Category: Article

  • Reverse Suicide Rotation!; America’s New Drone Policy in West Asia

    Reverse Suicide Rotation!; America’s New Drone Policy in West Asia

    Increased US Threat in Iran’s Vicinity:
    Since the drones in this plan are based on the Shahed-136 model but feature additional capabilities and automated coordination, their deployment could boost US ability for precision strikes, swarming attacks, and long-range operations targeting regional assets.

    Evolving Deterrence and Military Competition:
    The introduction of a large number of low-cost drones will challenge the traditional balance between Iran’s air-missile capabilities and advanced US systems, potentially initiating a new arms race focused on “cheap mass production.”

    Uncertain Security and Political Outcomes:
    Deploying these systems, which can operate independently and within networks, raises questions about Washington’s intentions: Is it deterrence? Preparing for future offensives? Pressuring Iran? Or fostering a new pattern of regional conflict? The key issue is the impact of deploying the Scorpion Strike drone unit and affordable, network-capable drones on regional power dynamics, security, and Iran’s deterrence against the US. This report explores how this could alter combat rules, increase limited conflicts, or forge a new drone warfare paradigm in West Asia.

    Background
    The US Army has deployed its first operational unit equipped with affordable kamikaze drones of the “Unmanned Combat Attack System” type in West Asia. These systems are based on reverse-engineering the Iranian Shahed-136 drone. According to Gifron Aerospace, the team leader, establishing the Scorpion Strike Task Force marks a major shift in operational structure and reflects Washington’s new stance on Iran. Earlier reports also highlighted the US military’s need to heavily invest in these Shahed-136 clones, which are quick to produce and adaptable, and could be crucial in future global missions.

    Analysis of Findings:

    Mechanism of Formation of the Scorpion Task Force
    The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced the formation of the Scorpion Strike Task Force, created under the “US Military Drone Dominance Plan” launched earlier this year by US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. The task force, which reports directly to the US Special Operations Command Central, is responsible for overseeing the deployment of new drones in the region. Additionally, the “CENTCOM Joint Rapid Response Task Force,” established last September to enhance the deployment of military capabilities, has also been involved. Tim Hawkins, a CENTCOM spokesperson, explained that the task force includes approximately 24 specialists whose role is to manage the deployment and operation of new drones. He noted that while the exact number of drones deployed remains undisclosed, their deployment is substantial enough to grant the US military a “significant level of operational capability.”

    Drones and Estimated Production Cost
    The drones, featuring a delta wing design and measuring about 10 feet in length and 8 feet in width, were created by Arizona’s Spectre Works in partnership with the US Army. This system includes technical features enabling ‘automated coordination” among the drones, making them suitable for group tactics and network operations. Captain Tim Hawkins, a project team member, reported that each drone costs approximately $35,000. Despite the low price, the system offers capabilities comparable to traditional long-range US Army systems but at a significantly reduced cost. He also highlighted their long range, the ability to operate beyond line of sight, and extensive coverage potential within CENTCOM’s area. An official CENTCOM statement mentioned that these long-range, autonomous LUCAS drones are now operational in the region and can be launched via various methods, including catapults, rocket-assisted systems, and ground- or vehicle-based launchers.

    Multi-platform drones
    Military analyst Joseph Trowick explained that LUCAS drones can be launched from various platforms, not just ground-based systems. These drones support multiple launch methods, including deployment from naval vessels, which enhances their value in maritime and sea-based missions. Earlier US military analyses indicated that integrating inexpensive, multi-role drones into the US Navy could add new layers of defense, attack, electronic warfare, intelligence, and networking capabilities. This would transform warships into advanced nodes within a combat network. Trowick also noted that the initial design of the new UAS drone was directly inspired by Iran’s Shahed-136. The US military collaborated with several innovative tech companies to develop and produce the drone, which is a “direct result of that reverse engineering effort”. While it follows the general pattern of the Shahed, some parts have been redesigned to meet US operational requirements.

    FLM-136 UAV
    SpectreWorks, a manufacturer of these drones, has released specifications for a related design called the FLM-136, described as a “training target” or experimental platform. According to the data, the drone can reach a maximum range of approximately 715 km and remain airborne for up to six hours. Its payload capacity, excluding fuel, is around 18 kg, and it flies at about 137 km/h, with the ability to accelerate to roughly 194 km/h. It remains unclear whether these features fully represent the operational prototype of the combat offensive system or if they only pertain to experimental and early versions.

    According to data from the US Army Operational Environment Data Integration Network portal, the Shahed-136 drone features a 50-horsepower internal combustion engine and can reach speeds of around 185 km/h (100 knots). Its standard version has an operational range of approximately 2,000 km and can carry a 40 kg warhead. Designed mainly for point attacks on stationary targets, it relies on pre-programmed targeting data. Recently, Iran has introduced new Shahed-136 variants, including models with advanced guidance systems and a jet engine version with different speeds and ranges. Russia has also started producing the “Geran” variants based on the same design since beginning drone cooperation with Iran. Several derivative models are now part of its arsenal. Reports suggest that both Iran and Russia are working to enhance their drones with more dynamic, flexible, and reactive targeting capabilities, aiming for semi-intelligent drones capable of attacking moving targets or altering course during flight.

    The Importance of Cheap, High-Performance Drones
    Captain Tim Hawkins announced that the US has reached a new stage: mass-producing drones and deploying them in West Asia for the first time. He described this as a “reverse scenario against Iran,” where the US is using the same approach Iran developed through frequent drone attacks in the region. According to the head of the CENTCOM team at MacDill Air Base, observing Russia’s operations in Ukraine and Iran’s drone attacks on the Zionist regime shows that this tactic can cause significant disruption and impose heavy defense costs on the enemy. From the US perspective, it is now time to apply the same “Iranian strategy” against Iran.
    Although the Scorpion Special Forces haven’t yet deployed their new drones in actual missions, they have been tested against regional targets, confirming their operational potential. Hawkins pointed out that enhancing the US’s offensive and defensive capabilities is a concurrent strategy and stated that “sometimes effective defense comes from effective attack.” Until now, the US military has mainly regarded the drones publicly as training tools or threat simulators rather than as active offensive systems.The system could also be employed against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. While the US has announced a formal ceasefire with the group, the capability to strike them remains if necessary. The main obstacle, however, is not a lack of offensive power but rather identifying the right target. From a strategic perspective, drones like Shahed offer advantages beyond West Asia and North Africa, providing the ability to deliver large amounts of low-cost firepower. This enhances the capability to weaken enemy defenses and aligns with the US military’s focus on developing long-range, affordable, and mass-produced weapon systems.

    New capabilities
    Modern drones can be continuously upgraded thanks to their modular and open architecture design. This setup permits the integration of the latest sensors, navigation tools, and AI components without altering the core drone structure. As previously mentioned, advancements in positioning, navigation, and timing technologies are ongoing, allowing affordable, precision-attack drones to leverage this flexibility to combat electronic warfare. Additionally, the deployment of artificial intelligence in lower-end drones is imminent, enabling them to navigate autonomously without GPS and target moving objects effectively.Consequently, the effectiveness of electronic warfare in disrupting these systems is waning. In the near future, thousands of inexpensive yet highly threatening drones—costing just a fraction of a traditional cruise or ballistic missile—could easily overwhelm and disable even the most advanced enemy air defenses. This capability is expected to become a vital component of future major conflicts. Tim Hawkins notes that development efforts are progressing rapidly, especially for low-cost attack drones that are scalable and upgradeable. Spectre Works is not alone in this market; Gryphon Aerospace, an American company, also supplies a drone similar to the Shahed series, the Arrowhead MQM-172, to the US armed forces.

  • Changing the US Presence in Syria: Details of Military and Logistics Movements at US Bases in Eastern Syria

    Changing the US Presence in Syria: Details of Military and Logistics Movements at US Bases in Eastern Syria

    Analysis of satellite images and field reports from early 2025 indicates a shift in US force deployment from dispersal to concentration along the eastern axis. Deir Ezzor bases, once serving as contact points for local threats, have seen reduced activity and the withdrawal of equipment recently. The evacuation of some facilities at CONOCO, Al-Omar, and Green Village initially suggested a potential withdrawal, but later developments suggest otherwise. Current data reveals that Washington is adopting a strategy of “reducing presence and increasing infrastructure depth.” Recent weeks have seen the transfer of equipment, new construction, and convoy movements across multiple eastern bases, indicating a strategic reorganization rather than a withdrawal, effectively shifting the focus of US presence in Syria.

    Conceptual Framework
    After 2025, the US military presence in Syria has shifted to a new phase that diverges significantly from earlier patterns. Instead of focusing on “territorial dominance” through large bases and extensive field operations, the current strategy emphasizes positional-functional control. In this approach, bases serve not just as military locations but as strategic instruments for blocking geopolitical bottlenecks and influencing the region’s geoeconomic network.In this context, the significance of bases is determined by their role within power chains and strategic routes rather than their size. For example, Qasrak base as a logistical gateway east of the Euphrates and a command post for northeastern Syria, while Al-Tanf is pivotal in disrupting Iran’s land corridor to the Mediterranean. These bases serve as “geopolitical levers,” demonstrating a shift from tactical presence to targeted influence engineering. Each base now functions as a tool for managing regional relations and maintaining strategic balances.

