Category: US

  • Britain Opposes Potential U.S. Military Action Against Iran — But Why?

    Britain Opposes Potential U.S. Military Action Against Iran — But Why?

    Britain’s opposition to the use of Diego Garcia is reportedly linked to its prior plans to return sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to the Mauritius. Keir Starmer, the British Prime Minister, pledged in May 2025 to hand over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius in accordance with a ruling by The Hague court. However, Donald Trump has opposed the move, citing the strategic importance of the Diego Garcia air base and its 100-year lease arrangement.

    Consequently, launching attacks on Iran from Diego Garcia would effectively signal British support for military action and could carry significant repercussions. Such consequences could jeopardize British interests in West Asia, particularly maritime shipping routes in the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea. For this reason, London is currently opposed to any potential move by Trump to strike Iran.

    It is worth noting that Diego Garcia lies approximately 3,800 kilometers from Iran and about 3,400 kilometers from Yemen. The island has served as a primary base for U.S. strategic bombers during previous operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen, and it could play a central role in any potential confrontation between Washington and Tehran.

  • Invisible Flows; Economic Competition Between Iran and the United States on Iraqi Soil

    Invisible Flows; Economic Competition Between Iran and the United States on Iraqi Soil

    During the year before the 2025 parliamentary elections, Muhammad Shia al-Sudani’s government introduced a new form of role-playing in Iraq’s technology and information sectors. It awarded sensitive telecom and communication contracts to companies linked with resistance forces and granted Axis of Resistance views this trend through several strategic lenses.

    • Increasing Iraq’s strategic independence in the field of communications and reducing the country’s dependence on structures under Western influence
    • Stabilizing the soft power and social influence of the resistance movement against separatist or destabilizing projects
    • Reducing the scope of US surveillance and espionage by limiting Western-dependent information and technology tools
    • Economic and technological synergy between Iran and Iraq, especially in the field of communications, data, and electronic infrastructure
    • Preventing Iraq from becoming a base for intelligence operations against Iran and the countries of the Axis of Resistance

    Background
    Iraq’s telecommunications sector, after oil, has become a key strategic area for the Axis of Resistance. Expanding influence here not only enhances the Axis’s economic and technological capabilities but also plays a crucial role in fortifying Iraq’s internal security, supporting its legitimate government, deterring foreign interference, and managing information. From Iran’s view, control in this sector helps protect Iraq’s vital communications from Takfiri terrorism, foreign intelligence eavesdropping, and infiltration, while also countering psychological warfare and perception operations against the Resistance axis. Therefore, any US attempt to label Iraq’s telecommunications as a “threat” or a “sanctions circumvention tool” aligns more with a renewed maximum pressure strategy and limiting Iran-Iraq cooperation. This approach has been recently reinforced by the US National Security Council’s Memorandum No. 2.

    Infiltration of telecommunications infrastructure
    The effort to effectively infiltrate the telecommunications infrastructure of allied countries is not aimed at “control,” but at safeguarding national security, countering Western cyberattacks, and establishing information deterrence. There are two strategic reasons for this from the Resistance Axis perspective; first, in nations facing external threats, Takfiri terrorism, and Western intelligence operations—such as Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq—digital telecommunications are seen as crucial to national security. Foreign interference in this sector can lead to perception wars, political instability, and fake protests, which Iran and other Resistance Axis members have repeatedly experienced.
    Therefore, enhancing the Resistance Axis’ role here means shielding regional countries from cyber infiltration and foreign sabotage. second, managing data traffic and information routes enables governments to protect critical networks and keep internal communications secure during crises or widespread cyberattacks. Temporarily slowing internet speeds or restricting platforms is not meant to suppress society but to prevent misuse of digital tools like encrypted messaging or video calls during security crises.
    Many countries, including Western ones, recognize such measures as protective. From this view, what some call “Iranian dominance of the telecommunications sector” is actually a legitimate effort to achieve digital independence, bolster cyber sovereignty, and reduce reliance on Western-controlled infrastructure—an essential step for collective security based on resistance and regional stability.

