Author: Mirza

  • Taiwan Strait Time!

    Taiwan Strait Time!

    The Longstanding Dispute
    Prior to the outbreak of the Iran war in February 2026, China had consistently upheld the “One China” principle, regarding Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory. Beijing’s policy combined gradual pressure with avoidance of direct confrontation: regular military patrols around Taiwan, diplomatic pressure to limit Taiwan’s international recognition, and deepening economic ties aimed at eroding the island’s operational autonomy. At the same time, China presented peaceful reunification as the preferred option, while reserving the right to use force to prevent Taiwan’s formal independence. Tensions mainly escalated during Taiwan’s electoral periods, but Beijing’s strategic priority prior to the crisis was maintaining stability and focusing on economic development.

    The Encirclment Policy Laboratory
    Concurrently with the Iran war, China closely monitored developments in the Strait of Hormuz as an operational model for “controlling critical chokepoints.” The most important lesson for Beijing was that even a weaker power, by blockading a vital route (Hormuz) and disrupting roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies, could pressure the United States and alter its behavior. This experience holds strategic significance for China: a blockade of Taiwan, which produces nearly 90% of the world’s advanced microchips, could deliver a far deeper shock to the global economy. Within this framework, Iran’s ability to use the global supply chain as leverage demonstrated that geoeconomic tools can serve as substitutes for, or complements to, military superiority.

    The Failure of the Silicon Shield
    In light of the Hormuz experience, the effectiveness of Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” strategy—which relied on U.S. dependence on the semiconductor industry to guarantee the island’s security—has been somewhat called into question. Analysts such as Eric Freeman argue that if China moves toward controlling trade routes and gradually encircling Taiwan, the United States will face a stark dilemma: accepting the new reality and retreating, or entering a costly confrontation. In this scenario, China could, without direct invasion, shift the deterrence balance in its favor by exerting pressure on trade and technology flows. The outcome would be a transition from interdependence-based deterrence to deterrence rooted in the control of critical chokepoints.

  • Aircraft losses of US-Israeli, European, and Arab countries in the Iran War

    Aircraft losses of US-Israeli, European, and Arab countries in the Iran War

    The U.S. and Israeli aircraft:

    Iran Front – Including 178 drones (official statement), 9 fighter jets, 8 aircraft, 11 helicopters, and 16 cruise missiles and bombs

    Destruction of 2 C-130 transport aircraft and 4 MH-6 helicopters during a U.S. special operation in southern Isfahan, on April 5.

    Drones:
    — MQ-9 Drone: At least 28 units
    — MQ-4C Drone: 1 unit (April 9)
    — MQ-1 Drone: 2 units (April 4, May 31)
    — RQ-21 Drone: 1 unit (March 30)
    — LUCAS Suicide Drone: Undisclosed number
    — Hermes 900 Drone: At least 8 units
    — Heron Drone: At least 2 units (March 31, April 5)
    — Harop Suicide Drone: Undisclosed number
    — Orbiter Drone: Undisclosed number

    Fighter jets:
    — Destruction of three U.S. F-15E fighter jets over Kuwait (March 2)
    — Destruction of one F-15 fighter jet in central Iran (April 1)
    — Destruction of one A-10 fighter jet over the Strait of Hormuz (April 2)
    — Destruction or damage to one F-35 fighter jet in central Iran (March 19)
    — Destruction or damage to one F-16 fighter jet in central regions (March 21)
    — Damage to one U.S. F-15E fighter jet over Hormuz Island (March 22)
    — Destruction or damage to one U.S. F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jet in southern Iran (March 25)

    Tanker aircraft and AWACS:
    — Destruction or damage to 5 KC-135 refueling aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, March 1-3
    — Destruction of 1 E-3G AWACS aircraft and damage to several other KC-135 refueling aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base, March 27

    Helicopters:
    — Damage to 1 CH-47 helicopter in Kuwait, April 3
    — Destruction or damage to 1 Black Hawk helicopter, April 3
    — Destruction or damage to 1 CH-47 helicopter at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, date unspecified
    — Destruction or damage to 1 CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, date unspecified
    — Destruction of an AH-64E Apache helicopter in the Strait of Hormuz, June 8

