Category: Article

  • Security Reconfiguration of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council

    Security Reconfiguration of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council

    The Fragile Shadow of Neutrality

    In recent years, GCC countries had adopted a strategy based on neutrality, balancing, and mediation between Iran and the United States. Despite extensive security ties with Washington, they avoided direct involvement in military conflict, with countries like Oman and Qatar playing key mediating roles. However, doubts regarding the effectiveness of the U.S. security umbrella gradually increased—from Washington’s limited response to the 2019 attacks to the erosion of deterrence following the events of 2025, when even the presence of major U.S. bases did not prevent Qatar from being targeted in a Zionist strike. At the same time, Iran framed the presence of these bases as part of the justification for its own attacks. These developments prompted a reassessment of the costs versus benefits of hosting U.S. security assets, and three key divides within the GCC—over trust in the U.S., the role of the Zionist regime, and the approach toward Iran—became entrenched as the main lines of strategic disagreement.

    The Hormuz Shock

    During the war, GCC states found themselves directly at the center of the conflict, with 83% of Iran’s missile and drone strikes directed at them. Regional energy and logistics infrastructure were also targeted, and the Strait of Hormuz was effectively transformed into a geopolitical pressure tool. The war demonstrated that despite economic diversification efforts, the region’s structural dependence on hydrocarbons (approximately 30% of GDP and up to 85% of government revenues) and food imports (85% of food needs) remains intact. Disruption in Hormuz could trigger severe recessions (up to 14% GDP decline in some countries). Politically, GCC unity appeared more fragile than ever; member states’ responses to Iran, the U.S., and the Zionist regime were not uniform, and strategic rifts widened. The outcome has been the coexistence of multiple divergent approaches within a shared crisis: some moved toward limited security cooperation, others toward balancing with Iran, and still others toward closer alignment with the U.S. and the Zionist regime.

    The Future of the Persian Gulf

    In future scenarios for the Persian Gulf following the Iran war, three main trajectories are conceivable: In a pessimistic scenario, the pressure of war pushes GCC countries toward more genuine cooperation—creating practical convergence in areas such as joint air defense, arms production, and the interconnection of economic infrastructure like rail and energy networks—while raising the likelihood of direct confrontation with Iran. In a more probable scenario, cooperation remains confined to crisis management and limited security coordination, with disagreements over the roles of the U.S., the Zionist regime, and Iran—as well as Saudi–Emirati rivalry—preventing strategic integration. In an optimistic scenario, regional rivalries, particularly between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, intensify, and countries move toward separate strategies toward Iran and the U.S., resulting in increased intra-GCC fragmentation, an arms race, and political divergence. It is likely that the UAE will enter direct conflict; Oman will adopt a strong stance against the regime and a critical posture toward U.S. intervention; Kuwait and Bahrain will passively follow U.S. directives; and Saudi Arabia will maintain neutrality, awaiting the right moment to strike at Iran’s and the UAE’s interests and those of their allies.

  • Taiwan Strait Time!

    Taiwan Strait Time!

    The Longstanding Dispute
    Prior to the outbreak of the Iran war in February 2026, China had consistently upheld the “One China” principle, regarding Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory. Beijing’s policy combined gradual pressure with avoidance of direct confrontation: regular military patrols around Taiwan, diplomatic pressure to limit Taiwan’s international recognition, and deepening economic ties aimed at eroding the island’s operational autonomy. At the same time, China presented peaceful reunification as the preferred option, while reserving the right to use force to prevent Taiwan’s formal independence. Tensions mainly escalated during Taiwan’s electoral periods, but Beijing’s strategic priority prior to the crisis was maintaining stability and focusing on economic development.

    The Encirclment Policy Laboratory
    Concurrently with the Iran war, China closely monitored developments in the Strait of Hormuz as an operational model for “controlling critical chokepoints.” The most important lesson for Beijing was that even a weaker power, by blockading a vital route (Hormuz) and disrupting roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies, could pressure the United States and alter its behavior. This experience holds strategic significance for China: a blockade of Taiwan, which produces nearly 90% of the world’s advanced microchips, could deliver a far deeper shock to the global economy. Within this framework, Iran’s ability to use the global supply chain as leverage demonstrated that geoeconomic tools can serve as substitutes for, or complements to, military superiority.

    The Failure of the Silicon Shield
    In light of the Hormuz experience, the effectiveness of Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” strategy—which relied on U.S. dependence on the semiconductor industry to guarantee the island’s security—has been somewhat called into question. Analysts such as Eric Freeman argue that if China moves toward controlling trade routes and gradually encircling Taiwan, the United States will face a stark dilemma: accepting the new reality and retreating, or entering a costly confrontation. In this scenario, China could, without direct invasion, shift the deterrence balance in its favor by exerting pressure on trade and technology flows. The outcome would be a transition from interdependence-based deterrence to deterrence rooted in the control of critical chokepoints.

  • From Classical Confrontation to Geoeconomic Deadlock; Dissecting the Second Phase of the Iran-U.S. War

    From Classical Confrontation to Geoeconomic Deadlock; Dissecting the Second Phase of the Iran-U.S. War

    Iran’s Naval Blockade in the Strait of Hormuz: From Economic Pressure to Global Crisis Contagion

    The naval blockade against Iran—which has effectively already begun—can, at the tactical level, swiftly target the main flow of Tehran’s foreign currency revenues, given that over 90% of its foreign trade and the bulk of its oil exports pass through the Persian Gulf. Disruption along this route could generate daily losses of up to roughly $435 million and, in the short term, even lead to a halt in oil production due to limited storage capacity. However, at the strategic level, the core issue is not the “initial effectiveness” but rather the “sustainability and management of consequences”—since this blockade is being imposed at a global chokepoint through which about 20% of the world’s energy flow transits. Any disruption there would directly translate into higher energy prices, global inflation, and pressure on energy-importing economies, particularly in Asia.

    This interdependence transforms the blockade from a unilateral leverage tool into a “crisis contagion mechanism,” whose costs are transferred to third parties and gradually generate reverse political pressure on Washington. On the other hand, effective implementation of the blockade demands a continuous and extensive naval presence, preparedness to intercept non-Iranian vessels, and acceptance of the risk of confrontation with major powers such as China—a fact which, as analyses explicitly state, turns this operation into an open-ended military commitment that is, in the medium term, “unsustainable.” Furthermore, legal constraints arising from the transit passage regime in the Strait of Hormuz effectively rule out the possibility of complete closure, and any effort to extend the blockade to third-party ships would raise the threshold of conflict from a bilateral to a multilateral level. Consequently, in the current situation, the naval blockade should be analyzed not as a definitive solution, but rather as a pressure instrument with short-term functionality and long-term uncontrollable repercussions—one that, while capable of severely pressuring Iran’s economy in its initial phase, will in all likelihood, over a longer horizon, lead to the erosion of America’s strategic capacity and credibility due to the networked nature of the energy economy and operational limitations. In any case, the issue of the naval blockade of Iran and its feasibility in strategic terms is analyzed as follows:

    Attrition in the “Endless” Mission: Pentagon experts warn that a full blockade of Iran’s ports and coastlines would constitute a massive military operation with no time ceiling. America’s geographic distance and the need for a permanent naval presence render this mission “unsustainable” logistically in the medium and long term, to the point that the U.S. military would effectively lack the capability to fully cover all trade exchanges across such a vast geographical area.

    The Industrial Self-Sanction Trap: Contrary to initial assumptions, this blockade targets the U.S. defense industry even more than Iran. The obstruction of sea lanes halts the trade of critical mineral commodities such as sulfur, which is essential for copper and cobalt extraction. This crisis severely diminishes America’s ability to “repair battle-damaged equipment” and “produce jet engines and drones,” while driving up input prices by as much as 165%.

    Economic Deadlock and Shifting Objectives: A daily cost of $2 billion, with a projected total expenditure of up to $1 trillion, coupled with the inability to eliminate Iran’s underground military capabilities, is pushing Washington toward a strategy of “graceful exit.” In practice, America’s geographic distance and the vulnerability of allied supply chains have minimized Washington’s resilience in the face of a war of attrition.

    Return to Direct Clash between Iran and the United States: From Tactical Pause to the Likelihood of a War of Attrition

    A return to direct confrontation between Iran and the United States depends less on sheer political will than on the disruption of the fragile balance now established between the costs of continuing the war and the costs of retreating. From the American perspective, the main precondition for resuming hostilities is that the naval blockade, economic pressure, and limited airstrike threats fail to compel Tehran to accept Washington’s preferred arrangements—particularly given that, according to available sources, Iran, despite enduring heavy military blows, has not collapsed; rather, it has emerged from the first phase with more uncompromising leadership, buried reserves of enriched uranium, and greater political cohesion. Conversely, from Iran’s standpoint, the condition for re-entering direct war is that Washington or Israel crosses the line from deterrence and pressure into infrastructure warfare, high-level assassinations, intensified blockade, or attempts to impose “unconditional surrender”—because, based on field data in Tehran, the prevailing assessment is that any ceasefire without credible guarantees would merely be a pause for a renewed attack within a shorter interval. For this reason, Iran’s planning horizon is not focused on a quick end to the war, but on readiness for a months-long, attritional conflict. Under such circumstances, the second phase of the war will most likely manifest not as a large-scale ground invasion, but as a hybrid, escalating form of combat.

    The characteristics of this conflict can be outlined as follows: expansion of strikes on Iran’s economic and energy infrastructure by the U.S. and Israel, and in response, reciprocal Iranian attacks on energy facilities, refineries, ports, shipping routes, and American and allied interests in the region—a pattern whose early signs have already been observed in strikes on Assaluyeh, disruptions to Qatar’s LNG capacity, and threats to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. The decisive point, however, is that the U.S. also faces serious deterrent obstacles to re-entering an unlimited war. In other words, according to some estimates, the cost of war has reached approximately $2 billion per day and could exceed $1 trillion, while the blockade of Hormuz itself places pressure on America’s own defense supply chain, with West Point assessments even describing it as a “pre-logistics crisis” for replenishing equipment and munitions. Hence, the most probable scenario is that, if negotiations fail again, the second phase of the war will not be a lightning offensive, but a multi-level war of attrition, in which the U.S. seeks, without engaging in ground occupation, to incrementally raise the economic and infrastructural costs for Iran, while Iran, relying on the survival of its missile capacity, the Hormuz leverage, and its ability to generate regional insecurity, raises the costs of continued conflict for the U.S., its allies, and the global economy. Thus, the central issue in returning to direct hostilities is not the mere feasibility of initiating war, but each side’s capacity to endure the consequences of its second phase.

    Validating NATO’s Confrontation with the U.S.: Genuine Rupture or Structural Dependency?

    The claim of “NATO confronting the U.S.” reflects, more than an operational scenario, a transition from a value-based alliance to an asymmetric and “transactional” security order. The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy, with its absolute prioritization of homeland defense and deterrence of China in the Indo-Pacific region, has reduced NATO to a secondary instrument, placing the main burden of conventional defense against Russia on European allies. This paradigm shift, combined with Washington’s pressure to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, has deepened the rifts inherited from the first Trump era to the level of a “crisis of strategic trust,” where analysts at think tanks such as Brookings and the IISS regard unilateral U.S. actions as undermining the foundations of Western deterrence.

