GCC in Turmoil Over the Strait of Hormuz

During the war imposed by the U.S. and the Zionist regime against Iran, the GCC countries as a unified bloc demonstrated a common official stance on certain issues, such as condemning Iranian attacks on their countries, expressing concern over economic damage to oil, trade, and tourism, fearing becoming secondary targets, and welcoming ceasefires. In an emergency meeting of foreign ministers on March 1, 2026, and in subsequent statements, Council members described Iran’s attacks as a “clear violation of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the principles of good neighborliness.” They reserved their right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter and declared they would take “all necessary measures” to protect their security, citizens, and territory. However, the forty-day war gradually deepened the internal organizational and structural divisions among the six GCC states — divisions that had been shaped in recent years, particularly after the 2017 Qatar crisis and the emergence of geopolitical rivalry (2025) between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, especially in Yemen. The main axes of the recent GCC rift can be divided into three spectra based on the type and level of each country’s relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States, and the Zionist regime. Within this framework, the six Arab states of the Gulf have adopted three different approaches and strategies. This raises the key question: how can the three strategies adopted by the six GCC member states toward the Ramadan War lead to the deepening or even the breakup of this regional organization?

Theoretical Framework: Balance of Threat

In classical realist theory, states are assumed to seek maximum security and to balance against threatening powers. However, the Balance of Threat theory revises this model. According to Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory, states react not merely to “power” but to “perceived threat.” This theoretical framework explains why GCC members, in response to the forty-day war, moved toward divergences and differences in reactions and strategies. The core point of Walt’s theory is that, contrary to popular belief, states do not balance solely in response to increases in others’ power; rather, it is the level of perceived threat that drives states toward balancing. By distinguishing between power and threat, Walt introduces four components as threat factors: 1) aggregate capabilities (population, economic and military power, etc.); 2) geographic proximity (a direct relationship exists between threat perception and proximity); 3) offensive capabilities (the greater a country’s offensive capabilities, the greater the security concerns it raises); and 4) aggressive intentions (states with aggressive intentions pose greater threats than status quo powers). According to Balance of Threat theory, what encourages states to engage in balancing is their perception of one another as threats, not merely the degree of their power. For example, the increase in Iran’s military power is tangible for Oman, but unlike the UAE or Saudi Arabia, Oman has not taken balancing measures because it does not perceive Iran as a threat. In fact, each actor within the GCC has a specific perception of the Iranian threat. Some see Iran as an existential, long-term, and broad threat and call for balancing or strengthening defensive capacities, while others view Iran as a more limited threat and lean toward diplomacy and mediation. The result of these differences is a duality of threat perception and the intensification of internal rifts within the Council.

Key Findings and Analysis

Part One: The Ramadan War and the Three Strategies of GCC States

A. War Containment Strategy: Oman and Qatar

Qatar and Oman, while condemning attacks against Iran as well as Iranian attacks on Arab countries, consider war escalation dangerous and place primary blame on the war’s instigators — the Zionist regime and the United States. Qatari and Omani officials have argued that Tel Aviv’s strategy is to draw Arab countries into direct confrontation with Iran to wear down both sides and ultimately shift the balance of power in its favor. In essence, Qatar and Oman fall into the category of mediating actors who criticize the continuation of war and escalation of tensions. Among them, Oman holds a more critical view of U.S. and Israeli policies toward Iran. Omani media and officials blamed Washington and Tel Aviv for starting the war without consulting regional countries and criticized the influence of the Zionist regime and regional parties unwilling to censure the United States. Throughout the war and afterward, Muscat has emphasized a policy of diplomacy and maintaining good relations with Tehran. Until Iran’s naval blockade, Oman was even introduced as Tehran’s potential partner in monitoring the Strait of Hormuz. However, while Qatar falls within this spectrum, it has adopted a more contradictory and paradoxical policy compared to Oman. On one hand, it allowed the U.S. to conduct operations from its soil; on the other, it maintained historical ties with Iran, avoided directly condemning the U.S. and Israel, and pursued mediation between Iran and the U.S. In this context, it described the ceasefire as an initial step toward de-escalation and called for immediate dialogue between the two sides.