    The map in the US Congressional Report shows the deployment of US military bases in Syria and areas under its control in 2025, with an emphasis on key points in northeastern Syria and strategic borders. Source: US Congressional Report (CRS 2025) – Syria: Transition and U.S. Policy

    Based on US Congressional reports and Tom Barrack’s speech at the Doha Forum, Syria has shifted from being merely a ongoing crisis to becoming a strategic platform for shaping a new regional order in the Arab East. This shift suggests that the US intends to maintain a presence in Syria to influence emerging power dynamics. Rather than sticking to a purely security-focused approach, the US is redefining its global role as a key actor in the region’s geopolitical and security landscape. This military reorientation represents not only a tactical change but also a move toward establishing a new power framework in West Asia.

    The New Map of US Military Presence
    The US military presence in Syria has shifted from direct control to managing strategic locations. These bases now serve not just military purposes but act as points within a broader geopolitical network shaping regional dynamics. This section examines three active bases and their contribution to extending US influence in Syria.

    Inactive Bases
    In 2025, the United States shifted its military focus to strategic and geopolitical areas by closing several key bases in Syria. Bases like Al-Omar and CONOCO, primarily used for energy and surveillance, were transferred to SDF forces. Additionally, Tal Baydar and Wazir bases, closed due to their poor locations and diminished Turkish sensitivities, became part of the new US strategy targeting crucial geopolitical hubs. These actions indicate that the US now aims not only to secure oil resources but also to control strategic positions to influence Syria’s future political and security landscape.

    US geopolitical logic
    The US presence in Syria, particularly in the northeastern regions, has experienced notable changes driven by security concerns and regional geopolitics, reflecting efforts to shape a new regional order. These changes not only involve scaling back military footprint in certain areas but also show a reinterpretation of America’s role in Syria and the wider region. Strategic American bases in Syria serve as tools of geopolitical influence, impacting the regional power dynamics in Arab East and West Asia. The motivations and geopolitical reasoning behind this realignment of US bases and its presence in Syria are discussed below.

    Containing Iran and controlling the land corridor
    One of the primary objectives of the United States in Syria is to restrict Iranian influence. The strategic Al-Tanf base, situated at the Syria-Jordan-Iraq border triangle, is seen as crucial to U.S. interests. Since the start of the U.S. presence in Syria, Al-Tanf has been instrumental in blocking Iran’s land corridor and continues to serve this purpose. The goal of maintaining Al-Tanf is to prevent Iran from establishing a land link from Tehran to Beirut, thereby stopping Iran from entering Lebanon and expanding its regional influence. The U.S. presence here acts as a chokepoint for Iran, playing an essential role for the Western alliance and the Zionist regime, especially in hindering Iran’s coordination with resistance forces in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

    Maintaining leverage in Syria’s political future
    Another objective of the United States in restructuring bases and trimming its military footprint is to utilize the remaining bases as leverage in the Syrian political arena. The 2025 US Congressional Report notes that the US has transformed its military presence into a bargaining tool in political negotiations following the fall of the Assad regime. While justified as efforts against ISIS, this presence primarily aims to be involved in Syria’s reconstruction and to shape its future political and security frameworks in alignment with Washington’s interests. Key bases like Qasr and al-Shaddadi, which serve as strategic contacts with local forces and Syrian Kurds, provide the US with significant influence in post-Assad negotiations.

    Managing the relationship with Turkey
    Another strategic move for the United States in Syria involves managing its complex relationship with Turkey. By withdrawing from sensitive areas in northern Syria, such as Tal Baydar, the U.S. has lessened Turkey’s sensitivities and improved its security position. Meanwhile, reports emerged in late 2024 and early 2025 about the establishment of a base in Ain al-Arab, which were consistently denied by both American and Turkish sources. Regardless, the U.S. goal of rebuilding the base near the Turkish border can be seen as a deterrent against Türkiye, allowing Washington to influence Turkish policies in northern Syria.

    Presence in the future geoeconomic corridors
    Among American politicians, Syria is considered a key element in the evolving landscape of the Arab East. At the Doha Forum, Tom Barrack mentioned that the United States is leveraging Syria as a platform to forge a new geopolitical and economic framework. Linking Syria with Lebanon, the Zionist regime, Turkey, and Jordan could influence trade, energy, and transit pathways. These nations, which serve as vital economic and commercial hubs in the region, can be strategically connected through key locations like Qasrak, Al-Shaddadi, and Al-Tanf. This allows the U.S. not only to utilize these networks now but also to steer and reshape them in the future.

    Turning Syria into a scene for containing Russia
    After the collapse of the old order, the United States sees a chance to restore its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria. The Syrian bases serve to contain Iranian influence and oppose Russian expansion in the area. By keeping a military presence and enhancing key strategic locations in Syria, the U.S. can better negotiate with Moscow and act as a deterrent to Russian ambitions.

    Conclusion
    Since 2025, the U.S. has significantly restructured its military presence in Syria, emphasizing key bases in strategic locations. These adjustments aim to curb Iranian influence, especially by severing the Tehran-Beirut land corridor and limiting the resistance axis’s maneuvering capabilities. Bases such as Qasrak, Al-Shaddadi, and Al-Tanf now function as tools for overseeing energy resources, trade routes, and shaping policies in Syria and among regional actors like Turkey. Beyond oil, the U.S. seeks to play a decisive role in Syria’s political landscape and regional power dynamics, using these bases to counter Russian influence. These strategic adjustments enable the U.S. to stay a dominant player, safeguarding its security and shaping a new economic and political order around Syria.

  • The Crossroads of Asia and Africa Under Bin Zayed’s Grip

    The Crossroads of Asia and Africa Under Bin Zayed’s Grip

    Introduction

    In recent decades, under Crown Prince and Abu Dhabi ruler Mohammed bin Zayed, the UAE has pursued an assertive and expansionist strategy aimed at extending its political, economic, and military reach from the Gulf to the Horn of Africa. Bin Zayed, a member of the influential Al Nahyan family, is a staunch opponent of political Islam and a strategic ally of the United States. Washington, in turn, has relied on the UAE in its regional policies, particularly in countering Islamist groups and managing crises.

    The UAE’s population is estimated at around 10 million, of which only one million are citizens; the majority are foreign workers. This demographic reality, combined with oil wealth and vast financial resources, has enabled a foreign policy rooted in economic power and regional networking. Exploiting instability and deep divisions in countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and Libya, the UAE has exerted significant influence over local actors—an influence that would have been impossible in the presence of strong, centralized governments.

    Abu Dhabi’s Role in the Horn of Africa Balance

    The UAE’s military interventions in Libya and Sudan exemplify this approach. In these cases, Abu Dhabi backed forces and groups that countered the influence of rivals like Turkey and Qatar. Over the past decade, Emirati foreign policy has relied on exploiting weak state structures, proxy military networks, and financial capacity—a strategy built on “transactional diplomacy” and “targeted interventionism.”

    Internationally, this policy emerged as the U.S. retreated from its role as global liberal hegemon and scaled back military interventions. Between 2009 and 2011, Bin Zayed recognized that the resulting power vacuum in West Asia and the Horn of Africa offered an unprecedented opportunity for his country to assert itself. Aware of the UAE’s demographic and military limitations but financial and logistical strength, he sought to elevate its geopolitical standing through proactive engagement in surrounding regions.

    The outcome was the launch of a hegemonic and expansionist project spanning both sides of the Red Sea—from the Gulf of Aden to the coasts of Sudan and Eritrea. Through massive investments in ports, infrastructure, and logistics networks across Africa, the UAE became one of the continent’s largest port investors. This economic strategy, combined with military and intelligence activities, enabled Abu Dhabi to build a “transnational empire” blending hard and soft power. Additionally, through informal gold trade networks, the UAE has extracted enormous financial gains from Africa, including the smuggling of roughly 400 tons of gold annually. These economic interests are closely tied to Emirati‑linked companies and institutions active in Africa’s port, security, and financial sectors.

    Socotra: UAE’s Expanding Maritime Influence

    Gradual Entrenchment in Socotra

    The UAE’s approach in Socotra illustrates its strategy of incremental influence and consolidation of geostrategic presence. Following the devastation caused by Cyclone Chapala in 2015, Abu Dhabi deployed relief and engineering teams, establishing itself as a humanitarian actor. This foothold soon evolved into the construction of strategic infrastructure, port facilities, and a limited military presence. Over time, Socotra—ecologically and geostrategically significant—became integrated into the UAE’s maritime influence network stretching across the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea.

