American drones carried out a strike in Marib province, killing two senior figures of the al‑Qaeda terrorist organization.
On the evening of Monday, December 8, U.S. military drones targeted a motorcycle near a farm in the al‑Hadhun area, northeast of Marib city. The attack killed Abu Ubaidah al‑Hadhrami, a field commander of al‑Qaeda, and Anis al‑Hasili, a senior intelligence and security operative of the group.
Al‑Hadhrami was a prominent member of al‑Qaeda’s Yemen branch, known for publishing a booklet titled “Thus We Were Killed in the Name of Jihad” criticizing ISIS actions against al‑Qaeda. In recent months, he had also engaged in activities supporting Gaza. Anis al‑Hasili, meanwhile, was a senior intelligence official within al‑Qaeda and maintained close ties with Mabkhout bin Aboud al‑Sharif, head of the Islah Party organization in Marib.
According to Western media statistics on U.S. airstrikes in Yemen over the past two decades, more than 386 operations have been carried out against al‑Qaeda members in the country.
UPDATE, December 11:
Local sources in Marib report that Abu Ubaidah al‑Hadhrami, a senior al‑Qaeda member, was not killed in the recent U.S. drone strike on the al‑Hadhun area. The individual who was actually killed has been identified as Mohammed Saeed al‑Kazmi, known as al‑Saqi, a field commander of al‑Qaeda from Abyan province. Al‑Kazmi was one of the key figures overseeing al‑Qaeda’s operations and movements in Abyan.
Analysts note that his elimination effectively aided the Southern Transitional Council in consolidating control over Abyan. Meanwhile, the initial reports of al‑Hadhrami’s death appear to have been part of an intelligence tactic—either by Western security agencies or al‑Qaeda itself—intended to mislead and confuse opposing intelligence networks.
According to the joint investigation by Follow the Money, La Lettre, Le Soir, and Knack, several current and former NSPA employees are suspected of accepting bribes from defense companies in exchange for multi‑million‑euro contracts. Documents obtained show that Elbit and its subsidiary Orion Advanced Systems were suspended on July 31, with several contracts frozen—including supplies of ammunition, aircraft protection systems, and military detonators.
A key figure linked to the case, identified as Italian citizen Eliau E., is wanted internationally on charges of bribery and participation in an organized criminal group. He owns or directs several defense consulting firms in the U.S., Lithuania, and Greece. While no official connection to Elbit has been disclosed, sources close to the investigation claim he acted as a consultant for the company. Elbit itself is not directly under investigation.
The probe has also led to arrests: a former Belgian Ministry of Defense official and ex‑NSPA employee was detained in May 2025, while a Turkish former NSPA staffer—now head of defense firm Arca—was also arrested in Belgium. He was slated for extradition to the U.S., but the American investigation was abruptly halted in July, leading to his release.
Elbit Systems has categorically denied any involvement, rejecting claims of contract suspensions and insisting that no NATO or NSPA programs have been withdrawn.
Analysts argue that the heightened scrutiny of Israeli defense companies reflects global backlash against Israel’s war crimes and genocide in Gaza, noting that firms like Elbit play a central role in sustaining the military campaigns in the occupied territories and across the region.
At the same time, STC fighters seized all checkpoints and outposts surrounding the PetroMasila oil company (affiliated with Saudi Arabia) in Hadhramaut province.
The advance of Emirati‑aligned forces in Hadramaut and Shabwa, coupled with the repeated withdrawals of Islah fighters, marks a significant shift. The STC does not have the capacity to control these areas without support from other Emirati‑backed factions, indicating Abu Dhabi’s role behind the scenes.
In the coming days, attention will turn to Saudi Arabia’s response to these southern advances and what orders will be issued to the al‑Dara al‑Watan forces. Opponents of the UAE in Hadramaut are awaiting action by al‑Dara al‑Watan against the southerners.
Al‑Arab Weekly reported that Savaya’s appointment—made without congressional approval—signals Donald Trump’s intent to restore direct control of foreign policy to his inner circle in the White House. This reflects a recurring pattern in his foreign policy: major international decisions bypassing the State Department and pursued through personal and political ties with loyal associates. As seen in direct talks with North Korea’s leader or the Abraham Accords, Trump favors “personal, fast‑track diplomacy” over formal channels. In Iraq, choosing a non‑diplomat close to the president shows his preference for informal but controllable pathways. Savaya thus embodies a model where the president directly manages foreign relations to advance political, security, and electoral goals. His appointment marks the return of Trump’s personalized diplomacy to the Middle East—enhancing Washington’s direct influence but risking the weakening of professional, institutional foreign policy structures.