    The February 2026 war in Iran and the crisis over the proposal to annex Greenland have acted as key accelerators of this operational divergence. The joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, conducted without sufficient consultation with Brussels, triggered a bipolar reaction across Europe. While countries such as Spain, deeming the war illegal, refused to provide their bases (Rota and Morón) or airspace to U.S. forces, Washington threatened to suspend their membership or sever trade relations entirely, thereby challenging NATO’s cohesion. Simultaneously, the U.S. insistence on acquiring Greenland and the threat of imposing 25% tariffs on European goods have been legally interpreted as violations of Article 1 of the Washington Treaty, and for the first time, intelligence services of long-standing allies such as Denmark were compelled to factor the United States in as a “potential security risk” in their calculations. Despite these unprecedented tensions, structural limitations preclude an outright institutional confrontation, since the 1949 treaty lacks a mechanism for expelling or counteracting members, and Article 13 only provides for voluntary withdrawal. As a result, Europe’s reaction is proceeding not through direct confrontation within NATO, but through the “gradual Europeanization of security” and the activation of parallel structures now taking shape. The “Readiness 2030” plan—with its €800 billion budget and the SAFE financial instrument for joint arms procurement prioritizing European industries—alongside the drafting of the EU’s “Article 42.7 Handbook” as a substitute for NATO’s Article 5, signals a serious effort to manage dependency on America and prepare for the scenario of a potential U.S. exit from the alliance. This process, rather than collapse, has given rise to a “realist NATO,” in which raw power and European defense autonomy replace earlier idealism.

    With the breakdown of negotiations, the likelihood of NATO’s formal entry into war remains near zero, owing to the firm opposition of countries such as Spain and Italy and the lack of consensus over the legal legitimacy of operations. The economic costs arising from $106 oil and a monthly financial burden of €3 billion for Europe, coupled with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, severely constrain the allies’ financial capacity for a protracted conflict. Militarily, the rapid depletion of U.S. interceptor missile stockpiles (e.g., THAAD and SM-3)—which would take up to six years to replenish—has confronted Washington with a “munitions gap” and weakened NATO’s readiness to defend other fronts. Under these conditions, the most plausible scenario is the continuation of unilateral U.S. intervention with limited support from certain specific allies, alongside the acceleration of European defense independence plans (such as Readiness 2030) to decouple from Washington’s security orbit.

    The Bab al-Mandab Strait and Its Impact in the Second Phase of the Conflict

    In the second phase of the war, the Bab al-Mandab Strait could function as a “complementary chokepoint” and Iran’s most significant strategic leverage mechanism, since Tehran is capable of transforming a regional crisis into an international geoeconomic blockade by affecting 12% of global trade and 22% of container traffic.

    This map shows how two vital energy bottlenecks in the world, the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, can become tools of geopolitical pressure and disrupt the flow of global trade due to regional tensions.

    Based on analyses from think tanks such as the Israeli regime’s National Security Studies Institute and Al Jazeera, Iran—through its allied proxy Ansarallah—possesses not only the capability to block alternative energy export routes—such as the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia that delivers oil to Yanbu port, which still requires passage through this strait to reach Asia—but also, by forcing vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, it has increased shipping companies’ operational costs by up to $50 million per week and created the risk of oil prices spiking to $150–200 per barrel.

  • Maven in the Iran War

    Maven in the Iran War

    In late February 2026, the United States and the Zionist regime launched coordinated military operations under the names “Epic Fury” and “Roaring Lion” against Iran—operations considered the largest U.S. military action since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During this conflict, CENTCOM struck over 11,000 targets, while Iran responded with thousands of missiles and drones. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was martyred in the initial attacks. However, these statistics alone do not capture the historical significance of this war; rather, what distinguishes this conflict is the central role of artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and commercial technologies—which no longer serve merely as support tools but have been placed at the core of operations.

    The “Maven” project had been initiated back in 2018. Prior to the emergence of large language models, this unit, in collaboration with several companies, was supporting the Maven project to advance “computer vision”—an AI capability that enables the detection and differentiation of objects in satellite imagery, assisting analysts in reviewing visual data.

    The Maven project helped accelerate the deployment of machine learning in the fields of reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence analysis, and geospatial intelligence. This legacy ultimately led to the development of the “Maven Smart System” by Palantir Technologies, which today has become the cornerstone of AI-driven U.S. military operations.

    Background

    The U.S. Department of Defense has designated Palantir as the “sole responsible supplier” for the Maven AI system—a system used for field data analysis, target identification, and military decision support. The author emphasizes that this contract marks the transition of the Maven project from the experimental phase to a permanent U.S. military infrastructure level. According to the sources cited, the system is capable of analyzing satellite data, drone footage, sensor inputs, and field intelligence in real time, generating a “unified operational picture” for military commanders. A notable point is the direct link between Palantir and America’s broader strategy in the domain of “AI-enabled warfare,” which itself indicates that the U.S. government is gradually outsourcing its intelligence analysis and targeting infrastructure to private Silicon Valley companies—a trend that, in his view, blurs the boundaries between government, military, and tech firms.

    Analysis and Findings

    A. The Role of Silicon Valley in the U.S. War Department

    Silicon Valley’s role in the U.S. Department of Defense has expanded significantly in recent years; this collaboration has moved beyond limited research projects in cybersecurity over the past decade and has now become a central pillar of the U.S. military’s digital transformation. Recognizing the rapid pace of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big data analytics, the Pentagon has increasingly turned to partnerships with Silicon Valley tech companies to enhance decision-making, combat effectiveness, and intelligence superiority. A prime example of this trend is the massive contracts with firms like Palantir Technologies, Google Cloud, and Microsoft, which are involved in projects such as Maven and the Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability. The U.S. Department of Defense now has over 200 active contracts with companies based in the San Francisco Bay Area, a large portion of which are directly linked to digital warfare operations. This extensive partnership, however, has not always been without challenges. Today, the bulk of AI system development for the Department of Defense is managed by private contractors based in Silicon Valley. From the Pentagon’s perspective, collaboration with Silicon Valley is a strategic necessity. The engineers and researchers in this region are among the world’s foremost experts in areas such as image processing, data analysis, and deep learning platform design. By establishing the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in 2018, the Pentagon effectively opened a gateway for direct engagement with tech companies. This body is tasked with adapting emerging civilian technologies for military applications and setting ethical and technical standards for the use of AI in warfare. Through this model, the U.S. military can innovate at a pace close to the private sector, without being bogged down for years in bureaucratic procedures. Silicon Valley has become a vital component of America’s modern warfare infrastructure, where the line between commercial technology and military application is increasingly blurred. Companies like Palantir, Anduril Industries, and SpaceX now play pivotal roles in combat data analysis, autonomous drones, and military satellite communications. By September 2024, the share of commercial technology firms in the U.S. Department of Defense’s research budget had risen from 11% in 2015 to over 37% in 2024. This extensive partnership, while enhancing military efficiency, has also raised new concerns about transparency, social oversight, and the over-reliance of national security on the private sector and tech investors.

    Image of part of the terms of the US Department of Defense contract with Palantir

    B. The Role of Maven in the Attack on Iran

    The Maven system combines satellite imagery, drone videos, radar data, and signals intelligence into a unified interface, allowing operators to identify targets, recommend weapon types, and generate attack plans almost simultaneously. The results have been remarkable: over a thousand targets were struck in the first 24 hours of operations—a pace unimaginable if relying solely on human analysis. This process has continued using only 10% of the analysts that would previously have been required for such a level of operations.

    However, the system’s limitations are equally notable. Maven’s overall accuracy is estimated at around 60%, compared to roughly 84% for human analysts. Despite this, Palantir’s Chief Technology Officer has described it as “the first large-scale AI-enabled combat operation”—a characterization that raises serious questions about the ethical considerations of AI-based targeting and the adequacy of civilian protection mechanisms. These very concerns about protective safeguards have also led to the recent controversy between Anthropic and the Department of Defense.

    C. The History of Maven

    Project Maven is one of the U.S. Department of Defense’s programs in the field of applying artificial intelligence to military data analysis, launched in 2017. Its official name was the “Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team,” and its primary objective was to use machine learning for the automated analysis of images and videos from reconnaissance drones. The project was initially designed to accelerate the processing of vast battlefield data, particularly in Middle Eastern operations. Early sources about the program’s inception were published in Department of Defense statements in 2017. Project Maven focused specifically on drone imagery analysis—using machine vision algorithms to detect individuals, vehicles, and suspicious objects in aerial footage. Previously, such imagery had to be analyzed manually by human personnel, a highly time-consuming process. The project’s goal was to reduce the workload on analysts and increase the speed of operational decision-making. Pentagon official reports emphasized that the system played a “decision-support” role and was not a complete replacement for human personnel. The name Palantir Technologies has frequently been associated with U.S. defense data analysis projects. Palantir is a major government contractor in the fields of big data analytics and intelligence software, with its products such as “Palantir Gotham” used in defense and security agencies. Although Project Maven was broadly executed with the participation of multiple contractors, media attention was largely focused on Google’s initial partnership with the Pentagon, while companies like Palantir were also active in the defense technology ecosystem related to data analysis and AI.

    According to statistics released by the White House on April 8, the U.S. military struck over 13,000 targets in Iran during the first 38 days of the war—including more than 2,000 command-and-control centers, 1,500 air defense targets, and 1,450 targets related to industrial infrastructure.

    The White House emphasized that “all these targets were legitimate and military in nature.” However, the New York Times and other media outlets, through reports and images, have documented the destruction of civilian facilities. These reports have sparked a wave of criticism and raised the question of whether over-reliance on AI systems has led to targeting errors and increased civilian casualties.

    During operations against Iran, the Maven Smart System—a Palantir product—played a central role in gathering and analyzing battlefield intelligence. According to Cameron Stanley, the Pentagon’s senior official for digital and artificial intelligence, the system collected data on enemy force positions from various sources, including radar signals, satellite and drone imagery, electronic communications, and other intelligence feeds, combining them all into a unified operational picture of the battlefield.

    Stanley, who presented these remarks at Palantir’s “AIPCon 9” conference on March 12, stated that Maven is not limited to target identification. According to him, the system can also determine the most suitable friendly unit to engage each target and provide U.S. combat units with specific operational options—including attack routes, required munitions types, and other relevant information for mission execution. He explained that previously, commanders had to consult eight or nine different systems simultaneously to make battlefield decisions, but Maven now aggregates all this information into a single visual interface. In this way, a commander can identify a target, select the appropriate attack package, and initiate the operational process with just a few clicks.

  • Turkey’s Engagement with Regional Actors in Shaping Energy Corridors

    Turkey’s Engagement with Regional Actors in Shaping Energy Corridors

    In West Asia and North Africa, oil and its transmission routes have never been merely economic matters; they have always been defined in close connection with politics, national sovereignty, and survival calculations. Every decision in the energy sector carries profound geopolitical messages capable of altering the balance of power among regional actors. Within this framework, Ankara’s announcement to terminate the Kirkuk–Ceyhan oil pipeline agreement with Iraq by 2026 once again demonstrated that energy lies at the heart of Turkey’s security and strategic calculations. From the Erdogan government’s perspective, this decision is not merely a revision of a technical contract but part of a broader effort to redefine the future of energy, reduce costly dependencies, and consolidate Turkey’s role as a regional energy hub. Simultaneously, the cautious resumption of Iraqi oil exports through this pipeline after a long hiatus reflects both parties’ awareness of the geopolitical costs of obstructing energy arteries—an obstruction that, beyond inflicting heavy economic losses on Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, exposed the depth of legal and sovereignty disputes among Baghdad, Erbil, and Ankara. Meanwhile, developments in Syria and the prospect of a post-Assad order represent a key variable in Turkey’s energy and geopolitical calculations. From Ankara’s perspective, post-Assad Syria is not only a security issue but also a geopolitical opportunity to diversify and complete energy and transit corridors—corridors that could link Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean, and even European markets. In this context, the central question is how Turkey is attempting, through the simultaneous use of energy tools, transit corridors, and Syria’s geopolitical shifts, to redefine its position in West Asia’s transitional order. This situation raises a fundamental question: Will energy and its transit routes in the coming decade become a factor intensifying competition and divisions among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, or can they serve as a lever for cooperation, integration, and the definition of shared regional interests? The answer to this question will shape not only the future of Turkey’s relations with its neighbors but also the configuration of the region’s energy and geopolitical order.