    Overall, Emirati foreign policy over the past two decades has combined geopolitical ambition, targeted economic investment, and exploitation of regional instability. Backed by financial resources and international legitimacy, the UAE has achieved influence far beyond its demographic and military weight, extending from the Gulf to the Horn of Africa and reshaping the security architecture around the Red Sea.

    Abd al‑Kuri: A Strategic Outpost

    Located west of Socotra, Abd al‑Kuri island—home to about 500 residents—sits at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean shipping lanes. Its position makes it a vital observation point for vessels entering the Gulf of Aden, and in recent years it has been transformed into a military and logistical hub.

    In November of that year, U.S. Central Command conducted a Red Sea naval exercise with Bahrain, the UAE, and Israel—the first joint drill among Abraham Accords signatories. This marked the beginning of overt military cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv. Defense ties accelerated: Israel’s Elbit Systems signed contracts to supply defense systems to the UAE Air Force, deployed early‑warning radar in Emirati territory, and in February 2023 unveiled a joint unmanned vessel capable of mine detection. By October 2023, construction began on a 2.4‑km runway in Abd al‑Kuri, later expanded into a full military airfield.

    Satellite imagery in March 2024 revealed the phrase “I love the UAE” etched into nearby sand dunes—a symbolic marker of entrenched Emirati presence. By March 2025, the runway was completed, capable of hosting medium and heavy military cargo aircraft such as U.S. C‑130 Hercules, Russian Il‑76 transports, and advanced drones like Israel’s Hermes‑900. Concurrently, the UAE’s state defense conglomerate EDGE Group entered talks with Elbit Systems to expand its drone fleet, underscoring growing synergy between Emirati investment and Israeli technology. Abd al‑Kuri thus emerged not merely as a small island but as a pivotal node in Abu Dhabi’s geostrategic plan to control maritime routes across Bab al‑Mandeb, in coordination with both Washington and Tel Aviv.

    Storm Gathering at Bab al‑Mandeb

    Parallel to developments in Abd al‑Kuri, extensive activity began on Samhah, the smallest inhabited island of the Socotra archipelago. From 2024 to mid‑2025, the UAE built a runway, paved roads, and support facilities. Given the island’s rugged terrain, the airstrip is suited for surveillance missions and limited reconnaissance flights rather than heavy transport. It is optimized for advanced drones like the Hermes‑900, enabling electronic monitoring and maritime patrols. Samhah’s location between the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea makes it ideal for overseeing a chokepoint through which roughly 12% of global trade passes.

    Satellite images from March–April 2025 showed a temporary sand barrier on the island’s western side, likely for drainage and construction support—typical of isolated military projects. During this period, the Yang Star, a Comoros‑flagged landing craft, anchored off Samhah, ferrying engineering equipment and materials between Socotra, Abd al‑Kuri, and Yemeni ports. Other vessels, including Takreem and Mabrouka‑2, regularly connected Socotra, Yemeni coasts, Abd al‑Kuri, and Bosaso in northern Somalia, forming the logistical backbone of the UAE’s maritime influence network in the southern Arabian Sea and Bab al‑Mandeb.

    Mayun: The Critical Node

    While Socotra, Abd al‑Kuri, and Samhah are key points in this network, Mayun (historically Perim) is strategically the most vital. This volcanic island lies at the center of Bab al‑Mandeb, a strait notorious for treacherous currents and reefs, earning the name “Gate of Tears.” It separates Yemen from Eritrea and Djibouti—both hosts to U.S. and Western military bases. Mayun’s strategic importance dates back centuries, serving as a control point for maritime trade even before the Suez Canal opened in 1869.

    In early 2021, reports surfaced of a “mysterious airbase” under construction on Mayun, with no state claiming responsibility. Analysts noted that whoever controls it gains leverage over Bab al‑Mandeb, enabling air operations into Yemen and naval missions across the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and East African coasts. Satellite imagery from 2023–2025 showed a 1.85‑km runway along the island’s western shore, surfaced for medium aircraft, large drones, and reconnaissance planes. While little changed in 2023–2024, 2025 images revealed resurfacing and leveling—signs of reactivation and preparation for new missions.

    This evolving network—from Socotra to Mayun—illustrates how the UAE, through incremental infrastructure projects, military cooperation, and logistical integration, has built a layered maritime presence across one of the world’s most strategic chokepoints. It reflects Abu Dhabi’s ambition to secure influence over global trade routes and embed itself in the security architecture of the Red Sea and Arabian Sea.

    UAE’s Power Play Amid Crisis

    The series of moves in the islands of Samhah, Abd al‑Kuri, and Mayun reflects the emergence of an integrated military‑maritime chain along Yemen’s vital southern sea lanes. The United Arab Emirates, leveraging investment, military technology, and newly forged security ties with Israel and Western partners, is consolidating this network to exert stronger control over trade and military routes in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

    In this context, recent satellite imagery analysis of the Bosaso base in northern Somalia shows that the UAE has deployed critical infrastructure for maritime surveillance and control. At the northern end of the base, a phased‑array radar system has been identified, most likely the GM‑403 model by France’s Thales, with an effective range of over 400 km and the ability to track more than a thousand aerial targets simultaneously—including drones, fighter jets, cruise missiles, and artillery shells. However, intelligence reports and local sources also suggest the possible deployment of the EL/M‑2084 radar system by Israel’s IAI/ELTA, the same system used in the “Iron Dome” air defense network.

    Given the informal security cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv after the Abraham Accords, this possibility is far from unlikely. Geopolitically, the installation of such a system in Bosaso enables the UAE to maintain continuous surveillance over maritime and aerial movements across the Gulf of Aden, Bab al‑Mandeb Strait, and the southern entrance to the Red Sea—an area through which a vital share of global energy and trade flows from East Asia to Europe.

    This development positions Bosaso as a key link in the UAE’s chain of bases in the Horn of Africa and Yemeni islands—including Socotra, Abd al‑Kuri, Samhah, and Mayun. The Bosaso radar thus functions not only as part of a multilayered regional monitoring system but also as the intelligence backbone of Abu Dhabi’s broader plan to control maritime routes across southern Arabia and eastern Africa. This strategy carries a dual nature: on one hand serving “counter‑terrorism and maritime security,” and on the other consolidating Abu Dhabi’s geostrategic dominance in competition with Iran, Turkey, and Qatar in the security landscape of the Arabian Sea and Red Sea.

  • From Socotra to Sudan: Zionist-Emirati Entrenchment in Strategic Regions

    From Socotra to Sudan: Zionist-Emirati Entrenchment in Strategic Regions

    New satellite imagery has revealed a rapidly growing web of military, logistical, and intelligence bases established by the United Arab Emirates along strategic corridors from the Socotra archipelago in the Indian Ocean to the coasts of Somalia and Yemen. This complex military infrastructure effectively serves as Abu Dhabi’s “control ring” over one of the busiest and most sensitive maritime routes in the world—connecting the Arabian Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and the Red Sea. Since the Al-Aqsa Storm operation against the Zionist regime and the outbreak of the Gaza war, the pace of construction and equipping of these bases has sharply accelerated, making them a cornerstone of the region’s geopolitical reconfiguration.

    In this new security structure, the UAE is not the sole actor. Its strategic allies—most notably the Zionist regime and the United States—have played decisive roles in designing, building, and technically supporting the network. Reports confirm the presence of Zionist military officers and technical experts on Socotra islands, where advanced radar systems, electronic surveillance equipment, and maritime control devices manufactured by the regime have been installed. These systems enable the UAE and its allies to monitor Ansarallah’s activities in real time and, if necessary, neutralize missile or naval threats before they reach their targets.

    Chain of Military Oversight

    On the intelligence front, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv have reached an unprecedented level of convergence. Through a joint intelligence platform called Crystal Ball, the two countries share data collected from satellites, drones, and electronic surveillance systems. According to confidential promotional documents prepared for Western partners, the platform was created to “design, deploy, and enhance regional intelligence capabilities in support of energy security and international trade.”

    From a geostrategic perspective, this initiative has elevated the UAE from a minor Gulf player to a mid-level power with transregional capabilities. By controlling vital shipping routes through which much of the world’s oil and trade flows, Abu Dhabi positions itself as a “security mediator” in international maritime security. Meanwhile, the Zionist regime’s presence in this chain signals a shift in Tel Aviv’s cooperation field—from the Gulf to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean—a development that could alter the naval balance of power against Iran and the resistance axis.

    The expansion of such infrastructure has raised regional and international concerns. Many security analysts argue that the network is not limited to countering Yemeni forces but is shaping a “transnational surveillance architecture” that allows the UAE and its allies to control communications, transport, and even the movement of military personnel and equipment across southern Arabia and the Horn of Africa. Ultimately, the militarization of Socotra and adjacent coasts has become a symbol of the new regional power competition in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean—where surveillance technologies, intelligence data, and multilateral security cooperation are replacing direct military occupation.

