Baghdad–Ankara Water Agreement; Turkey’s Security and Political Leverage over Iraq?!
The recent water and energy accord between Turkey and Iraq—beginning with the financing mechanism for water projects signed in early 2024 and expanded into combined oil–water packages in November 2025—marks a strategic shift in managing the Tigris–Euphrates basin. In practice, Ankara has strengthened its ability to regulate water flow, quality, and allocation into Iraq through legal, technical, and financial frameworks, the entry of Turkish companies, and project financing. Baghdad, instead of exercising full sovereignty over shared resources, is gradually ceding long‑term access and decision‑making to foreign partners, particularly Turkey and its international allies. This situation carries serious legal, economic, environmental, and security implications for Iraq’s internal stability, agricultural productivity, food security, and strategic independence.
Field Context of the Agreement
The water deal between Turkey and Iraq evolved from two decades of intermittent talks but took on a new, complex structure after 2024. Two key developments set the stage: the sharp decline of Tigris–Euphrates inflows to below 30 billion cubic meters annually, and the completion of Turkey’s Ilisu Dam. Facing simultaneous water shortages and public discontent, Baghdad was compelled to accept Ankara’s new cooperation model.
In early 2024, both sides signed the Water Project Financing Mechanism, turning water cooperation into a financial and technological package. Turkey pledged technical support and investment via Turkish banks and NATO‑linked institutions, but in return gained control over contractor selection, monitoring technologies, and hydrological data exchange.
About a year later, the oil–water linkage agreement, first reported by Al‑Monitor (2025), revealed the geopolitical logic: water in exchange for oil. Turkey secured new concessions in Kurdish oil exports and pipeline routes in return for increasing water flows. This elevated the deal from an environmental partnership to a security‑economic bargain with deep political consequences.
Analytical Feedback
Turkish think tanks such as ORSAM described the cooperation as Ankara’s “soft power tool,” while analysts from Shafaqna and Etemad warned that the projects expose Iraq’s economic and informational infrastructure to NATO influence. Western research centers like CKH (2025) and Al‑Monitor stressed that the agreement has widened Iraq’s internal divides: Shiite and nationalist parties see it as a threat to sovereignty, whereas Baghdad’s government frames it as a “survival necessity against drought.”
Thus, the water accord has transformed from an environmental project into a multi‑layered arena of power, economic, and security competition—where Turkey, under the guise of development cooperation, extends its geopolitical influence over Iraq and, by extension, the Resistance Axis.
Future Threats
- Consolidation of Geopolitical Control
Turkey’s completion of major dams (Ilisu, GAP project) gives it effective control over storage and release of Tigris–Euphrates waters. Recent agreements lack unconditional commitments to increase Iraq’s water supply; instead, they tie flows to joint financial and technical projects. Coordination committees and technical mechanisms risk becoming unilateral decision‑making tools for Ankara, especially since monitoring equipment and data exchange are managed by Turkish entities. This enables immediate pressure on Baghdad, potentially triggering agricultural and energy crises in southern and central Iraq, forcing political concessions. - Economic Dependence on Foreign Actors
The financing mechanism (April 2024) and oil–water contracts (November 2025) opened Iraq’s water, electricity, and agricultural infrastructure to Turkish capital and companies. This “finance for access” model entrenches dependency. Long‑term contracts and technical conditions reduce Baghdad’s economic autonomy, while Western‑linked banking networks impose obligations that constrain independent policy. Domestic opposition risks being countered by threats of reduced services or halted funding. - Weakening of Independent Regional Players
The water deal, framed as technical cooperation, indirectly reshapes the role of traditional regional actors. Analysts note that the Ankara–Baghdad energy‑water chain diminishes Tehran’s influence in transboundary resource management and creates openings for NATO, especially U.S. involvement, in Iraq’s critical infrastructure. This dynamic could spark strategic competition among regional blocs, placing Baghdad between national interests and international pressure. - Information Warfare and Data Security Risks
A core element of the agreements is the transfer of “smart water management” technologies and monitoring systems. Academic sources warn that foreign‑managed systems could expose sensitive databases on resources and infrastructure to external actors. Such data can be exploited economically or militarily, enabling predictive crisis modeling or infiltration operations. Without independent governance safeguards, Baghdad risks losing informational sovereignty. - Environmental and Social Consequences
Declining river inflows already reduce agricultural output, worsen soil erosion, and intensify dust storms. Regional reports explicitly link dust crises to water shortages. Altered seasonal flows threaten staple crop production and undermine Iraq’s food security, heavily reliant on direct irrigation. Social impacts include rural‑urban migration, strain on urban services, ethnic tensions, and increased recruitment potential for insurgent groups exploiting grievances. Absent compensatory social policies and alternative economic programs, these pressures could destabilize Iraq internally and turn discontent into protest or violence.
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