    Key Findings and Analysis

    1- The Growth of Resistance and Iran’s Influence in Iraq’s Tech Sector
    Iran leverages advanced telecommunications, whether from allies like Russia and China or domestically produced, as part of a strategy to boost digital sovereignty and cyber defense. These tools enable Iran and regional allies to monitor, safeguard, and strengthen critical networks against cyber threats from hostile nations, primarily targeted by Western intelligence, especially the U.S. and Europe. Controlling telecommunications regulators in allied countries allows Iran and resistance groups to introduce secure, compatible technologies aligned with security needs while blocking systems that could cause dependency or data leaks. This acts as a sovereign security measure rather than anti-competitive behavior, as regional nations face widespread electronic espionage, making unregulated market access to key infrastructure risky. Additionally, establishing and managing independent, encrypted networks helps Iran and resistance forces secure their strategic communications from cyber attacks, eavesdropping, and sabotage by foreign adversaries. This creates an information defense shield crucial for regional stability during crises and curbing foreign influence. Economically, overseeing telecommunications infrastructure in allied nations can bolster an independent digital economy. Price and bandwidth controls serve not to create monopolies but to prevent Western dominance, protect sensitive data, and ensure sustainable government revenue. Leveraging unused network capacity or international links might also generate legitimate income under sanctions, helping regional actors earn foreign currency and lessen economic vulnerabilities.

    2- Resistance-oriented capabilities in Iraq’s telecommunications industry
    A) Single Internet Gateway:
    A single Internet gateway centralizes the management of global connectivity, serving as a tool for digital sovereignty. By routing international connections through a single, government-controlled point, countries like Iran, Iraq, or Lebanon can protect themselves against cyber threats from foreign entities such as NSA, Israeli operations, or Western tech firms that transfer data abroad. This approach does not isolate them from the global network but ensures data flows are regulated according to national laws and security protocols. Unregulated private options, including some Western satellite Internet services, could threaten a country’s cyber sovereignty. Therefore, nations have the authority to establish their own legal frameworks to uphold security.

    B) Preventing Foreign Infiltration
    Controlling key organizations to prevent foreign infiltration of critical infrastructure is vital. Countries vulnerable to terrorist threats, cyber sabotage, and extensive information infiltration—especially those under pressure from the United States or the Zionist regime—must maintain an integrated and secure telecommunications management system. From the resistance axis perspective, coordination among the head of state, the ministry of communications, the regulatory authority, and the national operator is crucial, not to stifle competition but to shield critical infrastructure from infiltration by Western companies and security agencies. This strategy aims to protect fiber optic cables, submarine cables, microwave stations, and data centers from unauthorized access by foreign or malicious entities. Such access is not meant to control society but to prevent cyberattacks, delay targeted attacks, avoid network breaches, and safeguard data traffic. In volatile regions like Iraq and Yemen, lacking these controls often facilitates infiltration by the Zionist regime, the United States, or Takfiri groups.

    C) Cyber ​​Defense and Preventing Covert Attacks
    Deep inspection technologies play a crucial role in cyber defense and thwarting covert attacks within the resistance-oriented framework. They enhance protection against electronic espionage, multi-layered cyber assaults, and networks of digital terrorists. These tools enable governments to detect attack patterns, suspicious data flows, infiltration methods, and attempts to bypass national laws. Monitoring IP addresses, devices, and suspicious activities is standard practice worldwide—from China and Russia to the United States. When combined with intelligent management of network traffic speed and routes, these technologies defend citizens and critical infrastructure from malware, data theft, deception, and foreign espionage. From the resistance axis perspective, these measures aim to create a secure internet, establish independent digital governance, and prevent foreign influence—not to restrict people, but to shield nations that have long been targets of hybrid warfare and cyberattacks.

