.

    A closer look at the project’s objectives and the recent alignment between Baku and Ankara with the West reveals that the Zangezur/Trump Corridor is part of the broader contest over a new multipolar world order. While Azerbaijani officials emphasize its economic and transit benefits—claiming it could even benefit Iran or Armenia—the underlying Western strategy aims to forge a “Turkic-NATO” alliance to contain the China-Russia-Iran axis.

    The opaque nature of the American company

    Although much has been written about the corridor’s economic and logistical implications, its security and political dimensions remain underexplored. As noted, the U.S. involvement goes beyond commercial interests and could influence both the construction and strategic outcomes of the corridor. Given the hegemonic and capitalist nature of Washington’s political system, its economic and security agendas are deeply intertwined. Separating these motives in the Zangezur project would be an oversimplification.

    Why the Middle Corridor matters to Washington

    The strategic importance of the Caucasus and the Middle Corridor has grown significantly for the U.S., especially after the war in Ukraine. The conflict has rendered the northern route of China’s Belt and Road Initiative unstable, and Washington opposes the development of the Iranian branch of the Middle Corridor. As a result, the preferred route connecting China to Europe now runs through Turkic-speaking countries—Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

    Expanding the Middle Corridor also supports other Western economic-security projects, such as the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline and the transfer of rare earth materials from Central Asia for defense industries. The overarching goal, led by the U.S., is to develop the “Turanic” corridor to exclude Russia and China from Eurasian trade while maintaining Western access to Central Asia.

    Washington is not content with merely supporting the corridor—it seeks to control it. The Zangezur segment has become a key component of this strategy. Trump’s involvement in the corridor serves three core security-economic objectives:

    1. Establishing a presence at Iran’s border to monitor its military and security movements
    2. Undermining Russia’s influence in its traditional sphere and leveraging the Caucasus in the Ukraine conflict
    3. Controlling the Middle Corridor to exert pressure on China.

    As observed, the security dimensions of the Zangezur Corridor project—particularly for Iran and Russia—are highly significant, which helps explain the strategic alignment between Moscow and Tehran on this issue. Without a doubt, the United States is likely to deploy its military and intelligence capabilities alongside engineering teams to support such a complex and multifaceted initiative, potentially reshaping the regional landscape.

    It’s important to recognize that the interplay between military dominance and financial control is not merely academic—it’s a matter of survival for the current global financial system centered around the United States. In this context, the deployment of U.S. forces near Iran and Armenia under the guise of the Zangezur Corridor can be interpreted as a de facto military outpost, reinforcing Washington’s strategic footprint in the region.

    Objectives and Motivations Behind U.S. Involvement in the Zangezur Corridor

    • Recent studies suggest that foreign military bases established through regional alliances can enhance U.S. economic development. In contrast, bases acquired through military occupation tend to harm the U.S. economy. For example, in models where bases are set up via occupation, hostility between the host government and the foreign military tenant is more likely. Therefore, the U.S. has opted for alliance-based deployment in the Zangezur Corridor project.

    • Another strategic motivation for U.S. presence in the corridor is the potential training of extremist forces near Iran’s northwestern borders. Russian officials have claimed that the U.S. military base in al-Tanf, Syria, has been converted into a “terrorist training center.” Sergey Naryshkin, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, stated that American forces trained 500 ISIS members and other extremists—primarily migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia—for operations against Russian troops in Syria. If the U.S. applies a similar model near Iran or in the Caucasus, it could pose serious security risks for both Iran and Russia, especially given the increasing use of drones by extremist groups.

    • Central Asia’s strategic value is rising due to its energy reserves and rare minerals. To secure access to these resources and ensure energy and military security, the West needs a foothold in the region. Russia, China, and Iran currently hold significant influence there, and expanding Western presence would weaken this axis. In the event of regional tensions, the U.S. could use the Zangezur Corridor and its associated military infrastructure as a logistical base.

    Former Iranian ambassador to Baku, Seyed Abbas Mousavi, commented on the nature of the American company involved in the corridor: “A transregional country is entering our region through a private company. We don’t know the true nature of these companies. It’s possible that later, under the pretext of supporting them, the U.S. will deploy military forces to the region, which could be dangerous and certainly requires close cooperation among Iran, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.” Recent developments suggest that the company involved is likely of a military-security nature, as evidenced by the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Azerbaijan’s military equipment sector. Supplying arms to Azerbaijan effectively amounts to indirect U.S. military presence near Iran’s borders.

    In summary, U.S. military involvement in the South Caucasus via the Zangezur Corridor offers strategic advantages for both Washington and NATO. It enables pressure on China, Russia, and Iran while boosting U.S. geopolitical and geo-economic influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. However, this approach contributes to the militarization of the region, contradicting stated goals of stability and potentially harming smaller regional states—especially Armenia and Azerbaijan.

  • Washington’s Stern Warning to Baghdad Amid Speculation of Israeli Strike on Iraq

    Washington’s Stern Warning to Baghdad Amid Speculation of Israeli Strike on Iraq

    Iraqi Defense Minister Thabit al-Abbasi revealed in a televised interview that U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth had informed him via a phone call about an imminent military operation in the region. Hegseth reportedly issued a firm warning against any involvement by Iraqi factions, ending the 11–12 minute call—held in the presence of Iraq’s Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of Joint Operations—with the statement: “This is your final notice, and you know well how the current U.S. administration will respond.”

    The Hebrew outlet Walla, citing sources within the Israeli military command, reported that Iran is heavily investing in Iraqi resistance groups to prepare for potential air and ground attacks against Israel. According to Israeli intelligence, Iran has recently strengthened the military and logistical infrastructure of its allied factions in Iraq. These developments reportedly coincide with a recent visit by Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, to Baghdad, where he met with group leaders.

    The report claims that during these meetings, various scenarios for a possible attack on Israel were discussed, including drone and missile strikes, as well as ground operations via Syria and Jordan.

    The disclosure of this direct communication between the U.S. and Iraqi defense ministers, alongside Israeli media reports of a potential strike on Iraq, signals a new phase in the confrontation between the resistance axis and Israel. Washington’s warning aims to prevent coordination among resistance fronts in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine, and to block the formation of a unified operational axis against Israel.

    Resistance group activity in Iraq targeting U.S. and Israeli interests has long been a point of contention between Baghdad and Washington. These attacks were temporarily halted under U.S. pressure and mediation by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani.

    From Tel Aviv’s perspective, Iraq is increasingly becoming Iran’s strategic front against Israel. The recent transfer of drones and missiles from Iran to Iraqi resistance groups has raised serious concerns in both Washington and Tel Aviv, fueling speculation about a potential Israeli preemptive strike on weapons depots or logistical bases inside Iraq.

    Pete Hegseth’s warning to Iraq’s defense minister was not merely a security concern—it also suggests that the U.S. is tacitly aware of Israel’s military plans and seeks to diplomatically shield itself from any retaliatory actions by Iraqi groups. Washington understands that any Israeli attack on Iraq could quickly escalate into direct conflict between U.S. forces and resistance factions on Iraqi soil.