    Background

    Among all foreign actors active in the Syrian crisis, Turkey has been the most steadfast supporter of opposition currents against the Damascus government, continuing this support despite heavy security, political, and economic costs. The consequences of this policy, particularly in the form of millions of Syrian refugees, have placed additional pressure on Turkey’s economy and social fabric, gradually becoming one of the most contentious domestic issues in the country. In past years, domestic critics of the Erdogan government repeatedly questioned this policy, calling for normalization of relations with Bashar al-Assad’s government and an end to support for opposition groups. From these factions’ perspective, the continuation of conflict neither guaranteed Turkey’s national security nor imposed long-term costs on Ankara. However, Assad’s fall transformed the equation, and the Erdogan government views this development as validation of its strategy. Ankara now believes its long-term investment in Syrian opposition groups has yielded effective leverage within Damascus’s new power structure. The groups and actors with which Turkey has established political, security, and field ties during the crisis years now find themselves in a position to play a significant role in Syria’s political future, thereby strengthening Turkey’s position as a decisive actor. Prior to Assad’s fall, Turkey’s policy in Syria was based on four core objectives:

    • Facilitating the return of a portion of Syrian refugees
    • Securing its southern borders
    • Containing and rolling back the political and territorial gains of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces
    • Securing concessions for its allied opposition groups in any negotiation process with Damascus.

    With the collapse of Assad’s government, the last objective has effectively become obsolete. Under the new circumstances, Ankara is attempting to pursue the remaining three objectives through more indirect and complex paths. Influencing Damascus’s new leadership, establishing active communication with Syria’s Arab community and local tribes, while simultaneously maintaining military and security pressure on the Syrian Democratic Forces, are Turkey’s primary tools for shaping the post-fall order in Syria. However, this strategy’s scope is not limited to Syria alone. Turkey is simultaneously attempting to translate its growing influence in Syria into leverage for increasing geopolitical pressure on Iraq—particularly in areas sensitive to Ankara in terms of border security, energy, and the presence of actors aligned with the Axis of Resistance. In this framework, Turkey is using political, economic, and security tools to shift the balance of influence in Iraq in its favor and limit the role of actors close to the Axis of Resistance. Pressuring Baghdad on security matters, cross-border operations, and managing Kurdistan Region files are part of this multi-layered strategy to consolidate Turkey’s regional position. Overall, Turkey’s policy in the post-Assad era can be seen as a coordinated effort to translate field gains in Syria into sustainable geopolitical influence across West Asia’s northern axis—a strategy encompassing both Syria and Iraq, with the ultimate goal of redefining Turkey’s role against the Axis of Resistance and solidifying Ankara’s position as a decisive regional actor.

    Analysis and Findings:

    Major projects in Iraq

    Ankara’s Strategy Toward Baghdad:
    Iraq, which until recently was primarily viewed by Ankara as an unstable security belt on Turkey’s southern periphery, has now become one of the focal points of Turkey’s regional strategy. This shift in perspective has been shaped following the transformation of regional dynamics after the events of October 7—developments accompanied by the relative weakening of Iran’s influence across several fronts, increased economic and diplomatic weight of Arab Gulf states, and regional actors’ search for new stability models in West Asia. In this context, Turkey’s renewed engagement with Iraq is not limited to containing the PKK but reflects broader ambitions to redefine Ankara’s regional role. This new approach encompasses a combination of security cooperation with Baghdad and Erbil, advancing a fragile internal peace process in Turkey, and a targeted effort to integrate Iraq into trade, transit, and energy networks between Turkey and the Gulf states. At the heart of this strategy lies geoeconomic logic. Ankara seeks to consolidate its position as a regional trade and energy connectivity hub by investing in shared infrastructure and creating sustainable interdependencies. Projects such as oil pipelines, medium-term gas export plans, and electricity grid development are key tools for Turkey to link Iraq to the region’s emerging energy architecture. The implications of this approach extend beyond Iraq as well. For Europe, redefining connectivity routes and access to energy resources, alongside strengthening stability in the continent’s southeastern neighborhood, holds strategic importance—and developments in Iraq, within this framework, are part of Europe’s larger energy security equation.

    Turkey’s policy shift toward Baghdad has occurred concurrently with a series of profound regional transformations, from the Gaza war and escalating Iran-Israel tensions to the fall of the Assad regime, which are collectively rearranging the balance of power in West Asia. These developments have heightened Ankara’s concerns about the spillover of insecurity and the expansion of crisis into its periphery. In such an atmosphere, Turkey feels an urgent need for cooperation with Baghdad to contain PKK threats and recalibrate relations with Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces—particularly given fears that Iraq might become the next arena for indirect confrontation between Iran and Israel. This concern has turned Ankara’s more active engagement with Baghdad into a security and political necessity. At the same time, this renewed engagement is meaningful within the broader context of Turkey’s rapprochement with Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Ankara seeks to position Iraq within a network of emerging regional frameworks that pursue trade, connectivity, and stability simultaneously. Overall, this new alignment strengthens Turkey’s strategic influence in Iraq while reducing Iran’s weight and centrality in shaping Baghdad’s regional dependencies. Thus, from Ankara’s perspective, Iraq is not only a security issue but a geopolitical and geoeconomic opportunity for redefining the regional order in West Asia.

    Turkey’s Strategies in Iraq in Confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran:
    Strategic estrangement between Turkey and the United States effectively began in March 2003, when Ankara opposed opening a northern front for U.S. forces during the invasion of Iraq. This decision marked a turning point in bilateral relations and laid the groundwork for a series of mutual tensions and mistrust that deepened over the years. In the months following Iraq’s occupation, field incidents further intensified this rift. The detention of a truck belonging to Turkish special forces in April 2003 and the arrest of Turkish military personnel in July of that year in Sulaymaniyah—an event known as the “Hood Incident”—dealt a serious blow to mutual trust and hardened Ankara’s security outlook toward developments in Iraq. The PKK’s return to armed activities in 2004 further exacerbated Turkey’s threat perception. Simultaneously, widespread opposition from Iraqi Shiite Arabs and Kurds to any Turkish military role—rooted in concerns over the revival of Ottoman ambitions—marginalized Ankara from effective participation in post-war reconstruction and Iraq’s political transition. In this tense atmosphere, Iran’s growing influence in Iraq after 2003 further strengthened Turkey’s security-driven perspective. The expansion of Popular Mobilization Forces into disputed areas such as Tal Afar and Sinjar during the fight against ISIS brought Iran’s influence closer to Turkey’s borders, overlapping with PKK presence and bases—a situation Ankara perceived as a “dual security threat.” In response to this linkage between the PKK, Shiite militias, and Iran, Turkey gradually shifted since 2016 toward a strategy based on unilateral military actions. This strategy included cross-border operations, establishing operational bases in northern Iraq, and deepening security and political cooperation with the Kurdistan Regional Government. However, in recent years, Ankara has sought to recalibrate its approach, redefining its military activities within the framework of “joint security arrangements” with Baghdad rather than unilateral authorities. The stated goal of this shift is to reduce political estrangement in Iraq and gain greater legitimacy for Turkey’s military presence, while addressing Baghdad’s sovereignty sensitivities. Despite this rhetorical shift, Turkey’s cross-border operations and the legal status of its bases in Iraq remain contentious, complicating bilateral relations. Nevertheless, efforts to establish shared institutional frameworks indicate both sides’ willingness to manage disputes through formal cooperation. In this regard, in 2024 Turkey and Iraq agreed to establish a joint security coordination center in Baghdad and transform the controversial Bashiqa base into a center for joint training and cooperation under Iraqi command. Turkish officials describe this move not as a retreat but as a strategic shift toward a “shared security” model—one that, while maintaining Ankara’s operational presence, grants greater formal authority to the Iraqi government.
    Over the past years, Ankara has continuously sought to reduce its strategic estrangement from Baghdad. The turning point in this process dates back to the Kurdistan Region’s independence referendum in September 2017, when Turkey aligned with Iraq’s central government against Kurdish separatism, supported Baghdad’s recapture of Kirkuk, and thereby opened the path to gradual engagement with Iraq’s federal structure. This process accelerated with the shift of U.S. forces from combat to advisory roles from 2021 onward—a change shaped under internal Iraqi pressure for U.S. withdrawal following the assassinations of General Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. From Ankara’s perspective, this situation simultaneously contained a threat and an opportunity: the threat of a potential vacuum being filled by Iran, and the opportunity to institutionalize security, economic, and political cooperation with Baghdad before that could occur. Recent geopolitical developments, including the fall of Assad’s regime, the weakening of Iran’s regional position, and mounting pressure on the Axis of Resistance, have created new room for maneuver for Turkey. Ankara views these developments as an opportunity to expand its influence through institutional mechanisms and emerging regional alignments. In this framework, Turkey seeks to integrate Iraq into its broader strategy by linking security cooperation to infrastructure development and positioning Baghdad within regional energy, trade, and stability equations—a strategy aimed at establishing a new balance against Tehran. One tool of this policy is the multilateral security framework involving Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, launched in 2025 to manage the ISIS threat. At the Amman summit in March 2025, Turkey, Syria, and Jordan agreed to establish a joint operations center for counterterrorism coordination and managing ISIS-linked camps and prisons. Ankara views this framework as a tool to limit the role of the Syrian Democratic Forces—which it considers the Syrian branch of the PKK—and hopes that by transferring management of camps such as Al-Hol and Roj to Syria’s new government, the logistical links between the PKK and these forces, particularly along the strategic Sinjar corridor, will be severed. The Sinjar corridor, once part of Iran’s ground bridge connecting its allied networks in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, retains its geopolitical significance.

    Turkey’s Strategic Objectives in Establishing Economic Agreements with Iraq:
    Turkey’s new approach toward Iraq is not solely a product of geopolitical competition with Iran but also a direct reaction to Ankara’s marginalization in the U.S.-led India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) initiative. In response, Turkey is promoting the Iraq-based “Development Road” project as a strategic alternative to IMEC—a project aimed at preserving Turkey’s geoeconomic position, balancing against Iranian influence, and deepening ties with Gulf Arab partners. This major logistics project, by connecting Basra to Turkish territory, transforms Iraq into the cornerstone of Ankara’s east–west connectivity vision, while complementing the central corridor passing through Central Asia and Turkey. The Grand Faw Port, as a regional logistics hub, stands at the center of this project, covering a corridor of approximately 1,200 kilometers from southern Iraq to the Turkish border. Simultaneously, Ankara is upgrading its domestic infrastructure and border crossings, including Habur–Fishkhabur and Ovaköy, to better align with EU customs zones. Regionally, this initiative is part of Turkey’s broader strategy to create interconnected networks and temporary economic alliances along the Turkey–Iraq–UAE–Qatar axis. Given domestic financial constraints, Turkey relies on Gulf state investments, particularly from the UAE and Qatar, to share costs, reduce political risks, and secure regional support. Beyond financing Iraq’s infrastructure, this support lends political legitimacy to the project and integrates Baghdad into broader regional economic frameworks—while enabling Ankara to compete with Iran’s east–west corridors that bypass Turkey.

