Introduction

In recent decades, under Crown Prince and Abu Dhabi ruler Mohammed bin Zayed, the UAE has pursued an assertive and expansionist strategy aimed at extending its political, economic, and military reach from the Gulf to the Horn of Africa. Bin Zayed, a member of the influential Al Nahyan family, is a staunch opponent of political Islam and a strategic ally of the United States. Washington, in turn, has relied on the UAE in its regional policies, particularly in countering Islamist groups and managing crises.

The UAE’s population is estimated at around 10 million, of which only one million are citizens; the majority are foreign workers. This demographic reality, combined with oil wealth and vast financial resources, has enabled a foreign policy rooted in economic power and regional networking. Exploiting instability and deep divisions in countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and Libya, the UAE has exerted significant influence over local actors—an influence that would have been impossible in the presence of strong, centralized governments.

Abu Dhabi’s Role in the Horn of Africa Balance

The UAE’s military interventions in Libya and Sudan exemplify this approach. In these cases, Abu Dhabi backed forces and groups that countered the influence of rivals like Turkey and Qatar. Over the past decade, Emirati foreign policy has relied on exploiting weak state structures, proxy military networks, and financial capacity—a strategy built on “transactional diplomacy” and “targeted interventionism.”

Internationally, this policy emerged as the U.S. retreated from its role as global liberal hegemon and scaled back military interventions. Between 2009 and 2011, Bin Zayed recognized that the resulting power vacuum in West Asia and the Horn of Africa offered an unprecedented opportunity for his country to assert itself. Aware of the UAE’s demographic and military limitations but financial and logistical strength, he sought to elevate its geopolitical standing through proactive engagement in surrounding regions.

The outcome was the launch of a hegemonic and expansionist project spanning both sides of the Red Sea—from the Gulf of Aden to the coasts of Sudan and Eritrea. Through massive investments in ports, infrastructure, and logistics networks across Africa, the UAE became one of the continent’s largest port investors. This economic strategy, combined with military and intelligence activities, enabled Abu Dhabi to build a “transnational empire” blending hard and soft power. Additionally, through informal gold trade networks, the UAE has extracted enormous financial gains from Africa, including the smuggling of roughly 400 tons of gold annually. These economic interests are closely tied to Emirati‑linked companies and institutions active in Africa’s port, security, and financial sectors.

Socotra: UAE’s Expanding Maritime Influence

Gradual Entrenchment in Socotra

The UAE’s approach in Socotra illustrates its strategy of incremental influence and consolidation of geostrategic presence. Following the devastation caused by Cyclone Chapala in 2015, Abu Dhabi deployed relief and engineering teams, establishing itself as a humanitarian actor. This foothold soon evolved into the construction of strategic infrastructure, port facilities, and a limited military presence. Over time, Socotra—ecologically and geostrategically significant—became integrated into the UAE’s maritime influence network stretching across the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea.

Overall, Emirati foreign policy over the past two decades has combined geopolitical ambition, targeted economic investment, and exploitation of regional instability. Backed by financial resources and international legitimacy, the UAE has achieved influence far beyond its demographic and military weight, extending from the Gulf to the Horn of Africa and reshaping the security architecture around the Red Sea.

Abd al‑Kuri: A Strategic Outpost

Located west of Socotra, Abd al‑Kuri island—home to about 500 residents—sits at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean shipping lanes. Its position makes it a vital observation point for vessels entering the Gulf of Aden, and in recent years it has been transformed into a military and logistical hub.

In November of that year, U.S. Central Command conducted a Red Sea naval exercise with Bahrain, the UAE, and Israel—the first joint drill among Abraham Accords signatories. This marked the beginning of overt military cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv. Defense ties accelerated: Israel’s Elbit Systems signed contracts to supply defense systems to the UAE Air Force, deployed early‑warning radar in Emirati territory, and in February 2023 unveiled a joint unmanned vessel capable of mine detection. By October 2023, construction began on a 2.4‑km runway in Abd al‑Kuri, later expanded into a full military airfield.

Satellite imagery in March 2024 revealed the phrase “I love the UAE” etched into nearby sand dunes—a symbolic marker of entrenched Emirati presence. By March 2025, the runway was completed, capable of hosting medium and heavy military cargo aircraft such as U.S. C‑130 Hercules, Russian Il‑76 transports, and advanced drones like Israel’s Hermes‑900. Concurrently, the UAE’s state defense conglomerate EDGE Group entered talks with Elbit Systems to expand its drone fleet, underscoring growing synergy between Emirati investment and Israeli technology. Abd al‑Kuri thus emerged not merely as a small island but as a pivotal node in Abu Dhabi’s geostrategic plan to control maritime routes across Bab al‑Mandeb, in coordination with both Washington and Tel Aviv.