    3- The Role of Iraqi Resistance Groups in the Telecommunications Industry and the US Confrontation
    A contract in the Iraqi telecommunications sector highlights a critical aspect of communication security: the Popular Mobilization Forces’ access to Western, particularly American, satellite internet technology. This access, which enables the forces to utilize advanced communication systems, is part of Iraq’s broader effort to bolster defenses against terrorism, cyber attacks by the Zionist regime, and American influence in regional communication networks. Although the US has not officially sanctioned the Popular Mobilization Forces, it has made extensive efforts over the years to restrict their access to strategic technologies. A notable example is the prolonged US campaign to recover M-1 Abrams tanks held by some PMF units, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, during the fight against ISIS—an effort that achieved only partial success. This demonstrates that the US aims to limit Iraq’s self-defense capabilities. In late 2024, US-sanctioned Faleh al-Fayyadh signed a contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Communications to supply strategic satellite communication systems to the PMF headquarters. The contract, titled “Contract for the Supply of Strategic Satellite Communications Systems to the PMF Committee,” was signed by Nabil Abdul-Baqi, then director general of Al-Salam Company, a state-owned entity affiliated with the Ministry.

    In late 2024, Faleh al-Fayyadh, who is sanctioned by the US, signed a contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Communications to supply strategic satellite communications systems to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) headquarters. The contract, officially titled “Contract for the Supply of Strategic Satellite Communications Systems to the PMF Committee,” was signed by Nabil Abdul-Baqi, then director general of the state-owned Al-Salam Company affiliated with the Ministry of Communications.

    Although the contract is relatively small at 1.09 billion Iraqi dinars (around $832,000), it involves advanced equipment, including VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) systems of the US-made Kymta U-8 type. Most of the equipment listed is produced in the US and Europe. Analysis suggests that this equipment was initially sold to the Iraqi Ministry of Communications, likely with the understanding that they were the end user. However, it appears to have been later transferred to the PMF by the Iraqi government, aligned with national security needs. From Baghdad’s and the resistance axis’s viewpoint, such a transfer is a legitimate, defensive action within Iraqi sovereignty, though it might trigger a response from Washington.

    4- Engineer Company; the infrastructure arm of the resistance
    The “General Engineer Company” is part of Iraq’s effort to strengthen its sovereignty and stabilize its economy and security. These forces played a crucial role in protecting territorial integrity and regional security during tough years fighting Takfiri terrorism. Founded in 1401, the company aims to organize the economy of popular organizations and reduce reliance on foreign firms, similar to Iran’s large construction entities like Khatam al-Anbiya. Its structure allows legal activities across sectors such as industry, agriculture, infrastructure, communications, and equipment, leveraging government resources to boost Iraq’s rebuilding efforts. U.S. sanctions are not driven by concern for Iraq’s economy but by a desire to hinder the development of independent, domestic infrastructure that could weaken Western dominance. Washington fears Iraq developing a resistance economy—one based on local power and popular support—reducing Western economic influence and contractors. Sanctions against the company and its affiliates are thus a form of political pressure aimed at limiting Iraq’s popular forces and regional allies. In communications, the company’s involvement in fiber optic and telecom projects is seen by Iran as essential to prevent Iraq’s dependency on Western systems.

    Controlling communication infrastructure locally ensures data security, privacy, and guards against foreign espionage. The U.S. fears Iraq becoming autonomous in this sector, as data networks are key points of dependence in the region. From this angle, U.S. hostility toward the company’s communication projects reflects efforts to preserve this dependence. For resistance groups, U.S. sanctions aim to prevent the formation of a coordinated, resilient resistance network within the broader resistance axis.

    Companies involved in digital infrastructure, energy, and communications, when managed by popular Iraqi institutions, can enhance data exchange, secure communications, technology transfer, and regional economic cooperation. This process will eventually reinforce Iraqi sovereignty and diminish Washington’s influence, which is why the US aims to impede or slow it through sanctions. Additionally, US claims about Western communication equipment or technologies being transferred to popular forces are part of psychological warfare and media campaigns to undermine the reputation of legitimate Iraqi institutions. These allegations are largely based on political speculation and seek to delegitimize institutions crucial in fighting terrorism and maintaining stability. The supervision of the Iraqi Ministry of Communications should not be used as a tool of external pressure but should be conducted within the framework of Iraqi sovereignty by its legitimate institutions. Any Western intervention in this sector perpetuates the same approach that has long hindered Iraq’s political and economic independence.

    Iraq’s fiber optic infrastructure, which is in the hands of resistance groups.
  • Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council: Iran’s Missile Program Is Not Negotiable

    Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council: Iran’s Missile Program Is Not Negotiable

    He added that Iran’s missile program is part of the country’s national security and is not subject to negotiation.