B. War Escalation Strategy: United Arab Emirates and Bahrain

Among the six GCC states, the UAE adopted the harshest stance during the forty-day war and also suffered the most attacks. The UAE closed its embassy in Tehran and emphasized strengthening ties with the U.S. and Israel. Abu Dhabi concluded during the war that past efforts to re-engage with Tehran were insignificant and that there was no value in moving away from the Abraham Accords. The UAE also called for war escalation and declared its readiness to join military efforts to confront Tehran and end Iran’s ability to control and manage the Strait of Hormuz. Yousef Al-Otaiba, UAE ambassador to Washington, wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in the midst of the Ramadan War titled “The UAE Stands Up to Iran,” calling for a more decisive approach. He claimed, “Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been damaged and its allies weakened, but more must be done to completely eliminate its missile and drone threat,” arguing that the current war requires an end that eliminates Iran’s long-term threat. He also announced his country’s readiness to join an international initiative to reopen and secure the Strait of Hormuz. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to the UAE president, also stated, “We did not want the war, but we won it,” and called for long-term guarantees against Iran’s nuclear, missile, and regional allies. In recent years, the UAE has had its eyes on the three islands — Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa — and views weakening or defeating Iran in war as the best option to gain control of these strategic islands. Therefore, it sought to draw the U.S. into a war in the southern Persian Gulf to occupy the three islands. The UAE had previously conducted extensive military exercises to seize similar points. A ceasefire and the end of the war would thus thwart its ambitions to control these islands. In this regard, the UAE’s Mirage fighter jet attack on Lavan Island, carried out hours after the ceasefire announcement, can be seen as an attempt to sabotage the de-escalation and ceasefire process.

Alignment of Bahrain

On the other hand, Bahrain, which joined the Abraham Accords alongside the UAE in 2020, pursued a policy fully aligned with the UAE during the war. Bahrain, which hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet, called Iran’s attacks on its territory “treason” and pursued a Chapter VII Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force, which was vetoed by Russia and China. In effect, Bahrain and the UAE pursued a strategy of crisis escalation and weakening Iran during the forty-day war.

C. War Insulation Strategy: Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait adopted a risk coverage and insulation strategy during the forty-day war. They avoided open alignment but facilitated U.S. military operations behind the scenes. Saudi Arabia, which had improved its ties with Tehran after the Beijing agreement, followed a dual approach but one leaning closer to the UAE. Nevertheless, Riyadh adopted a more balanced approach compared to Abu Dhabi. Although Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. forces to use its bases, it refrained from directly responding to Iran. Saudi officials condemned Iranian attacks on Riyadh and eastern Saudi Arabia, expelled some Iranian diplomats, and issued limited diplomatic warnings, but unlike the UAE, did not call for continuing or escalating the war, nor did they promise to join the U.S. and Israeli campaign. In fact, Riyadh pursued a regional diplomacy approach, maintaining dialogue with Iran to prevent escalation, and implicitly supported Pakistan’s mediation efforts to reduce tensions.

Kuwait Following Saudi Arabia

Kuwait also followed a policy aligned with Saudi Arabia, adopting a strategy of compliance and accompaniment with the U.S. Although Kuwait, like the other five GCC members, denies that the U.S. launched military operations from its soil or airspace on February 28, according to France 24, after Iran’s attacks, Kuwait allowed the U.S. to use its facilities for missile strikes. As a result, after the UAE, Kuwait suffered the heaviest blows from Iranian attacks during the conflict among Gulf states. Hence, to insulate itself and manage risk, Kuwait sought to reduce the intensity of the war. In this regard, Kuwait’s crown prince, in a phone call with Pakistan’s prime minister, supported Islamabad’s mediation efforts between Iran and the U.S. to stop the war.

Part Two: Impact of the Three Strategies on the GCC’s Internal Rift

Disagreements among the six states over relations with the Zionist regime, level of cooperation with the U.S., and how to deal with Iran have made solidarity and unity nearly impossible. On one hand, Oman and Qatar insist on engagement and mediation, viewing Iran as a neighbor manageable through diplomacy. On the other hand, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and to some extent Kuwait, regard Iran as a threat to their national security and interests. Therefore, it appears that in the medium term, further rifts may emerge among GCC countries as a single bloc, including between the UAE and Oman.

