Tag: PDKI

  • The Echo of PJAK in Turkey’s Silence

    The Echo of PJAK in Turkey’s Silence

    PJAK was established in 2004 by Iranian members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Its military branch, the “Eastern Kurdistan Units,” operates across Iranian Kurdistan and Qandil in Iraq. Due to its origins, PJAK is influenced by the Turkish PKK, and the United States also regards it as an affiliate of the PKK.

    Over the past two decades, multiple clashes have occurred between Iranian forces and PJAK. One of the most significant confrontations took place in the summer of 2011, when the Iranian army launched a large-scale operation against PJAK positions in Qandil, which ended with a ceasefire declared on September 29 of that year. Nevertheless, sporadic skirmishes continued in the following years.

    PJAK is led jointly by Amir Karimi and Peyman Wiyan. The group is part of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and regards Abdullah Öcalan as its ideological leader. After the collapse of the peace process between Turkey and the PKK in 2015, a significant number of Iranian Kurds joined the KCK’s ranks, now making up roughly 35% of its military forces. This has strengthened PJAK’s role in both regional and international contexts.

    With the resumption of talks between Turkey and Öcalan in 2024, along with the PKK’s announcement of its withdrawal from armed struggle, the future of the PJAK remains uncertain. Some believe that the PKK’s military and guerrilla capabilities may shift to the PJAK, which could create significant security challenges for Iran.
    Maybe it’s worth revisiting Öcalan’s earlier statements; since 2008, he has expressed concerns regarding Iran’s interference in the peace process and in 2013, recommended boosting PJAK forces to 40,000 to confront Iranian dangers.

    Global developments—from the war in Ukraine and the Syrian crisis to Iran-Turkey rivalry, the role of Israel, and NATO tensions—have influenced Turkey’s strategic calculations regarding Iran. Turkey’s experiences in Syria and Iraq have shown that the Kurds act as a balance of power. Ankara now seeks engagement and coordination with PJAK instead of direct confrontation.

    In this context, Netanyahu’s focus on destabilizing Iran has pushed Turkey to develop a more calculated approach toward Iranian affairs. It seems Ankara has concluded that it cannot play an effective role in Iran’s future developments without considering PJAK’s influence. All these factors are compelling Turkey to seriously revise and prepare its strategic agenda concerning Iran. One indication of this may be the Turkish leadership’s intention to align the PKK’s congress with its own interests in renegotiation and potential rearmament.

    The Necessity of PJAK in Turkey’s New Strategy
    In 2015, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), along with several other Kurdish parties, attempted to reclaim their former position in Iranian Kurdistan’s political and social scene through a campaign called “Rasan,” aiming to curb PJAK’s growing influence. Clashes occurred in the mountainous region of Kileh Shin, allegedly part of an operation orchestrated by the Turkish government. Media outlets close to the PDKI and to some extent Komala subtly confirmed Turkey’s role in these events.

    However, these efforts failed, and the Iranian Kurdish parties were unsuccessful in achieving their objectives. Following this setback, Turkey began looking for a more effective alternative force in the region—and that force was PJAK. Simultaneously, Israel unofficially conveyed a message to these Kurdish parties suggesting that significant developments were approaching in Iran and that Kurds could play a key role in shaping them.

    PJAK in Turkey’s Strategic Calculations
    PJAK has yet to hold a congress to formally disarm or dissolve, and this process has stalled, with Qandil attributing the deadlock to Öcalan’s absence from the process. Even if a decision to end armed struggle is made, the guerrilla forces would not immediately lay down their arms. Integrating them into formal politics would require a transitional structure—something PJAK could provide, but only if a comprehensive agreement is reached between Turkey and Öcalan, and anti-Turkish elements within PJAK shift their stance.

    Turkey aims to use PJAK as a tool to manage potential developments in Iran and prevent the Kurds from aligning with Israeli interests, thereby avoiding a repeat of the Syrian scenario. For this reason, Ankara seeks to incorporate PJAK into any future peace agreements. According to a Kurdish journalist, Turkey envisions PJAK playing a role in Iran similar to that of the Syrian National Army (SNA) in Syria.

    Iran’s Position in the Turkey-PJAK Equation
    Since 2013, when PKK guerrillas withdrew toward Iran’s borders, Tehran has grown increasingly concerned about the implications of the Turkey-PKK peace process. In meetings with the PKK and Kurdish parties in Iraq, Iran explicitly warned about the expanded presence of these forces near its borders, questioning who would control PJAK in the event of a Turkey-Öcalan agreement. This concern led to a widening rift between Iran and Qandil.

