Following escalating crises and the continued failures of the Palestinian Authority, a group of influential tribal leaders in Hebron, located in the West Bank, has issued an official letter calling for withdrawal from the current political framework and the establishment of a localized entity known as the “Hebron Emirate.” The proposal, submitted to Israeli Economy Minister Nir Barkat, is built around peaceful relations, regional development, and the creation of an economic zone in cooperation with Tel Aviv.
As part of the initiative, the sheikhs formally recognize Israel as the “nation-state of the Jewish people” and cite the Abraham Accords as a roadmap for coexistence. They have also requested support from the United States and President Donald Trump to help advance the project. Their proposal not only reflects deep dissatisfaction with the Palestinian Authority’s governance but also signals an effort to redefine Palestinian political order through traditional tribal structures.
This initiative emerges at a time when hopes for a two-state solution have significantly diminished following the events of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent conflicts. As a result, alternative models such as localized emirates are gaining traction. The following report explores the dimensions, reactions, and challenges surrounding this unprecedented proposal.
The Hebron area compared to the entire West Bank and Gaza
Nature of the Hebron Emirate Proposal
Led by Sheikh Wadee’ Jaabari, tribal leaders from five major clans in Hebron have formally called for the establishment of an autonomous emirate, independent from the Palestinian Authority. In their official letter, they propose recognizing Israel as the “nation-state of the Jewish people” and expect reciprocal recognition of the Hebron Emirate as the legitimate representative of Arabs in the region.
The sheikhs argue that the Oslo Accords have resulted in corruption, violence, and economic collapse, rendering the current political framework ineffective and lacking legitimacy. Their initiative reflects a shift toward traditional tribal governance as an alternative to centralized Palestinian leadership.
Sheikh Wadi al-Jaabari in Jerusalem, July 3
Operational Pillars of the Hebron Emirate Proposal
The plan outlines the creation of a 1,000-hectare autonomous economic zone near Israeli-controlled territory. In its initial phase, the zone would employ 1,000 Palestinian workers, with the potential to expand to 50,000 if successful. Sheikh Wadee’ Jaabari emphasizes a “zero tolerance” policy toward terrorism, relying on tribal structures to ensure security and stability.
Tribal Legitimacy vs. Formal Political Structures
In contrast to the centralized Palestinian political system shaped by the PLO and later the Palestinian Authority, the sheikhs base their proposal on traditional tribal legitimacy. They argue that external powers have imposed artificial governance models on Palestinians, and now is the time to return to indigenous, locally rooted leadership. Citing an Arab proverb—“Only the village’s calves can plow its land”—they suggest that outsiders lack the insight to address local needs and realities.
Tel Aviv’s Response and Key Stakeholders
Israeli Economy Minister Nir Barkat is one of the main supporters of the initiative and has reportedly advanced discussions with government backing. He views the proposal as a practical alternative to the failed one-state and two-state solutions. Zionist scholar Mordechai Kedar, a vocal advocate of the Palestinian emirate model, has played a key role in connecting the tribal leaders with Israeli officials. He believes Hebron could serve as a successful prototype for other cities across the West Bank.
Former Mayor of Jerusalem, Nir Barakat, current Minister of Economy of the regime, October 6, 2021
Challenges and Obstacles
Despite receiving political backing, Israel’s security institutions—such as Shin Bet and segments of the military—remain skeptical of the Hebron Emirate proposal. Their concerns center on the tribal leadership’s ability to manage weapons, counter terrorism, and maintain comprehensive control over the region. Military analysts warn that the absence of a centralized authority could lead to instability and chaos.
Locally, several groups and residents in Hebron have voiced opposition, arguing that the initiative lacks legitimacy and does not represent the broader population. Supporters of the Palestinian Authority may respond with resistance or even security confrontations, further complicating the plan’s implementation.
Conclusion
The Hebron Emirate initiative, led by tribal sheikhs, represents an ambitious attempt to reshape governance in the West Bank—moving beyond the Palestinian Authority and the two-state paradigm toward practical coexistence and economic integration with Israel. While some Israeli and Arab actors view the proposal as promising, its execution faces serious political, social, and security challenges.
The future of this initiative will depend on internal support, regional acceptance, and the involvement of international players—particularly the United States. It may also signal the emergence of a more cautious reformist current within the Palestinian Authority, echoing the vision of certain Zionist theorists who have long advocated for sidelining the PA in favor of localized alternatives.
Developing a Multi-Layered and Flexible Air Defense System
Iran’s most effective tool to counter Israel’s long-range, multi-axis operations is a dynamic, multi-layered air defense architecture. According to RAND analysis, integrating long-range systems like Bavar-373, S-300, and S-400 with medium and short-range platforms such as Mersad and Oerlikon, alongside mobile point-defense systems like Tor-M1 and Pantsir-S1, creates a dense and responsive network capable of intercepting threats across various altitudes and distances.
The IISS Military Balance 2024 report highlights that such layered defenses prevent adversaries from overwhelming a single tier—whether via low-altitude cruise missiles or high-altitude ballistic strikes. CSIS further emphasizes that combining rapid-response short-range systems with real-time data-driven C4I networks significantly enhances decision-making speed during saturation attacks.
Lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine, documented by War on the Rocks, show that even advanced systems are vulnerable without mobility. Thus, Iran must prioritize maneuverability, frequent repositioning, and continuous joint training between the Army and IRGC to minimize preemptive detection.
Jane’s Defence Weekly (2020–2024) also notes that mobile point-defense systems and radar stations capable of relocating within 30 minutes can severely disrupt Israeli F-35I mission planning and increase operational costs.
Counterintelligence and Information Warfare
To neutralize Israel’s intelligence advantage—rooted in HUMINT and SIGINT networks—Iran must implement a comprehensive counterintelligence and data security framework. RAND’s study on Israel-Iran conflicts reveals that Israel’s advanced surveillance and human infiltration around military sites enable precision strikes and targeted assassinations. The report recommends isolating Secure C4I centers from open networks to reduce interception risks.
CSIS stresses the importance of indigenous encryption, independent satellite systems, and constant monitoring of command network entry points to block cyber intrusions. FDD’s analysis adds that threat detection must extend beyond technical layers to behavioral monitoring of key personnel. Domestic FCC centers should track anomalies, unauthorized access, and suspicious communication patterns. This should be reinforced with Red Team/Blue Team exercises, allowing forces to simulate real-world responses and patch vulnerabilities before exploitation.
Such measures can erode Israel’s intelligence edge and disrupt hybrid operations before they materialize.
Strengthening and Integrating Cyber Infrastructure
Leading think tanks agree that bolstering cyber infrastructure and fostering coordination between military and intelligence agencies is vital for Iran’s cyber defense. CSIS’s Iran and Cyber Power report recommends forming joint task forces to continuously assess vulnerabilities and synchronize cyber responses. RAND advocates for a policy framework based on continuous updates, regular training, and adoption of cutting-edge technologies to counter complex, preemptive attacks.
CISA underscores the need for early threat detection and rapid response to prevent enemy infiltration and enhance network resilience. This integration not only boosts system durability but also enables swift reactions to emerging threats, protecting critical infrastructure and maintaining operational continuity.
Strategic Dispersion and Engineered Deception
To counter precision and simultaneous strikes, dispersing critical facilities and deploying engineered deception technologies is essential. RAND’s research warns that concentrated installations are highly vulnerable, while geographic dispersion confuses enemy targeting priorities.
War on the Rocks, analyzing Russia’s defense in Ukraine, shows that thermal, radio, and mobile decoys complicate enemy identification and reduce strike success rates. CSIS also highlights the value of electronic deception and mobile structures in air defense networks, which waste enemy resources and neutralize attacks.
These engineered tactics, combined with advanced concealment systems, enhance operational survivability and prevent concentrated enemy assaults—preserving strategic balance amid regional tensions.
Active Diplomacy and Breaking Regional Isolation
Expanding security and technological ties with neighboring states is a cornerstone of Iran’s deterrence strategy. CSIS reports that intelligence-sharing with Gulf countries can create rapid data exchange corridors for timely threat detection. RAND emphasizes that active diplomacy and regional coalitions raise the cost of aggression and improve Iran’s political and operational landscape.
Crisis Group advocates for leveraging modern information technologies and regional security coordination to build trust and reduce tensions. This approach not only strengthens Iran’s national security but also opens avenues for economic and technological cooperation, enhancing resilience against complex threats.