    Abu Dhabi–Tel Aviv Convergence

    “Relations between the UAE and the Zionist regime were highly developed even before formal diplomatic ties, but kept silent—not hidden, just silent,” recalls Alon Pinkas, a Zionist diplomat who advised four foreign ministers. The newly built Emirati military and intelligence bases are located in areas not officially under UAE sovereignty. Instead, they are established in territories controlled by Abu Dhabi’s informal allies, including Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council, military commander Tareq Saleh, and the regional governments of Somaliland and Puntland—both technically part of Somalia but in tense relations with Mogadishu and with the UAE.

    The Emirati Military Network

    The UAE’s military network includes bases, airstrips, and logistical hubs at key maritime points:

    • Abd al-Kuri and Samhah islands (part of Socotra), now administered by the Southern Transitional Council
    • Bosaso airport in Puntland and Berbera airport in Somaliland
    • Mokha port on Yemen’s western coast
    • Mayun volcanic island in the middle of the strategic Bab al-Mandeb strait, through which nearly 30% of the world’s oil passes

    All these facilities have been newly built or expanded in recent years, forming a coordinated chain of naval and air bases.

    According to regime security sources, this complex network was developed through close coordination between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv, granting effective control over vast sections of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. It constitutes part of a joint UAE–Zionist defense system aimed at creating an integrated regional missile defense, early warning, and intelligence-sharing mechanism.

    Regional Security Architecture

    The Washington Institute for Near East Policy notes that multilateral air-defense coalitions have become the cornerstone of West Asia’s security architecture after October 7, 2023. Member states have integrated radar, intelligence, and early-warning systems to counter shared threats.

    Despite official claims that the network focuses on monitoring global shipping traffic and Yemeni activities, diplomatic and local sources report that Bosaso and Berbera bases now serve broader roles—acting as logistical support hubs for Emirati operations in Sudan’s civil war. In that conflict, Abu Dhabi backs the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) against Sudan’s army. The expansion of Emirati bases around Yemen reflects a wider strategy pursued in recent years, leveraging financial power and diplomatic influence to extend reach across unstable African regions. The UAE has funded or established military bases in southeastern Libya (under General Khalifa Haftar), Chad, the Central African Republic, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

    Emirati Presence in Sudan

    Within Sudan itself, the UAE has maintained two active bases since the war began in April 2023:

    • One in Nyala, southern Darfur
    • Another in al-Malha, 200 km northeast of al-Fashir, the capital of northern Darfur

    The latter area has been under heavy and violent RSF siege for more than 500 days. Thus, what outwardly appears as a surveillance chain against maritime threats has, in practice, evolved into a geostrategic network transforming the UAE into a transregional power with active arms in West Asia, the Horn of Africa, and deep into the African continent.

  • Doctrine of Controlled Resistance: A Narrative of Joseph Aoun’s Strategic Shift Toward Zionist Attacks

    Doctrine of Controlled Resistance: A Narrative of Joseph Aoun’s Strategic Shift Toward Zionist Attacks

    Introduction

    On the international stage, Hebrew media reports claiming that recent Zionist regime attacks were coordinated with the United States—and that Tel Aviv is dissatisfied with the “army’s slow pace in disarming Hezbollah”—illustrate the mounting pressure from Washington and Tel Aviv to curb this trajectory. The West now fears the emergence of an independent Lebanese national defense model, in which the army and resistance secure the country’s borders without reliance on international institutions. This concern has driven the Zionist regime to employ its attacks not only as military responses but also as political tools to prevent closer ties between the army and Hezbollah.

    Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal’s report on Hezbollah’s military rebuilding—coinciding with U.S. diplomatic and security maneuvers alongside Arab allies—signals a coordinated effort to reframe Lebanon’s narrative from “legitimate defense” to “regional threat.” From this perspective, a critical question arises: does Joseph Aoun’s recent directive to delay the disarmament of the resistance reflect political weakness and isolation, or is it a calculated attempt by Aoun and the army to redefine Lebanon’s defense policy and restore national legitimacy? Exploring this question is key to understanding the new phase of security developments along Lebanon’s southern borders and the balance of power in the Middle East.

    From “Potential Partner” to “Implicit Supporter of Resistance”

    At the outset of his presidency, Joseph Aoun was regarded by the West and Arab allies as a “potential partner” to contain Hezbollah and rebuild Lebanon’s political order after the war. Yet, over time, the gap between Western promises and on-the-ground realities eroded this perception. The “Barak Roadmap” and Arab backing for Hezbollah’s disarmament placed Aoun in a dilemma between external pressures and domestic sensitivities. As Zionist attacks persisted and Washington failed to manage the crisis, the legitimacy of alignment with the West weakened in Lebanon. Gradually, Aoun shifted from cooperating with Washington to emphasizing Lebanon’s “right to national defense” against Zionist aggression. By October 2025, he had transformed from a pragmatic figure supported by the West into a nationalist leader who saw his political survival in maintaining balance among the state, the army, and the resistance.

    The Beginning of a New Phase in Lebanon’s Defense Policy

    In late October 2025, the Wall Street Journal published a report claiming that Hezbollah had resumed “rebuilding its military capacity” after the ceasefire. According to Zionist and Arab security sources, part of the defensive equipment was entering Lebanon via Syria, while other parts were being produced domestically. The report warned that the Zionist regime was “losing patience” and might act “unilaterally” if Beirut failed to respond.

    The significance of this report lay less in its military content than in its political and psychological impact. Around the same time, Joseph Aoun ordered the Lebanese army to respond to any Zionist aggression—a decision widely seen as the start of a new phase in Lebanon’s defense policy. Simultaneously, renewed Zionist attacks on southern Lebanon, Aoun’s directive to suspend Hezbollah’s disarmament, and the overlap of these events created a tense and complex environment where media narratives and military decisions shaped public opinion in parallel.

    Strategically, the Wall Street Journal report pursued two objectives:

    • First, by amplifying claims of weapons transfers from Syria, it sought to provide international legitimacy for any potential Zionist preemptive strike, making such action politically defensible—something already witnessed in recent attacks on southern Lebanon.
    • Second, the narrative targeted Lebanon’s political sphere by raising the issue of “security contacts between Lebanon and the Zionist regime,” thereby deepening internal mistrust and placing Aoun between two conflicting narratives: either ignore Hezbollah’s activities or implicitly cooperate with the Zionist regime.

    This dual pressure was precisely what Aoun sought to avoid. Until then, he had tried to maintain a fragile balance among the army, the state, and the resistance. Yet the Wall Street Journal article disrupted that equilibrium, marking a preemptive strike in the war of narratives—framing any Lebanese defensive action as “aligned with the resistance axis.”

    Regionally, the timing of the report with the Egyptian intelligence chief’s visit to Beirut and the U.S. defense secretary’s call to Baghdad was no coincidence. These events reflected a multilayered coordination—political, security, and media—aimed at curbing Lebanon’s shift from “Western cooperation” toward “independent defense.”

    Thus, the Wall Street Journal report should be seen not as a reflection of battlefield reality but as a tool to redefine it. It implanted the Zionist regime’s narrative in the public mind, reframing Aoun’s decision from “legitimate defensive action” into a “reactive and risky response.” In this sense, its publication marked the first shot in a new media war—one designed to shape the battlefield in southern Lebanon through words and headlines before any bullets were fired.

    A New Equation Between Army, Hezbollah, and the State

    Recent developments in southern Lebanon—particularly Joseph Aoun’s direct order to the army to confront Zionist incursions and his subsequent proposal to suspend the plan for exclusive arms control south of the Litani River—represent a turning point in redefining Lebanon’s security equation. These decisions demonstrated that the Lebanese army was no longer a neutral observer but was gradually becoming part of the national deterrence system. By issuing this directive, Aoun effectively shifted from “containing the resistance” toward conditionally integrating the army into the concept of legitimate defense—a reflection of the collapse of the old order and the emergence of a new doctrine of “controlled resistance.”

    Structurally, the suspension of the arms monopoly plan signaled the return of defensive initiative to Lebanon’s domestic institutions. In practice, the army acknowledged Hezbollah’s defensive role, since confronting Zionist aggression is impossible without coordination with the resistance. For the first time since the 2006 war, the Lebanese army, through an official decision, stepped beyond the restrictive framework of Resolution 1701. Thus, the boundary between the roles of the state and the resistance was redefined—not as contradiction but as overlap.

    The Strategic Credibility Crisis of the Zionist Regime

    As analyst Ibrahim Majid observed, the Zionist regime, which a year earlier boasted of “complete victory” over Hezbollah, now admits that the resistance has been “rebuilt.” This shift in narrative is not the result of new intelligence but rather an implicit acknowledgment of failure to achieve war objectives. To compensate for this setback, the Zionist regime needs to construct a new threat—one that justifies its continued aggression and pressures the Lebanese state into internal conflict with the resistance.