Redefining Sovereignty in Iraq
In his first official statements, Savaya stressed the need for centralized command and ending the activities of armed groups outside government control—remarks clearly aimed at Hashd al‑Shaabi and Iran‑aligned forces. From Washington’s perspective, curbing these groups is a prerequisite for Baghdad’s “real sovereignty” and future security and economic cooperation. At a deeper level, this policy redefines sovereignty itself: Iraqi independence is framed as alignment with U.S. policies. Analysts argue this is part of Trump’s broader plan to contain Iran from within Iraq’s structures, not through direct confrontation but via reconstruction, investment, and minority support. A symbolic example is the reintegration of the Christian “Nineveh Plains Protection Units” into the army, signaling centralization of power and weakening of non‑state actors. Savaya’s mission can thus be seen as an effort to reconfigure Iraq’s security architecture to serve Western interests—ostensibly strengthening the central government but in practice shifting the balance toward Washington’s preferred order.
Linking Security Policy with Economic Reconstruction
Savaya’s statements place economic recovery on par with security reform. He repeatedly emphasized the need for foreign investment, rebuilding Iraq’s worn‑out infrastructure, and opening the economy to international companies. For Washington, economic development is a prerequisite for political stability and central government authority. Observers note, however, that deeper political and strategic aims lie behind this economic agenda. U.S. reconstruction plans are not merely humanitarian or technical—they are part of a wider policy to redefine Iraq’s role in the regional order and secure American access to its energy resources. Linking reconstruction with Western economic presence ensures continued U.S. political influence while reducing rivals’ roles in energy. Analysts highlight similarities with past U.S. experiences in rebuilding crisis‑stricken states, where investment and infrastructure projects became tools of political and security engineering. With about 11% of global oil reserves, Iraq holds a special place in this strategy. Savaya spoke of “reviving Iraq’s historic role in the region,” suggesting economic engagement as a prelude to “restoring state authority and social trust.” Yet in practice, foreign corporate expansion and concentrated reconstruction projects may reshape Iraq’s economy in ways more aligned with external powers than with national priorities.
Soft Power Through Religious Minorities
Savaya’s appointment carries a clear political message: reasserting U.S. influence in Iraq’s social fabric via religious minorities. He hails from a Chaldean‑Assyrian family rooted in Tal Afar, Nineveh, and maintains close ties with Iraqi Christian diaspora communities in the U.S. Analysts see this as a cultural and social lever in areas once dominated by resistance groups and Iran‑aligned forces. Assyrian media outlets such as Syri Press and Baghdad Tribune framed his appointment as “the return of Iraq’s Christian voice.” In reality, it represents an attempt to build a new social base for Washington’s policies in northern Iraq, particularly in regions where sectarian tension and ethnic divides facilitate external involvement. In this context, the revival of the “Nineveh Plains Protection Units” within the Iraqi army—coinciding with Savaya’s mission—carries symbolic weight. Though presented as enhancing minority security and rebuilding war‑damaged areas, it may in practice foster military and social structures aligned with Western‑oriented currents. Thus, leveraging religious minorities serves not only humanitarian purposes but also as part of America’s soft‑power strategy to re‑embed its political and economic presence in Iraq.
Dual Function of Savaya’s Appointment
The timing of Savaya’s appointment, coinciding with Iraq’s parliamentary elections, adds another dimension. Reports suggest the move aims to exert indirect influence on Iraq’s political landscape, steering it toward coalitions more aligned with Washington’s policies. Savaya’s mission includes mediating among Sunni, Kurdish, and minority groups, encouraging their participation in a U.S.‑backed political framework. While presented as fostering stability and reducing armed groups’ influence, this is part of a broader strategy to reshape Iraq’s power balance so that future government decisions align more closely with Western interests.
Iraq’s Role in the New U.S. Strategy
Regionally, Sawaya’s appointment is seen as part of Trump’s overarching plan to reconfigure Middle Eastern order. Analysts link it to Washington’s efforts to advance normalization between Arab states and Israel. Iraq, with its geographic position between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, and the Kurdistan Region, is viewed as a potential connecting hub for America’s allies. Sawaya’s mission thus extends beyond economic cooperation and reconstruction—he is positioned to facilitate Baghdad’s political and security ties with regional coalitions favored by Washington.
In summary, Sawaya’s appointment represents a multi‑layered initiative pursuing political, economic, and symbolic goals simultaneously. Individually, he embodies the use of minority social capital in U.S. policy; politically and security‑wise, he is tasked with limiting armed groups and strengthening central authority; strategically, his mission consolidates Washington’s foothold in Iraq’s economy and energy sector, aligning the country more closely with the Western bloc. His slogan of a “Strong Iraq” reflects a broader ambition: to reintegrate Baghdad into an order designed to secure U.S. and allied interests in the region.
Would you like me to refine this into a policy brief format (executive summary + key implications) or keep it as a long‑form analytical translation?