Conclusion
Israel’s strategic power rests on intelligence dominance, long-range air capabilities, cyber assets, and its alliance with the United States. By adopting layered defense systems, reinforcing cyber security, and avoiding over-concentration of assets, Iran can reduce its vulnerabilities and raise the cost of aggression. Continued regional intelligence cooperation and implementation of an “active defense” doctrine are key to maintaining strategic equilibrium in the face of future threats.
Israel’s extensive SIGINT and HUMINT networks, combined with advanced satellite and drone reconnaissance systems, enable real-time tracking of Iran’s military and nuclear movements. According to RAND, the fusion of communication intercepts, satellite imagery, and local human sources provides commanders with a level of clarity that allows for precise analysis and targeting.
The Israeli regime’s SIGINT network includes electronic listening stations in allied countries (such as Iraqi Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and Gulf states) and signal-intercepting ships in international waters. These assets continuously monitor a wide range of radio, satellite, and phone communications in and around Iran. Using AI-powered data analytics, they identify and geolocate command-and-control nodes, extracting precise coordinates for targeted strikes.
Meanwhile, Mossad and Shin Bet’s HUMINT operations maintain deep infiltration into Iran’s academic and industrial sectors, activating a network of local informants who not only verify SIGINT data but also report hard-to-track details such as traffic patterns at strategic sites. These sources have been recruited and retained over the past decade through financial incentives, emigration support, and psychological operations.
A clear example of this integrated approach was Operation Narnia, in which at least 11 senior Iranian nuclear scientists were targeted in a single night. Official reports indicate targeting precision within 10 meters. The psychological impact not only disrupted Iran’s technical expertise but also fractured internal decision-making and coordination, with full recovery of Iran’s intelligence-operational capacity expected to take considerable time.
Air Power and Long-Range Weaponry
Israel’s F‑35I Adir fighter jets, combining stealth technology with onboard sensor networks, function as more than just aircraft—they serve as airborne command-and-control hubs. These jets are tasked with penetrating air defense networks and, using “Beast Mode,” can carry external weapons after disabling radar systems to increase bombing payloads. Data collected via electronic and infrared sensors is encrypted and transmitted to command centers, guiding F‑15I and F‑16I jets for simultaneous precision strikes.
This networked approach enables highly coordinated SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) and OCA (Offensive Counter-Air) missions. No previous operation against Iran has demonstrated such synchronization.
Additionally, Israel’s long-range offensive layer includes standoff weapons like air-launched Sparrow ballistic missiles and Spice guided bombs, extending operational reach by several hundred kilometers. Simultaneous launches from multiple directions saturate Iran’s S‑300 and S‑400 systems, and when combined with F‑35I support, enable the capture of strategic targets such as uranium enrichment facilities and air defense sites. High-altitude aerial refueling not only prolongs battlefield endurance but also allows for continuous air support loops. According to CSIS experts, this “multi-axis simultaneous operations” model significantly improves penetration into Iran’s defense zones compared to traditional pinpoint strikes.
Electronic and Cyber Warfare
Since Operation Rising Lion, Israel has integrated battlefield and cyber tactics to neutralize Iranian defenses before physical strikes commence.
In the first phase, electronic warfare units deploy systems like IAI’s Scorpius to target S‑300 and S‑400 radar signals, saturating multiple frequency bands and inducing “artificial sleep” in ground receivers. This multi-step process includes active jamming, injecting false data into control systems, and sudden disruptions—rendering even mobile defense stations unable to activate quickly.
Next, Mossad and Unit 8200 cyber teams infiltrate air defense management networks and data centers, issuing fake commands to deactivate radars or reposition antennas. As a result, when F‑35I jets or combat drones enter Iranian airspace, no effective alerts are triggered.
Simultaneously, large-scale cyberattacks target cross-border communication support networks. Internal servers are replaced, root account passwords are rotated, and encrypted traffic is intercepted using known vulnerabilities. The Washington Institute emphasizes that these intrusions are designed to disable logistical support systems and crisis command centers, preventing Iran from mounting a coordinated rapid response.
Ultimately, a hybrid network of cyber and electronic attacks, combined with drone-based cover operations inside Iran, enables the destruction or disabling of defense systems deep within Iranian territory without direct confrontation. This model, blending jamming, cyber infiltration, and stealth explosive drones, represents a new framework for long-range attacks unprecedented in the history of Israeli-Iranian conflict.
Support and Coordination with the United States
At the strategic level, Israel’s formal integration into the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and close cooperation with the Pentagon have granted its air and naval forces access to extensive logistical and intelligence resources. Following this integration, Israel’s F‑35I jets and other airborne units can refuel and rearm at joint U.S. bases in the region, including B‑52 facilities in Qatar and aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf. Logistical support—spare parts and specialized personnel—is provided under joint supervision and through coordinated exercises, reducing operational costs by up to 30% and minimizing response time.
Israel’s role within CENTCOM’s unified command structure also facilitates missile and air defense alert sharing. By integrating the U.S. Shared Early Warning system with Israel’s Arrow system at a joint command center, any missile or drone launch in the region is rapidly detected and its coordinates shared with both nations’ commanders. Additionally, joint engineering and cybersecurity teams conduct regular drills to secure military networks and prepare for nuclear threats. This collaboration has created a secure and transparent logistical support system that complicates any offensive action with dual-layered challenges.
On the political-military front, regional affairs officers (FAOs) and joint representatives within CENTCOM have strengthened personal relationships and information exchange among senior commanders. These interactions—through regular visits by CENTCOM leadership to Tel Aviv and the presence of Israeli advisors at U.S. command centers—enable swift and frictionless strategic alignment. The result is a secure logistical and intelligence network that pushes Israel’s offensive-defensive capabilities to saturation levels, forcing adversaries into limited reactive positions.
Special Operations and Targeting Key Commanders
Elite units such as Sayeret Matkal and Shayetet 13 operate within a unified mission architecture, executing psychological and tactical strikes deep inside Iran before the main aerial bombardment begins. According to CSIS, these units use real-time intelligence from fusion centers in Tel Aviv and Washington to infiltrate target facilities via small insertion teams (Fast-Rope Insertion), install field sensors, and transmit precise coordinates to jets and drones for synchronized strikes.
Their methodology centers on “Deep Joint Strike” operations—simultaneous missile bombardment and infiltration teams supported by drones and electronic warfare. These teams identify and eliminate communication keywords and commander gathering points, crippling Iran’s high-level management and response capabilities both logistically and psychologically, making coordinated national reactions virtually impossible.
CSIS recommends continued use of this tactical combination, noting its long-term strategic effectiveness. Iran’s ability to rebuild special operations capacity is hindered by cultural and security complexities, and the psychological deterrence created may pave the way for future successful strikes.
According to Western sources, Israel has presented Damascus with a new security proposal. The plan includes establishing no-fly zones over parts of southern Syria while preserving an aerial corridor from Syria to Iran. This corridor is strategically vital for Tel Aviv, potentially allowing future airstrikes on Iranian targets. The proposed no-fly zone would cover Suwayda, Daraa, Quneitra, and parts of Damascus. In exchange, Israel would withdraw from some areas it recently occupied in southern Syria—but notably, it refuses to pull back from Mount Hermon.
Meanwhile, Syria’s new government is expanding its diplomatic outreach, engaging with figures like Tom Barrack, Ayman Safadi, and representatives from Gulf Arab states. These interactions suggest Damascus is working to build a multilayered network of security and political alliances. The goal appears to be reducing international pressure while gaining flexibility in dealing with local forces (such as the SDF) and regional powers like Turkey and Israel. Al-Julani, at the helm of this effort, seems intent on balancing U.S.-Israeli demands with Turkey’s red lines.
In the context of ongoing tensions between Iran and Israel, Tel Aviv’s proposal for Syrian no-fly zones is part of a broader strategy to secure a reliable aerial corridor toward Iran. The recent collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the destruction of much of Syria’s air defense systems have made Syrian airspace one of the least risky and most cost-effective routes for Israeli aircraft heading toward Iran’s western borders. Any agreement with Damascus could significantly enhance Israel’s operational capabilities against Iranian targets.
Possible no-fly zone requested by the Israeli regime in southern Syria
Another Israeli objective is to minimize the risk of direct confrontation with Turkish air forces. Turkey’s military presence in Syria—especially in air defense—has grown in recent months, increasing the chances of accidental clashes with Israeli jets. By negotiating a no-fly zone with Damascus, Israel aims to unilaterally manage Syrian airspace, impose its terms on both Ankara and Damascus, and reduce the likelihood of unintended military incidents.
