Author: Mirza

  • Hamas agrees to Egypt and Qatar’s ceasefire proposal

    Hamas agrees to Egypt and Qatar’s ceasefire proposal

    The Palestinian news agency Samaa also reported that Hamas and Palestinian groups fully support the proposal offered by Egypt and Qatar for a ceasefire.

    The proposal includes a pathway to reach a comprehensive agreement to end the war and will temporarily pause military operations for 60 days.

    It is reported that 600 trucks of humanitarian aid will enter Gaza each day, and 1,700 Palestinian prisoners, including 1,500 from Gaza, will be released. Discussions to end the conflict are also scheduled to start during the 60-day ceasefire period.

  • U.S. Forces to Withdraw from Baghdad and Ain al-Asad

    U.S. Forces to Withdraw from Baghdad and Ain al-Asad

    Official Iraqi government sources have announced the beginning of the withdrawal of the U.S.-led international coalition forces from Baghdad and the Ain al-Asad base in Anbar province. The first phase of withdrawal is scheduled for September this year, during which U.S. forces stationed at Baghdad Airport and the Joint Operations Command will be relocated to Erbil.

    An Iraqi official told Al Jazeera that this retreat is part of an agreement between Baghdad and Washington, and that foreign military trainers will remain in Iraq. Meanwhile, Hussein Alawi, advisor to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani, stated that the coalition’s mission in Baghdad and Ain al-Asad will end in September 2025, with the second phase—complete withdrawal—set to be finalized by September 2026.

    According to Alawi, the Iraqi government is committed to strengthening its armed forces and transforming its security relations with coalition countries into stable bilateral partnerships. These relationships will extend beyond military cooperation to include political, economic, and cultural dimensions. He also announced the formation of a high-level military committee to oversee the implementation of the agreement.

    Currently, around 2,500 U.S. troops are present in Iraq as part of the international coalition, primarily stationed at three bases: Ain al-Asad in Anbar, Al-Harir in Erbil, and Victory Base at Baghdad Airport.

    The phased withdrawal from Iraq marks a turning point in Baghdad’s efforts to reclaim full security and military sovereignty. This process not only responds to internal pressures but also reflects the Al-Sudani government’s intention to gradually transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and restore the traditional role of the army in maintaining national stability.

    However, the continued presence of military trainers and ongoing bilateral defense cooperation with the U.S. and other coalition members indicates that Iraq is not seeking a complete severance of security ties. Instead, it aims to shift these relations from the temporary and emergency framework established after the rise of ISIS to a more balanced and enduring strategic partnership.

    The withdrawal from Baghdad and Ain al-Asad can also be seen as a direct result of pressure from resistance groups and their repeated warnings against the continued presence of foreign troops in Iraq. This outcome was achieved through serious negotiations led by the Al-Sudani government. However, it remains unclear whether the plan will be fully implemented or merely symbolic. Past experiences show that the U.S. has previously promised to withdraw its forces from Iraq but failed to follow through, extending its presence instead—raising ongoing doubts about Washington’s commitment to the latest agreement.

  • Turkey has spoken! Corridor from Sweida to the north is prohibited!

    Turkey has spoken! Corridor from Sweida to the north is prohibited!

    Turkey deemed such actions “imperialist and Zionist demands”, and a threat to the unity and sovereignty of Syria, as well as to the country’s political transition process. The spokesperson emphasized that Ankara will take all necessary measures to protect its national security.

    This stance indicates that Turkey views the situation not merely in terms of border security in Syria, but as part of a broader regional equation. This perspective may lead Turkey to consider more direct and preemptive actions in the Syrian arena.

    The mentioned corridor, often referred to as the so-called “David’s Corridor” is seen as a long-standing goal of Zionists aimed at expanding their influence in the region, both physically and spiritually. As long as this corridor is perceived as a threat to Turkey, the country will view it as a significant geopolitical shift and will oppose it firmly, unless the issues related to the Syrian Democratic Forces and the PKK in northern Syria are resolved.