    Turkey-Iraq Energy Agreement:
    By placing Iraq at the center of its regional connectivity strategy, Ankara has extended the same logic to the energy sector—a domain where pipelines and transit routes are not merely economic assets but effective instruments of geopolitical influence. Iraq’s vast oil and gas reserves, if integrated into regional infrastructure, play a key role in Turkey’s vision of becoming an energy hub—a goal that leads to increased regional influence, supply route diversification, and enhanced Turkey’s position in European energy security. In this regard, Turkey seeks to strengthen and synergize its existing network, including the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, TurkStream, and Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipelines, to connect West Asian and Caspian resources to European markets while reducing dependence on Russia and Iran. Within this framework, resuming oil flows through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline has become a primary priority for Ankara. The pipeline was halted in March 2023 following an international arbitration ruling in favor of Iraq, imposing a $1.5 billion fine on Turkey for unauthorized oil exports from the Kurdistan Region between 2014 and 2018. In response, Ankara terminated the 50-year pipeline agreement in July 2025 and announced its readiness to negotiate a new framework—one that would recognize Baghdad’s sovereignty over oil exports, establish a clear revenue-sharing mechanism, and ensure supply stability. In September 2025, Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government reached an agreement to begin oil exports through this pipeline—a pilot move to restore oil flows toward Turkey. Although Ankara still contests the arbitration ruling, it has signaled willingness to restore oil flows under redesigned arrangements that integrate the pipeline into a broader regional infrastructure vision. Continuing this process, Turkey has submitted a comprehensive draft of a new agreement to Baghdad to expand bilateral energy cooperation. This proposal extends beyond oil to include natural gas, petrochemicals, and electricity—reflecting the expanded scope of Ankara’s energy diplomacy. Crucially, the plan is designed to align energy transit infrastructure with regional connectivity corridors, complementing the “Development Road” project. Turkey’s energy minister has emphasized that the program also envisions extending the pipeline to southern Iraq’s oil fields—a move that would increase export capacity and establish a direct link between southern Iraq and Turkish ports. From Ankara’s perspective, this strategy not only diversifies Iraq’s export routes but also embeds the country more deeply into Turkey-centric regional energy networks—thereby strengthening Turkey’s ambition to become a regional energy hub and enhancing its geoeconomic influence during a period of widespread regional instability from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea.

    Scenarios for the Turkey-Iraq Energy Agreement:
    Several potential scenarios may emerge as a result of Turkey’s decision:
    Scenario 1: Successful Negotiation of a New Agreement
    In this scenario, Ankara and Baghdad will successfully sign a new, comprehensive, and extensive oil agreement. Supporting factors include the Iraqi parliament’s readiness to vote on a draft law regulating the renewable energy sector and encouraging local and international investment. Washington’s support further reinforces these prospects, with U.S. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce confirming U.S. backing for the understanding among Baghdad, Erbil, and Turkey.
    Scenario 2: Continuation of the Status Quo
    In this scenario, oil relations between Iraq and Turkey will remain largely unchanged. The full-capacity restart of the oil pipeline remains out of reach, particularly as estimates indicate Iraq currently lacks the capacity to export 1.5 million barrels per day to Turkey.
    Scenario 3: Failure of New Agreement Negotiations
    Various technical and diplomatic challenges between Ankara and Baghdad could hinder finalizing a new agreement. Critics argue that a new deal might restrict oil exports through the State Organization for Marketing of Oil, potentially undermining the Kurdistan Region’s autonomy.
    Scenario 4: Revised Extension of the Original Agreement
    Many analysts consider this scenario more likely, whereby both countries extend their original oil agreement but with enhanced cooperation, coordination, and increased export quotas. Turkey’s Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has affirmed Turkey’s willingness to extend the 1973 agreement with legal amendments and expanded activities. Kemal Etrushi, advisor to the Kurdistan Region’s Prime Minister, has also suggested the likelihood of an extension, provided that maintenance and transit costs are economically viable for all parties.

  • Digital Infrastructure Diplomacy in West Asia

    Digital Infrastructure Diplomacy in West Asia

    Saudi Arabia is considering replacing the Zionist regime route with a Syrian route for the fiber optic cable connecting the kingdom to Greece via the Mediterranean Sea—a decision that goes beyond a mere technical or economic choice, reflecting a shift in the region’s geopolitical alignments. Riyadh’s insistence on routing the cable through Syria indicates its intention to bolster Damascus’s regional standing while simultaneously politically distancing itself from Israel in the wake of the Gaza war developments.

    Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has adopted a tough stance against Israel, which has provided the political groundwork for this shift. At the same time, the growing disagreements between Riyadh and the UAE over issues such as Yemen, Sudan, and Red Sea security have added a new competitive dimension to this decision.

    The selection of Syria could contribute to the country’s economic reintegration into the region and enhance its geo-economic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, while Israel’s exclusion from this potential corridor would weaken its standing in the race to become an energy and data hub. On the other hand, Greece—particularly Athens—is striving to position itself as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East in the fields of energy, real estate, and artificial intelligence, and this project could strengthen its role in the new regional connectivity architecture. Overall, this plan symbolizes the transition from traditional energy geopolitics to data geopolitics and digital infrastructure, and could influence the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arab world.

    Background
    Within the framework of the broader “East-to-Mediterranean Data Corridor” strategy, a joint fiber optic cable project between Saudi Arabia and Greece has been designed. The project is being pursued with the participation of major companies, including STC, PPC, OTA, and TTSA. The aim of this initiative is to establish a high-capacity data transmission route between the Persian Gulf and Europe via the Mediterranean, providing complementary digital infrastructure for energy and technology cooperation between the two regions.

    The key development in this project is Riyadh’s shift from the proposed route through Israel to the alternative option via Syria. This change is not merely technical or economic, but rather a reflection of the geopolitical realignment in Saudi Arabia’s peripheral environment. In recent years, growing rifts have emerged between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over issues such as Yemen, Sudan, and Red Sea security.

    From a Saudi perspective, the increasing convergence between the regime and the UAE could shift the regional influence balance against Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the selection of a new route for the fiber optic cable is seen as part of a strategy to reduce dependence on the Israel–UAE axis. This decision also carries multi-layered implications for Greece. Athens has established close strategic ties with Israel in recent years and has pursued extensive cooperation in energy and Eastern Mediterranean security. However, Greece is simultaneously seeking to position itself as a hub connecting Europe and West Asia in the fields of energy, real estate, logistics, and artificial intelligence. Thus, whether Athens accepts or rejects Riyadh’s proposed new route could affect the balance of its relations with the Zionist regime and place Greece in a geopolitical dilemma. From a technical perspective, fiber optic cables—transmitting data in milliseconds via optical pulses—form the backbone of the global digital economy. With the expansion of artificial intelligence and the growing need for big data processing, Gulf countries are making substantial investments in data centers and communication infrastructure to transform themselves, beyond their traditional role as oil and gas exporters, into key players in Europe’s data and digital services market.

    Overall, the rerouting of the cable is not merely an infrastructure decision but part of the geo-economic and geopolitical competition in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. This development could affect coalition formations, digital connectivity routes, and even regional security equations, serving as an indicator of a new phase in Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with the UAE–Israel axis over strategic data infrastructure.

    Analysis and Findings:

    • Strategic Shift: Saudi Arabia’s efforts to include Syria in major infrastructure projects—particularly in telecommunications and data connectivity—are part of Riyadh’s broader strategy to reshape the regional order. By leveraging its financial capacity and foreign investment, Saudi Arabia aims to turn Damascus into a hub for road, rail, and digital transit between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. This approach pursues two simultaneous goals: strengthening potential allies and rebuilding Syria’s geopolitical position, while creating a balance against the growing influence of the UAE and the Zionist regime around the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, the announcement by Saudi Arabia’s Investment Council of approximately $800 million in telecommunications infrastructure investment in Syria carries an important geopolitical message. According to Saudi Arabia’s official news agency, the project involves establishing a fiber optic network spanning over 4,500 kilometers aimed at “regional and international connectivity for Syria.” Such a project is not merely an economic endeavor but a redefinition of Syria’s role as a connectivity node in the new regional connectivity architecture. Trend analysis shows that from Riyadh’s perspective, Damascus lies at the heart of a “connectivity-oriented” strategy—roads, rail lines, and fiber optic cables must pass through Syrian territory to solidify the link between the Persian Gulf and Europe. This perspective transforms Syria from a security dossier into a geo-economic asset. In other words, Riyadh is seeking to revive Syria’s role in the regional value chain by investing in both hard infrastructure (roads, rail, cables) and soft infrastructure (data networks). From a regional competition perspective, the inclusion of Syria in these projects comes at the expense of excluding or downplaying the Zionist regime’s role in data connectivity routes. This signifies a tangible shift in Saudi Arabia’s strategic calculations. In 2022, discussions on normalizing relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv were at their peak, but subsequent regional developments—particularly escalating geopolitical rivalries and shifting coalition alignments—have moderated this approach. Today, Saudi Arabia’s priority is not symbolic convergence with Israel but consolidating its independent position in the regional connectivity architecture.
    • Widening Saudi–UAE Rift: According to narratives close to decision-making circles in Riyadh, including statements by Al-Tuwaijri, the rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is not a transient disagreement but the result of accumulated strategic grievances across several regional files. From a Saudi perspective, Abu Dhabi—through its financial power and proxy networks—has sought to become a small state with outsized influence in its immediate environment, which has conflicted with Riyadh’s geopolitical interests. In the Yemen file, the Saudi narrative holds that the UAE’s presence within the Arab coalition began with Riyadh’s invitation, but Abu Dhabi gradually deviated from declared objectives and supported separatist movements in the south. This perception is echoed in Sudan, where documented UAE military support for the Rapid Support Forces is seen as an effort to deepen internal divisions and consolidate Abu Dhabi’s influence. Likewise, in Somaliland, UAE support for quasi-state structures in northern Somalia is viewed by Saudi Arabia as another indication of a policy of environmental influence independent of Arab coordination. In Tunisia, concrete instances include the provision of armored equipment to opposition movements to undermine democratic processes. This narrative, within the Saudi framework, portrays the UAE as an interventionist actor in the internal affairs of Arab countries—an approach Riyadh considers contrary to the principles of Arab solidarity. In terms of identity and relative power, this narrative depicts the UAE as a smaller actor geographically, demographically, and economically that has at times sought to punch above its weight. This perspective is linked to recent economic developments in Saudi Arabia, where major economic transformation programs have led to a gradual shift of capital and international companies from Dubai and Abu Dhabi to Riyadh. In this context, economic competition is said to have fueled geopolitical rivalry and heightened mutual sensitivities. Regarding the relationship between the two leaders, recalling Mohammed bin Zayed’s role in bolstering Mohammed bin Salman’s standing in Washington prior to his crown prince status points to a period of strategic convergence. However, according to this narrative, divergence intensified when Mohammed bin Zayed found the rapid growth of Saudi economic power and capital concentration unacceptable. From Al-Tuwaijri’s viewpoint, this shift in the economic balance became a psychological-political factor in intensifying personal and strategic rivalry between the two leaders.
    • The Role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Saudi Arabia’s New Architecture: Saudi Arabia is redefining its regional orientation—a shift that not only involves distancing from Abu Dhabi but also includes strengthening ties with Turkey and maintaining the détente process with Iran. This realignment should be analyzed within Riyadh’s broader efforts to consolidate its independent position in regional security equations and avoid becoming entangled in costly scenarios of direct confrontation with Tehran. On the international level, speculation about the possibility of renewed U.S. military action against Iran under the Trump administration has heightened uncertainty. The deployment of U.S. naval and military capabilities in the region sends a clear deterrent message; however, reports simultaneously indicate that at least nine Arab leaders have contacted Washington to allow more time for ongoing negotiations in Muscat. This diplomatic movement suggests that a significant portion of the Arab world views a full-scale war scenario as a threat to regional stability and its economic interests. In this framework, Al-Tuwaijri’s narrative emphasizes that Iran is a different actor than examples like Venezuela and, if faced with an existential threat, would employ extensive and potentially destructive deterrence tools. From this analytical perspective, Iran’s capacity to target U.S. bases in the region, disrupt Persian Gulf energy security, and even block the Strait of Hormuz is assessed as Tehran’s “strategic cards.” Such a scenario could have far-reaching economic and security consequences for the Gulf Arab states. The findings indicate that Saudi Arabia’s pivot toward Turkey and the continuation of détente with Iran are part of an active balancing strategy against three simultaneous variables: competition with the UAE, U.S. pressure for full alignment against Iran, and the risk of widespread instability in the event of military conflict. Riyadh seeks to avoid being drawn into a comprehensive confrontation that could target the region’s energy infrastructure and economy by diversifying its regional partners and maintaining diplomatic channels. This approach reflects Saudi Arabia’s move from rigid alliances toward a more flexible, multi-balancing foreign policy.
  • GCC in Turmoil Over the Strait of Hormuz

    GCC in Turmoil Over the Strait of Hormuz

    During the war imposed by the U.S. and the Zionist regime against Iran, the GCC countries as a unified bloc demonstrated a common official stance on certain issues, such as condemning Iranian attacks on their countries, expressing concern over economic damage to oil, trade, and tourism, fearing becoming secondary targets, and welcoming ceasefires. In an emergency meeting of foreign ministers on March 1, 2026, and in subsequent statements, Council members described Iran’s attacks as a “clear violation of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the principles of good neighborliness.” They reserved their right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter and declared they would take “all necessary measures” to protect their security, citizens, and territory. However, the forty-day war gradually deepened the internal organizational and structural divisions among the six GCC states — divisions that had been shaped in recent years, particularly after the 2017 Qatar crisis and the emergence of geopolitical rivalry (2025) between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, especially in Yemen. The main axes of the recent GCC rift can be divided into three spectra based on the type and level of each country’s relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States, and the Zionist regime. Within this framework, the six Arab states of the Gulf have adopted three different approaches and strategies. This raises the key question: how can the three strategies adopted by the six GCC member states toward the Ramadan War lead to the deepening or even the breakup of this regional organization?