    He further stated that Iran will continue nuclear negotiations and is prepared to cooperate in order to reach a constructive and lasting agreement. However, he stressed that the talks must be fair, realistic, and free from stalling tactics, and should not be used as a tool for other objectives.

  • Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces: A battle with Iran will serve as an eye-opening lesson for Trump!

    Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces: A battle with Iran will serve as an eye-opening lesson for Trump!

    Major General Seyed Abdolrahim Mousavi emphasized that if Trump intends to pursue war, entering such a conflict would serve as an eye-opening lesson for him, the outcome of which would prevent him from issuing threats and engaging in bluster on the global stage.

    He also questioned why the U.S. president speaks of negotiations while simultaneously issuing threats!!!

  • Rubio: Washington Still Insists on a Diplomatic Solution Regarding Iran

    Rubio: Washington Still Insists on a Diplomatic Solution Regarding Iran

    Speaking after a meeting with Robert Fico, Prime Minister of Slovakia, he said: “We are focused on negotiations, and diplomatic efforts are ongoing.”

    Rubio declined to comment on the possibility of any military action, but noted that U.S. representatives are traveling to hold meetings related to the Iran file, and that Washington will await the outcomes of these talks. He also stressed that the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf is aimed at defending American forces and interests.

  • Araghchi Departs for Geneva for Second Round of Iran–U.S. Talks

    Araghchi Departs for Geneva for Second Round of Iran–U.S. Talks

    According to official sources, indirect talks between Iran and the United States will be held on Tuesday. The discussions are being conducted with the mediation of Oman. The stated aim of this round of negotiations is to continue examining technical and political solutions to advance the dialogue process and reduce differences.

  • Syria’s Minister of Information Met With IREX!

    Syria’s Minister of Information Met With IREX!

    During the meeting, the head of the American delegation claimed to have an “understanding of the real condition of the media” and called for identifying the sector’s practical needs so that training and development initiatives could be designed accordingly.The organization IREX is an institution whose primary objective is expanding U.S. influence worldwide. The United States pursues this agenda under the cover of exchanging researchers, teachers, students, and ideas in targeted countries.

  • The United States Burns Its Bases After Evacuating Them in Syria! (Video)

    The United States Burns Its Bases After Evacuating Them in Syria! (Video)

    The transfer of part of the military equipment from Al-Shaddadi base, which had begun earlier, is expected to continue until February 10. These movements, along with the burning of the bases, are part of Washington’s strategy to reduce its presence in the region and prevent these facilities from being reused.

  • Escalation of U.S. Terror Operations in Central and Eastern Yemen

    Escalation of U.S. Terror Operations in Central and Eastern Yemen

    On February 12, a passenger vehicle was struck by an unidentified drone along the coast of the city of Al-Ghaydah, the capital of Al-Mahrah province. As a result of the attack, one or two unidentified individuals were killed. It is believed that one of them may have been a Somali national with a background in either Al-Qaeda or ISIS. A Yemeni source identified the two individuals as Abdullah Abdulrazzaq, originally from Somalia, and Mohammed al-Hammami, a resident of Sana’a.

    Images released by local sources indicate that the missile used in the strike was a Ninja missile (AGM-114 Hellfire), reportedly deployed by U.S. drones. The United States uses this missile in highly specific targeted operations. Previously, it had only been employed in assassinations in Syria and in one case in Lebanon. Therefore, this marks the first reported use of the Ninja missile in U.S. operations in Yemen.

    U.S. drones also conducted two additional operations in Marib province on 25 January and 4 February, though official details have not been released. According to local sources, the first strike involved three missiles fired at a house in the Al-Kharashi area north of Marib city, killing three Al-Qaeda members from the Al-Qayfa area in Al-Bayda province. The second attack targeted a gathering of four Al-Qaeda members — Idris al-Masri, Abu Saleh Ibrahim al-Banna, Battar al-San’ani, Homam al-San’ani, and the son of Khaled Batarfi — in the Arq Al Shabwan area northeast of Marib city.

    According to statistics reported by Western media regarding U.S. airstrikes in Yemen over the past two decades, more than 390 operations have been carried out against Al-Qaeda members in the country.