If implemented, this plan would have wide-ranging regional consequences, with Israel standing to gain the most. It would solidify a permanent aerial threat against Iran from the west, restrict Turkey’s operational freedom in Syrian skies, and place Damascus under Israeli dominance. Although the Syrian government may not favor the proposal, the current military realities in southern Syria are pressuring Damascus to accept it.
Turkey’s economic and trade cooperation with the Zionist regime is carried out through three main channels: sea, land, and air. These methods are as follows:
— Use of maritime transport and logistics routes: Oil, construction materials, steel, and more are shipped from Turkish ports to Israeli ports using vessels flying the flags of neutral countries such as Liberia, Panama, etc. According to available data, about 18% of Israel’s essential non-oil goods are supplied by Turkish cargo ships.
The maritime route is critical for supplying oil to the Zionist regime. Based on existing information, most of Israel’s oil needs are met by Central Asian countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan via shipping routes that pass through Turkey. Thus, oil from the Caspian Sea is transported by the Baku government in cooperation with Turkey through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline into Turkey. Turkish tankers load the oil at Ceyhan port and, upon entering Israeli waters, turn off their AIS tracking systems and deliver the cargo to ports in Haifa, Ashdod, and Ashkelon. In January of last year, Israel topped the list of oil destinations from Azerbaijan, receiving 523,500 tons of oil worth $297 million.
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which transports oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea
— Use of hybrid land and air routes: Trade via this method is conducted through third countries. Goods are likely transported overland from Turkey to Georgia and Azerbaijan, and from there flown to Israel. Azerbaijani logistics companies play a key role in this process. Cargo flights from Baku to Israel are actively ongoing, and it’s likely that Turkish goods are included in these shipments.
— Use of Turkish and other Israel-friendly air routes: Turkish and Israeli airlines may use routes through countries such as Jordan, the UAE, and Greece. Cargo may be labeled “for Oman,” while its actual destination is Tel Aviv.
Possible sea and air routes for transporting oil and goods to the Zionist regime
Financial transactions are also conducted through intermediary countries. Banks in the UAE and Switzerland facilitate money transfers between Turkey and Israel. Even cryptocurrency transactions may be used to maintain anonymity.
Overall, neither Turkey nor the Zionist regime shows any real intention of fully cutting economic and trade ties. Turkey profits from trade in various sectors, and Israel benefits not only from securing oil and essential goods like textiles and food, but also from Turkey’s potential role in exporting Israeli gas to Europe. Additionally, Israel can use Turkey as a gateway to access Central Asian and Caucasus markets. This is a strategically important issue that economically benefits both sides. In this context, public statements from Turkish and Israeli officials about severing ties are mostly for domestic consumption and global image management. As long as tensions remain “rhetorical,” it’s highly unlikely that the profitable trade between Turkey and Israel will be disrupted.
Economic and trade cooperation between countries—especially Islamic ones—and the Israeli regime prevents pressure from being effectively applied and instead enables the regime to continue its crimes against the Palestinian people and the region. Cutting off these ties is one of the most effective ways to pressure Israel to stop its crimes.
As a regionally influential country, if Turkey truly seeks to end the killing and war against Palestinians and apply pressure on Israel, it must sever its economic, trade, and political relations with the regime. Otherwise, it will be considered a direct and indirect accomplice in the crimes committed by the Israeli regime.
The “mini-state” model has emerged in several post-Ottoman Arab countries. Yemen, Libya, Lebanon (especially before the recent war), and to a large extent Sudan and Somalia, have all experienced this form of governance. The Trucial States (now the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain) prior to 1971, and the territory of present-day Saudi Arabia before King Abdulaziz’s wars and the founding of the third Saudi state, are other examples. A diluted version of this model can be seen in present-day Iraq, though it has weakened since the first post-Saddam decade. Syria itself experienced a similar situation between 1946 and 1963.
Preconditions for Mini-State Formation
This situation arises when three conditions are met:
The central government lacks sufficient hegemony.
Nation-building efforts are severely disrupted, leading citizens to prioritize other identity factors over national identity.
Economic resources are no longer monopolized by the state, forcing it to rely on influential actors for funding and security.
If the central government is either in the “state-building phase” or has a system where political competition is institutionalized—especially if public opinion plays a role—this fragmentation intensifies. It’s crucial to distinguish between the legal structure of power and its actual distribution. None of the examples mentioned earlier are legally federal systems.
Key Groups Likely to Form Mini-States
This section identifies powerful domestic actors that may evolve into influential entities, forcing the central government to engage with them. In Arabic political discourse, such groups are said to form a “mini-state” (a state within a state).
A) Kurds They are the most likely to establish a mini-state, possibly limited to northeastern Syria or areas like northern Hasakah and Ain al-Arab (Kobani). All four conditions mentioned earlier apply strongly to the Kurdish context.
B) Druze The Druze are the second most likely group to form a mini-state. In broader governance comparisons, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are pursuing semi-secession, and one of the main Druze factions recently reached an agreement with the central government. Under this deal, the Interior and Justice Ministries in Suwayda province will be staffed exclusively by locals, while Druze groups will retain their weapons. This arrangement lays the groundwork for a mini-state in Suwayda.
C) Alawites The coastal Alawite community has a moderate chance of forming a mini-state. Despite widespread sensitivity toward this group, internal cohesion, restrained ambitions, effective foreign support, and smart strategy could enable them to establish control over coastal areas.
D) Free Syrian Army (Jaysh Suriya al-Hurra) This group, formed under direct U.S. guidance in the al-Tanf region, now controls territory from al-Tanf to Qaryatayn and Palmyra. Their strengths include foreign backing and a dual identity—Arab opposition to Assad with some advantages similar to the SDF. Their semi-autonomous presence within the Syrian army structure positions them as a potential mini-state.
E) Daraa Daraa also has high potential for mini-state formation, but internal divisions among southern factions pose a major challenge. The population is split into four or five groups with serious rivalries, and at least half look to external powers for support. These internal fractures reduce the likelihood of a unified mini-state.
F) Others Beyond these five, other regions also show potential for mini-state emergence. Due to space constraints, only their names are listed:
Arab tribes of Deir ez-Zor
Arab tribes of Raqqa
Turkmens of northern Aleppo
Salafists of Idlib
Smaller minorities
Signs of This Scenario Emerging
What are the indicators of this scenario unfolding in Syria? Both political and security developments offer clues. The clearest sign is Damascus’s concession to Suwayda’s Druze elders, allowing them to control the Interior and Justice Ministries—an arrangement even more extensive than the SDF-Damascus agreement. Another sign is the central government’s efforts to alter the situation in Afrin, which may lead to demographic changes.
On the security front, armed groups in many areas refuse to surrender their weapons or integrate into a unified national army. Continued activity by pro-Assad militias (known as “Shabiha”), casualties inflicted by Tahrir al-Sham, and Damascus’s lack of control over all Syrian territory—effectively dividing the country into three or four zones—are further indicators.
Politically, the most telling signs are how local elites influence governance. In provinces like Daraa and Suwayda, governors are chosen based on local power brokers’ preferences. In Daraa, Deir ez-Zor, Hama, and Aleppo, senior military commanders are appointed by external forces, not the president. Suwayda still lacks a military commander, and in coastal provinces, competition between official ministries and the newly formed “National Reconciliation Committee” is intensifying. In eastern Euphrates regions, no governors or military commanders have been appointed at all.
The Dawn of Hope While the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) concentrated their efforts on combating ISIS, Bashar al-Assad, backed by Iran and Russia, managed to reclaim large swaths of territory previously lost to Salafi groups. By 2019, following ISIS’s defeat, the conflict reached a form of deadlock. However, sudden offensives by groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army altered the dynamics.
In the meantime, factions like the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), which had previously fought alongside the government, remained active—justifying their continued operations as responses to growing Israeli occupation. This faction, which supports the formation of a “Greater Syria,” expressed its support on December 17 for the establishment of a front to confront Israeli aggression. In response, the group Uli al-Baas emerged on January 9, initially under the name “Southern Liberation Front,” before adopting its current name and symbolism on January 11.
As post-Assad Syria became a contested arena between Israeli and Turkish influence, Uli al-Baas framed itself as part of the Axis of Resistance against what it calls the “Global Axis of Evil.” In a statement to Newsweek, the group’s political bureau—officially named “The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Uli al-Baas”—affirmed that praising Israeli occupation and Turkish incursions is expected, since “[America] is the sponsor of chaos, terrorism, and evil across the globe.” The group’s emblem—featuring a raised Kalashnikov—mirrors an iconography first introduced by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later adopted by Hezbollah and other Iran-aligned resistance groups, including several in Iraq. The term Uli al-Baas, mentioned in the Qur’an, was previously invoked by Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem in reference to the group’s struggle against Israel.