He announced that during joint operations against ISIS, several senior commanders—including the governor of Homs—were arrested, while millions of Captagon pills and 14 production workshops across various provinces were seized. He emphasized that after Syria’s liberation, security institutions have faced the dual challenge of rebuilding public trust and establishing lasting stability.
Khattab’s remarks reflect the new Syrian government’s effort to project a different image of the country’s security apparatus in the post‑Assad era. The emphasis on historic transformation and institutional reconstruction suggests that the security establishment is seeking political and operational distance from the legacy of the former regime.
At a time when public opinion still recalls the atrocities of recent months in Syria’s coastal and southern regions, showcasing security successes is being used as a pathway to build domestic legitimacy.
Qasrak Base, located in northern Hasakah province near the town of Tal Tamer, functions as a joint facility between the Global Coalition against ISIS and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Covering an area of 1.8 square kilometers, the base was constructed in late 2017 and early 2018 on elevated agricultural land. The hill on which the base sits is locally known by the names “Jabal Ghol” and “Jabal Qalayeb.”
The well-equipped Qasrak base on November 6, 2022 (the main logistics section of the base is in the image above) Source: Google Maps and Airbus
Situated at geographic coordinates 36.706242, 40.511955, the Qasrak base lies roughly 30 kilometers from the center of Hasakah city and 33 kilometers from the Turkish border. Its 1.7‑kilometer runway is capable of accommodating military transport and cargo aircraft. As a strategic and logistical hub, Qasrek supports coalition operations in coordination with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and oversees the main supply routes linking Hasakah and Deir Ezzor.
Right image: Location of Qasrak base from Hasakah; Left image: Location of this base relative to the Turkish borderThe longest runway built by the US in Syria
Significant construction and expansion activities were first observed in early 2025, concentrated across three main sections. The eastern sector saw the most extensive work: land was leveled and covered with concrete at two separate points, likely in preparation for new facilities or warehouses intended for equipment and logistical supplies. The larger site measures approximately 193 by 94 meters, while the smaller one is about 84 by 60 meters.
Scope and dimensions of construction in the eastern part of the base
In addition to satellite imagery, multiple videos have documented the surge of activity at this base, including the movement of vehicles and convoys. The earliest footage, released by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) in early 2025, showed heavy machinery and bulldozers, described as “expansion operations at the base.” Analysis of visible structures and geographic features further confirmed that the location was indeed the Qasrek base.
Comparing field and satellite images to verify the base’s alleged location
Later, on September 28, 2025, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) released a video showing military convoys belonging to the Global Coalition moving toward the base. On October 18, 2025, another video depicted several coalition trucks carrying military and logistical equipment along the route from the al‑Walid border crossing toward the base.
A long line of trucks at the Al-Waleed border crossing on the way to the Qasrak base
In addition to ground movements, aerial activity at the base has increased significantly, with military transport aircraft landing on multiple occasions. Compared to previous years, this level of operations is unprecedented; prior to Assad’s fall, the base had only limited air traffic. Notable examples include an American cargo plane documented by SOHR on May 24, 2025, and another coalition transport aircraft recorded on July 23, 2025. Furthermore, on October 18, 2025, Syria Now reported that a large American cargo plane, escorted by helicopters from the Iraqi border, landed at the base. Taken together, these developments indicate that the Global Coalition is actively redeploying forces at Qasrek, likely transforming it into a key military logistics hub in northeastern Syria.
The moment a C-130 transport plane flies over Hasakah and near Qasrak base
Activities in Deir Ezzor
The expansion and intensification of activity has not been limited to the Qasrak base. Parallel, though distinct, developments have also been observed in Deir ez‑Zor—particularly at U.S. bases located in the al‑Omar oil field and the Conoco gas field. Alongside the rapid growth of Qasrak, satellite imagery shows American forces withdrawing from Conoco, al‑Omar, and the base near Green Village on the outskirts of Deir Ezzor.
Photographs taken since early 2025 reveal extensive relocation of equipment and the evacuation of facilities at these sites. Reports first published in May 2025 indicated that the Pentagon intended to transfer forces from al‑Omar and Conoco in Deir ez‑Zor to Qasrek and al‑Shaddadi in Hasakah, thereby reducing the U.S. military presence in the region to fewer than 1,000 troops.
Summary
Satellite imagery shows that between January and October 2025, U.S. forces withdrew from the Conoco, al‑Omar, and Green Village bases in the Deir Ezzor countryside. At the same time, Qasrak base near Hasakah witnessed rapid engineering and logistical expansion from July 2025 onward, including the construction of new facilities and the repeated arrival of supply convoys. These developments appear to have effectively transformed Qasrak into the primary command and supply hub for U.S. forces in northeastern Syria.