    Turkey is particularly concerned about scenarios that could strengthen federal or autonomous structures in Syria, as these might bolster the position of armed Kurds in the northern regions.

  • Pentagon Stops Paying Salaries to Peshmerga Forces

    Pentagon Stops Paying Salaries to Peshmerga Forces

    According to the new U.S. budget law and documents released by the Pentagon, the United States will stop directly paying the salaries of the Peshmerga forces in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq by the end of 2025. Starting in 2026, the central government in Baghdad will be fully responsible for providing salaries for these forces. This decision is part of a broader effort to redefine the U.S. role in Iraq and gradually reduce the coalition mission in the country.

    A memorandum of understanding signed in September 2022 between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Kurdistan Region’s Peshmerga Ministry indicates that the budget for salary payments will gradually decrease, reaching approximately $135 million in 2024, about $60 million in 2025, and ultimately zero in 2026.

    Despite this overall budget reduction in 2026, logistical support for Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga will continue. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense will still receive equipment including communication systems, Hellfire missiles, reconnaissance systems, and logistics services. Additionally, the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service will receive a package valued at over $65 million.

    The U.S. decision to suspend payments to the Peshmerga forces marks a significant shift in Washington’s role in Iraq and sends a clear message to transfer security responsibilities to the central government in Baghdad. However, the Peshmerga forces’ financial dependence on foreign aid and the existence of parallel party structures present challenges to this transition. If Baghdad fails to provide salaries for these forces due to budgetary constraints or political disagreements with the Kurdistan Region, the risk of a security gap in northern Iraq may increase, which could have significant regional implications.

  • Operation Dawn Begins: Israeli Regime Launches Major Air Drill Amid Tensions

    Operation Dawn Begins: Israeli Regime Launches Major Air Drill Amid Tensions

    It is said that this exercise has been designed and implemented with the aim of assessing the readiness of the Zionist regime’s army to confront multi-front attacks and simultaneous conflicts. The operation is commanded by the Chief of Staff of the Israeli regime’s army, General Eyal Zamir, and is overseen by the army’s comptroller, retired Brigadier General Ofer Sarig.

    In addition to Israeli fighter jets, 40 fighter jets from the United States and 20 from Britain are also present in this exercise. A significant number of reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering aircraft have also been deployed for operational support.

    This exercise is being held amid rising tensions in the region, especially in southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, and officials of the regime continue their threats against Iran. The Israeli army has recently intensified its airstrikes against alleged Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon and is preparing for the full occupation of the Gaza Strip.

    According to the spokesperson of the Zionist regime’s army, the goal of the exercise is to assess reaction speed, decision-making quality, and operational coordination among various branches of the army. The exercise will continue until the end of the week. Some believe that the Israeli regime may use this exercise for another surprise and to carry out new attacks against Iran.

  • Silent Heirs of the Golan: The Emergence of New Resistance Group in Syria

    Silent Heirs of the Golan: The Emergence of New Resistance Group in Syria

    The Dawn of Hope
    While the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) concentrated their efforts on combating ISIS, Bashar al-Assad, backed by Iran and Russia, managed to reclaim large swaths of territory previously lost to Salafi groups. By 2019, following ISIS’s defeat, the conflict reached a form of deadlock. However, sudden offensives by groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army altered the dynamics.

    In the meantime, factions like the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), which had previously fought alongside the government, remained active—justifying their continued operations as responses to growing Israeli occupation. This faction, which supports the formation of a “Greater Syria,” expressed its support on December 17 for the establishment of a front to confront Israeli aggression. In response, the group Uli al-Baas emerged on January 9, initially under the name “Southern Liberation Front,” before adopting its current name and symbolism on January 11.