    Theoretical Framework: Balance of Threat

    In classical realist theory, states are assumed to seek maximum security and to balance against threatening powers. However, the Balance of Threat theory revises this model. According to Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory, states react not merely to “power” but to “perceived threat.” This theoretical framework explains why GCC members, in response to the forty-day war, moved toward divergences and differences in reactions and strategies. The core point of Walt’s theory is that, contrary to popular belief, states do not balance solely in response to increases in others’ power; rather, it is the level of perceived threat that drives states toward balancing. By distinguishing between power and threat, Walt introduces four components as threat factors: 1) aggregate capabilities (population, economic and military power, etc.); 2) geographic proximity (a direct relationship exists between threat perception and proximity); 3) offensive capabilities (the greater a country’s offensive capabilities, the greater the security concerns it raises); and 4) aggressive intentions (states with aggressive intentions pose greater threats than status quo powers). According to Balance of Threat theory, what encourages states to engage in balancing is their perception of one another as threats, not merely the degree of their power. For example, the increase in Iran’s military power is tangible for Oman, but unlike the UAE or Saudi Arabia, Oman has not taken balancing measures because it does not perceive Iran as a threat. In fact, each actor within the GCC has a specific perception of the Iranian threat. Some see Iran as an existential, long-term, and broad threat and call for balancing or strengthening defensive capacities, while others view Iran as a more limited threat and lean toward diplomacy and mediation. The result of these differences is a duality of threat perception and the intensification of internal rifts within the Council.

    Key Findings and Analysis

    Part One: The Ramadan War and the Three Strategies of GCC States

    A. War Containment Strategy: Oman and Qatar

    Qatar and Oman, while condemning attacks against Iran as well as Iranian attacks on Arab countries, consider war escalation dangerous and place primary blame on the war’s instigators — the Zionist regime and the United States. Qatari and Omani officials have argued that Tel Aviv’s strategy is to draw Arab countries into direct confrontation with Iran to wear down both sides and ultimately shift the balance of power in its favor. In essence, Qatar and Oman fall into the category of mediating actors who criticize the continuation of war and escalation of tensions. Among them, Oman holds a more critical view of U.S. and Israeli policies toward Iran. Omani media and officials blamed Washington and Tel Aviv for starting the war without consulting regional countries and criticized the influence of the Zionist regime and regional parties unwilling to censure the United States. Throughout the war and afterward, Muscat has emphasized a policy of diplomacy and maintaining good relations with Tehran. Until Iran’s naval blockade, Oman was even introduced as Tehran’s potential partner in monitoring the Strait of Hormuz. However, while Qatar falls within this spectrum, it has adopted a more contradictory and paradoxical policy compared to Oman. On one hand, it allowed the U.S. to conduct operations from its soil; on the other, it maintained historical ties with Iran, avoided directly condemning the U.S. and Israel, and pursued mediation between Iran and the U.S. In this context, it described the ceasefire as an initial step toward de-escalation and called for immediate dialogue between the two sides.

    B. War Escalation Strategy: United Arab Emirates and Bahrain

    Among the six GCC states, the UAE adopted the harshest stance during the forty-day war and also suffered the most attacks. The UAE closed its embassy in Tehran and emphasized strengthening ties with the U.S. and Israel. Abu Dhabi concluded during the war that past efforts to re-engage with Tehran were insignificant and that there was no value in moving away from the Abraham Accords. The UAE also called for war escalation and declared its readiness to join military efforts to confront Tehran and end Iran’s ability to control and manage the Strait of Hormuz. Yousef Al-Otaiba, UAE ambassador to Washington, wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in the midst of the Ramadan War titled “The UAE Stands Up to Iran,” calling for a more decisive approach. He claimed, “Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been damaged and its allies weakened, but more must be done to completely eliminate its missile and drone threat,” arguing that the current war requires an end that eliminates Iran’s long-term threat. He also announced his country’s readiness to join an international initiative to reopen and secure the Strait of Hormuz. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to the UAE president, also stated, “We did not want the war, but we won it,” and called for long-term guarantees against Iran’s nuclear, missile, and regional allies. In recent years, the UAE has had its eyes on the three islands — Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa — and views weakening or defeating Iran in war as the best option to gain control of these strategic islands. Therefore, it sought to draw the U.S. into a war in the southern Persian Gulf to occupy the three islands. The UAE had previously conducted extensive military exercises to seize similar points. A ceasefire and the end of the war would thus thwart its ambitions to control these islands. In this regard, the UAE’s Mirage fighter jet attack on Lavan Island, carried out hours after the ceasefire announcement, can be seen as an attempt to sabotage the de-escalation and ceasefire process.

    Alignment of Bahrain

    On the other hand, Bahrain, which joined the Abraham Accords alongside the UAE in 2020, pursued a policy fully aligned with the UAE during the war. Bahrain, which hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet, called Iran’s attacks on its territory “treason” and pursued a Chapter VII Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force, which was vetoed by Russia and China. In effect, Bahrain and the UAE pursued a strategy of crisis escalation and weakening Iran during the forty-day war.

    C. War Insulation Strategy: Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

    Saudi Arabia and Kuwait adopted a risk coverage and insulation strategy during the forty-day war. They avoided open alignment but facilitated U.S. military operations behind the scenes. Saudi Arabia, which had improved its ties with Tehran after the Beijing agreement, followed a dual approach but one leaning closer to the UAE. Nevertheless, Riyadh adopted a more balanced approach compared to Abu Dhabi. Although Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. forces to use its bases, it refrained from directly responding to Iran. Saudi officials condemned Iranian attacks on Riyadh and eastern Saudi Arabia, expelled some Iranian diplomats, and issued limited diplomatic warnings, but unlike the UAE, did not call for continuing or escalating the war, nor did they promise to join the U.S. and Israeli campaign. In fact, Riyadh pursued a regional diplomacy approach, maintaining dialogue with Iran to prevent escalation, and implicitly supported Pakistan’s mediation efforts to reduce tensions.

    Kuwait Following Saudi Arabia

    Kuwait also followed a policy aligned with Saudi Arabia, adopting a strategy of compliance and accompaniment with the U.S. Although Kuwait, like the other five GCC members, denies that the U.S. launched military operations from its soil or airspace on February 28, according to France 24, after Iran’s attacks, Kuwait allowed the U.S. to use its facilities for missile strikes. As a result, after the UAE, Kuwait suffered the heaviest blows from Iranian attacks during the conflict among Gulf states. Hence, to insulate itself and manage risk, Kuwait sought to reduce the intensity of the war. In this regard, Kuwait’s crown prince, in a phone call with Pakistan’s prime minister, supported Islamabad’s mediation efforts between Iran and the U.S. to stop the war.

    Part Two: Impact of the Three Strategies on the GCC’s Internal Rift

    Disagreements among the six states over relations with the Zionist regime, level of cooperation with the U.S., and how to deal with Iran have made solidarity and unity nearly impossible. On one hand, Oman and Qatar insist on engagement and mediation, viewing Iran as a neighbor manageable through diplomacy. On the other hand, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and to some extent Kuwait, regard Iran as a threat to their national security and interests. Therefore, it appears that in the medium term, further rifts may emerge among GCC countries as a single bloc, including between the UAE and Oman.

    Divergent Stances of Kuwaiti and Omani Celebrities

    The worldviews of GCC states regarding the war have also differed. Mishari Al-Afasi, a Kuwaiti reciter, produced an anti-Iranian work titled “Tabbat Yada Iran wa Man Ma’aha” (Perish the hands of Iran and those with them), attempting to shape public opinion in GCC states against Iran. However, the video’s release was met with widespread backlash from Arab social media users, who responded with similar language, writing, “Perish the hands of Israel, America, and those with them.” On the other hand, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Khalili, the Grand Mufti of Oman, expressed support for the Resistance Axis led by Iran in its all-out battle against American-Zionist aggressors. Meanwhile, on Eid al-Fitr, the people of Sur in southeastern Oman gathered in a public rally, reciting poetry to express their support and solidarity with the Iranian nation and fighters in their battle against the U.S. and the Zionist regime.

    Emirati and Saudi Criticism of U.S. Policy

    While some GCC states have asked the U.S. to find an exit from the war, others have advised intensifying strikes to overthrow the Iranian government. These contradictory preferences among Council members indicate a process of fragmentation. There is also sharp disagreement among Gulf Arab elites regarding the future of U.S. bases in the region and hosting them. Some argue that these bases, rather than guaranteeing GCC security and stability, have become a source of instability. Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, a UAE university professor and former advisor to the UAE president, said, “The UAE no longer needs America to defend itself… What the UAE needs is merely to obtain the best and newest weapons that America has. So, it is time to think about closing U.S. bases, because they are a liability, not a strategic asset.” In contrast, Mamdouh Al-Muhaini, director of Saudi Arabia’s Al-Arabiya and Al-Hadath networks, wrote in an article in Asharq Al-Awsat titled “Destroying Relations Between Gulf Countries and America”: “Relations with America are important and strategic, and this relationship must extend not only to military and political dimensions but also to all economic and cultural aspects.”

    Joining External Alliances

    After the start of the Ramadan War, some GCC states have taken steps to join alliances outside the GCC framework. Saudi Arabia and Qatar seek to join an Islamic bloc comprising Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt. Although the Saudi kingdom will continue to seek U.S. support, it is also trying to complement this dependence by deepening regional ties with Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, as well as increasing reliance on China. Shortly after the war began, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey held an emergency meeting of foreign ministers of Islamic countries. If this axis’s cooperation deepens, it could create strategic weight beyond the GCC and the U.S. security umbrella for Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

    The Zionist Tinge of Abu Dhabi and Manama

    The UAE and possibly Bahrain may officially join Netanyahu’s envisioned “Hexagon” axis or the “Abraham Bloc” in the future. In any case, the Zionist regime and the level of ties with it have been a source of division within the GCC. Although the UAE and Bahrain have maintained their relations, other GCC members view the Zionist regime’s hegemonic ambitions with serious concern. This conflict of interests and clash of perspectives makes strategic convergence and unity among the six countries nearly impossible.

    Strategic Conclusions and Recommendations

    While GCC states quickly aligned at the start of the Ramadan War under a common crisis, the sustained pressure and cost of war have driven them toward divergent paths. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait have moved toward a policy of “hard containment,” while Qatar and Oman continue to insist on “engagement and mediation.” This rift directly serves Iran’s interest in creating division. Another major consequence of the war for GCC states is the absolute discrediting of the U.S. security umbrella. U.S. bases, long seen as sources of deterrence and protection, have now become a liability, turning Arab countries into direct targets. Donald Trump’s erratic and unpredictable behavior reinforces the feeling that Washington is no longer reliable. Therefore, it is plausible that the leaders of these countries, after witnessing America’s inability to prevent the destruction of critical infrastructure, may seek new partners such as Russia and China. They may also turn to countries like Ukraine, Turkey, Canada, and South Korea to bolster their defense capabilities, including in the drone sector. It is worth noting that this search for new allies to reduce absolute dependence on the U.S. aligns with Iran’s national interests and security. Finally, it must be noted that GCC unity has always been reactive and has rarely translated into long-term strategy. Although the GCC is not currently disintegrating or collapsing, it is revealing the limits of the organization’s cohesion and solidarity as a strategic concept.