    The pace of U.S. air operations in Yemen over the past three months has increased significantly compared to the previous two years, including the period following the inauguration of Donald Trump. Over the last three months alone, seven operations have been conducted — six in Marib and one in Al-Mahrah. In terms of timing, one operation took place in November, three in December, and three up to February 12. Since the beginning of these operations — marked by the assassination of Abu Ali al-Harithi on November 5, 2002 — the stated objective of the United States has been to counter Al-Qaeda activities. Since then, more than 1,600 individuals have reportedly been killed under this pretext.

  • Reverse Suicide Rotation!; America’s New Drone Policy in West Asia

    Reverse Suicide Rotation!; America’s New Drone Policy in West Asia

    Increased US Threat in Iran’s Vicinity:
    Since the drones in this plan are based on the Shahed-136 model but feature additional capabilities and automated coordination, their deployment could boost US ability for precision strikes, swarming attacks, and long-range operations targeting regional assets.

    Evolving Deterrence and Military Competition:
    The introduction of a large number of low-cost drones will challenge the traditional balance between Iran’s air-missile capabilities and advanced US systems, potentially initiating a new arms race focused on “cheap mass production.”

    Uncertain Security and Political Outcomes:
    Deploying these systems, which can operate independently and within networks, raises questions about Washington’s intentions: Is it deterrence? Preparing for future offensives? Pressuring Iran? Or fostering a new pattern of regional conflict? The key issue is the impact of deploying the Scorpion Strike drone unit and affordable, network-capable drones on regional power dynamics, security, and Iran’s deterrence against the US. This report explores how this could alter combat rules, increase limited conflicts, or forge a new drone warfare paradigm in West Asia.

    Background
    The US Army has deployed its first operational unit equipped with affordable kamikaze drones of the “Unmanned Combat Attack System” type in West Asia. These systems are based on reverse-engineering the Iranian Shahed-136 drone. According to Gifron Aerospace, the team leader, establishing the Scorpion Strike Task Force marks a major shift in operational structure and reflects Washington’s new stance on Iran. Earlier reports also highlighted the US military’s need to heavily invest in these Shahed-136 clones, which are quick to produce and adaptable, and could be crucial in future global missions.

    Analysis of Findings:

    Mechanism of Formation of the Scorpion Task Force
    The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced the formation of the Scorpion Strike Task Force, created under the “US Military Drone Dominance Plan” launched earlier this year by US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. The task force, which reports directly to the US Special Operations Command Central, is responsible for overseeing the deployment of new drones in the region. Additionally, the “CENTCOM Joint Rapid Response Task Force,” established last September to enhance the deployment of military capabilities, has also been involved. Tim Hawkins, a CENTCOM spokesperson, explained that the task force includes approximately 24 specialists whose role is to manage the deployment and operation of new drones. He noted that while the exact number of drones deployed remains undisclosed, their deployment is substantial enough to grant the US military a “significant level of operational capability.”

    Drones and Estimated Production Cost
    The drones, featuring a delta wing design and measuring about 10 feet in length and 8 feet in width, were created by Arizona’s Spectre Works in partnership with the US Army. This system includes technical features enabling ‘automated coordination” among the drones, making them suitable for group tactics and network operations. Captain Tim Hawkins, a project team member, reported that each drone costs approximately $35,000. Despite the low price, the system offers capabilities comparable to traditional long-range US Army systems but at a significantly reduced cost. He also highlighted their long range, the ability to operate beyond line of sight, and extensive coverage potential within CENTCOM’s area. An official CENTCOM statement mentioned that these long-range, autonomous LUCAS drones are now operational in the region and can be launched via various methods, including catapults, rocket-assisted systems, and ground- or vehicle-based launchers.

    Multi-platform drones
    Military analyst Joseph Trowick explained that LUCAS drones can be launched from various platforms, not just ground-based systems. These drones support multiple launch methods, including deployment from naval vessels, which enhances their value in maritime and sea-based missions. Earlier US military analyses indicated that integrating inexpensive, multi-role drones into the US Navy could add new layers of defense, attack, electronic warfare, intelligence, and networking capabilities. This would transform warships into advanced nodes within a combat network. Trowick also noted that the initial design of the new UAS drone was directly inspired by Iran’s Shahed-136. The US military collaborated with several innovative tech companies to develop and produce the drone, which is a “direct result of that reverse engineering effort”. While it follows the general pattern of the Shahed, some parts have been redesigned to meet US operational requirements.