Divergent Stances of Kuwaiti and Omani Celebrities

The worldviews of GCC states regarding the war have also differed. Mishari Al-Afasi, a Kuwaiti reciter, produced an anti-Iranian work titled “Tabbat Yada Iran wa Man Ma’aha” (Perish the hands of Iran and those with them), attempting to shape public opinion in GCC states against Iran. However, the video’s release was met with widespread backlash from Arab social media users, who responded with similar language, writing, “Perish the hands of Israel, America, and those with them.” On the other hand, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Khalili, the Grand Mufti of Oman, expressed support for the Resistance Axis led by Iran in its all-out battle against American-Zionist aggressors. Meanwhile, on Eid al-Fitr, the people of Sur in southeastern Oman gathered in a public rally, reciting poetry to express their support and solidarity with the Iranian nation and fighters in their battle against the U.S. and the Zionist regime.

Emirati and Saudi Criticism of U.S. Policy

While some GCC states have asked the U.S. to find an exit from the war, others have advised intensifying strikes to overthrow the Iranian government. These contradictory preferences among Council members indicate a process of fragmentation. There is also sharp disagreement among Gulf Arab elites regarding the future of U.S. bases in the region and hosting them. Some argue that these bases, rather than guaranteeing GCC security and stability, have become a source of instability. Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, a UAE university professor and former advisor to the UAE president, said, “The UAE no longer needs America to defend itself… What the UAE needs is merely to obtain the best and newest weapons that America has. So, it is time to think about closing U.S. bases, because they are a liability, not a strategic asset.” In contrast, Mamdouh Al-Muhaini, director of Saudi Arabia’s Al-Arabiya and Al-Hadath networks, wrote in an article in Asharq Al-Awsat titled “Destroying Relations Between Gulf Countries and America”: “Relations with America are important and strategic, and this relationship must extend not only to military and political dimensions but also to all economic and cultural aspects.”

Joining External Alliances

After the start of the Ramadan War, some GCC states have taken steps to join alliances outside the GCC framework. Saudi Arabia and Qatar seek to join an Islamic bloc comprising Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt. Although the Saudi kingdom will continue to seek U.S. support, it is also trying to complement this dependence by deepening regional ties with Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, as well as increasing reliance on China. Shortly after the war began, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey held an emergency meeting of foreign ministers of Islamic countries. If this axis’s cooperation deepens, it could create strategic weight beyond the GCC and the U.S. security umbrella for Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

The Zionist Tinge of Abu Dhabi and Manama

The UAE and possibly Bahrain may officially join Netanyahu’s envisioned “Hexagon” axis or the “Abraham Bloc” in the future. In any case, the Zionist regime and the level of ties with it have been a source of division within the GCC. Although the UAE and Bahrain have maintained their relations, other GCC members view the Zionist regime’s hegemonic ambitions with serious concern. This conflict of interests and clash of perspectives makes strategic convergence and unity among the six countries nearly impossible.

Strategic Conclusions and Recommendations

While GCC states quickly aligned at the start of the Ramadan War under a common crisis, the sustained pressure and cost of war have driven them toward divergent paths. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait have moved toward a policy of “hard containment,” while Qatar and Oman continue to insist on “engagement and mediation.” This rift directly serves Iran’s interest in creating division. Another major consequence of the war for GCC states is the absolute discrediting of the U.S. security umbrella. U.S. bases, long seen as sources of deterrence and protection, have now become a liability, turning Arab countries into direct targets. Donald Trump’s erratic and unpredictable behavior reinforces the feeling that Washington is no longer reliable. Therefore, it is plausible that the leaders of these countries, after witnessing America’s inability to prevent the destruction of critical infrastructure, may seek new partners such as Russia and China. They may also turn to countries like Ukraine, Turkey, Canada, and South Korea to bolster their defense capabilities, including in the drone sector. It is worth noting that this search for new allies to reduce absolute dependence on the U.S. aligns with Iran’s national interests and security. Finally, it must be noted that GCC unity has always been reactive and has rarely translated into long-term strategy. Although the GCC is not currently disintegrating or collapsing, it is revealing the limits of the organization’s cohesion and solidarity as a strategic concept.

Regarding strategic recommendations for deepening the rift and preventing GCC cohesion, Iran can take the following steps: expanding political, economic, and military ties with Oman and improving relations with Qatar; preventing convergence and attempting to sow discord between the UAE and Saudi Arabia through social media; and threatening GCC countries over granting military bases to the U.S. or the Zionist regime.