Despite its alignment with the Axis of Resistance, Uli al-Baas claims organizational and political independence, asserting no affiliation with any party or state. It presents itself as a revolutionary, nationalist movement rooted in Arab identity, with a distinct political project aimed at establishing a strong and liberty-oriented state.
A Turbulent Beginning On January 13, Uli al-Baas claimed it was deploying light armored vehicles and fighters to Quneitra, Suwayda, Daraa, Damascus, and surrounding rural areas. Four days later, it officially declared the start of its “military operations” against Israeli presence in the south. The group’s first alleged action was reported on January 24, claiming that one of its units downed an Israeli drone in the Tal Ahmar area of rural Quneitra on January 21. On January 31, it issued a second statement, asserting that it had attacked Israeli forces in the village of Turanja, northern Quneitra. However, no evidence was provided, and on February 14, the group’s Telegram channel retracted the claim.
Cooperation with Other Fronts On February 19, Uli al-Baas announced the deaths of two senior commanders, Muhannad al-Baqari and Muhammad Mansour, during an operation near Israeli positions in Quneitra. Just two days later, on February 21, the group formed a coalition with two other Iran-aligned factions— Liwa Dir’ al-Sahel, led by Miqdad Fathi, and Ashbah Ruh al-Muqawama, led by Abdulhamid al-Shamali. This alliance targeted ISIS, Salafi movements, and the newly restructured Syrian government. The republication of the coalition’s official statement by Uli al-Baas clearly indicated its confrontational stance toward Damascus.
Mission The group identifies the expulsion of Israeli forces from southern Syria as a central objective. It cites Israel’s violations of the 1973 ceasefire line and its continued strikes on Syrian installations as justification for its armed resistance. Uli Albas views the Syrian interim government as complicit due to its silence regarding Israeli aggression. The Zionist officials, meanwhile, have warned they will not allow hostile forces to establish a presence near their borders.
Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Uli al-Baas
Post-Crisis Syria Despite Donald Trump’s stated intent to reduce military presence in the Middle East, roughly 2,000 American troops remain stationed in Syria. After the Gaza war, these forces were frequently targeted by militias, although such attacks diminished with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. With Uli al-Baas now rising and directly opposing U.S. and Israeli influence in Syria, the future of Washington’s regional presence has become increasingly uncertain.
While the U.S. State Department has reiterated its commitment to inclusive and peaceful governance in Syria and its opposition to terrorist entrenchment, it continues to classify HTS as a terrorist organization—despite the group’s claimed shift away from jihadist ideology.
Complicating matters further is the escalating tension between the U.S. and Iran, which intensified after Washington’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018. Uli al-Baas portrays Iran as a defender of sovereignty and freedom from U.S. domination, arguing that the pressure against Tehran stems from its threat to Israel’s existence.
PJAK was established in 2004 by Iranian members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Its military branch, the “Eastern Kurdistan Units,” operates across Iranian Kurdistan and Qandil in Iraq. Due to its origins, PJAK is influenced by the Turkish PKK, and the United States also regards it as an affiliate of the PKK.
Over the past two decades, multiple clashes have occurred between Iranian forces and PJAK. One of the most significant confrontations took place in the summer of 2011, when the Iranian army launched a large-scale operation against PJAK positions in Qandil, which ended with a ceasefire declared on September 29 of that year. Nevertheless, sporadic skirmishes continued in the following years.
PJAK is led jointly by Amir Karimi and Peyman Wiyan. The group is part of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and regards Abdullah Öcalan as its ideological leader. After the collapse of the peace process between Turkey and the PKK in 2015, a significant number of Iranian Kurds joined the KCK’s ranks, now making up roughly 35% of its military forces. This has strengthened PJAK’s role in both regional and international contexts.
With the resumption of talks between Turkey and Öcalan in 2024, along with the PKK’s announcement of its withdrawal from armed struggle, the future of the PJAK remains uncertain. Some believe that the PKK’s military and guerrilla capabilities may shift to the PJAK, which could create significant security challenges for Iran. Maybe it’s worth revisiting Öcalan’s earlier statements; since 2008, he has expressed concerns regarding Iran’s interference in the peace process and in 2013, recommended boosting PJAK forces to 40,000 to confront Iranian dangers.
Global developments—from the war in Ukraine and the Syrian crisis to Iran-Turkey rivalry, the role of Israel, and NATO tensions—have influenced Turkey’s strategic calculations regarding Iran. Turkey’s experiences in Syria and Iraq have shown that the Kurds act as a balance of power. Ankara now seeks engagement and coordination with PJAK instead of direct confrontation.
In this context, Netanyahu’s focus on destabilizing Iran has pushed Turkey to develop a more calculated approach toward Iranian affairs. It seems Ankara has concluded that it cannot play an effective role in Iran’s future developments without considering PJAK’s influence. All these factors are compelling Turkey to seriously revise and prepare its strategic agenda concerning Iran. One indication of this may be the Turkish leadership’s intention to align the PKK’s congress with its own interests in renegotiation and potential rearmament.
The Necessity of PJAK in Turkey’s New Strategy In 2015, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), along with several other Kurdish parties, attempted to reclaim their former position in Iranian Kurdistan’s political and social scene through a campaign called “Rasan,” aiming to curb PJAK’s growing influence. Clashes occurred in the mountainous region of Kileh Shin, allegedly part of an operation orchestrated by the Turkish government. Media outlets close to the PDKI and to some extent Komala subtly confirmed Turkey’s role in these events.
However, these efforts failed, and the Iranian Kurdish parties were unsuccessful in achieving their objectives. Following this setback, Turkey began looking for a more effective alternative force in the region—and that force was PJAK. Simultaneously, Israel unofficially conveyed a message to these Kurdish parties suggesting that significant developments were approaching in Iran and that Kurds could play a key role in shaping them.
PJAK in Turkey’s Strategic Calculations PJAK has yet to hold a congress to formally disarm or dissolve, and this process has stalled, with Qandil attributing the deadlock to Öcalan’s absence from the process. Even if a decision to end armed struggle is made, the guerrilla forces would not immediately lay down their arms. Integrating them into formal politics would require a transitional structure—something PJAK could provide, but only if a comprehensive agreement is reached between Turkey and Öcalan, and anti-Turkish elements within PJAK shift their stance.
Turkey aims to use PJAK as a tool to manage potential developments in Iran and prevent the Kurds from aligning with Israeli interests, thereby avoiding a repeat of the Syrian scenario. For this reason, Ankara seeks to incorporate PJAK into any future peace agreements. According to a Kurdish journalist, Turkey envisions PJAK playing a role in Iran similar to that of the Syrian National Army (SNA) in Syria.
Iran’s Position in the Turkey-PJAK Equation Since 2013, when PKK guerrillas withdrew toward Iran’s borders, Tehran has grown increasingly concerned about the implications of the Turkey-PKK peace process. In meetings with the PKK and Kurdish parties in Iraq, Iran explicitly warned about the expanded presence of these forces near its borders, questioning who would control PJAK in the event of a Turkey-Öcalan agreement. This concern led to a widening rift between Iran and Qandil.
This concern was not solely security-related; it also stemmed from a deeper geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Turkey. From Tehran’s perspective, PJAK could become a tool of Turkish influence if the group aligns itself with Ankara. As a regional actor, Iran must maintain ties with Qandil and use political tools to prevent the balance from tipping solely in Turkey’s favor.
The future role of PJAK depends on the PKK’s orientation toward Iran. If relations between Qandil and Tehran deteriorate, it would signal a full alignment of the PKK with Turkey—a scenario that seems unlikely for now without concrete assurances. For the sake of regional stability, both Iran and Qandil will likely be forced to maintain engagement.
The Iranian armed forces launched the ‘Operation True Promise 3’ shortly after the Zionist regime’s aggression on Iran on June 13, And attacked Israeli positions across occupied Palestine. During the operation, Iranians utilized a variety of ballistic missiles, such as Emad, Qadr, Kheibar-Shekan, Sejjil, Hajj Qassem, Fattah-1 hypersonic missile, and Shahed-136 and 238 suicide drones, along with Arash-1 and 2 suicide drones. It also involved cruise missiles and other cyber and intelligence tools.
Areas that were targeted in Israel by Iranian missiles during ‘Operation True Promise 3″
This operation was conducted daily in multiple stages, targeting various Israeli military assets including military and intelligence centers, air bases, fuel production sites, energy supply facilities, defense infrastructure, military industrial complexes, command and control hubs, and operational support units.