    Regarding strategic recommendations for deepening the rift and preventing GCC cohesion, Iran can take the following steps: expanding political, economic, and military ties with Oman and improving relations with Qatar; preventing convergence and attempting to sow discord between the UAE and Saudi Arabia through social media; and threatening GCC countries over granting military bases to the U.S. or the Zionist regime.

  • The Confrontational Geometry of the Zionists with the Resistance

    The Confrontational Geometry of the Zionists with the Resistance

    Strategic Reconfiguration
    Despite enduring severe military pressure after the Gaza war, the “Axis of Resistance” not only did not collapse but entered a phase of strategic reconfiguration. The weakening of certain field capabilities—particularly in Hezbollah and the Syrian front—has been offset by strengthening the networked model. By intelligently distributing capacity among actors such as Hashd al-Shaabi and Ansarallah, the costs of confrontation decreased and operational flexibility increased. The use of informal economic and logistical mechanisms also helped maintain operational continuity. Within this framework, the deeper integration of Hamas into the Axis structure led to enhanced cohesion and field synergy. The outcome of these developments has been the formation of an axis that, despite external pressures, evolved from a centralized structure into a multi-layered, recoverable resistance network capable of preserving its strategic initiative.

    Multi-Front Confrontation and Controlled Escalation
    During the Ramadan War, the Axis of Resistance implemented a strategy of “layered pressure” against the Zionist regime and its allies by simultaneously activating the Lebanese, Iraqi, and Yemeni fronts, although the level of coordination among actors was not fully unified. Hezbollah created direct military pressure by firing hundreds of rockets, missiles, and drones and expanding hostilities along the northern borders. Concurrently, Iraqi resistance groups carried out dozens of drone and rocket attacks on American and Zionist-linked targets, drawing the conflict deeper into Iraq, while Ansarallah activated the strategic-economic dimension of the war through missile strikes on southern occupied territories and disrupting shipping in the Red Sea. In response, the regime, relying on air superiority, conducted hundreds of precision strikes on the infrastructure of these actors, attempting to curb their operational capacity. However, both sides’ behavior demonstrated that the conflict remained within a framework of “controlled escalation”: despite the intensity of the attacks, neither moved toward all-out regional war, keeping casualty levels and operational scope within limits that preserved deterrence while preventing a slide into a full-scale conflict.

    The Future of the Axis of Resistance
    In the post-war period, the trajectory of the Axis of Resistance can be formulated within three main scenarios: In the optimistic scenario, the axis, by returning to its flexible, networked logic—rather than relying on vulnerable centralized structures—reconstructs multi-layered deterrence through deepening military, economic, and logistical ties in Iraq, Yemen, and other peripheral arenas, consolidating its position by leveraging the ongoing transition of the international system. In the intermediate scenario, the axis remains within a “crisis management” framework: a certain level of operational cooperation is maintained, but internal limitations of the actors (in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen) and regional divisions prevent full strategic cohesion, with the axis operating in a semi-coordinated, reactive mode. In the pessimistic scenario, however, the process of erosion and external pressure leads to divergence, with each group acting based on its own local capacities and the axis’s operational cohesion diminishing. As a result, collective deterrence weakens, and coordinated responses in future crises will no longer be guaranteed.

  • Kill All The Birds With One Stone: Why Kiev And Brussels Are Preparing To Destroy The TurkStream Pipeline

    Kill All The Birds With One Stone: Why Kiev And Brussels Are Preparing To Destroy The TurkStream Pipeline

    The Economics of the Pipelines: Who Loses, What and How Much

    Two of the most important Russian gas export arteries in the southern direction are under threat: TurkStream and Blue Stream. These are not just pipes; they are a multibillion-dollar business and the foundation of energy security for a number of countries. Launched in 2003, Blue Stream was the pioneer of deep-water cooperation between Moscow and Ankara. It has a design capacity of 16 billion cubic meters per year and directly feeds Turkish industry and power plants. TurkStream, commissioned in 2020, has twice the capacity at 31.5 billion cubic meters. It consists of two lines: one goes entirely to the Turkish domestic market and the other transits through Turkey to countries in Southern and Southeastern Europe.

    Click to see the full-size image

    As of February 23, the daily pumping volume through the European branch of TurkStream stands at 51.4 million cubic meters. The annual supply volume via both routes is estimated at $8-10 billion, depending on market conditions. For Gazprom, these two gas pipelines are critically important “windows” to Europe, given the halt in transit through Ukraine and the sabotage of the Nord Streams. Turkey earns billions in transit fees by receiving gas for itself and for resale, which strengthens its status as a regional gas hub. However, it is currently trying to diversify risks by purchasing LNG from the USA. Further down the chain, gas goes to Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, and Greece, where industrial operations and the heating of millions of homes depend on it. Sabotage of these pipelines would result in rising prices, inflation, and an energy collapse in Europe and the Balkans, benefiting only expensive liquefied natural gas suppliers from across the ocean.

    Putin’s Statement and the Threat of Terrorism

    At a meeting of the FSB board, Vladimir Putin stated that the Russian government has operational information about planned explosions of the TurkStream and Blue Stream gas pipelines, which run along the bottom of the Black Sea. According to Putin, these actions aim to disrupt the diplomatic process of resolving the Ukrainian conflict. Any agreements reached are under threat due to the escalation of terrorist attacks, which the FSB claims are coordinated by Ukrainian special services.

    Putin’s statement and the threat of terrorism / Download video here

    Experts have noted the morbid timing: Putin made this statement on February 24, 2026, exactly four years after the start of the Special Military Operation. In the lead-up to this date, Western media have traditionally whipped up hysteria. Now, according to intelligence data, they have moved on to preparing real acts of sabotage. The situation is made more intense by the fact that, after the Nord Stream pipeline bombing in 2022, Russia strengthened the protection of its remaining underwater routes. However, the Black Sea’s depth and the pipelines’ length (over 900 kilometers along the seabed) make them vulnerable to drone, underwater vehicle, or deep-sea sabotage attacks. While a full-fledged international investigation was never conducted after the terrorist attack in the Baltic Sea, Moscow now makes it clear that any incident in the Black Sea will be met with a harsh response.

    The Terror Attack Scenario: How Britain and Ukraine Could Blow Up Gas at the Bottom of the Black Sea

    The beneficiaries of this terrorist act are most likely British intelligence services working against Trump and the interests of globalists, attempting to punish Turkey. This plan is similar in audacity to the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, but the stakes are higher this time, and the chosen theater of operations is the Black Sea, where the interests of Turkey, Russia, and NATO intersect.

    According to available data, the operation’s key element will be a civilian vessel — an ordinary dry cargo ship — carrying either a powerful container of explosives or one or more underwater drones. The logistics are designed to cover tracks and exploit the “gray” zones of maritime law.

    Click to see the full-size image

    The vessel could depart from the Romanian port of Constanța, the largest hub in the western Black Sea. Intense commercial traffic there makes inspection difficult. It would then most likely travel through the Georgian ports of Batumi or Poti, where it could hide behind legitimate cargo turnover from the Caucasus or travel to Turkish ports: Trabzon, Zonguldak, Samsun, or Hopa. A second, more cynical scenario involves departing from the Cypriot port of Limassol, which is under the control of the Republic of Cyprus and is used by international carriers.

    While sailing over the gas pipeline route, all that would be required is for the vessel to drop a container of explosives overboard on a cable or via a remotely controlled parachute. Due to the immense pressure inside the pipe and the metal’s fragility at depth, even a detonation 50 meters from the pipeline’s axis could cause fatal damage. Another option is to launch a small underwater drone, or unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), that would settle on the seabed next to the pipeline and be activated remotely at the right moment.

    Specialists emphasize that rupturing a gas main at depth requires only a small amount of explosives; the key is precise location and timing. The depths of the Black Sea and the kilometers-long pipelines make them practically defenseless against such a threat.

    Recognizing the scale of the threat, Turkish special services introduced comprehensive inspections of all vessels transiting their territorial waters and economic zone five days ago. The Turkish Navy and Coast Guard are operating at full capacity. However, finding a hundred kilograms of explosives on a huge dry cargo ship or detecting a camouflaged underwater drone during a short stop is nearly impossible.

    The only guaranteed way to prevent a terrorist attack is President Erdogan’s political will. Ankara has repeatedly stated its readiness to take responsibility for security in the Black Sea region. The time for action is now. Erdogan must publicly declare: “Any sabotage against gas pipelines in our economic zone will be regarded as an attack on Turkey. We will not allow the Black Sea to become a zone of energy terror. Ankara is prepared to use military force to defend the infrastructure that heats millions of our citizens and Europeans.”

    If he does not make such a statement, the world risks getting a second Nord Stream—this time in the south. Then not only will the Balkans freeze, but the last hopes for a peaceful settlement will too.

    Kiev’s Motives and the Britain Connection: A Strike Against Trump and Erdogan

    If the sabotage of TurkStream and Blue Stream is successful, Ukraine will have solved a complex set of problems. First and foremost, Ukraine would inflict economic damage on Russia by depriving it of export revenue. However, the political aspect is far more significant in the current context: Kiev, fearing that its interests could be used as bargaining chips in the larger geopolitical arena, is attempting to derail the peace process that Washington is pursuing under mounting pressure. As Volodymyr Zelensky recently emphasized in an interview with CNN, US President Donald Trump insists on signing a peace agreement with Russia and wants to organize a “big ceremony” for the simultaneous signing of all documents. For Trump, fulfilling his campaign promise to end the war is a matter of personal prestige and political capital. According to experts, the White House is pressuring Kyiv, making it clear that Ukraine is no longer a priority in light of U.S. plans to return to the Middle East. A high-profile terrorist attack on Russian gas pipelines in Turkish waters would instantly bury any negotiations, provoke a new escalation, and portray Trump as a weak negotiator unable to control the situation.

    Click to see the full-size image

    However, the main target is apparently Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Kiev’s interests here align with those of influential circles in Brussels. 2026 has become a triumphant year for Turkish diplomacy. At Donald Trump’s invitation, Erdogan joined the “Peace Council” on Gaza. Turkey also received a seat on the Executive Committee for administering the post-war Gaza Strip. This caused fury in Israel and serious irritation in Europe, which found itself excluded from processes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Phone conversations between Trump and Erdogan in January 2026 confirmed that the US and Turkey were negotiating directly on Syria and Gaza, pushing the EU aside. Blowing up TurkStream is a strike against this partnership. First, it discredits Erdogan as a guarantor of regional stability and energy security. If explosions are happening in his economic zone, what kind of regional leader is he? Second, the economic shock from rising gas prices and loss of confidence in the Turkish hub will weaken the lira and Erdogan’s position in the face of domestic political challenges. Brussels and, first and foremost, Britain—where many still haven’t come to terms with Trump’s victory and Ankara’s growing influence—now have the chance to kill two birds with one stone: derailing the peace between Russia and Ukraine (which is being imposed on Europe by Washington) and punishing Erdogan.

    Ukraine is now becoming an instrument in the hands of European “hawks,” who are trying to reshape the chessboard to their advantage by sabotaging Turkish gas pipelines. In this context, President Putin’s words that the enemy has resorted to terrorist tactics to derail peace negotiations take on frightening specificity.

    Click to see the full-size image

    Conclusion

    Vladimir Putin’s statement about preparing to bomb TurkStream is more than just a diplomatic note; it’s a signal that the conflict is entering its most dangerous terrorist phase. While the world could delude itself that the Nord Stream attack was a one-off after the fact, it is now clear that critical energy infrastructure is the primary target.