    A New Phase of Deterrence

    Strategically, Joseph Aoun’s order for the army to respond directly to Zionist incursions ushered Lebanon into a new phase of formal deterrence. With this directive, he narrowed the historic gap between the state and the resistance, moving the concept of “national defense” from rhetoric into practice. While the decision garnered support from parts of society, it simultaneously placed Lebanon at the center of U.S. and Arab diplomatic pressure. Nevertheless, Aoun’s move can be seen as a calculated effort to reclaim sovereignty and restore legitimacy to Lebanon’s security decision-making.

    Ultimately, Lebanon now operates within a framework of threefold deterrence: the army, the resistance, and the state—each playing distinct yet complementary roles in defending the nation. Looking ahead, three possible trajectories emerge:

    • Stabilization of controlled deterrence through limited coordination between the army and the resistance.
    • Short-term localized clashes if Zionist attacks persist.
    • Escalation to a regional confrontation should the resistance axis intervene directly.

    Lebanon today stands in a state between war and peace—what can be termed “armed peace.” Its stability rests not on external agreements but on internal capacity to maintain balance among the state, the army, and the resistance.

  • Endless Cyber Conflicts: From Tehran to Tel Aviv

    Endless Cyber Conflicts: From Tehran to Tel Aviv

    The Twelve‑Day Cyber War
    The twelve‑day conflict between Iran and Israel, which took place from June 11 to 17, marked a turning point in the history of Middle Eastern cyber warfare. Initiated by Israel’s Operation “Rising Lion”, the confrontation saw a 700 percent increase in cyberattacks against Israeli infrastructure. Unit 8200, the largest military unit within Israel’s Defense Forces and often compared to the U.S. NSA or the UK’s GCHQ, played a pivotal role. Responsible for clandestine operations, SIGINT collection, codebreaking, counter‑espionage, cyber warfare, and surveillance, Unit 8200 has become one of the most sophisticated cyber units globally. Its importance is underscored by the fact that its veterans founded companies such as Check Point, CyberArk, Claroty, CyCognito, and Palo Alto Networks, which both support national security and serve as instruments of Israel’s cyber soft power abroad.

    Unit 8200’s Role in the Twelve‑Day War
    During the June 2025 conflict, Unit 8200 carried out a wide range of cyber operations against Iran. According to CloudSEK, between June 11 and 17, more than 35 pro‑Iranian hacker groups launched coordinated cyberattacks on Israeli military, governmental, and infrastructure targets. In response, Israel activated only four to five groups, but the sophistication of Unit 8200 and affiliated groups such as Predatory Sparrow far outweighed sheer numbers. This group, regarded as the successor to INDRA, employed unique cyberattack methods against Iran’s critical infrastructure, having previously inflicted significant damage on rail systems, steel plants, and fuel stations. Israel’s National Cyber Directorate (INCD) reported that in 2024, the number of alerts doubled, with cyberattack damages estimated at over $3 billion. These figures highlight the unprecedented intensity of the conflict, which went far beyond simple DDoS attacks or website defacements, encompassing complex intrusions into critical infrastructure, theft of sensitive data, and disruption of industrial systems.

    Technological Transformation and AI Tools
    One of Unit 8200’s most significant advancements has been the development and deployment of advanced artificial intelligence systems. According to The Guardian and +972 Magazine, Unit 8200 is building a large language model (LLM) similar to ChatGPT, trained on millions of intercepted Arabic conversations from Palestinians. Still in its training phase, this AI tool is designed to analyze, translate, predict, and summarize text, dramatically enhancing the unit’s surveillance and intelligence capabilities. INCD’s new strategy for 2025–2028 includes the creation of a “Cyber Dome”, an AI‑based national cyber defense system aimed at countering growing threats from Iran and Hamas. At a conference in Tel Aviv, Unit 8200’s commander revealed that AI technology had already been used to select Hamas targets. Reports also indicate that Microsoft and other major U.S. tech firms have supported Unit 8200 by providing Azure cloud services, enabling the migration of 70 percent of sensitive data to the cloud. This reflects the deep integration of Western technologies into Israel’s cyber warfare structure.

    Analysis of Tactics and Operational Methods
    In the twelve‑day war, Unit 8200 employed a wide array of advanced tactics, showcasing significant evolution in cyber warfare methods. According to Dark Reading, the attacks against Iran unfolded in three distinct phases: the first marked by massive DDoS waves and initial intrusion attempts; the second focused on targeting managed service providers (MSPs); and the third, ongoing phase, characterized by slower but far more sophisticated operations.

    Iranian attackers, who previously relied on outdated malware and easily blocked scripts, have shifted to using remote management tools (RMMs) and legitimate Windows software, making detection and blocking far more difficult. Exploitation of zero‑day vulnerabilities, which once took days or weeks, now occurs within 30–40 minutes.

    This dramatic increase in speed and efficiency reflects growing cooperation among Iran‑aligned groups, with shared intelligence, infrastructure, and R&D capabilities. In response, Unit 8200 has deployed advanced tools to target high‑value and unconventional assets.

    Strategic Consequences and Regional Impact
    The twelve‑day cyber war had profound strategic implications for the Middle East. According to the Lieber Institute, in the six months following the Gaza war’s outbreak in October 2023, about 60 percent of Iran’s cyber operations were directed against Israel, intensifying across all fronts from espionage to infrastructure attacks. This escalation was reinforced by Tehran’s allies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. Israel’s National Cyber Directorate, which issued 367 alerts in 2023, raised the figure to 736 in 2024, including 518 high‑priority “red alerts.”

    With much of Iran’s defensive infrastructure destroyed and several senior military officials killed by Tel Aviv’s air campaign, Tehran’s strategic options have been significantly constrained. This operational damage reduces the feasibility of a major conventional response in the short term, making asymmetric tools—especially cyber warfare—far more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, scarred by the Shamoon attack that wiped 30,000 computers and temporarily crippled Saudi Aramco, are increasingly turning to cyber capabilities as instruments of national security. Western states, on the other hand, continue to portray Iran as a disruptive actor in this domain, though experience shows Israel does not wait passively—conducting periodic attacks reminiscent of the Stuxnet virus.

    Below, three possible scenarios for the evolution of this new type of warfare are outlined:

    Scenario One: AI‑Driven Cyber War
    In the first scenario, Unit 8200 leverages its advances in artificial intelligence to enter a new phase of cyber warfare. Once its developing LLM is completed and operational, the unit will be able to process vast amounts of surveillance data in real time. This capability will enable faster target identification, more accurate enemy movement predictions, and automated cyber operations. The planned AI‑based Cyber Dome (2025–2028) could evolve into a multilayered defense system that not only repels attacks but also acts preemptively against potential threats. In this scenario, Unit 8200 is expected to use deep learning algorithms to detect complex patterns in network traffic and anticipate zero‑day attacks before they occur. Deeper collaboration with U.S. tech giants such as Microsoft, Google, and Meta would provide massive computing resources and training data, potentially leading to the development of autonomous cyber weapons capable of independently deciding on targets and attack methods. In response, Iran is likely to invest heavily in AI‑based defensive capabilities and may seek cooperation with countries such as Russia and China to access advanced technologies.

    Scenario Two: Expansion of Cyber Warfare to Regional Critical Infrastructure
    In this scenario, cyber conflict extends beyond Iran and Israel to encompass the entire Middle East. Unit 8200 may adopt a strategy of “maximum cyber pressure,” targeting not only Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure but also vital civilian systems such as electricity grids, water networks, transportation, and banking. Reports indicate that the CyberAvengers group, affiliated with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, targeted Unitronics PLC devices across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors—including water and wastewater systems—for a year beginning October 7. Such attacks highlight the growing tendency to strike critical infrastructure, with potentially catastrophic consequences for civilian populations. In this scenario, Unit 8200 would likely exploit its capabilities to penetrate industrial control systems (ICS) and SCADA networks in Iran, aiming to cause widespread disruptions that could trigger social unrest. Conversely, Iranian cyber groups may attempt to strike Israel’s critical infrastructure, including water treatment facilities, power plants, and transportation networks. This escalation could evolve into a “cyber cold war”, where both sides continuously probe each other’s defenses and search for vulnerabilities without necessarily launching full-scale destructive attacks.

    Scenario Three: Convergence of Cyber Warfare with Physical Operations
    The third scenario is the most complex and dangerous, involving the integration of cyber operations with physical attacks and psychological warfare. Here, cyberattacks are not used as standalone tools but as part of a multi-layered strategy. For example, Unit 8200 might first disable Iran’s air defense systems through cyber intrusions, then conduct airstrikes, followed by information operations to amplify psychological impact. Reports suggest that during recent operations, false messages attributed to the Israeli military—warning of bomb shelter attacks—were disseminated by pro-Iranian groups to spread panic among civilians. Such hybrid operations are highly destructive, as defending against them requires coordination across military, security, and civilian sectors. Leveraging its AI capabilities, Unit 8200 could design sophisticated disinformation campaigns, using deepfakes and AI-generated content to manipulate public opinion. In this scenario, the boundaries between cyber warfare, information warfare, and conventional conflict blur entirely. Iran, in turn, may coordinate cyber-physical attacks through its regional allies against Israeli and allied interests. Israel itself has long engaged in such operations, often playing a role in initiating or facilitating unrest inside Iran.