    Cruise Missiles and Bombs:
    — Interception and destruction of 15 AGM-158 JASSM or Tomahawk cruise missiles
    — Shooting down 1 GBU-39 bomb

    Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen Fronts – Including 14 drones, 3 aircraft, and 2 helicopters

    Drones:
    — 3 U.S. MQ-9 drones: in Jabal Maraqsha, Abyan Governorate (March 3), the desert of Marib (May 17), and north of Marib city (May 29) – by Yemeni Armed Forces
    — 1 U.S. MQ-9 drone: north of Basra (March 10) – by Iraqi Resistance
    — 8 Israeli Hermes 450 drones: Bint Jbeil (March 16), Al-Ayshiyeh region (April 1), Aynatha (April 2), Siddiqin (April 12), Adloun (April 17), Al-Hawsh (April 24), Nabatieh (April 30), Al-Khardali (June 10) – by Hezbollah
    — 1 Israeli Hermes 900 drone: southern Lebanon (April 28) – by Hezbollah
    — 1 Israeli Heron 1 drone: Nahla in Baalbek (June 11) – by Hezbollah

    Tanker aircraft, transport planes, and Helicopters:
    — Destruction of 1 KC-135 refueling aircraft and damage to another KC-135 in western Iraq (March 21) – by Iraqi Resistance
    — Destruction or damage to 1 U.S. UH-60 helicopter at Camp Victory, Iraq (April 5) – by Iraqi Resistance
    — 1 Iraqi Army Antonov-32 transport aircraft (April 10) – by Iraqi Resistance
    — Destruction or damage to 1 Israeli helicopter in the Yaroun area of southern Lebanon, type unknown (April 11) – by Hezbollah

    European countries aircraft:
    — One Italian Army MQ-9 drone (March 15)

    Arab countries aircraft:
    — 1 UAE Army helicopter, type unknown (March 9)
    — 1 Qatari Army helicopter, type unknown (March 22)
    — 2 Wing Loong drones belonging to Saudi or the UAE: in Shiraz (April 1) and Bushehr (April 3)

    The statistics presented are based on official statements by the armed forces of Iran, Iraqi resistance groups, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, as well as admissions by the United States, the Zionist regime, European, and Arab countries.

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  • From Classical Confrontation to Geoeconomic Deadlock; Dissecting the Second Phase of the Iran-U.S. War

    From Classical Confrontation to Geoeconomic Deadlock; Dissecting the Second Phase of the Iran-U.S. War

    Iran’s Naval Blockade in the Strait of Hormuz: From Economic Pressure to Global Crisis Contagion

    The naval blockade against Iran—which has effectively already begun—can, at the tactical level, swiftly target the main flow of Tehran’s foreign currency revenues, given that over 90% of its foreign trade and the bulk of its oil exports pass through the Persian Gulf. Disruption along this route could generate daily losses of up to roughly $435 million and, in the short term, even lead to a halt in oil production due to limited storage capacity. However, at the strategic level, the core issue is not the “initial effectiveness” but rather the “sustainability and management of consequences”—since this blockade is being imposed at a global chokepoint through which about 20% of the world’s energy flow transits. Any disruption there would directly translate into higher energy prices, global inflation, and pressure on energy-importing economies, particularly in Asia.

    This interdependence transforms the blockade from a unilateral leverage tool into a “crisis contagion mechanism,” whose costs are transferred to third parties and gradually generate reverse political pressure on Washington. On the other hand, effective implementation of the blockade demands a continuous and extensive naval presence, preparedness to intercept non-Iranian vessels, and acceptance of the risk of confrontation with major powers such as China—a fact which, as analyses explicitly state, turns this operation into an open-ended military commitment that is, in the medium term, “unsustainable.” Furthermore, legal constraints arising from the transit passage regime in the Strait of Hormuz effectively rule out the possibility of complete closure, and any effort to extend the blockade to third-party ships would raise the threshold of conflict from a bilateral to a multilateral level. Consequently, in the current situation, the naval blockade should be analyzed not as a definitive solution, but rather as a pressure instrument with short-term functionality and long-term uncontrollable repercussions—one that, while capable of severely pressuring Iran’s economy in its initial phase, will in all likelihood, over a longer horizon, lead to the erosion of America’s strategic capacity and credibility due to the networked nature of the energy economy and operational limitations. In any case, the issue of the naval blockade of Iran and its feasibility in strategic terms is analyzed as follows:

    Attrition in the “Endless” Mission: Pentagon experts warn that a full blockade of Iran’s ports and coastlines would constitute a massive military operation with no time ceiling. America’s geographic distance and the need for a permanent naval presence render this mission “unsustainable” logistically in the medium and long term, to the point that the U.S. military would effectively lack the capability to fully cover all trade exchanges across such a vast geographical area.

    The Industrial Self-Sanction Trap: Contrary to initial assumptions, this blockade targets the U.S. defense industry even more than Iran. The obstruction of sea lanes halts the trade of critical mineral commodities such as sulfur, which is essential for copper and cobalt extraction. This crisis severely diminishes America’s ability to “repair battle-damaged equipment” and “produce jet engines and drones,” while driving up input prices by as much as 165%.

    Economic Deadlock and Shifting Objectives: A daily cost of $2 billion, with a projected total expenditure of up to $1 trillion, coupled with the inability to eliminate Iran’s underground military capabilities, is pushing Washington toward a strategy of “graceful exit.” In practice, America’s geographic distance and the vulnerability of allied supply chains have minimized Washington’s resilience in the face of a war of attrition.

    Return to Direct Clash between Iran and the United States: From Tactical Pause to the Likelihood of a War of Attrition

    A return to direct confrontation between Iran and the United States depends less on sheer political will than on the disruption of the fragile balance now established between the costs of continuing the war and the costs of retreating. From the American perspective, the main precondition for resuming hostilities is that the naval blockade, economic pressure, and limited airstrike threats fail to compel Tehran to accept Washington’s preferred arrangements—particularly given that, according to available sources, Iran, despite enduring heavy military blows, has not collapsed; rather, it has emerged from the first phase with more uncompromising leadership, buried reserves of enriched uranium, and greater political cohesion. Conversely, from Iran’s standpoint, the condition for re-entering direct war is that Washington or Israel crosses the line from deterrence and pressure into infrastructure warfare, high-level assassinations, intensified blockade, or attempts to impose “unconditional surrender”—because, based on field data in Tehran, the prevailing assessment is that any ceasefire without credible guarantees would merely be a pause for a renewed attack within a shorter interval. For this reason, Iran’s planning horizon is not focused on a quick end to the war, but on readiness for a months-long, attritional conflict. Under such circumstances, the second phase of the war will most likely manifest not as a large-scale ground invasion, but as a hybrid, escalating form of combat.

    The characteristics of this conflict can be outlined as follows: expansion of strikes on Iran’s economic and energy infrastructure by the U.S. and Israel, and in response, reciprocal Iranian attacks on energy facilities, refineries, ports, shipping routes, and American and allied interests in the region—a pattern whose early signs have already been observed in strikes on Assaluyeh, disruptions to Qatar’s LNG capacity, and threats to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. The decisive point, however, is that the U.S. also faces serious deterrent obstacles to re-entering an unlimited war. In other words, according to some estimates, the cost of war has reached approximately $2 billion per day and could exceed $1 trillion, while the blockade of Hormuz itself places pressure on America’s own defense supply chain, with West Point assessments even describing it as a “pre-logistics crisis” for replenishing equipment and munitions. Hence, the most probable scenario is that, if negotiations fail again, the second phase of the war will not be a lightning offensive, but a multi-level war of attrition, in which the U.S. seeks, without engaging in ground occupation, to incrementally raise the economic and infrastructural costs for Iran, while Iran, relying on the survival of its missile capacity, the Hormuz leverage, and its ability to generate regional insecurity, raises the costs of continued conflict for the U.S., its allies, and the global economy. Thus, the central issue in returning to direct hostilities is not the mere feasibility of initiating war, but each side’s capacity to endure the consequences of its second phase.

    Validating NATO’s Confrontation with the U.S.: Genuine Rupture or Structural Dependency?