    There are now two possible scenarios for future developments. Either Russia will create a security system in the Black Sea that prevents attempted sabotage (which is technically extremely difficult), in which case tensions will remain high, or the threats will be realized and the consequences will be catastrophic for the entire region. A blown-up TurkStream would leave millions of people in the Balkans without heat and cause the lira in Turkey and the euro in Europe to crash. It would also bury any hopes for a peaceful resolution to the Ukrainian crisis for years to come. In this war, there will be no winners—only the frozen and impoverished.

    Originally posted on SouthFront.press

  • Washington and Concerns Over Increasing Oil Prices; the Impact of the Oil Price Surge on the Conclusion of the 12-Day War

    Washington and Concerns Over Increasing Oil Prices; the Impact of the Oil Price Surge on the Conclusion of the 12-Day War

    Investigating the claim of a connection between energy prices and the end of the 12-day war
    To prove this connection exists, it is important to analyze the media and influential figures’ perspectives on the matter, along with examining various evidence from previous years and the outcomes of similar events. This helps understand why the decision-making apparatus in Washington responded the way it did. Additionally, before the “American-Israeli” attack on Iran, CENTCOM commander Gen. Erik Kurilla outlined a comprehensive plan for several weeks of bombing Iran in front of Trump, yet despite strong backing from the Israeli regime lobby, it was rejected. According to Trump’s first vice president, J.D. Vance, Washington was satisfied with a limited operation and targeted strikes to destroy nuclear facilities, rather than pursuing a full-scale war. Ultimately, however, Tel Aviv decided to proceed with the attacks and convinced Trump to target Iran’s nuclear sites.

    1. Trump expresses concern about rising oil prices hours before war beginsOn the night of the attack, a well-known Bloomberg journalist tweeted a crucial excerpt from Trump’s conversation with Energy Secretary Chris Wright. Trump had expressed concerns about the increase in oil prices roughly 10 days earlier, citing rising geopolitical risks, and had threatened to “shout out” to the secretary if the trend persisted. During that period, the Republican administration had successfully kept inflation under control.
    Conversations between Trump and the US Secretary of Energy at a Cabinet meeting before the war began
    1. US President’s oil tweetsTrump’s tweets amid a war with Iran highlight Washington’s sensitivity to oil prices, revealing how Wall Street financial markets remain vulnerable to this key resource, regardless of other structural aspects of the US economy.

    In the first tweet, he orders the Secretary of Energy to drill more oil fields in the U.S. to boost production, and in the second tweet, which came minutes after the first, he warns energy companies against raising oil prices.

    In the third tweet, coinciding with the war’s final moments, Trump confirms China’s ongoing purchase of Iranian oil. His expression of satisfaction aims to stabilize the energy market and consequently minimize fluctuations in oil prices.

    1. Warning from the world’s leading publications and think tanks

      • Oxford Economic Journal article
      This article examines how the heightened tension between Tehran and Tel Aviv influences oil prices and global market outlooks. A chart illustrates expected fluctuations in oil prices per barrel. The author forecasts that, in the event of a sudden shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices could rise to around $130. Similarly, if Iran’s regime damages its energy infrastructure to halt exports, prices might reach approximately $100. Furthermore, increased sanctions on Iranian oil could reduce exports by up to 100,000 barrels per day, pushing prices to about $80. This increase from the current price of around $75 creates a significant gap with substantial economic implications for the US.

      • Deutsche Bank report (German central bank)
      On June 13, which marks the start of the war, the German Central Bank released a report on how reducing Iranian oil exports by 50 and 100 percent of their capacity, as well as the (effective) closure of the Strait of Hormuz, would affect rising oil prices.

      • Politico’s revelations regarding the war with Ansar Allah
      On February 21, 2025, Politico disclosed a confidential conversation between Vance and Trump. During this exchange, Vance expressed concern about rising oil prices and their severe economic impact, amidst pressure from the Zionist AIPAC lobby to counter the war-mongering actions of certain US government officials. This highlights the complex nature of the situation at that time. The report underscores that oil prices can significantly influence international conflicts and disputes.

      • World Bank report after the October 7 attack
      Immediately after Operation Storm al-Aqsa and its continuation for several days, the World Bank prepared a report in which it presented predictions of how oil production would decline and, as a result, oil prices would rise for world markets. In this text, the situation was assumed to deteriorate to the point that if tensions caused a daily production decrease of 7-8 million barrels of oil, countries would see oil prices increase to $160. The ongoing wars and tensions between the resistance axis and the Zionist regime are so sensitive that this group of reports can be largely attributed to similar conditions. Such a security-economic pattern has been recorded at different points in time as a repeatable chain that can be used to predict energy market events after the start of a major regional war.
    2. Conversations on the fourth day of the Netanyahu cabinet war meetingAccording to the Times of Israel, Ron Dermer, a close ally of Netanyahu for nearly 20 years who also manages relations with the U.S. and Arab nations, opposes calls to bomb Iranian refineries. He stated during that meeting: “If we target civilian infrastructure like refineries, the war will be over before we can attack Fordow and accomplish our goals.”
    Ron Dermer, Israel’s Minister of Strategic Affairs, with Blinken, the US Secretary of State in 2023.

    The key question is why the war would end by striking Iran’s oil facilities. Mehdi Kharatian, a recognized Iranian analyst, believes this aggressive move could trigger a dangerous chain reaction in the region. He suggests that Iran might escalate tensions in Southwest Asia’s infrastructure sectors, potentially deterring the United States from fully engaging in the conflict.

    1. Rising oil prices and Democrats’ troubles ahead of the electionTwo days after “Operation True Promise 2” and during the Republican-Democrat election debates, the Telegraph reported that Biden, then US President, mentioned that the regime was contemplating attacking Iranian oil facilities. Some media labeled this potential move as a “headache for the Democrats.” However, the following day, the Biden administration rejected this idea and instead proposed an alternative or replacement plan.

    Final Thoughts
    This discussion presents several clear reasons and pieces of evidence supporting the idea that rising oil prices can help end major wars, acting as a pressure tool on U.S. decision-making. High-ranking US officials prioritize global energy stability and supply chain security, actively working to eliminate threats in this sector. Consequently, Iran’s main leverage during the conflict—the “shock of closing the Strait of Hormuz”—did not need to be used. The US is well aware that any existential threat or large-scale attack on Iran would prompt Iran to use this strategic leverage quickly and decisively! Therefore, it is far wiser for the US to consider this fact carefully before attempting any attack on Iran, as Iran has the potential to ignite the region and severely disrupt the global economy.

  • Invisible Flows; Economic Competition Between Iran and the United States on Iraqi Soil

    Invisible Flows; Economic Competition Between Iran and the United States on Iraqi Soil

    During the year before the 2025 parliamentary elections, Muhammad Shia al-Sudani’s government introduced a new form of role-playing in Iraq’s technology and information sectors. It awarded sensitive telecom and communication contracts to companies linked with resistance forces and granted Axis of Resistance views this trend through several strategic lenses.

    • Increasing Iraq’s strategic independence in the field of communications and reducing the country’s dependence on structures under Western influence
    • Stabilizing the soft power and social influence of the resistance movement against separatist or destabilizing projects
    • Reducing the scope of US surveillance and espionage by limiting Western-dependent information and technology tools
    • Economic and technological synergy between Iran and Iraq, especially in the field of communications, data, and electronic infrastructure
    • Preventing Iraq from becoming a base for intelligence operations against Iran and the countries of the Axis of Resistance

    Background
    Iraq’s telecommunications sector, after oil, has become a key strategic area for the Axis of Resistance. Expanding influence here not only enhances the Axis’s economic and technological capabilities but also plays a crucial role in fortifying Iraq’s internal security, supporting its legitimate government, deterring foreign interference, and managing information. From Iran’s view, control in this sector helps protect Iraq’s vital communications from Takfiri terrorism, foreign intelligence eavesdropping, and infiltration, while also countering psychological warfare and perception operations against the Resistance axis. Therefore, any US attempt to label Iraq’s telecommunications as a “threat” or a “sanctions circumvention tool” aligns more with a renewed maximum pressure strategy and limiting Iran-Iraq cooperation. This approach has been recently reinforced by the US National Security Council’s Memorandum No. 2.

    Infiltration of telecommunications infrastructure
    The effort to effectively infiltrate the telecommunications infrastructure of allied countries is not aimed at “control,” but at safeguarding national security, countering Western cyberattacks, and establishing information deterrence. There are two strategic reasons for this from the Resistance Axis perspective; first, in nations facing external threats, Takfiri terrorism, and Western intelligence operations—such as Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq—digital telecommunications are seen as crucial to national security. Foreign interference in this sector can lead to perception wars, political instability, and fake protests, which Iran and other Resistance Axis members have repeatedly experienced.
    Therefore, enhancing the Resistance Axis’ role here means shielding regional countries from cyber infiltration and foreign sabotage. second, managing data traffic and information routes enables governments to protect critical networks and keep internal communications secure during crises or widespread cyberattacks. Temporarily slowing internet speeds or restricting platforms is not meant to suppress society but to prevent misuse of digital tools like encrypted messaging or video calls during security crises.
    Many countries, including Western ones, recognize such measures as protective. From this view, what some call “Iranian dominance of the telecommunications sector” is actually a legitimate effort to achieve digital independence, bolster cyber sovereignty, and reduce reliance on Western-controlled infrastructure—an essential step for collective security based on resistance and regional stability.

    Key Findings and Analysis

    1- The Growth of Resistance and Iran’s Influence in Iraq’s Tech Sector
    Iran leverages advanced telecommunications, whether from allies like Russia and China or domestically produced, as part of a strategy to boost digital sovereignty and cyber defense. These tools enable Iran and regional allies to monitor, safeguard, and strengthen critical networks against cyber threats from hostile nations, primarily targeted by Western intelligence, especially the U.S. and Europe. Controlling telecommunications regulators in allied countries allows Iran and resistance groups to introduce secure, compatible technologies aligned with security needs while blocking systems that could cause dependency or data leaks. This acts as a sovereign security measure rather than anti-competitive behavior, as regional nations face widespread electronic espionage, making unregulated market access to key infrastructure risky. Additionally, establishing and managing independent, encrypted networks helps Iran and resistance forces secure their strategic communications from cyber attacks, eavesdropping, and sabotage by foreign adversaries. This creates an information defense shield crucial for regional stability during crises and curbing foreign influence. Economically, overseeing telecommunications infrastructure in allied nations can bolster an independent digital economy. Price and bandwidth controls serve not to create monopolies but to prevent Western dominance, protect sensitive data, and ensure sustainable government revenue. Leveraging unused network capacity or international links might also generate legitimate income under sanctions, helping regional actors earn foreign currency and lessen economic vulnerabilities.

    2- Resistance-oriented capabilities in Iraq’s telecommunications industry
    A) Single Internet Gateway:
    A single Internet gateway centralizes the management of global connectivity, serving as a tool for digital sovereignty. By routing international connections through a single, government-controlled point, countries like Iran, Iraq, or Lebanon can protect themselves against cyber threats from foreign entities such as NSA, Israeli operations, or Western tech firms that transfer data abroad. This approach does not isolate them from the global network but ensures data flows are regulated according to national laws and security protocols. Unregulated private options, including some Western satellite Internet services, could threaten a country’s cyber sovereignty. Therefore, nations have the authority to establish their own legal frameworks to uphold security.