    As post-Assad Syria became a contested arena between Israeli and Turkish influence, Uli al-Baas framed itself as part of the Axis of Resistance against what it calls the “Global Axis of Evil.” In a statement to Newsweek, the group’s political bureau—officially named “The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Uli al-Baas”—affirmed that praising Israeli occupation and Turkish incursions is expected, since “[America] is the sponsor of chaos, terrorism, and evil across the globe.”
    The group’s emblem—featuring a raised Kalashnikov—mirrors an iconography first introduced by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later adopted by Hezbollah and other Iran-aligned resistance groups, including several in Iraq. The term Uli al-Baas, mentioned in the Qur’an, was previously invoked by Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem in reference to the group’s struggle against Israel.

    Despite its alignment with the Axis of Resistance, Uli al-Baas claims organizational and political independence, asserting no affiliation with any party or state. It presents itself as a revolutionary, nationalist movement rooted in Arab identity, with a distinct political project aimed at establishing a strong and liberty-oriented state.

    A Turbulent Beginning
    On January 13, Uli al-Baas claimed it was deploying light armored vehicles and fighters to Quneitra, Suwayda, Daraa, Damascus, and surrounding rural areas. Four days later, it officially declared the start of its “military operations” against Israeli presence in the south.
    The group’s first alleged action was reported on January 24, claiming that one of its units downed an Israeli drone in the Tal Ahmar area of rural Quneitra on January 21. On January 31, it issued a second statement, asserting that it had attacked Israeli forces in the village of Turanja, northern Quneitra. However, no evidence was provided, and on February 14, the group’s Telegram channel retracted the claim.

    Cooperation with Other Fronts
    On February 19, Uli al-Baas announced the deaths of two senior commanders, Muhannad al-Baqari and Muhammad Mansour, during an operation near Israeli positions in Quneitra. Just two days later, on February 21, the group formed a coalition with two other Iran-aligned factions— Liwa Dir’ al-Sahel, led by Miqdad Fathi, and Ashbah Ruh al-Muqawama, led by Abdulhamid al-Shamali. This alliance targeted ISIS, Salafi movements, and the newly restructured Syrian government. The republication of the coalition’s official statement by Uli al-Baas clearly indicated its confrontational stance toward Damascus.

    Mission
    The group identifies the expulsion of Israeli forces from southern Syria as a central objective. It cites Israel’s violations of the 1973 ceasefire line and its continued strikes on Syrian installations as justification for its armed resistance. Uli Albas views the Syrian interim government as complicit due to its silence regarding Israeli aggression. The Zionist officials, meanwhile, have warned they will not allow hostile forces to establish a presence near their borders.

    Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Uli al-Baas

    Post-Crisis Syria
    Despite Donald Trump’s stated intent to reduce military presence in the Middle East, roughly 2,000 American troops remain stationed in Syria. After the Gaza war, these forces were frequently targeted by militias, although such attacks diminished with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. With Uli al-Baas now rising and directly opposing U.S. and Israeli influence in Syria, the future of Washington’s regional presence has become increasingly uncertain.

    While the U.S. State Department has reiterated its commitment to inclusive and peaceful governance in Syria and its opposition to terrorist entrenchment, it continues to classify HTS as a terrorist organization—despite the group’s claimed shift away from jihadist ideology.

    Complicating matters further is the escalating tension between the U.S. and Iran, which intensified after Washington’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018. Uli al-Baas portrays Iran as a defender of sovereignty and freedom from U.S. domination, arguing that the pressure against Tehran stems from its threat to Israel’s existence.

  • The Echo of PJAK in Turkey’s Silence

    The Echo of PJAK in Turkey’s Silence

    PJAK was established in 2004 by Iranian members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Its military branch, the “Eastern Kurdistan Units,” operates across Iranian Kurdistan and Qandil in Iraq. Due to its origins, PJAK is influenced by the Turkish PKK, and the United States also regards it as an affiliate of the PKK.

    Over the past two decades, multiple clashes have occurred between Iranian forces and PJAK. One of the most significant confrontations took place in the summer of 2011, when the Iranian army launched a large-scale operation against PJAK positions in Qandil, which ended with a ceasefire declared on September 29 of that year. Nevertheless, sporadic skirmishes continued in the following years.