    FLM-136 UAV
    SpectreWorks, a manufacturer of these drones, has released specifications for a related design called the FLM-136, described as a “training target” or experimental platform. According to the data, the drone can reach a maximum range of approximately 715 km and remain airborne for up to six hours. Its payload capacity, excluding fuel, is around 18 kg, and it flies at about 137 km/h, with the ability to accelerate to roughly 194 km/h. It remains unclear whether these features fully represent the operational prototype of the combat offensive system or if they only pertain to experimental and early versions.

    According to data from the US Army Operational Environment Data Integration Network portal, the Shahed-136 drone features a 50-horsepower internal combustion engine and can reach speeds of around 185 km/h (100 knots). Its standard version has an operational range of approximately 2,000 km and can carry a 40 kg warhead. Designed mainly for point attacks on stationary targets, it relies on pre-programmed targeting data. Recently, Iran has introduced new Shahed-136 variants, including models with advanced guidance systems and a jet engine version with different speeds and ranges. Russia has also started producing the “Geran” variants based on the same design since beginning drone cooperation with Iran. Several derivative models are now part of its arsenal. Reports suggest that both Iran and Russia are working to enhance their drones with more dynamic, flexible, and reactive targeting capabilities, aiming for semi-intelligent drones capable of attacking moving targets or altering course during flight.

    The Importance of Cheap, High-Performance Drones
    Captain Tim Hawkins announced that the US has reached a new stage: mass-producing drones and deploying them in West Asia for the first time. He described this as a “reverse scenario against Iran,” where the US is using the same approach Iran developed through frequent drone attacks in the region. According to the head of the CENTCOM team at MacDill Air Base, observing Russia’s operations in Ukraine and Iran’s drone attacks on the Zionist regime shows that this tactic can cause significant disruption and impose heavy defense costs on the enemy. From the US perspective, it is now time to apply the same “Iranian strategy” against Iran.
    Although the Scorpion Special Forces haven’t yet deployed their new drones in actual missions, they have been tested against regional targets, confirming their operational potential. Hawkins pointed out that enhancing the US’s offensive and defensive capabilities is a concurrent strategy and stated that “sometimes effective defense comes from effective attack.” Until now, the US military has mainly regarded the drones publicly as training tools or threat simulators rather than as active offensive systems.The system could also be employed against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. While the US has announced a formal ceasefire with the group, the capability to strike them remains if necessary. The main obstacle, however, is not a lack of offensive power but rather identifying the right target. From a strategic perspective, drones like Shahed offer advantages beyond West Asia and North Africa, providing the ability to deliver large amounts of low-cost firepower. This enhances the capability to weaken enemy defenses and aligns with the US military’s focus on developing long-range, affordable, and mass-produced weapon systems.

    New capabilities
    Modern drones can be continuously upgraded thanks to their modular and open architecture design. This setup permits the integration of the latest sensors, navigation tools, and AI components without altering the core drone structure. As previously mentioned, advancements in positioning, navigation, and timing technologies are ongoing, allowing affordable, precision-attack drones to leverage this flexibility to combat electronic warfare. Additionally, the deployment of artificial intelligence in lower-end drones is imminent, enabling them to navigate autonomously without GPS and target moving objects effectively.Consequently, the effectiveness of electronic warfare in disrupting these systems is waning. In the near future, thousands of inexpensive yet highly threatening drones—costing just a fraction of a traditional cruise or ballistic missile—could easily overwhelm and disable even the most advanced enemy air defenses. This capability is expected to become a vital component of future major conflicts. Tim Hawkins notes that development efforts are progressing rapidly, especially for low-cost attack drones that are scalable and upgradeable. Spectre Works is not alone in this market; Gryphon Aerospace, an American company, also supplies a drone similar to the Shahed series, the Arrowhead MQM-172, to the US armed forces.