Based on our investigations and gathered information, the Iranian armed forces have targeted and attacked the following locations during Operation True Promise 3.
– June 13 and 14; first and second days 1- Israeli Defense Ministry headquarters in Tel Aviv: 32.0728, 34.7892 2- Rishon Lezion: 31.9701, 34.7904
Iranian missile hits Israeli Defense Ministry headquarters in Tel AvivThe moment an Iranian hypersonic missile hit the Israeli Defense Ministry headquarters in Tel AvivThe moment an Iranian hypersonic missile hit the Israeli Defense Ministry headquarters in Tel Aviv – another angleThe moment at least 15 Iranian ballistic missiles hit Tel AvivThe moment an Iranian ballistic missile hit the Rishon LeZion area south of Tel AvivImages from the site of the Iranian ballistic missile strike on the Rishon Letzion area south of Tel Aviv
– June 15, Day 3 1- Haifa Refinery: 32.7947, 35.0522 2- A Villa in Tamra near Haifa 3- Eilat Port 4- Tel Aviv (various areas): Weizmann Institute in Rehovot area: 31.9037, 34.8080 Bat Yam area 5- Ramat David Air Base: 32.6680, 35.18174
Ramat David Air Base is the primary Israeli Air Force installation in northern the occupied Palestinian territory. Situated on the southeastern edge of Haifa, 46 kilometers from Lebanon, it features three runways. The base hosts multiple squadrons, including F-16 fighter jets, Heron drones, and attack helicopters. It has been a crucial part of Israel’s operations in Lebanon and was frequently targeted by Hezbollah rockets and drones during the recent conflict.
The moment an Iranian ballistic missile hit the city of HaifaFire breaks out at Haifa refinery after Iranian missiles hitIranian missile hits villa in Tamra town near HaifaTwo Iranian Shahed-238 drones hit the port of Eilat. This is the first officially recorded successful operation using this type of jet-powered suicide drone.Iranian missiles hit various areas in Tel Aviv, including the Bat Yam areaThe moment Iranian missiles hit points in Tel AvivIranian missiles hit and caused extensive damage to the Weizmann Institute of Science in the town of Rehovot, located in the southern suburbs of Tel Aviv.
– June 16, Day 4 1- Rafael Military Industries in Haifa: 32.8562, 35.2818 2- A snagogue in Lachish area 3- Haifa Power Plant: 32.7910, 35.06526 4- Tel Aviv, Gush Dan area, disruption of air defense systems and hit on Arrow 3 system
Iranian missile hits Rafael military industries in HaifaIranian missile hits synagogue in Lachish areaThe moment two Iranian missiles hit the Haifa power plant and a fire broke out in the area. As you can see, a large number of interceptor missiles were fired in the final stage, but they did nothing and out of the three missiles, two missiles hit the targets. These interceptors are the final stage and before that, the exo-atmospheric interceptors had also failed.A rare angle shot of the moment an Iranian missile hit a target in Haifa. The missile came straight at the cameraman. Fast and scary!Two Iranian missiles hit Tel AvivIranian missile strikes hit Tel Aviv, including the Bani Barak areaVideo showing the Israeli army’s Arrow 3 defense system malfunctioning amid a missile attack at dawn on the fourth day of the war. The IRGC stated it had disrupted Israel’s defense systems. In this footage, we observe the disruption described by the IRGC, along with an Israeli interceptor missile striking another launcher.
– June 17, Day 51 1- Disruption of Israel’s air defense systems and the downing of an interceptor missile in Tel Aviv 2- Aman military intelligence center and Mossad headquarters in Herzliya
The interceptor missile failed and returned and hit a point in Tel Aviv.Iranian missiles hit Mossad facilities in the Herzliya area of Tel Aviv. The cameraman also says in the video: “Wow… they even managed to hit Mossad!”Another video of Iran’s missile attack on the Mossad headquarters in Herzliya. In this video, at least three missiles hit the area around the headquarters and one missile hits the headquarters itself.On the fifth day of the war, during the IRGC missile attacks, the Aman logistics center in Herzliya, which is part of the Israeli Army’s military intelligence branch, was also targeted.
– June 18, Day 6 1- Disruption of Israel’s air defense systems and the fall of an interceptor missile in Tel Aviv for the third time. 2- Tel Aviv
In this video, the Israeli interceptor missile malfunctioned and crashed after launch, causing a fire in Tel Aviv. These malfunctions are likely accidentals, as Iranian jamming systems disrupt Israeli defenses.The moment two more missiles hit Tel AvivBreathtaking moments of Iranian missiles reaching Tel Aviv and Israeli interceptors firing. In this video, it is confirmed that 3 Iranian missiles hit.
– June 19, Day 7 1- Occupied Golan 2- Tel Aviv, a high-rise building near Stock Exchange Building in Ramat Gan: 32.0643, 34.7704 and Ministry of Defense facilities in Tel Aviv 3- Israeli army’s Command and Intelligence (IDF C4I) headquarters and the Intelligence HQ in the Gav-Yam Technology Park in Beersheba 4- Microsoft Building in Beersheba
The moment one of the Iranian army’s suicide drones (probably the Arash type) hit Israeli positions. The strikes captured by a surveillance camera in the occupied Golan.A video depicts two missiles, possibly Sejjil-type, striking Tel Aviv. The Israeli regime heavily censored news about the Iranian missile strikes on the seventh day of the war.Iranian missiles hit Tel Aviv, near stock exchange building in Ramat Gan areaThe moment an Iranian missile hit the IDF C4I HQ and the intelligence headquarters in the Gav-Yam Technology Park in the city of Beersheba. Iranian missile hits IDF C4I HQ and central intelligence HQs in Gav-Yam Technology Park in BeershebaAn Iranian missile hit the Microsoft building in Beersheba, with Israeli defenses failing to intercept it. The company has partnered with the Zionist regime on AI, drones, and cybersecurity services for the Israeli army.
– June 20, Day 8 1- Ministry of Interior Building in Haifa: 32.8159, 35.0027 2- Beersheba 3- Ashkelon 4- Radar system in the occupied Golan with suicide drone
An Iranian missile hits near the Interior Ministry in HaifaIranian missile hit BeershebaIranian missile hit BeershebaIranian missile hit AshkelonIranian suicide drone hits Israeli army radar system in occupied Golan Heights
– June 21, Day 9 1- Tel Aviv 2- Beisan area, drone attack 3- Occupied Golan, drone attack 4- Road 90, Aghwar area, Jordan Valley
The moment two Iranian missiles hit Tel AvivThe location of the Iranian suicide drone strikes in the occupied Golan Heights and Road 90 in the Aghwar area in eastern occupied Palestine.The site of the suicide drone strike in the Baysan area in occupied PalestineThe moment a Shahed-136 drone of the Iranian armed forces hit the Baysan area in northern occupied Palestine.
– June 22, Day 10 1- Haifa 2- Tel Aviv, Ramat Aviv
Iranian missile hits a target in Haifa portThe moment multiple Iranian missiles hit Tel AvivOne or more Iranian missiles hit the Ramat Aviv area of Tel Aviv, causing widespread destruction. According to Zionist media reports, the Iranian armed forces launched 22 missiles in one phase and five more missiles in a second phase towards the occupied territories.Images show widespread destruction at the site of an Iranian missile strike in Tel Aviv. Ramat Aviv, a residential area in northwest Tel Aviv founded by Zionists originally from Eastern Europe, was targeted, possibly due to the presence of security and military centers in the area.
– June 23, Day 11 1- Ashdod Power Plant: 31.8312, 34.6943 2- Ashkelon 3- Safed 4- Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar: 25.1154, 51.3164
The moment a missile hit the Ashdod power plant, located along a road in the occupied territories towards Tel Aviv. According to the Israeli Energy Minister, 8,000 customers lost their electricity after the missile hit.This video appears to have been recorded by a Zionist settler, likely in Ashkelon. It shows the sound of several missiles hitting the occupied territories, with the Israeli commenting on the Iranian missile strikes, saying: “What is that sound? Wow, wow, wow.”Iranian missile hits the town of Safed in northern occupied PalestineAnother missile hit northern occupied PalestineIranian missile hits unspecified point in northern occupied Palestine
– June 24, Day 12 1- Beersheba city
The moment a missile hits a seven-story building in Beersheba.
The attack sites listed are based on image and video evidence of Iranian strikes in the occupied territories. Additionally, sites such as Ben Gurion Airport, Nevatim Air Base, Hatzerim Air Base, the Sail Tower in central Haifa hosting AI12 Labs, the Hadera Power Plant, Ovda Air Base in the southern Negev, the Kiryat Gat semiconductor industrial zone, and Meron Air Control Base in northern occupied Palestine have also been targeted by Iranian strikes, according to IRGC statements and other international media reports.