    Conclusion: An Uncertain Future in Cyberspace
    The twelve-day conflict in June demonstrated that a new era of cyber warfare has begun—an era in which Israel’s Unit 8200, armed with advanced AI technologies, extensive international cooperation, and innovative tactics, seeks to maintain cyber superiority in the region. Yet, as reports indicate, this advantage is fragile, with Iran rapidly expanding its own capabilities. The three scenarios analyzed—AI-driven escalation, expansion to critical infrastructure, and convergence with physical operations—all point to the potential for dangerous intensification in the future. What is clear is that the cyber war between Iran and Israel has entered a new phase, one in which international laws and norms are repeatedly violated and civilian populations bear the greatest burden. The development of Israel’s Cyber Dome and Iran’s likely countermeasures could push the region into a cyber arms race with no foreseeable end. Ultimately, the international community must remain alert to the growing risks of this cyber conflict and work to establish legal and diplomatic frameworks to contain it before its consequences spiral out of control.

  • Baghdad–Ankara Water Agreement; Turkey’s Security and Political Leverage over Iraq?!

    Baghdad–Ankara Water Agreement; Turkey’s Security and Political Leverage over Iraq?!

    Field Context of the Agreement

    The water deal between Turkey and Iraq evolved from two decades of intermittent talks but took on a new, complex structure after 2024. Two key developments set the stage: the sharp decline of Tigris–Euphrates inflows to below 30 billion cubic meters annually, and the completion of Turkey’s Ilisu Dam. Facing simultaneous water shortages and public discontent, Baghdad was compelled to accept Ankara’s new cooperation model.

    In early 2024, both sides signed the Water Project Financing Mechanism, turning water cooperation into a financial and technological package. Turkey pledged technical support and investment via Turkish banks and NATO‑linked institutions, but in return gained control over contractor selection, monitoring technologies, and hydrological data exchange.

    About a year later, the oil–water linkage agreement, first reported by Al‑Monitor (2025), revealed the geopolitical logic: water in exchange for oil. Turkey secured new concessions in Kurdish oil exports and pipeline routes in return for increasing water flows. This elevated the deal from an environmental partnership to a security‑economic bargain with deep political consequences.

    Analytical Feedback

    Turkish think tanks such as ORSAM described the cooperation as Ankara’s “soft power tool,” while analysts from Shafaqna and Etemad warned that the projects expose Iraq’s economic and informational infrastructure to NATO influence. Western research centers like CKH (2025) and Al‑Monitor stressed that the agreement has widened Iraq’s internal divides: Shiite and nationalist parties see it as a threat to sovereignty, whereas Baghdad’s government frames it as a “survival necessity against drought.”

    Thus, the water accord has transformed from an environmental project into a multi‑layered arena of power, economic, and security competition—where Turkey, under the guise of development cooperation, extends its geopolitical influence over Iraq and, by extension, the Resistance Axis.

    Future Threats

    1. Consolidation of Geopolitical Control
      Turkey’s completion of major dams (Ilisu, GAP project) gives it effective control over storage and release of Tigris–Euphrates waters. Recent agreements lack unconditional commitments to increase Iraq’s water supply; instead, they tie flows to joint financial and technical projects. Coordination committees and technical mechanisms risk becoming unilateral decision‑making tools for Ankara, especially since monitoring equipment and data exchange are managed by Turkish entities. This enables immediate pressure on Baghdad, potentially triggering agricultural and energy crises in southern and central Iraq, forcing political concessions.
    2. Economic Dependence on Foreign Actors
      The financing mechanism (April 2024) and oil–water contracts (November 2025) opened Iraq’s water, electricity, and agricultural infrastructure to Turkish capital and companies. This “finance for access” model entrenches dependency. Long‑term contracts and technical conditions reduce Baghdad’s economic autonomy, while Western‑linked banking networks impose obligations that constrain independent policy. Domestic opposition risks being countered by threats of reduced services or halted funding.
    3. Weakening of Independent Regional Players
      The water deal, framed as technical cooperation, indirectly reshapes the role of traditional regional actors. Analysts note that the Ankara–Baghdad energy‑water chain diminishes Tehran’s influence in transboundary resource management and creates openings for NATO, especially U.S. involvement, in Iraq’s critical infrastructure. This dynamic could spark strategic competition among regional blocs, placing Baghdad between national interests and international pressure.
    4. Information Warfare and Data Security Risks
      A core element of the agreements is the transfer of “smart water management” technologies and monitoring systems. Academic sources warn that foreign‑managed systems could expose sensitive databases on resources and infrastructure to external actors. Such data can be exploited economically or militarily, enabling predictive crisis modeling or infiltration operations. Without independent governance safeguards, Baghdad risks losing informational sovereignty.
    5. Environmental and Social Consequences
      Declining river inflows already reduce agricultural output, worsen soil erosion, and intensify dust storms. Regional reports explicitly link dust crises to water shortages. Altered seasonal flows threaten staple crop production and undermine Iraq’s food security, heavily reliant on direct irrigation. Social impacts include rural‑urban migration, strain on urban services, ethnic tensions, and increased recruitment potential for insurgent groups exploiting grievances. Absent compensatory social policies and alternative economic programs, these pressures could destabilize Iraq internally and turn discontent into protest or violence.
  • American Hashd al‑Shaabi!

    American Hashd al‑Shaabi!

    Return of Trump’s Personal Diplomacy

    Al‑Arab Weekly reported that Savaya’s appointment—made without congressional approval—signals Donald Trump’s intent to restore direct control of foreign policy to his inner circle in the White House. This reflects a recurring pattern in his foreign policy: major international decisions bypassing the State Department and pursued through personal and political ties with loyal associates. As seen in direct talks with North Korea’s leader or the Abraham Accords, Trump favors “personal, fast‑track diplomacy” over formal channels. In Iraq, choosing a non‑diplomat close to the president shows his preference for informal but controllable pathways. Savaya thus embodies a model where the president directly manages foreign relations to advance political, security, and electoral goals. His appointment marks the return of Trump’s personalized diplomacy to the Middle East—enhancing Washington’s direct influence but risking the weakening of professional, institutional foreign policy structures.

    Redefining Sovereignty in Iraq

    In his first official statements, Savaya stressed the need for centralized command and ending the activities of armed groups outside government control—remarks clearly aimed at Hashd al‑Shaabi and Iran‑aligned forces. From Washington’s perspective, curbing these groups is a prerequisite for Baghdad’s “real sovereignty” and future security and economic cooperation. At a deeper level, this policy redefines sovereignty itself: Iraqi independence is framed as alignment with U.S. policies. Analysts argue this is part of Trump’s broader plan to contain Iran from within Iraq’s structures, not through direct confrontation but via reconstruction, investment, and minority support. A symbolic example is the reintegration of the Christian “Nineveh Plains Protection Units” into the army, signaling centralization of power and weakening of non‑state actors. Savaya’s mission can thus be seen as an effort to reconfigure Iraq’s security architecture to serve Western interests—ostensibly strengthening the central government but in practice shifting the balance toward Washington’s preferred order.

    Linking Security Policy with Economic Reconstruction

    Savaya’s statements place economic recovery on par with security reform. He repeatedly emphasized the need for foreign investment, rebuilding Iraq’s worn‑out infrastructure, and opening the economy to international companies. For Washington, economic development is a prerequisite for political stability and central government authority. Observers note, however, that deeper political and strategic aims lie behind this economic agenda. U.S. reconstruction plans are not merely humanitarian or technical—they are part of a wider policy to redefine Iraq’s role in the regional order and secure American access to its energy resources. Linking reconstruction with Western economic presence ensures continued U.S. political influence while reducing rivals’ roles in energy. Analysts highlight similarities with past U.S. experiences in rebuilding crisis‑stricken states, where investment and infrastructure projects became tools of political and security engineering. With about 11% of global oil reserves, Iraq holds a special place in this strategy. Savaya spoke of “reviving Iraq’s historic role in the region,” suggesting economic engagement as a prelude to “restoring state authority and social trust.” Yet in practice, foreign corporate expansion and concentrated reconstruction projects may reshape Iraq’s economy in ways more aligned with external powers than with national priorities.