  • Changing the US Presence in Syria: Details of Military and Logistics Movements at US Bases in Eastern Syria

    Changing the US Presence in Syria: Details of Military and Logistics Movements at US Bases in Eastern Syria

    Analysis of satellite images and field reports from early 2025 indicates a shift in US force deployment from dispersal to concentration along the eastern axis. Deir Ezzor bases, once serving as contact points for local threats, have seen reduced activity and the withdrawal of equipment recently. The evacuation of some facilities at CONOCO, Al-Omar, and Green Village initially suggested a potential withdrawal, but later developments suggest otherwise. Current data reveals that Washington is adopting a strategy of “reducing presence and increasing infrastructure depth.” Recent weeks have seen the transfer of equipment, new construction, and convoy movements across multiple eastern bases, indicating a strategic reorganization rather than a withdrawal, effectively shifting the focus of US presence in Syria.

    Conceptual Framework
    After 2025, the US military presence in Syria has shifted to a new phase that diverges significantly from earlier patterns. Instead of focusing on “territorial dominance” through large bases and extensive field operations, the current strategy emphasizes positional-functional control. In this approach, bases serve not just as military locations but as strategic instruments for blocking geopolitical bottlenecks and influencing the region’s geoeconomic network.In this context, the significance of bases is determined by their role within power chains and strategic routes rather than their size. For example, Qasrak base as a logistical gateway east of the Euphrates and a command post for northeastern Syria, while Al-Tanf is pivotal in disrupting Iran’s land corridor to the Mediterranean. These bases serve as “geopolitical levers,” demonstrating a shift from tactical presence to targeted influence engineering. Each base now functions as a tool for managing regional relations and maintaining strategic balances.

    The map in the US Congressional Report shows the deployment of US military bases in Syria and areas under its control in 2025, with an emphasis on key points in northeastern Syria and strategic borders. Source: US Congressional Report (CRS 2025) – Syria: Transition and U.S. Policy

    Based on US Congressional reports and Tom Barrack’s speech at the Doha Forum, Syria has shifted from being merely a ongoing crisis to becoming a strategic platform for shaping a new regional order in the Arab East. This shift suggests that the US intends to maintain a presence in Syria to influence emerging power dynamics. Rather than sticking to a purely security-focused approach, the US is redefining its global role as a key actor in the region’s geopolitical and security landscape. This military reorientation represents not only a tactical change but also a move toward establishing a new power framework in West Asia.

    The New Map of US Military Presence
    The US military presence in Syria has shifted from direct control to managing strategic locations. These bases now serve not just military purposes but act as points within a broader geopolitical network shaping regional dynamics. This section examines three active bases and their contribution to extending US influence in Syria.

    Inactive Bases
    In 2025, the United States shifted its military focus to strategic and geopolitical areas by closing several key bases in Syria. Bases like Al-Omar and CONOCO, primarily used for energy and surveillance, were transferred to SDF forces. Additionally, Tal Baydar and Wazir bases, closed due to their poor locations and diminished Turkish sensitivities, became part of the new US strategy targeting crucial geopolitical hubs. These actions indicate that the US now aims not only to secure oil resources but also to control strategic positions to influence Syria’s future political and security landscape.

    US geopolitical logic
    The US presence in Syria, particularly in the northeastern regions, has experienced notable changes driven by security concerns and regional geopolitics, reflecting efforts to shape a new regional order. These changes not only involve scaling back military footprint in certain areas but also show a reinterpretation of America’s role in Syria and the wider region. Strategic American bases in Syria serve as tools of geopolitical influence, impacting the regional power dynamics in Arab East and West Asia. The motivations and geopolitical reasoning behind this realignment of US bases and its presence in Syria are discussed below.