Storm Gathering at Bab al‑Mandeb

Parallel to developments in Abd al‑Kuri, extensive activity began on Samhah, the smallest inhabited island of the Socotra archipelago. From 2024 to mid‑2025, the UAE built a runway, paved roads, and support facilities. Given the island’s rugged terrain, the airstrip is suited for surveillance missions and limited reconnaissance flights rather than heavy transport. It is optimized for advanced drones like the Hermes‑900, enabling electronic monitoring and maritime patrols. Samhah’s location between the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea makes it ideal for overseeing a chokepoint through which roughly 12% of global trade passes.

Satellite images from March–April 2025 showed a temporary sand barrier on the island’s western side, likely for drainage and construction support—typical of isolated military projects. During this period, the Yang Star, a Comoros‑flagged landing craft, anchored off Samhah, ferrying engineering equipment and materials between Socotra, Abd al‑Kuri, and Yemeni ports. Other vessels, including Takreem and Mabrouka‑2, regularly connected Socotra, Yemeni coasts, Abd al‑Kuri, and Bosaso in northern Somalia, forming the logistical backbone of the UAE’s maritime influence network in the southern Arabian Sea and Bab al‑Mandeb.

Mayun: The Critical Node

While Socotra, Abd al‑Kuri, and Samhah are key points in this network, Mayun (historically Perim) is strategically the most vital. This volcanic island lies at the center of Bab al‑Mandeb, a strait notorious for treacherous currents and reefs, earning the name “Gate of Tears.” It separates Yemen from Eritrea and Djibouti—both hosts to U.S. and Western military bases. Mayun’s strategic importance dates back centuries, serving as a control point for maritime trade even before the Suez Canal opened in 1869.

In early 2021, reports surfaced of a “mysterious airbase” under construction on Mayun, with no state claiming responsibility. Analysts noted that whoever controls it gains leverage over Bab al‑Mandeb, enabling air operations into Yemen and naval missions across the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and East African coasts. Satellite imagery from 2023–2025 showed a 1.85‑km runway along the island’s western shore, surfaced for medium aircraft, large drones, and reconnaissance planes. While little changed in 2023–2024, 2025 images revealed resurfacing and leveling—signs of reactivation and preparation for new missions.

This evolving network—from Socotra to Mayun—illustrates how the UAE, through incremental infrastructure projects, military cooperation, and logistical integration, has built a layered maritime presence across one of the world’s most strategic chokepoints. It reflects Abu Dhabi’s ambition to secure influence over global trade routes and embed itself in the security architecture of the Red Sea and Arabian Sea.

UAE’s Power Play Amid Crisis

The series of moves in the islands of Samhah, Abd al‑Kuri, and Mayun reflects the emergence of an integrated military‑maritime chain along Yemen’s vital southern sea lanes. The United Arab Emirates, leveraging investment, military technology, and newly forged security ties with Israel and Western partners, is consolidating this network to exert stronger control over trade and military routes in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

In this context, recent satellite imagery analysis of the Bosaso base in northern Somalia shows that the UAE has deployed critical infrastructure for maritime surveillance and control. At the northern end of the base, a phased‑array radar system has been identified, most likely the GM‑403 model by France’s Thales, with an effective range of over 400 km and the ability to track more than a thousand aerial targets simultaneously—including drones, fighter jets, cruise missiles, and artillery shells. However, intelligence reports and local sources also suggest the possible deployment of the EL/M‑2084 radar system by Israel’s IAI/ELTA, the same system used in the “Iron Dome” air defense network.

Given the informal security cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv after the Abraham Accords, this possibility is far from unlikely. Geopolitically, the installation of such a system in Bosaso enables the UAE to maintain continuous surveillance over maritime and aerial movements across the Gulf of Aden, Bab al‑Mandeb Strait, and the southern entrance to the Red Sea—an area through which a vital share of global energy and trade flows from East Asia to Europe.

This development positions Bosaso as a key link in the UAE’s chain of bases in the Horn of Africa and Yemeni islands—including Socotra, Abd al‑Kuri, Samhah, and Mayun. The Bosaso radar thus functions not only as part of a multilayered regional monitoring system but also as the intelligence backbone of Abu Dhabi’s broader plan to control maritime routes across southern Arabia and eastern Africa. This strategy carries a dual nature: on one hand serving “counter‑terrorism and maritime security,” and on the other consolidating Abu Dhabi’s geostrategic dominance in competition with Iran, Turkey, and Qatar in the security landscape of the Arabian Sea and Red Sea.