    This concern was not solely security-related; it also stemmed from a deeper geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Turkey. From Tehran’s perspective, PJAK could become a tool of Turkish influence if the group aligns itself with Ankara. As a regional actor, Iran must maintain ties with Qandil and use political tools to prevent the balance from tipping solely in Turkey’s favor.

    The future role of PJAK depends on the PKK’s orientation toward Iran. If relations between Qandil and Tehran deteriorate, it would signal a full alignment of the PKK with Turkey—a scenario that seems unlikely for now without concrete assurances. For the sake of regional stability, both Iran and Qandil will likely be forced to maintain engagement.

  • Iran’s warning to Iraq: Remove the terrorist groups from the Kurdistan Region!

    Iran’s warning to Iraq: Remove the terrorist groups from the Kurdistan Region!

    In recent years, the officials and military commanders of the Islamic Republic of Iran have repeatedly warned about the activity and deployment of terrorist groups near the borders of Iran and the Kurdistan region of Iraq, and have informed the local and government authorities of Iraq about their opposition. However, the central government of Iraq and the authorities of the Kurdistan region have not taken decisive and acceptable measures to expel these groups or prevent their attacks on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

    Therefore, with the increase of the activities of terrorist groups Komola, KDPI, PAK, PJAK and PKK in Iran’s borders, as well as attempts to carry out terrorist operations, the explosion in one of the country’s sensitive centers in Isfahan province by elements of the terrorist group Komala under the guidance of Mossad (the attack was neutralized in August), the attempt to bringing armed teams and import a large amount of weapons into Iran’s soil and the active role in the recent riots in Iran’s border cities made the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps determined to carry out a artillery and drone campaign against the positions of the mentioned terrorist groups in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

    Considering the number of terrorist groups and their foreign supporters, it seems that the recent attacks of the IRGC are not enough to completely destroy the terrorist groups and this operation is just a warning message and retaliatory action. On the other hand, the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the same time as the start of this operation, have put diplomatic consultations with the Iraqi authorities on the agenda and demanded an end to the activities of terrorist groups around their borders, especially in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

    The presence of terrorist groups in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, in addition to threatening the security of Iran, is also considered a serious threat to the security of Iraq. If proper action is not taken by the Iraqi authorities to expel terrorist groups from the Kurdistan Region, this issue can threaten Iraq’s national security in the long term, create problems in relations with neighboring countries, increase the number of foreign military bases in northern Iraq, and turning the Kurdistan region of Iraq into an arena for resolving regional disputes and military conflicts.

    Currently, the terrorist groups of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan (Komala) and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) are among the main separatist and terrorist groups in the eastern borders of the Kurdistan Region, focusing on attacking Iran’s national security. During the past years, many documents have been obtained about the use of the mentioned groups by western Intelligences, including the CIA and Mossad, to carry out subversive operations in Iran.

    Considering this issue, if the current negotiations to dismantle and evacuate the headquarters of these groups from the territory of the Kurdistan Region do not succeed, we may witness more effective and serious operations by Iran, including ground operations to clean up the eastern areas of the Kurdistan Region.

    Read more:
    Iran’s missile and drone attacks against terrorist groups in the Kurdistan region + Video
    15 terrorists were killed in Kurdistan Region of Iraq
    IRGC missile attacks on north of Er
    bil

    Map of the dispersion of terrorist groups in the eastern borders of the Kurdistan region of Iraq – Click to view full size
  • IRGC Missile Attack on Terrorist Groups in Iraqi Kurdistan; Video + Images

    IRGC Missile Attack on Terrorist Groups in Iraqi Kurdistan; Video + Images

    Yesterday missile attack have targeted several strategic places like the Koy Sanjaq area which the terrorist groups HDK an HDKA-KDPI using this area as a military base and training ground.

    According to eyewitnesses two of missiles hit the KDPI base in Koysinjaq. (Images)

     

     

    According to local reports at least 22 terrorists were killed including several commanders:

    1- Soheila Qader
    2- Ibrahim Zayuwi
    3- Nasrin Haddadi
    4- Hashem Azizi
    5- Karim Mahdavi
    6- Rahman Peyravi
    7-Muhammad Hasan Pour
    8- Karim Saqqezi
    and 35 other were wounded.

    It is also said that several other bases of terrorist groups have been targeted by IRGC missiles, and most of the casualties are related to those bases.

    Clearly, the news of these casualties is censored by these two terrorist groups.