    Soft Power Through Religious Minorities

    Savaya’s appointment carries a clear political message: reasserting U.S. influence in Iraq’s social fabric via religious minorities. He hails from a Chaldean‑Assyrian family rooted in Tal Afar, Nineveh, and maintains close ties with Iraqi Christian diaspora communities in the U.S. Analysts see this as a cultural and social lever in areas once dominated by resistance groups and Iran‑aligned forces. Assyrian media outlets such as Syri Press and Baghdad Tribune framed his appointment as “the return of Iraq’s Christian voice.” In reality, it represents an attempt to build a new social base for Washington’s policies in northern Iraq, particularly in regions where sectarian tension and ethnic divides facilitate external involvement. In this context, the revival of the “Nineveh Plains Protection Units” within the Iraqi army—coinciding with Savaya’s mission—carries symbolic weight. Though presented as enhancing minority security and rebuilding war‑damaged areas, it may in practice foster military and social structures aligned with Western‑oriented currents. Thus, leveraging religious minorities serves not only humanitarian purposes but also as part of America’s soft‑power strategy to re‑embed its political and economic presence in Iraq.

    Dual Function of Savaya’s Appointment

    The timing of Savaya’s appointment, coinciding with Iraq’s parliamentary elections, adds another dimension. Reports suggest the move aims to exert indirect influence on Iraq’s political landscape, steering it toward coalitions more aligned with Washington’s policies. Savaya’s mission includes mediating among Sunni, Kurdish, and minority groups, encouraging their participation in a U.S.‑backed political framework. While presented as fostering stability and reducing armed groups’ influence, this is part of a broader strategy to reshape Iraq’s power balance so that future government decisions align more closely with Western interests.

    Iraq’s Role in the New U.S. Strategy

    Regionally, Sawaya’s appointment is seen as part of Trump’s overarching plan to reconfigure Middle Eastern order. Analysts link it to Washington’s efforts to advance normalization between Arab states and Israel. Iraq, with its geographic position between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, and the Kurdistan Region, is viewed as a potential connecting hub for America’s allies. Sawaya’s mission thus extends beyond economic cooperation and reconstruction—he is positioned to facilitate Baghdad’s political and security ties with regional coalitions favored by Washington.

    In summary, Sawaya’s appointment represents a multi‑layered initiative pursuing political, economic, and symbolic goals simultaneously. Individually, he embodies the use of minority social capital in U.S. policy; politically and security‑wise, he is tasked with limiting armed groups and strengthening central authority; strategically, his mission consolidates Washington’s foothold in Iraq’s economy and energy sector, aligning the country more closely with the Western bloc. His slogan of a “Strong Iraq” reflects a broader ambition: to reintegrate Baghdad into an order designed to secure U.S. and allied interests in the region.


    Would you like me to refine this into a policy brief format (executive summary + key implications) or keep it as a long‑form analytical translation?

  • From Deir Ezzor to Hasakah: The Rise of U.S. Military Activity at Qasrek Base

    From Deir Ezzor to Hasakah: The Rise of U.S. Military Activity at Qasrek Base

    Qasrak Base, located in northern Hasakah province near the town of Tal Tamer, functions as a joint facility between the Global Coalition against ISIS and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Covering an area of 1.8 square kilometers, the base was constructed in late 2017 and early 2018 on elevated agricultural land. The hill on which the base sits is locally known by the names “Jabal Ghol” and “Jabal Qalayeb.”

    Situated at geographic coordinates 36.706242, 40.511955, the Qasrak base lies roughly 30 kilometers from the center of Hasakah city and 33 kilometers from the Turkish border. Its 1.7‑kilometer runway is capable of accommodating military transport and cargo aircraft. As a strategic and logistical hub, Qasrek supports coalition operations in coordination with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and oversees the main supply routes linking Hasakah and Deir Ezzor.

    Right image: Location of Qasrak base from Hasakah; Left image: Location of this base relative to the Turkish border
    The longest runway built by the US in Syria

    Significant construction and expansion activities were first observed in early 2025, concentrated across three main sections. The eastern sector saw the most extensive work: land was leveled and covered with concrete at two separate points, likely in preparation for new facilities or warehouses intended for equipment and logistical supplies. The larger site measures approximately 193 by 94 meters, while the smaller one is about 84 by 60 meters.

    In addition to satellite imagery, multiple videos have documented the surge of activity at this base, including the movement of vehicles and convoys. The earliest footage, released by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) in early 2025, showed heavy machinery and bulldozers, described as “expansion operations at the base.” Analysis of visible structures and geographic features further confirmed that the location was indeed the Qasrek base.

    Later, on September 28, 2025, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) released a video showing military convoys belonging to the Global Coalition moving toward the base. On October 18, 2025, another video depicted several coalition trucks carrying military and logistical equipment along the route from the al‑Walid border crossing toward the base.

    A long line of trucks at the Al-Waleed border crossing on the way to the Qasrak base

    In addition to ground movements, aerial activity at the base has increased significantly, with military transport aircraft landing on multiple occasions. Compared to previous years, this level of operations is unprecedented; prior to Assad’s fall, the base had only limited air traffic. Notable examples include an American cargo plane documented by SOHR on May 24, 2025, and another coalition transport aircraft recorded on July 23, 2025. Furthermore, on October 18, 2025, Syria Now reported that a large American cargo plane, escorted by helicopters from the Iraqi border, landed at the base. Taken together, these developments indicate that the Global Coalition is actively redeploying forces at Qasrek, likely transforming it into a key military logistics hub in northeastern Syria.

    Activities in Deir Ezzor

    The expansion and intensification of activity has not been limited to the Qasrak base. Parallel, though distinct, developments have also been observed in Deir ez‑Zor—particularly at U.S. bases located in the al‑Omar oil field and the Conoco gas field. Alongside the rapid growth of Qasrak, satellite imagery shows American forces withdrawing from Conoco, al‑Omar, and the base near Green Village on the outskirts of Deir Ezzor.

    Photographs taken since early 2025 reveal extensive relocation of equipment and the evacuation of facilities at these sites. Reports first published in May 2025 indicated that the Pentagon intended to transfer forces from al‑Omar and Conoco in Deir ez‑Zor to Qasrek and al‑Shaddadi in Hasakah, thereby reducing the U.S. military presence in the region to fewer than 1,000 troops.

    Summary

    Satellite imagery shows that between January and October 2025, U.S. forces withdrew from the Conoco, al‑Omar, and Green Village bases in the Deir Ezzor countryside. At the same time, Qasrak base near Hasakah witnessed rapid engineering and logistical expansion from July 2025 onward, including the construction of new facilities and the repeated arrival of supply convoys. These developments appear to have effectively transformed Qasrak into the primary command and supply hub for U.S. forces in northeastern Syria.

  • Abu Dhabi: The Second Baku!

    Abu Dhabi: The Second Baku!

    UAE and the Middle Corridor
    The Middle Corridor, largely composed of Turkic‑speaking states, is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Since the war in Ukraine, its importance has multiplied, as the northern route through Russia and Belarus faces security challenges. Arab investments, especially by the UAE, are now directed toward this corridor. For instance, within Dubai’s Silk Road project, the UAE successfully integrated Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into the Global Logistics Passport scheme, aiming to expand trade links across Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

    Diversifying its financial portfolio is a key driver of UAE interest in Central Asia, but its ambitions go beyond investment. Relations with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan highlight the role of DP World in building ports not only on the Caspian Sea but also in Russia’s Arctic, reflecting Abu Dhabi’s aspiration to become a global maritime logistics power.

    Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy underscores the growing importance of these states in its strategic agenda. Competition with regional and global powers in Central Asia’s economic and energy sectors, combined with its strategic presence in the Middle East and North Africa, reveals the multifaceted nature of UAE engagement. By leveraging financial resources, the Gulf state strengthens its influence and acts as a major player in regional economic growth.

    Initial cooperation between Central Asian countries and the UAE focused on trade and investment, but long‑term agreements have expanded into petrochemicals, energy, transport and logistics, agriculture, and aerospace. To deepen ties with the Caspian region, Abu Dhabi invested in port access as part of a global hub system, including DP World’s purchase of two special economic zones in Kazakhstan.

    Economic Agreements
    The UAE’s Masdar has launched renewable energy projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with electricity exported to Europe via undersea cables across the Caspian and Black Seas. Other Emirati firms, such as Abu Dhabi National Energy Company, have built wind power facilities in Central Asia with capacities ranging from tens to hundreds of megawatts.

    Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) is also active in petrochemicals in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan’s offshore fields, creating value‑added industries that enable refined exports. The establishment of the Astana International Financial Center in Dubai could turn Kazakhstan into a major financial hub for Central Asia within the Belt and Road framework.

    For example, in May this year, the UAE and Kazakhstan signed 20 agreements worth $5 billion, mostly in energy, transit, and logistics. More recently, ADNOC subsidiary XRG signed a preliminary deal with Azerbaijan’s Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) company, which plays a key role in delivering Azerbaijani gas to Europe.

    These agreements show Abu Dhabi’s intent to expand economic influence in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan—two pivotal states in the Middle Corridor—while also serving broader political and security objectives.

    Security–Economic Objectives
    The UAE’s investments in the Middle Corridor cannot be reduced to economic figures alone; they conceal strategic motives aligned with Israeli and Western agendas.