    PJAK is led jointly by Amir Karimi and Peyman Wiyan. The group is part of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and regards Abdullah Öcalan as its ideological leader. After the collapse of the peace process between Turkey and the PKK in 2015, a significant number of Iranian Kurds joined the KCK’s ranks, now making up roughly 35% of its military forces. This has strengthened PJAK’s role in both regional and international contexts.

    With the resumption of talks between Turkey and Öcalan in 2024, along with the PKK’s announcement of its withdrawal from armed struggle, the future of the PJAK remains uncertain. Some believe that the PKK’s military and guerrilla capabilities may shift to the PJAK, which could create significant security challenges for Iran.
    Maybe it’s worth revisiting Öcalan’s earlier statements; since 2008, he has expressed concerns regarding Iran’s interference in the peace process and in 2013, recommended boosting PJAK forces to 40,000 to confront Iranian dangers.

    Global developments—from the war in Ukraine and the Syrian crisis to Iran-Turkey rivalry, the role of Israel, and NATO tensions—have influenced Turkey’s strategic calculations regarding Iran. Turkey’s experiences in Syria and Iraq have shown that the Kurds act as a balance of power. Ankara now seeks engagement and coordination with PJAK instead of direct confrontation.

    In this context, Netanyahu’s focus on destabilizing Iran has pushed Turkey to develop a more calculated approach toward Iranian affairs. It seems Ankara has concluded that it cannot play an effective role in Iran’s future developments without considering PJAK’s influence. All these factors are compelling Turkey to seriously revise and prepare its strategic agenda concerning Iran. One indication of this may be the Turkish leadership’s intention to align the PKK’s congress with its own interests in renegotiation and potential rearmament.

    The Necessity of PJAK in Turkey’s New Strategy
    In 2015, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), along with several other Kurdish parties, attempted to reclaim their former position in Iranian Kurdistan’s political and social scene through a campaign called “Rasan,” aiming to curb PJAK’s growing influence. Clashes occurred in the mountainous region of Kileh Shin, allegedly part of an operation orchestrated by the Turkish government. Media outlets close to the PDKI and to some extent Komala subtly confirmed Turkey’s role in these events.

    However, these efforts failed, and the Iranian Kurdish parties were unsuccessful in achieving their objectives. Following this setback, Turkey began looking for a more effective alternative force in the region—and that force was PJAK. Simultaneously, Israel unofficially conveyed a message to these Kurdish parties suggesting that significant developments were approaching in Iran and that Kurds could play a key role in shaping them.

    PJAK in Turkey’s Strategic Calculations
    PJAK has yet to hold a congress to formally disarm or dissolve, and this process has stalled, with Qandil attributing the deadlock to Öcalan’s absence from the process. Even if a decision to end armed struggle is made, the guerrilla forces would not immediately lay down their arms. Integrating them into formal politics would require a transitional structure—something PJAK could provide, but only if a comprehensive agreement is reached between Turkey and Öcalan, and anti-Turkish elements within PJAK shift their stance.

    Turkey aims to use PJAK as a tool to manage potential developments in Iran and prevent the Kurds from aligning with Israeli interests, thereby avoiding a repeat of the Syrian scenario. For this reason, Ankara seeks to incorporate PJAK into any future peace agreements. According to a Kurdish journalist, Turkey envisions PJAK playing a role in Iran similar to that of the Syrian National Army (SNA) in Syria.

    Iran’s Position in the Turkey-PJAK Equation
    Since 2013, when PKK guerrillas withdrew toward Iran’s borders, Tehran has grown increasingly concerned about the implications of the Turkey-PKK peace process. In meetings with the PKK and Kurdish parties in Iraq, Iran explicitly warned about the expanded presence of these forces near its borders, questioning who would control PJAK in the event of a Turkey-Öcalan agreement. This concern led to a widening rift between Iran and Qandil.