    Containing Iran and controlling the land corridor
    One of the primary objectives of the United States in Syria is to restrict Iranian influence. The strategic Al-Tanf base, situated at the Syria-Jordan-Iraq border triangle, is seen as crucial to U.S. interests. Since the start of the U.S. presence in Syria, Al-Tanf has been instrumental in blocking Iran’s land corridor and continues to serve this purpose. The goal of maintaining Al-Tanf is to prevent Iran from establishing a land link from Tehran to Beirut, thereby stopping Iran from entering Lebanon and expanding its regional influence. The U.S. presence here acts as a chokepoint for Iran, playing an essential role for the Western alliance and the Zionist regime, especially in hindering Iran’s coordination with resistance forces in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

    Maintaining leverage in Syria’s political future
    Another objective of the United States in restructuring bases and trimming its military footprint is to utilize the remaining bases as leverage in the Syrian political arena. The 2025 US Congressional Report notes that the US has transformed its military presence into a bargaining tool in political negotiations following the fall of the Assad regime. While justified as efforts against ISIS, this presence primarily aims to be involved in Syria’s reconstruction and to shape its future political and security frameworks in alignment with Washington’s interests. Key bases like Qasr and al-Shaddadi, which serve as strategic contacts with local forces and Syrian Kurds, provide the US with significant influence in post-Assad negotiations.

    Managing the relationship with Turkey
    Another strategic move for the United States in Syria involves managing its complex relationship with Turkey. By withdrawing from sensitive areas in northern Syria, such as Tal Baydar, the U.S. has lessened Turkey’s sensitivities and improved its security position. Meanwhile, reports emerged in late 2024 and early 2025 about the establishment of a base in Ain al-Arab, which were consistently denied by both American and Turkish sources. Regardless, the U.S. goal of rebuilding the base near the Turkish border can be seen as a deterrent against Türkiye, allowing Washington to influence Turkish policies in northern Syria.

    Presence in the future geoeconomic corridors
    Among American politicians, Syria is considered a key element in the evolving landscape of the Arab East. At the Doha Forum, Tom Barrack mentioned that the United States is leveraging Syria as a platform to forge a new geopolitical and economic framework. Linking Syria with Lebanon, the Zionist regime, Turkey, and Jordan could influence trade, energy, and transit pathways. These nations, which serve as vital economic and commercial hubs in the region, can be strategically connected through key locations like Qasrak, Al-Shaddadi, and Al-Tanf. This allows the U.S. not only to utilize these networks now but also to steer and reshape them in the future.

    Turning Syria into a scene for containing Russia
    After the collapse of the old order, the United States sees a chance to restore its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria. The Syrian bases serve to contain Iranian influence and oppose Russian expansion in the area. By keeping a military presence and enhancing key strategic locations in Syria, the U.S. can better negotiate with Moscow and act as a deterrent to Russian ambitions.

    Conclusion
    Since 2025, the U.S. has significantly restructured its military presence in Syria, emphasizing key bases in strategic locations. These adjustments aim to curb Iranian influence, especially by severing the Tehran-Beirut land corridor and limiting the resistance axis’s maneuvering capabilities. Bases such as Qasrak, Al-Shaddadi, and Al-Tanf now function as tools for overseeing energy resources, trade routes, and shaping policies in Syria and among regional actors like Turkey. Beyond oil, the U.S. seeks to play a decisive role in Syria’s political landscape and regional power dynamics, using these bases to counter Russian influence. These strategic adjustments enable the U.S. to stay a dominant player, safeguarding its security and shaping a new economic and political order around Syria.

  • Where Is the Third Major U.S. Base in Saudi Arabia?

    Where Is the Third Major U.S. Base in Saudi Arabia?

    This base serves a logistical and supply role for U.S. forces in western Saudi Arabia and has recently undergone expansion. Development began in early 2025 and includes the construction of underground storage facilities, ammunition depots, new logistics and support infrastructure, as well as housing for U.S. personnel.

    Given its capabilities, the base could potentially serve as an alternative to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Qatar’s proximity to Iran and the presence of Iran’s short-range missile stockpiles have highlighted Al Udeid’s vulnerability, prompting the U.S. to consider substituting it with other bases. That said, the mission profile of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia is largely defensive and training-oriented. For instance, during the Saudi-Emirati coalition’s war in Yemen, these forces repeatedly took part in air defense operations, intercepting Yemeni missiles and drones and thereby indirectly engaging in the conflict.

    Overall, despite Saudi Arabia’s neutral stance in recent Iran–U.S. tensions, L.S.A. Jenkins could be considered a potential target of Iranian missile strikes. The base is approximately 1,300 km from Iran’s Ahvaz and 990 km from Saada.