    Former Israeli communications minister Ayoob Kara emphasized the need to connect the Middle Corridor via Turkey and the Mediterranean to Israel and then to Gulf Arab states: “If the Middle Corridor is built, we Israelis can connect to it. Stronger links between Turkic republics, Israel, and the Arab world will help counter Iran. We can connect via Turkey by ship, then by rail from Israel to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and onward to the UAE. This will expand trade between China, the Turkic republics, Israel, and Arab countries.”

    Thus, Emirati (and potentially Saudi) support for the Middle Corridor can be seen as part of a broader Israeli plan to encircle Iran’s transit routes.

    Strategic Goals of the UAE in the Middle Corridor:

    1. Rare minerals in Central Asia — vital for defense and technology industries. The West, heavily dependent on China, seeks alternative supplies. Recent agreements with Kazakhstan highlight the corridor’s strategic role in transferring these resources westward.
    2. Energy diversification via the Zangezur Corridor — supported by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Europe, reducing reliance on Russian energy post‑Ukraine war, looks to Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkmenistan, with the world’s fourth‑largest gas reserves, and Azerbaijan, aiming to double gas exports to Europe by 2027, require foreign investment. Projects like the proposed Trans‑Caspian pipeline could become feasible through Middle Corridor development.
    3. Countering Iran’s transit routes — by aligning with Israeli and Western strategies. As corridor competition shapes the new global order, the West seeks to reinforce Israeli economic hegemony in West Asia. Iran’s geography poses the main challenge, so rival corridors like the Middle Corridor are being strengthened with Emirati support.
  • How Israel’s Intelligence Network Operates in Yemen

    How Israel’s Intelligence Network Operates in Yemen

    According to the Italian magazine Il Faro sul Mondo, Israel is attempting to isolate the conflict in Yemen from the ongoing war in Gaza and is preparing for targeted military strikes against the Sanaa-based government. This strategy involves coordinated efforts across several domains:

    1. Recruitment and Deployment of Spy Networks
    In recent days, Mossad has launched a broad campaign on social media to recruit operatives, inviting opponents of Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement to join “Unit 504,” a covert operations wing. To establish this unit, Israeli agents have reportedly reached out to various anti-AnsarAllah factions in occupied Yemeni territories, including remnants of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s network and the Southern Transitional Council.

    These activities reflect Israel’s intent to expand its intelligence footprint in Yemen and carry out preemptive strikes in response to Yemen’s support for Palestinians in Gaza. Israeli officials frequently cite Ansar Allah’s slogans and flags as evidence of a “existential threat,” with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly stating his desire to continue attacks on Yemen—even after the recent ceasefire in Gaza. Channel 12 in Israel also reported that Netanyahu plans to maintain military pressure on Yemen beyond the Gaza conflict.

    Israeli intelligence efforts in Sanaa are not limited to recruiting from political opposition. They have also infiltrated humanitarian and international organizations, allegedly using operatives for sabotage. For instance, during Israel’s 16th airstrike on Yemen on August 28, the cabinet meeting location was targeted, resulting in the death of 12 Yemeni officials, including Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahwi of the Reform and Reconstruction Government.

    Yemeni security forces and Ansar Allah’s intelligence wing have responded by arresting networks linked to Hamed Hussein al-Majali—a Saudi agent affiliated with Mossad and the CIA—as well as operatives embedded in humanitarian organizations. However, countering Israeli espionage requires more advanced infrastructure and strategic planning.

    The primary goal of U.S. and Israeli intelligence in Yemen is to gather detailed information on missile and drone bases, naval positions, weapons depots, and the whereabouts of key political and military figures.

    2. Activation and Support of Anti-Ansarallah Groups
    Targeted assassinations in Sanaa and Al-Bayda province in recent days suggest that Western and Israeli intelligence agencies are reactivating covert cells in Ansarallah-controlled areas. These attacks, often aimed at field commanders and local officials, appear designed to destabilize and sow chaos. For example, on October 31, a female doctor was killed in Sanaa, and on November 2 and 3, two Ansarallah-affiliated personnel were assassinated in Rada’a district.

    Given the history of al-Qaeda and ISIS activity in Rada’a, it’s likely that these groups are being reactivated with support from Western-Arab intelligence. Surrounding areas such as Al-Qayfa, Al-Zahir, Mukayras, and Al-Sawma’ah remain vulnerable due to extremist presence, though most tribes in Al-Bayda are allied with Ansarallah, making a full collapse unlikely.

    Meanwhile, U.S. and British embassies in Yemen are reportedly strengthening ties with Saudi-Emirati-backed forces such as the Giants Brigades and Tariq Saleh’s units. With support from diplomats like Steven Fagin and Abdu Sharif, these groups are enhancing their capabilities for potential ground operations against Yemen’s revolutionary forces.

    3. Communications Networks and Satellite Surveillance
    Israeli intelligence is also focused on dominating communication systems in occupied Yemeni territories, conducting cyberattacks, analyzing satellite imagery to locate missile and drone bases, and monitoring Ansarallah’s field movements.

    While much of this activity remains covert, social media users—especially on X (formerly Twitter)—have been tracking and analyzing satellite images of military sites in Saada and Sanaa. These individuals may be directly or indirectly linked to Western intelligence agencies. Additionally, reports have surfaced that Southern Transitional Council forces have used Israeli Cellebrite spyware to monitor phone lines and track individuals in Hadramaut province, indicating that Israel is replicating its intelligence model from Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine in Yemen.

    Read more: Israeli Surveillance Grip on Hadhramaut Communications!

    Conclusion
    Israel’s espionage network in Yemen employs a range of tools and tactics similar to those used in other regional theaters. Yemenis, particularly in the north and central regions, benefit from strong public resistance to betrayal and foreign interference, rooted in tribal and cultural values. This social cohesion provides a powerful foundation for countering terrorist and intelligence operations.

    Israel’s primary objective is to detach Yemen from the regional resistance axis and neutralize its strategic threat. While continued missile and drone operations in the Red Sea and occupied Palestine offer a tactical response, they are insufficient against aerial assaults and surveillance dominance. A comprehensive strategy—including public mobilization, technological resilience, and regional coordination—is essential to confront and dismantle Israel’s intelligence apparatus in Yemen.

  • Is ISIS Preparing to Announce a “Wilayah of Sudan”?

    Is ISIS Preparing to Announce a “Wilayah of Sudan”?

    ISIS used the editorial of issue 519—titled “Sudan Between Islam and Nationalism”—to outline its ideological justification for involvement in Sudan. In this piece, the group portrays nationalism as the main obstacle to Islamic unity, labeling it a “satanic phenomenon” and a “remnant of ignorance.” ISIS claims that colonial powers promoted nationalism to distract Muslims from the suffering of fellow believers in other countries.

    The group further emphasizes religious loyalty over national identity, suggesting that Muslims bear direct responsibility for events in other Islamic nations. It rejects national sovereignty and borders, calling for their elimination through jihad. ISIS explicitly urges youth from Egypt and Libya to mobilize in support of “Sudanese brothers,” describing Sudan as a “ready battlefield” with “strategic impact across the region.”

    This is not the first time ISIS has addressed the Sudanese crisis. In issue 479 of Al-Naba, titled “The Forgotten Sudan,” the group called on Muslims worldwide to intervene, citing ongoing atrocities. In its analysis, ISIS characterizes the Sudanese conflict as a “pagan war” between “infidel factions,” branding both General Burhan’s and General Hemedti’s forces as “enemies of Islam.”

    Pro-ISIS users on social media have echoed this narrative, viewing the unrest in Sudan as an opportunity to establish a “Wilayah of Sudan” and expand the group’s operations. Some users have openly called on Muslim youth to join the “ranks of the mujahideen.” A user named “Al-Libi” wrote, “Military operations must begin immediately, and the Wilayah of Sudan must be declared.”

    These users describe the Sudanese government as a “tyrannical regime,” seeking to delegitimize its institutions. They label the warring factions as “apostates” and reject any form of compromise with them. Others, adopting a strategic tone, refer to Sudan as “the gateway to Africa,” stressing its geopolitical importance. A user named “Muslim” wrote, “Sudan is the key to ISIS’s expansion in the region, and we must seize this opportunity.”

    ISIS supporters also accuse the international community of double standards, claiming that Western powers only intervene when their interests are threatened.

    It appears that ISIS is exploiting Sudan’s instability to promote its extremist ideology and recruit fighters, particularly with an eye toward expanding its footprint in Africa. In recent years, the group has increased its presence across the continent, including the Lake Chad Basin (covering parts of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad), Puntland in northeastern Somalia, and northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province. Additionally, eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo—such as Beni, Lubero, and Ituri—as well as parts of the Sahel region in central Africa have become active zones for ISIS operations.

    Notably, pro-ISIS users—known as Munasirun—have circulated excerpts from these editorials in poster format under brands like Al-Adiyat and Hadm al-Aswar, further amplifying the group’s messaging around Sudan.