Some notable outcomes of Iran’s strikes on Israel:
Haifa Oil Refinery Shuts Down: The Haifa Oil Refinery has shut down following extensive damage from an Iranian missile attack on June 16, according to Yedioth Ahronoth. The Zionist economic newspaper Calcalist also reported that Sonol, one of Israel’s largest fuel companies, contacted its customers after damage to Bazan Company caused by Iranian missile strikes. They announced that, “Under these circumstances and due to the situation being out of our control, we are forced to reduce or cease fuel supplies to our customers.”
The destruction of the Weizmann Institute of Science and Technology: On June 15, Hajj Qasem tactical ballistic missiles struck the Weizmann Institute, causing extensive damage. The institute’s leader reported that the attack destroyed two research buildings and damaged 112 units, including 60 laboratories and 52 other structures. The head highlighted the institute’s difficulty in obtaining compensation and estimated the total damage at 2 billion shekels (approximately $590 million). Rebuilding is expected to take around five years.
The Weizmann Institute of Science is Israel’s leading and largest center for education and research in nuclear, military, and artificial intelligence fields. Founded 14 years before the Israeli regime in occupied Palestine, it trains students in physics, chemistry, electronics, and related disciplines at both master’s and doctoral levels. The institute has housed human data samples, biological databases, and trillions of bioinformatics records. Additionally, some alumni have contributed to the development of weapons for the Zionist military and are employed across its various scientific divisions.
Images showing the Weizmann Institute following an attack by Iranian tactical ballistic missiles.
Suspension of Maersk Shipping Company’s activities: Maersk, the largest international shipping company, announced that it will suspend all commercial transportation to the port of Haifa.
Suspension of flights at airports in occupied Palestine: Flights into and out of Ben Gurion Airport and other Israeli airports were completely suspended.
Ashdod power outage: Following an Iranian missile accurately hitting the Ashdod electrical station, the Israeli Minister of Energy announced that 8,000 customers have lost their electricity and Ashdod is experiencing a blackout.
Displacement of 18,000 settlers from the Bat Yam area: According to the Israeli economic-analytical newspaper Calcalist, the Iranian missile attack turned Bat Yam, one of Israel’s three most populous towns, into a ruined city akin to Gaza. About 18,000 residents have evacuated their homes due to damage and destruction. Of these, 12,000 have moved to hotels, while others are in rented apartments or temporary shelters. Additionally, four towns—Bat Yam, Tel Aviv, Rehovot, and Ramat Gan—are experiencing a severe housing shortage for displaced residents caused by the attacks. This destruction is expected to impact housing prices in the occupied territories over the medium term.
The residents of occupied Palestine experiencing the aftermath of the Iranian attacks; Zionists in the occupied territories sleeping in metro stations due to fear of Iranian missiles.
Moroccan soldiers killed in Iranian attack: A leaked document reports that two Moroccan soldiers killed when an Iranian missile struck Meron air control base in northern occupied Palestine. These casualties included a captain and a senior Moroccan commander who were there for joint exercises with Israeli forces. Additionally, another Moroccan soldier and officer were wounded and treated in Haifa. Notably, if Moroccans were killed in the attack, then Israeli casualties likely occurred as well. However, these Israeli losses are typically kept from the public view, as has often been the case.
Statistics and Israeli casualties from Iran’s Operation True Promise 3:
According to the latest reports from the Israeli media, the Israeli regime’s casualties include 33 deaths (including Arabs in northern Palestine) and 3238 injuries. Of the injured, 23 are reported to be in serious condition and 111 in moderate condition. It is important to note that these figures are based on information from media outlets and institutions linked to the Israeli regime, while the number of casualties in military and security zones remains concealed and censored, consistent with the regulations established by the regime’s army since the war’s outset.
International reactions to Israel’s aggression on Iran; Yemen’s military support and Pakistan’s political support for Iran:
Many countries worldwide and within the Islamic world, such as Russia, China, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, condemned Israel’s attack on Iran. Notably, Pakistan’s stance was more prominent in terms of broad political support, while Yemen offered significant political, social, and military backing. An emergency UN Security Council meeting on June 14 to discuss Israel’s assaults on Iran resulted in minimal action, with officials only expressing concern and urging Iran to exercise restraint. Western governments including the United States, France, Germany, England, and Canada also supported Israel.
A rally supporting Iran took place in Pakistan, where Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif expressed Pakistan’s stance. He stated: “Israel has targeted Yemen, Iran, and Palestine. If the Islamic world does not unite now, we all risk facing the same fate. Pakistan stands with Iran. Silence is no longer an option. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation should convene a meeting to develop a unified strategy. I urge all Islamic countries to immediately cut diplomatic ties with Israel.”
On June 15, the Yemeni Armed Forces announced they launched several Palestine 2 hypersonic ballistic missiles at different times, coordinating military operations with Iran and the IRGC targeting key Israeli sites in Tel Aviv region. Brigadier General Yahya Saree, spokesman for the Yemeni Armed Forces, stated: “The Yemeni Armed Forces salute the Islamic Republic of Iran, its nation, army, and leadership for bravely and determinedly confronting the brutal Zionist attack. Relying on God, they strike successive blows at its facilities, headquarters, and bases. While observing these developments, we proudly reaffirm our commitment to the people of Gaza and its loyal Mujahideen until the war and siege against Gaza end.”
According to the leader of Ansar Allah, the Yemeni army has continued its support for Palestine against the Zionist regime during Dhul-Hijjah (from May 28 to June 26). They reportedly utilized 25 ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, and suicide drones. Studies from Islamic World News indicate that Yemeni forces collaborated with Iranian forces on five occasions, launching a total of eight ballistic missiles and suicide drones targeting locations in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beersheba, and Eilat. Additionally, they emphasized that in response to U.S. military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, if the U.S. engages directly in the conflict with Iran, they will target all American ships in the Red Sea.
Yemeni people march in support of Iran
Conclusion: Iran’s Operation True Promise 3, which was a legitimate defense of Iran’s territory and airspace against widespread Israeli aggression, involved 22 waves of missile attacks and 10 stages of drone attacks that began on June 13 and lasted for 12 days. The positive effects of this operation inside and outside Iran led to the failure of the declared plan by Israeli regime leaders to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, change the political system of the Islamic Republic, and eliminate Iran’s military capabilities, especially its missile forces.
Zionist media and the military spokesperson for the regime claim that during the twelve-day war, the Iranian armed forces launched over 510 ballistic missiles, as well as more than 680 (with some reports claiming more than 1,000) suicide drones and cruise missiles towards the occupied territories. Israel also claims that only 55 of these missiles struck occupied Palestinian territory, while the rest were intercepted and destroyed by the air defenses.
However, this claim exaggerates the number of missiles, and the reported hits have been censored. The Israeli army’s statistics do not match the actual field conditions. Based on investigations by Islamic World News and visual evidence presented in this article, there are documented cases of 90 missile hits and 7 drone hits. Additionally, the Iranian armed forces reportedly launched around 300 to 350 missiles during Operation True Promise 3. Also, it should be noted, the exact count of drones and cruise missiles remains uncertain due to the lack of available visual documentation.
Undoubtedly, this figure is not definitive because of widespread censorship by the media and security institutions of the Zionist regime. The actual number of missiles hit is likely higher than the estimate provided. Overall, Operation True Promise 3 was a significant military effort with impactful results, prompting the leaders of the United States and Israel to agree to a temporary ceasefire.
According to four Israeli officials, following the October 7 attack on the occupied territories—which resulted in the death of over 1,200 Israelis and the taking of 250 hostages—artificial intelligence technologies were rapidly approved for field use. According to them, this led to cooperation between Unit 8200 and reserve forces in the “Studio” to swiftly develop new AI capabilities.
Over the past 18 months, the occupying regime has combined artificial intelligence with facial recognition software to match partially covered or injured faces with real identities. It has also used AI to compile lists of potential airstrike targets and developed an Arabic-language AI model to power a chatbot capable of scanning and analyzing text messages, social media posts, and other Arabic-language data.