He stated: “The United States expects Baghdad to take concrete measures against Iran-backed armed groups, including those operating inside Iraq. We are disappointed by Iraq’s retreat from the asset freeze targeting Hezbollah and the Houthis. Hezbollah and the Houthis pose dangers to both the region and the world, and all countries must ensure their territory is not used by these groups or other Iranian proxies for training, fundraising, acquiring weapons, or carrying out attacks. Washington will continue pressing Iraq to curb the activities of Iran-aligned groups that threaten U.S. and Iraqi interests.”
The spokesperson’s frustrated reaction underscores that Washington views Baghdad’s reversal as a setback in its broader campaign to pressure the “Axis of Resistance.” In recent weeks, the U.S. has sought to leverage economic tools and political pressure to compel Iraq to align with its extraterritorial sanctions. Iraq’s change of stance must be understood within the context of domestic complexities and the government’s concern over backlash from political and social factions close to the resistance camp.
Baghdad recognizes that any direct move against Hezbollah or Ansarallah would be perceived by Iraq’s Shiite public opinion and allied armed groups as siding with U.S. policy, potentially destabilizing the country’s internal political and security balance.
Control of the 23rd Mika Brigade headquarters in the Al-Abr area, which had recently fallen to STC fighters, was handed over to Al-Dara’ Al-Watan forces (Saudi-backed) under the mediation and pressure of the Saudi security-military committee. This indicates that Riyadh has blocked the southern advance toward Marib and prevented further escalation with Islah Party elements.
Meanwhile, the Shahn and Sarfait border crossings along Yemen’s frontier with Oman have come under STC control, with customs offices refusing to clear shipments without southern authorization. Flags of South Yemen have been raised at these crossings and other border points in Al-Mahra province.
Raising the South Yemeni flag at the crossings and border points of Al-Mahra province
The Hadhramaut Tribal Council has held the UAE fully responsible for the ongoing tensions and clashes in Hadhramaut, accusing southern fighters of attacking tribal forces. The council filed a complaint to the “International Quartet” (United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and UAE), alleging violations of the ceasefire, and urged the Saudi-Emirati coalition leadership to intervene against Abu Dhabi. This complaint comes despite the UAE itself being a member of the Quartet and a co-leader of the coalition alongside Saudi Arabia.
Overall, the Southern Transitional Council has exploited the recent political and economic turmoil in Yemen’s occupied areas to consolidate control over eastern Yemen. Given the weak administrative capacity of the southern forces, conditions in the east are expected to remain volatile and subject to further shifts.
Latest military situation in Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra as of December 6, 2025
Amir Bohbot, an Israeli military analyst, claimed that Hamas managed to infiltrate Abu Shabab’s group by placing one of its affiliates from the Tarabin tribe inside. This infiltrator allegedly deceived the group’s members and lured them into an ambush, which ultimately led to the killing of Abu Shabab along with several of his companions.
On the other hand, some members of the Tarabin tribe stated that Abu Shabab was killed during an armed clash in eastern Rafah. According to their account, gunmen from two families of the Tarabin tribe, angered by Abu Shabab’s escalating violent actions such as kidnappings and killings of opponents, opened direct fire on him. The confrontation resulted in Abu Shabab’s death as well as the deaths of the attackers.
Pokrovsk, formerly known by its Russian name Krasnoarmiisk until 2016, is the administrative center of Pokrovsk Raion. The European route E50, a major continental highway, runs through the city, making it both a key hub of Ukraine’s coal industry and an important transport junction in the Donbas. Before 2020, Pokrovsk had a population of about 60,127, but due to the war, by late July 2025 the number had fallen to fewer than 1,500 residents.
Alongside Konstantinovka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk, Pokrovsk served as one of the main logistical and supply centers for Ukraine’s military in Donetsk Oblast.
To capture Pokrovsk, Russian forces effectively cut off Ukrainian supply lines, leading to a much quicker fall compared to other cities that had required months of heavy fighting. In the same sector, the town of Mirnograd is now encircled by Russian troops. Following the fall of Pokrovsk, only Konstantinovka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk (marked in turquoise circles) remain under Ukrainian control in Donetsk. Once these are taken, Ukraine’s position in the Donbas will effectively collapse.
Despite this massive investment, Afghanistan’s security structures collapsed against the Taliban, and much of the equipment fell into Taliban hands after the fall of Ashraf Ghani’s government in 2021.
SIGAR’s mission is to provide accurate statistical data, and its figures closely reflect realities on the ground. These findings have had a significant impact on shaping U.S. policy, pushing leaders to avoid large‑scale military entanglements and instead pursue cheaper, less costly strategies in future conflicts.
The Eternity C, owned by a Greek company cooperating with Israel was attacked and sunk by Yemeni armed forces in the Red Sea on July 7.
This move is likely linked to recent UN‑ and Oman‑mediated talks between Ansarallah and Saudi Arabia. Ansarallah often undertakes such gestures to demonstrate good faith in fulfilling its commitments.