    B) Preventing Foreign Infiltration
    Controlling key organizations to prevent foreign infiltration of critical infrastructure is vital. Countries vulnerable to terrorist threats, cyber sabotage, and extensive information infiltration—especially those under pressure from the United States or the Zionist regime—must maintain an integrated and secure telecommunications management system. From the resistance axis perspective, coordination among the head of state, the ministry of communications, the regulatory authority, and the national operator is crucial, not to stifle competition but to shield critical infrastructure from infiltration by Western companies and security agencies. This strategy aims to protect fiber optic cables, submarine cables, microwave stations, and data centers from unauthorized access by foreign or malicious entities. Such access is not meant to control society but to prevent cyberattacks, delay targeted attacks, avoid network breaches, and safeguard data traffic. In volatile regions like Iraq and Yemen, lacking these controls often facilitates infiltration by the Zionist regime, the United States, or Takfiri groups.

    C) Cyber ​​Defense and Preventing Covert Attacks
    Deep inspection technologies play a crucial role in cyber defense and thwarting covert attacks within the resistance-oriented framework. They enhance protection against electronic espionage, multi-layered cyber assaults, and networks of digital terrorists. These tools enable governments to detect attack patterns, suspicious data flows, infiltration methods, and attempts to bypass national laws. Monitoring IP addresses, devices, and suspicious activities is standard practice worldwide—from China and Russia to the United States. When combined with intelligent management of network traffic speed and routes, these technologies defend citizens and critical infrastructure from malware, data theft, deception, and foreign espionage. From the resistance axis perspective, these measures aim to create a secure internet, establish independent digital governance, and prevent foreign influence—not to restrict people, but to shield nations that have long been targets of hybrid warfare and cyberattacks.

    3- The Role of Iraqi Resistance Groups in the Telecommunications Industry and the US Confrontation
    A contract in the Iraqi telecommunications sector highlights a critical aspect of communication security: the Popular Mobilization Forces’ access to Western, particularly American, satellite internet technology. This access, which enables the forces to utilize advanced communication systems, is part of Iraq’s broader effort to bolster defenses against terrorism, cyber attacks by the Zionist regime, and American influence in regional communication networks. Although the US has not officially sanctioned the Popular Mobilization Forces, it has made extensive efforts over the years to restrict their access to strategic technologies. A notable example is the prolonged US campaign to recover M-1 Abrams tanks held by some PMF units, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, during the fight against ISIS—an effort that achieved only partial success. This demonstrates that the US aims to limit Iraq’s self-defense capabilities. In late 2024, US-sanctioned Faleh al-Fayyadh signed a contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Communications to supply strategic satellite communication systems to the PMF headquarters. The contract, titled “Contract for the Supply of Strategic Satellite Communications Systems to the PMF Committee,” was signed by Nabil Abdul-Baqi, then director general of Al-Salam Company, a state-owned entity affiliated with the Ministry.

    In late 2024, Faleh al-Fayyadh, who is sanctioned by the US, signed a contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Communications to supply strategic satellite communications systems to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) headquarters. The contract, officially titled “Contract for the Supply of Strategic Satellite Communications Systems to the PMF Committee,” was signed by Nabil Abdul-Baqi, then director general of the state-owned Al-Salam Company affiliated with the Ministry of Communications.

    Although the contract is relatively small at 1.09 billion Iraqi dinars (around $832,000), it involves advanced equipment, including VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) systems of the US-made Kymta U-8 type. Most of the equipment listed is produced in the US and Europe. Analysis suggests that this equipment was initially sold to the Iraqi Ministry of Communications, likely with the understanding that they were the end user. However, it appears to have been later transferred to the PMF by the Iraqi government, aligned with national security needs. From Baghdad’s and the resistance axis’s viewpoint, such a transfer is a legitimate, defensive action within Iraqi sovereignty, though it might trigger a response from Washington.

    4- Engineer Company; the infrastructure arm of the resistance
    The “General Engineer Company” is part of Iraq’s effort to strengthen its sovereignty and stabilize its economy and security. These forces played a crucial role in protecting territorial integrity and regional security during tough years fighting Takfiri terrorism. Founded in 1401, the company aims to organize the economy of popular organizations and reduce reliance on foreign firms, similar to Iran’s large construction entities like Khatam al-Anbiya. Its structure allows legal activities across sectors such as industry, agriculture, infrastructure, communications, and equipment, leveraging government resources to boost Iraq’s rebuilding efforts. U.S. sanctions are not driven by concern for Iraq’s economy but by a desire to hinder the development of independent, domestic infrastructure that could weaken Western dominance. Washington fears Iraq developing a resistance economy—one based on local power and popular support—reducing Western economic influence and contractors. Sanctions against the company and its affiliates are thus a form of political pressure aimed at limiting Iraq’s popular forces and regional allies. In communications, the company’s involvement in fiber optic and telecom projects is seen by Iran as essential to prevent Iraq’s dependency on Western systems.

    Controlling communication infrastructure locally ensures data security, privacy, and guards against foreign espionage. The U.S. fears Iraq becoming autonomous in this sector, as data networks are key points of dependence in the region. From this angle, U.S. hostility toward the company’s communication projects reflects efforts to preserve this dependence. For resistance groups, U.S. sanctions aim to prevent the formation of a coordinated, resilient resistance network within the broader resistance axis.

    Companies involved in digital infrastructure, energy, and communications, when managed by popular Iraqi institutions, can enhance data exchange, secure communications, technology transfer, and regional economic cooperation. This process will eventually reinforce Iraqi sovereignty and diminish Washington’s influence, which is why the US aims to impede or slow it through sanctions. Additionally, US claims about Western communication equipment or technologies being transferred to popular forces are part of psychological warfare and media campaigns to undermine the reputation of legitimate Iraqi institutions. These allegations are largely based on political speculation and seek to delegitimize institutions crucial in fighting terrorism and maintaining stability. The supervision of the Iraqi Ministry of Communications should not be used as a tool of external pressure but should be conducted within the framework of Iraqi sovereignty by its legitimate institutions. Any Western intervention in this sector perpetuates the same approach that has long hindered Iraq’s political and economic independence.

    Iraq’s fiber optic infrastructure, which is in the hands of resistance groups.
  • The Role of Yemen in the Competition in the Horn of Africa

    The Role of Yemen in the Competition in the Horn of Africa

    In the 21st century, Persian Gulf countries have set ambitious geopolitical objectives, heavily relying on their rich oil revenues. As this trend continues and the oil market remains volatile, diversifying income sources becomes essential. Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030,” which focuses on expanding the non-oil sector and investing in foreign assets, aligns with this goal.
    Consequently, as oil resources decline, the Persian Gulf nations are aiming to diversify their economies and safeguard key assets like ports and farmland. The 2008 global financial crisis further accelerated this effort, prompting the Gulf countries to make significant investments in the Horn of Africa to broaden their economic bases.

    Recently, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Gateway Terminal (RSGT) signed a 30-year contract with Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA) to operate and develop the port of Tajoura. RSGT aims to turn Tajoura into a major multi-purpose terminal, expecting it to handle five million tons of cargo annually, strengthening its role as a gateway for Ethiopian imports and exports. However, there has been a shift from purely economic involvement to more direct political and military actions, with Gulf states establishing military bases and brokering peace in the region. Saudi Arabia’s strategy in the Red Sea focuses mainly on security, evident in its diplomatic and military moves such as a 2017 defense agreement with Djibouti and a 2018 peace treaty between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Its leadership in creating the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Council in 2020 underscores its commitment to regional security cooperation. Riyadh’s presence in the Horn of Africa appears aimed at controlling the Red Sea to counter threats, especially from Yemen’s Ansarullah. It’s noteworthy that Western media claim Yemen’s Ansarullah and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab are cooperating in arms shipments.

    UAE Movements
    While the UAE and Saudi Arabia often pursue Western strategies in various regions, this has occasionally caused rivalry, as seen in Sudan and eastern Yemen. Consequently, much of the UAE’s effort to expand influence in the Horn of Africa revolves around controlling western Yemen to attain its objectives in the oil-rich Hadramaut area. This region has recently become a conflict zone involving tribes near Saudi Arabia.
    The UAE has adopted a more assertive approach, establishing a strong military and economic footprint across the Horn of Africa. Over the last ten years, it has developed military bases in Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Its air base in Assab, Eritrea, symbolizes Abu Dhabi’s commitment to maintaining a lasting presence in the area. Although this base was later dismantled, the UAE’s control over port rights in Mukalla, Aden, and Berbera indicates its strategic goal of dominating maritime routes and influencing the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden regions.

    In fact, the events in Yemen and the Horn of Africa are closely linked. Growing influence in this region could enhance Yemen’s power by diminishing Ansar Allah’s influence. Interestingly, the Emirates’ ambitions appear more aggressive and far-reaching than Riyadh’s. They are even prepared to collaborate closely with the Zionist regime in this area.
    Recently, Western media have reported that Iran and Yemen’s Ansar Allah are gaining influence in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. This situation has prompted the Emirates and the Zionist regime to adopt a more coordinated strategy to address the issue. Some sources suggest that, along with Ethiopia, these two regimes have formed a secret alliance in the region.

    Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki recently made surprising statements, blaming the current Yemen crisis on the militarization of the country’s islands. He also emphasized that coastal nations should be responsible for securing the Red Sea, rather than relying on foreign military bases. His primary concern is the potential establishment of a military base on Yemen’s “Zaqr” island by the Emirates, which could pose a serious threat to Eritrea if completed. The presence of the Zionist regime via the Emirates on Yemeni islands threatens regional sovereignty and international interests. These actions form a dangerous shadow alliance that endangers Yemen’s sovereignty and risks transforming it into a shared military domain of the regime and Abu Dhabi.

    Another key point near the Emirates axis involves Somaliland, which is strongly supported by the Zionists and Ethiopia, each with different aims. Ethiopia sees Somaliland as a route to the sea to further its economic ambitions. Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv aim to establish a base there, possibly to target Yemen’s Ansarullah.

    Along with security concerns, the Emirates also aims to achieve its economic objectives, emphasizing food security. The region’s potential for agriculture and its proximity to the Gulf states make it appealing as a source of essential foods. The Horn of Africa plays a critical role in the Gulf states’ food security due to its fertile land and established trade routes. The Gulf region relies heavily on food imports, obtaining 85 percent of its staple foods from other countries.

    The Southern Transitional Council’s sinister plan for Ansar Allah
    Besides the explanations about the UAE’s regional influence, the Times reports that a delegation from the Southern Transitional Council recently visited Tel Aviv. They expressed willingness to recognize the “Israeli regime” (supporting the Zionist regime) and to sign the “Abraham Pact” in favor of Trump. However, this is conditional on the Zionist regime and the US participating in a joint ground (Southern Transitional Council) and air (Zionist regime and US) attack on Yemen’s Ansar Allah as a “common problem,” and on the Southern Transitional Council being able to establish the country of “South Yemen.”

    Conclusion
    Generally, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s roles in the Horn of Africa involve both competition and cooperation. While they share the goal of countering Iran and Yemeni AnsarAllah’s influence, they also have significant disagreements, as dominance in this region can boost their rivalry over Yemeni oil resources. The main reasons for their presence in the Horn of Africa can be summarized as follows:

    1- As the new global order emerges with multipolarity and diminishing US influence, Washington is delegating its objectives to other regions. Boosting the presence of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the Zionist regime aligns with US interests. Similarly, recognizing Somaliland in exchange for permission to establish a military base fits this pattern.

    2- The Persian Gulf countries’ involvement in the Horn of Africa and the broader Red Sea region is driven by security needs and economic ambitions. Heightened security concerns have increased the region’s importance, especially as Iran’s influence, supported by the “axis of resistance” and strengthened by the Yemeni war, extends to the Horn of Africa. Naval bases serve as strategic footholds, broadening the Persian Gulf’s influence over regional politics and economics. Recently, Western media have suggested cooperation between Ansar Allah and Somali al-Shabaab, despite their differing motives.

    3- Gaining control over the Horn of Africa allows influence into East, North, and even the Sahel regions of Africa. For instance, without Eritrean cooperation, access to trade routes leading to the Sudanese port would be difficult. Cooperation with Ethiopia could expand influence in Central and East Africa. However, Egypt, an Arab country typically aligned with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, often holds opposing views in this region, which may impact future political dynamics.