In late 2023, the Zionist regime was attempting to assassinate Ibrahim Biari, the commander of Hamas’s Jabalia Central Battalion, who was allegedly involved in planning the October 7 attack. The regime’s military intelligence intercepted Biari’s communications with other Hamas members but was unable to pinpoint his exact location. Therefore, they turned to an AI-powered audio tool—one that analyzed various sounds such as sonic booms and airstrikes. After the approximate location of Ibrahim Biari’s communications was identified, Zionist military officials were warned that the area—which included several apartment complexes—was highly populated. They stated that to ensure Biari’s death, multiple buildings needed to be targeted in the airstrike. The operation was approved and carried out.
Since then, the regime’s military intelligence has also used this audio tool—alongside maps and images of Gaza’s complex underground tunnels—to search for hostages. According to two Israeli officers, the tool has improved over time to identify individuals with greater accuracy.
Tracking the location of individuals According to three informed Israeli and American officials (whose names were not disclosed in the report), Israeli officers turned to a new military technology integrated with artificial intelligence to track their targets. This technology had been developed about a decade ago but had not yet been used on the battlefield. The effort to locate Martyr Ibrahim Biari provided fresh motivation to enhance the tool. Engineers from Unit 8200—the occupying regime’s equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency—rapidly integrated AI into the system.
Shortly afterward, the regime’s security personnel intercepted Mr. Biari’s phone calls and tested the AI-based audio tool, which identified the approximate location of his communications. Using this information, the Zionist regime ordered an airstrike on the area on October 31, 2023, resulting in the martyrdom of Ibrahim Biari.
According to a report by Airwars, a London-based conflict monitoring organization, due to the approximate nature of the AI-generated location, more than 125 civilians were also killed in the strike! Based on interviews with nine American and Israeli defense officials, the audio tool is just one example that demonstrates how the regime has used the Gaza war to test and rapidly deploy AI-supported military technologies on an unprecedented scale.
Behind-the-Scenes Companies and Reactions to the Committed Atrocities Many of these efforts resulted from collaboration between active-duty soldiers in Unit 8200 and reservists working at tech companies such as Google, Microsoft, and Meta. According to these individuals, Unit 8200 has established a central hub called the “Studio,” which serves as an innovation center and a place to connect experts with AI projects. Reservists from the aforementioned major companies are involved in this unit. The Studio’s primary mission is to rapidly adapt artificial intelligence technologies to meet military needs.
While the regime rapidly continued to develop its artificial intelligence arsenal, the deployment of these technologies has led to mistaken identifications, wrongful arrests, and civilian deaths. According to European and American defense officials, no other power has been as active as the occupying regime in testing AI tools in real battles. This situation provides an initial glimpse into how such technologies might be used in future wars, as well as a warning of how these technologies could malfunction or be misused, resulting in the killing of civilians.
Meta and Microsoft declined to comment on the killings carried out in the Gaza war using artificial intelligence, but Google, in an effort to clear itself of accusations, stated: “We have employees who serve as reservists for the regime in various countries around the world. The work these employees do as reservists is not related to Google.”
Avi Hasson, CEO of the nonprofit organization Startup Nation Central, which connects investors to companies in the occupied territories, said, “Reservists from Meta, Google, and Microsoft have played a vital role in advancing innovation in drones and data integration.” He added, “Reservists brought specialized knowledge and access to key technologies that were not available in the military.”
Avi Hasson
Artificial Intelligence in the Drone Manufacturing Industry The Israeli regime’s military soon began using artificial intelligence to upgrade its drone fleet. Aviv Shapira, founder and CEO of XTEND—a software and drone company collaborating with the regime’s military—said that AI-based algorithms have been used to develop drones capable of locking onto and tracking targets from a distance. “In the past, targeting relied on focusing on the image of the target. But now, AI can identify and track the object itself—whether it’s a moving vehicle or a person—with very high accuracy,” he said. Shapira added that his main clients—the occupying regime’s military and the U.S. Department of Defense—are aware of the ethical implications of using AI in warfare and are engaging in discussions about the responsible use of this technology.
Aviv Shapira
The Arabic Language: A Battleground for the Enemy to Influence Public Opinion According to three Israeli officers, one of the tools developed by the “Studio” was an Arabic-language artificial intelligence model, classified as a large language model. (This LLM was previously reported by the news site +972.) Developers had previously faced difficulties in creating such a model due to the lack of sufficient Arabic-language data to train the technology. Even when such data was available, it was mostly in standard written Arabic, which is far more formal than the dozens of different dialects used in spoken Arabic.
According to Israeli officers, the occupying regime’s military did not face this problem. The illegitimate government had access to decades’ worth of intercepted text messages, recorded phone conversations, and social media posts collected in colloquial Arabic. As a result, in the first few months of the Gaza war, Zionist elements developed the large language model and designed a chatbot capable of handling queries in Arabic. They integrated this tool with multimedia databases, enabling Zionist analysts to conduct complex searches across images and videos.
When the Zionist regime assassinated Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in September, the developed chatbot analyzed reactions to his martyrdom across the Arabic-speaking world. The technology distinguished between different dialects within Lebanon to assess public sentiment and helped the regime determine whether there was pressure from public opinion to carry out a retaliatory strike.
It is also reported that, at times, the chatbot was unable to recognize certain modern slang terms and words that had been phonetically transliterated from English into Arabic. One of the officers stated that this required Zionist intelligence officers specialized in various dialects to review and correct the results.
The chatbot also occasionally produced incorrect results. For example, instead of returning an image of a weapon, it would display a picture of a pipe. Nevertheless, they stated that the AI tool significantly accelerated the process of research and analysis.
Facial Recognition and Identification of Individuals At temporary checkpoints set up between northern and southern Gaza following the October 7 attacks, the regime also deployed cameras capable of capturing high-resolution images of Palestinians and sending them to an AI-based facial recognition program. According to two intelligence officers from the regime, the system sometimes struggled to identify individuals whose faces were covered. This led to the detention and interrogation of Palestinians who had been mistakenly identified by the facial recognition system.
The regime also used artificial intelligence to process and refine data collected by intelligence officials about Hamas members. Prior to the war, the regime had developed a machine learning algorithm called “Lavender,” designed to rapidly sort through data and assist in identifying low-level militants. This algorithm was trained on a database of confirmed Hamas members and aimed to predict who else might be affiliated with the group.
According to reports, “Lavender” helped the occupying army compile a list of 37,000 human targets based on their association with Hamas. Although the system’s predictions were not flawless, the regime used it at the beginning of the Gaza war to assist in selecting targets for attack!
Even before Assad’s fall, Syria’s power grid was in poor condition, but the decade-long civil war made things much worse. Power plants and transmission lines were severely damaged, and Syria, once an oil exporter, became dependent on imports. Following Assad’s downfall, the flow of Iranian oil—which had previously met Damascus’ energy needs—was halted, and most of the country’s oil resources came under the control of Kurdish-led forces (SDF).
Omar Shukrouk, Syria’s Minister of Electricity, stated that the country’s oil production capacity in government-controlled areas has dropped from 360,000 barrels per day to just 10,000.
Although there have been reports of oil supply resuming from Kurdish-controlled areas, the future of this arrangement remains uncertain due to tensions between Turkey and the Kurds, as well as the unclear U.S. policy toward these forces.
Temporary and Ineffective Solutions To escape the current energy crisis, Syrian officials have been offered various solutions:
1. Use of private generators and solar panels Advantages: • Can provide localized power for households and small businesses. • Solar energy is a sustainable and environmentally friendly option. Disadvantages: • High cost of purchase and installation, which many Syrians cannot afford. • Lack of proper infrastructure for large-scale deployment. • Limited electricity generation, especially during seasons with low sunlight.
2. Import of LPG from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Jordan Advantages: • A quick short-term solution to meet some energy demands. Disadvantages: • Mainly suitable for domestic uses like cooking, with limited impact on electricity generation. • High transportation costs and dependency on foreign suppliers reduce sustainability. • Limited volume of imported gas does not meet Syria’s wide-scale energy needs.
3. Use of floating power plant ships Advantages: • Can generate large amounts of electricity. • Quicker deployment compared to building new land-based power plants. Disadvantages: • Connecting these ships to the domestic power grid can take several months. • High operational and fuel supply costs requiring external financial support. • Difficulty transmitting electricity from coastal ports like Baniyas and Tartus to inland areas due to extensive damage in the transmission network.
Overcoming the Crisis with Zionist Gas? One option now under consideration is using natural gas from the Israeli regime to supply electricity in Syria. Currently, the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP), which was originally built in 2003 to deliver Egyptian gas to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, is now operating in reverse.
Instead of transporting gas from Egypt northward, the pipeline now delivers gas from the occupied territories southward into Egypt. This gas is extracted from the Leviathan field off the Israeli coast and sent to Jordan, where it supplies 70 percent of the country’s electricity.