    The claim of “NATO confronting the U.S.” reflects, more than an operational scenario, a transition from a value-based alliance to an asymmetric and “transactional” security order. The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy, with its absolute prioritization of homeland defense and deterrence of China in the Indo-Pacific region, has reduced NATO to a secondary instrument, placing the main burden of conventional defense against Russia on European allies. This paradigm shift, combined with Washington’s pressure to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, has deepened the rifts inherited from the first Trump era to the level of a “crisis of strategic trust,” where analysts at think tanks such as Brookings and the IISS regard unilateral U.S. actions as undermining the foundations of Western deterrence.

    The February 2026 war in Iran and the crisis over the proposal to annex Greenland have acted as key accelerators of this operational divergence. The joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, conducted without sufficient consultation with Brussels, triggered a bipolar reaction across Europe. While countries such as Spain, deeming the war illegal, refused to provide their bases (Rota and Morón) or airspace to U.S. forces, Washington threatened to suspend their membership or sever trade relations entirely, thereby challenging NATO’s cohesion. Simultaneously, the U.S. insistence on acquiring Greenland and the threat of imposing 25% tariffs on European goods have been legally interpreted as violations of Article 1 of the Washington Treaty, and for the first time, intelligence services of long-standing allies such as Denmark were compelled to factor the United States in as a “potential security risk” in their calculations. Despite these unprecedented tensions, structural limitations preclude an outright institutional confrontation, since the 1949 treaty lacks a mechanism for expelling or counteracting members, and Article 13 only provides for voluntary withdrawal. As a result, Europe’s reaction is proceeding not through direct confrontation within NATO, but through the “gradual Europeanization of security” and the activation of parallel structures now taking shape. The “Readiness 2030” plan—with its €800 billion budget and the SAFE financial instrument for joint arms procurement prioritizing European industries—alongside the drafting of the EU’s “Article 42.7 Handbook” as a substitute for NATO’s Article 5, signals a serious effort to manage dependency on America and prepare for the scenario of a potential U.S. exit from the alliance. This process, rather than collapse, has given rise to a “realist NATO,” in which raw power and European defense autonomy replace earlier idealism.

    With the breakdown of negotiations, the likelihood of NATO’s formal entry into war remains near zero, owing to the firm opposition of countries such as Spain and Italy and the lack of consensus over the legal legitimacy of operations. The economic costs arising from $106 oil and a monthly financial burden of €3 billion for Europe, coupled with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, severely constrain the allies’ financial capacity for a protracted conflict. Militarily, the rapid depletion of U.S. interceptor missile stockpiles (e.g., THAAD and SM-3)—which would take up to six years to replenish—has confronted Washington with a “munitions gap” and weakened NATO’s readiness to defend other fronts. Under these conditions, the most plausible scenario is the continuation of unilateral U.S. intervention with limited support from certain specific allies, alongside the acceleration of European defense independence plans (such as Readiness 2030) to decouple from Washington’s security orbit.

    The Bab al-Mandab Strait and Its Impact in the Second Phase of the Conflict

    In the second phase of the war, the Bab al-Mandab Strait could function as a “complementary chokepoint” and Iran’s most significant strategic leverage mechanism, since Tehran is capable of transforming a regional crisis into an international geoeconomic blockade by affecting 12% of global trade and 22% of container traffic.

    This map shows how two vital energy bottlenecks in the world, the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, can become tools of geopolitical pressure and disrupt the flow of global trade due to regional tensions.

    Based on analyses from think tanks such as the Israeli regime’s National Security Studies Institute and Al Jazeera, Iran—through its allied proxy Ansarallah—possesses not only the capability to block alternative energy export routes—such as the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia that delivers oil to Yanbu port, which still requires passage through this strait to reach Asia—but also, by forcing vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, it has increased shipping companies’ operational costs by up to $50 million per week and created the risk of oil prices spiking to $150–200 per barrel.

  • Maven in the Iran War

    Maven in the Iran War

    In late February 2026, the United States and the Zionist regime launched coordinated military operations under the names “Epic Fury” and “Roaring Lion” against Iran—operations considered the largest U.S. military action since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During this conflict, CENTCOM struck over 11,000 targets, while Iran responded with thousands of missiles and drones. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was martyred in the initial attacks. However, these statistics alone do not capture the historical significance of this war; rather, what distinguishes this conflict is the central role of artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and commercial technologies—which no longer serve merely as support tools but have been placed at the core of operations.