    This concern was not solely security-related; it also stemmed from a deeper geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Turkey. From Tehran’s perspective, PJAK could become a tool of Turkish influence if the group aligns itself with Ankara. As a regional actor, Iran must maintain ties with Qandil and use political tools to prevent the balance from tipping solely in Turkey’s favor.

    The future role of PJAK depends on the PKK’s orientation toward Iran. If relations between Qandil and Tehran deteriorate, it would signal a full alignment of the PKK with Turkey—a scenario that seems unlikely for now without concrete assurances. For the sake of regional stability, both Iran and Qandil will likely be forced to maintain engagement.

  • Israeli Intelligence Infiltration Plan in Yemen Using Ali Abdullah Saleh’s Son

    Israeli Intelligence Infiltration Plan in Yemen Using Ali Abdullah Saleh’s Son

    Recently, Arab media reported that Ansar Allah was at odds with its main political ally, the “Popular Congress Party,” and claimed that the party’s leaders were detained and their headquarters seized, allegedly due to connections with Ahmed Abdullah Saleh, the son of ex-Yemeni leader Ali Abdullah Saleh, now residing in the Emirates. These reports, however, were false, and the Yemeni Popular Congress Party denied the accusations circulated by Saudi and Emirati media that Ansar Allah intelligence agents had attacked its headquarters in Sanaa.

    Salim Al-Mughlas, a member of the Ansar Allah political bureau, revealed that Saudi Arabia and the UAE recently attempted to incite Yemeni factions and trigger internal conflict in Sanaa, but this plan failed. He dismissed rumors in Arab media about the arrest of Popular Congress Party members, stating that these provocations aimed to target both the Popular Congress Party and the Ansar Allah movement.

    The story indicates that the Ansar Allah intelligence service acted wisely by uncovering and preventing the sedition led by elements linked to the Popular Congress Party. It appears that Mossad is trying to involve Ahmed Abdullah Saleh in politics through Emirati agents and by attracting members of the Popular Congress Party based in Sanaa, aiming to create new security tensions. Meanwhile, alongside Tariq Saleh’s covert efforts to strengthen ties with the Islah Party in Taiz, local sources confirmed that Madin Abdullah Saleh, another son of former Yemeni leader Ali Abdullah Saleh, recently arrived in Marib. He traveled to Riyadh a few days earlier and was coordinated into Marib by the Saudis. These actions align with a tripartite plan involving Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia to reintroduce Saleh’s children into Yemeni politics. During his visit, Madin likely met with Saudi-UAE coalition military leaders, including Sultan Al-Aradah, other Islah Party leaders, and Lieutenant General Sagheer bin Aziz, to discuss ongoing political and military developments.

    The plan to bring Ali Abdullah Saleh’s children back is actually a security strategy orchestrated by the Israeli Mossad. It started by rewriting the story of Saleh’s death at the hands of Ansar Allah while he was fleeing Sanaa, and progressed through his eldest son Ahmed’s contact with members of the Popular Congress Party in Sanaa. Recently, this has become more evident with the movements of Tariq and Madin Saleh in southwestern Yemen and Marib. It is anticipated that Saleh’s sons will enter Yemen as part of a new group of mercenaries connected to the Saudi coalition. Their goal is to recruit members of the Popular Congress Party in Sanaa, as well as forces loyal to Tariq Saleh and supporters of Ali Abdullah Saleh, such as Lieutenant General Sagheer bin Aziz. This strategy aims to weaken the political influence of Ansar Allah’s allies.

    At first glance, this plan might appear weak and naive, since the Popular Congress Party lacks significant power in Sanaa. Meanwhile, Ansar Allah, with its considerable political and social influence, could easily seize control of the entire organization of this party through a security operation. However, their separation will undermine Ansar Allah’s political standing in Yemen. Additionally, their subordinate elements could turn into a Mossad spy network in Sana’a and infiltrate the Yemeni government and armed forces. This would allow Israel to gather more intelligence and data on military and vital installations, as well as the headquarters of Ansar Allah leaders, commanders, and the Yemeni armed forces.