There is now a proposal to redirect part of this gas, via Jordan and the AGP, to Syria. However, the plan faces not only technical hurdles but also significant political challenges.
Political Barriers and Operational Challenges The Syrian government would find it politically difficult to officially accept gas from Israel, as any open cooperation with Tel Aviv is unacceptable for Damascus. Therefore, officials may label the gas as “Egyptian” or “Jordanian” to minimize domestic and regional backlash.
In the occupied territories, some hardline factions oppose such a deal as well, arguing that Syria should not be aided. Nonetheless, relative stability in Syria could benefit Israeli security, as a power vacuum in the country enables extremist and militant groups to thrive.
Another major hurdle is the cost of project. Syria lacks both the infrastructure to transfer the gas and a reliable system to make payments. International energy companies, including Chevron, which has a stake in the Leviathan project, are reluctant to enter contracts without financial guarantees. If Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or the UAE agree to finance the project, the chances of its implementation would increase.
Syria Awaits Major Decisions As Syria’s energy crisis worsens by the day, its government is exploring different options. In the coming days, negotiations between Syria and Jordan are expected to take place, and the European Union has announced that it will lift certain energy sanctions on Syria.
Syria now stands at a major crossroads: it must either continue with temporary and ineffective measures or navigate political and financial obstacles to accept gas that may be labeled “Egyptian,” but originates from elsewhere. In the end, this path may well tie Syria’s future to the broader project of a new Levant.
The Israeli think tank INSS has published an article outlining the 2025–2026 Israeli security doctrine. Within this document, confrontation with Iran stands out as a fundamental issue and a major threat, with the name of Iran appearing nearly 60 times. Prominent elements in the document include: Iran’s nuclear program, the future of the Axis of Resistance, the nature of cooperation with the United States on Iran-related matters, and potential nuclear agreements. Notably, Iran’s relationships with Russia and the Resistance Axis are highlighted as strategic points. The doctrine presents various scenarios, followed by actionable strategies.
Battlefronts In the introduction of the doctrine document, Israel defines its surrounding adversaries and adopts an aggressive, security-driven approach toward regional states. Iran and Syria emerge as primary concerns. Regarding Iran, three potential scenarios are outlined:
1. A New Iran–U.S. Nuclear Deal: Tel Aviv should not oppose the agreement outright but rather seek a role in shaping it to ensure Tehran is prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons.
2. Iran Achieves Nuclear Capability: Immediate military action is required, preferably in coordination with the United States.
3. A Prolonged Stalemate: Continuous economic pressure and covert operations should be applied to weaken Iran steadily.
One noteworthy feature in this document is the grouping of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea under the acronym “CRINGE”, portraying them as a united front opposing the liberal-democratic world order. According to Israeli analysis, despite deep ideological differences and conflicting interests, these states are cooperating to challenge Western hegemony. The doctrine paints a dire global picture—dominated by authoritarianism, communism, and rising Islamic sentiment in liberal societies—while warning of rising extremist factions reshaping political landscapes. Ultimately, Iran is described as the leader of the Axis of Resistance, an integrated coalition that seeks Israel’s destruction.
A Shifting Strategic Environment Over a year into a multi-front war, Israel claims it has increased its strategic flexibility and gained greater maneuvering space in the short term. Before assessing Israel’s core national security challenges, the doctrine reviews broader changes in its strategic outlook.
1. Undermining Iran’s Security Doctrine From Israel’s viewpoint, Iran’s military capabilities are insufficient to deter a direct attack, and even reaching nuclear threshold status has not produced the expected deterrence. Israelis believe Iran’s resistance strategy has failed to contain Israel’s actions, and the resistance network is collapsing. The fall of Assad, they argue, has further weakened Iran’s regional strategy, eliminating Syria’s role. In this altered landscape, Iran will struggle to restore Hezbollah’s prior threat level against Tel Aviv. Opportunity: Iran is perceived as being at an unprecedented point of weakness, offering Israel expanded freedom of action. This opens opportunities to push for a tougher nuclear deal, reduce Iran’s regional influence, and even pursue military options to halt its nuclear program. Threat: If Iran concludes that nuclear threshold status is insufficient for deterrence, it may accelerate its nuclear weapon development, thereby altering the regional balance of power in its favor.
2. Shifting Regional Power Dynamics
Opportunity: Advancing the Abraham Accords can curtail Iranian influence. Potential diplomatic moves include: securing Israel’s northern border by leveraging Hezbollah’s weakness, forming a non-aggression pact with a new Syrian government (which may also ease tensions with Turkey), and finalizing normalization with Saudi Arabia. Close coordination with the United States would aid in realizing these goals.
Threat: Assad’s fall could produce unpredictable consequences, including jeopardizing Israel’s peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt. The emergence of a radical Sunni axis—led by a resurgent Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and beyond—could present a formidable new threat, potentially as dangerous as the former “Ring of Fire” led by Iran.
Iran’s Nuclear Threat: Three Strategic Scenarios
1. If an Agreement Is Reached: Tel Aviv should actively influence any potential nuclear deal. The agreement must ensure the following:
A) Immediate Halt to Nuclear Progress B) Comprehensive Threat Mitigation:
Fissile Material: Caps on uranium enrichment levels and stockpile quantities; dismantling of advanced centrifuges installed after 2018; intrusive and comprehensive inspections.
Delivery Systems: Restrictions on ballistic missile range and technology; limits on missile stockpiles; nonproliferation enforcement.
Weaponization: Oversight of nuclear research institutions and bans on any weapons-related nuclear activity.
These steps are deemed essential for safeguarding Israel’s security and preventing Iran’s military nuclear capability.
2. If No Agreement Is Achieved: Israel must ensure stringent enforcement of sanctions and maintain close intelligence and diplomatic ties with the United States. Enriching uranium to 90 percent should be declared a red line that justifies military action—with or without U.S. support. Since Iran aims to outlast the Trump presidency and anticipates policy shifts under a new administration (especially a rollback of maximum pressure), this period should be used to weaken Iran via covert operations, while avoiding visible foreign fingerprints. These actions are considered vital to blocking Iran’s nuclear advancement and preserving Israeli security.
3. If Iran Builds a Nuclear Weapon: This scenario involves Iran withdrawing from the NPT, enriching uranium to 90 percent, and conducting nuclear weapon tests. Israel believes that Iran’s nuclear facilities must be destroyed immediately in response. The U.S. should be urged to issue a decisive warning to Iran before any military action. To prevent a regional arms race and nuclear terrorism, Israel must act decisively. While coordination with the U.S. is essential, Israel’s independent military capabilities must be fully developed to ensure mission success.
New U.S–Israel Relations: Opportunities and Challenges
Opportunities: A second Trump term could strengthen U.S.–Israel relations through appointments of pro-Israel officials. This would provide Israel with greater regional autonomy, bolster deterrence against Iran, and establish a credible military threat to Tehran’s ambitions.
Challenges: Rising criticism within the Democratic Party—especially due to Israel’s internal policies—could erode bipartisan U.S. support. Israel must pursue a defense agreement as part of a broader regional strategy to counter isolation efforts. Such an agreement would also enhance deterrence against Iran’s nuclear threat and maintain U.S. military and technological support. Shaping future Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with Washington to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge is crucial.
Economic and Diplomatic Strategies
To counter Iran’s influence and boost economic ties, Israel must strategically expand its relations with Europe. This may require taking a firmer stance on Russia, while preserving key diplomatic channels. Such a strategy could undermine the Iran–Russia axis and curtail Tehran’s regional clout.
The Iran–Israel War Doctrine
According to Israel’s security doctrine, the October 7th attack was the moment when Tel Aviv finally awakened to the nature of the war Iran has been waging against it. The more Israel focused on Iran’s nuclear threat, the less it recognized that Iran’s strategy also hinges—perhaps even more—on its Axis of Resistance as a weapon against Zionism. Although Tehran’s “proxy war” strategy had long been discussed in Israeli defense circles, Tel Aviv failed to develop a suitable strategic or operational response. Thus, the October 7th war caused a dual disruption to Israel’s long-standing strategic thinking. The war represents a collision between two visions: one meticulously prepared by Iran’s axis, and the other rooted in Israel’s outdated military conceptions shaped by its belief in “wars with clear endings.” This outdated doctrine failed to address new types of threats. The fact that Israel was caught off guard, despite having prior intelligence, underscores its misjudgment of enemy strategies. The doctrine concludes that the war’s gains and failures must be analyzed through the tension between counterterrorism approaches and military-war theory—two frameworks that are not interchangeable.