    Overall, Ansar Allah must work harder than ever to maintain the unity of their internal front within the Sana’a government and prevent spies from infiltrating areas under their control. One method of infiltration involves reopening roads between cities held by Ansar Allah and the resigned government, which is being pushed by the UN. This move could allow spies easier access to Ansar Allah’s internal territories. Although Ansar Allah oversees and inspects these roads, Israeli field agents possess specialized training and resources to evade security checks, potentially infiltrating cities controlled by Ansar Allah.

  • Azerbaijan and Israel: Baku to Host European Rabbinical Conference

    Azerbaijan and Israel: Baku to Host European Rabbinical Conference

    Hundreds of European rabbis will gather in Baku to discuss Azerbaijan’s accession to the Abraham Accords. This conference is significant as it will be the first of its kind held in a Muslim country.

    Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is also likely to attend the event. The previous session of the Jewish Conference was canceled due to the Operation Al-Aqsa Flood against Israel on October 7, 2023.

    Holding the first European Jewish Conference in Baku not only highlights the strong relations between Azerbaijan and Israel but also reflects ongoing efforts to enhance cooperation between the two sides. The Donald Trump administration had been advocating for Azerbaijan’s accession to this treaty for some time, considering Azerbaijan’s geopolitical position and strategic relations with Tel Aviv.

  • New CENTCOM Commander Announced: Admiral Brad Cooper

    New CENTCOM Commander Announced: Admiral Brad Cooper

    General Michael Erik Kurilla had been the commander of CENTCOM since April 2022, leading U.S. operations in West Asia.

    Admiral Cooper has a distinguished career in the U.S. Navy, having commanded the 5th Fleet in Bahrain from 2021 to 2024. He has participated in major operations, including Desert Storm and the war in Afghanistan. Additionally, he served as a senior advisor to the Afghan interior minister and studied national security policy at Harvard and Tufts Universities.

    Admiral Brad Cooper

    While he has adopted a more cautious approach regarding Kurillas compared to Iran, Admiral Cooper maintains close relations with the Israeli regime and has played a significant role in enhancing security cooperation since Israel joined CENTCOM.

  • Yemen’s Army Drone Attacks Against Israel

    Yemen’s Army Drone Attacks Against Israel

    According to a statement from the spokesman of the Yemeni armed forces, these operations were deemed successful.

    The Yemeni armed forces urged Islamic and Arab nations to support Palestine. They also warned companies involved with the ports in occupied Palestine, calling on them to cease their cooperation to safeguard the crews of their ships.

    Data collected by IWN indicates that these operations mark the 169th to 171st air operations of the Yemeni armed forces against the positions of the Zionist regime in occupied Palestine

  • Iran Executes Man Convicted Of Spying For Israel Over Nuclear Scientist Assassination

    Iran Executes Man Convicted Of Spying For Israel Over Nuclear Scientist Assassination

    “Roozbeh Vadi… was executed following judicial proceedings and confirmation of his sentence by the Supreme Court,” the judiciary’s Mizan Online website said, adding that the man had leaked information about a “nuclear scientist who was assassinated during the Zionist regime’s recent aggression.”

    The execution was carried out by hanging, it added, noting that Mizan reported that Vadi worked at one of Iran’s “key and sensitive organizations” and that his access enabled him to pass on “classified information” after being recruited online by Mossad.

    Israel started the war on June 13, stating that its goal was to cripple Iran’s nuclear program. The war ended when a ceasefire was suddenly announced on June 24, just two days after the United States joined the war by attacking three key nuclear sites in Iran.

    During the war, over a dozen Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated by the Israeli military and intelligence. More than 30 of the Islamic Republic’s top military commanders were also killed.

    Mossad rule in the war was not limited to assassinations, however. The agency’s special forces led a covert attack on Iranian air defenses and ballistic missiles, deploying suicide drones and guided missiles from within the territories of the Islamic Republic.

    Some 700 people suspected of working for Mossad were arrested by Iranian security forces during the war. At least few have already been convicted and executed.

    Originally posted on SouthFront