    The “Maven” project had been initiated back in 2018. Prior to the emergence of large language models, this unit, in collaboration with several companies, was supporting the Maven project to advance “computer vision”—an AI capability that enables the detection and differentiation of objects in satellite imagery, assisting analysts in reviewing visual data.

    The Maven project helped accelerate the deployment of machine learning in the fields of reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence analysis, and geospatial intelligence. This legacy ultimately led to the development of the “Maven Smart System” by Palantir Technologies, which today has become the cornerstone of AI-driven U.S. military operations.

    Background

    The U.S. Department of Defense has designated Palantir as the “sole responsible supplier” for the Maven AI system—a system used for field data analysis, target identification, and military decision support. The author emphasizes that this contract marks the transition of the Maven project from the experimental phase to a permanent U.S. military infrastructure level. According to the sources cited, the system is capable of analyzing satellite data, drone footage, sensor inputs, and field intelligence in real time, generating a “unified operational picture” for military commanders. A notable point is the direct link between Palantir and America’s broader strategy in the domain of “AI-enabled warfare,” which itself indicates that the U.S. government is gradually outsourcing its intelligence analysis and targeting infrastructure to private Silicon Valley companies—a trend that, in his view, blurs the boundaries between government, military, and tech firms.

    Analysis and Findings

    A. The Role of Silicon Valley in the U.S. War Department

    Silicon Valley’s role in the U.S. Department of Defense has expanded significantly in recent years; this collaboration has moved beyond limited research projects in cybersecurity over the past decade and has now become a central pillar of the U.S. military’s digital transformation. Recognizing the rapid pace of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big data analytics, the Pentagon has increasingly turned to partnerships with Silicon Valley tech companies to enhance decision-making, combat effectiveness, and intelligence superiority. A prime example of this trend is the massive contracts with firms like Palantir Technologies, Google Cloud, and Microsoft, which are involved in projects such as Maven and the Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability. The U.S. Department of Defense now has over 200 active contracts with companies based in the San Francisco Bay Area, a large portion of which are directly linked to digital warfare operations. This extensive partnership, however, has not always been without challenges. Today, the bulk of AI system development for the Department of Defense is managed by private contractors based in Silicon Valley. From the Pentagon’s perspective, collaboration with Silicon Valley is a strategic necessity. The engineers and researchers in this region are among the world’s foremost experts in areas such as image processing, data analysis, and deep learning platform design. By establishing the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in 2018, the Pentagon effectively opened a gateway for direct engagement with tech companies. This body is tasked with adapting emerging civilian technologies for military applications and setting ethical and technical standards for the use of AI in warfare. Through this model, the U.S. military can innovate at a pace close to the private sector, without being bogged down for years in bureaucratic procedures. Silicon Valley has become a vital component of America’s modern warfare infrastructure, where the line between commercial technology and military application is increasingly blurred. Companies like Palantir, Anduril Industries, and SpaceX now play pivotal roles in combat data analysis, autonomous drones, and military satellite communications. By September 2024, the share of commercial technology firms in the U.S. Department of Defense’s research budget had risen from 11% in 2015 to over 37% in 2024. This extensive partnership, while enhancing military efficiency, has also raised new concerns about transparency, social oversight, and the over-reliance of national security on the private sector and tech investors.

    Image of part of the terms of the US Department of Defense contract with Palantir

    B. The Role of Maven in the Attack on Iran

    The Maven system combines satellite imagery, drone videos, radar data, and signals intelligence into a unified interface, allowing operators to identify targets, recommend weapon types, and generate attack plans almost simultaneously. The results have been remarkable: over a thousand targets were struck in the first 24 hours of operations—a pace unimaginable if relying solely on human analysis. This process has continued using only 10% of the analysts that would previously have been required for such a level of operations.

    However, the system’s limitations are equally notable. Maven’s overall accuracy is estimated at around 60%, compared to roughly 84% for human analysts. Despite this, Palantir’s Chief Technology Officer has described it as “the first large-scale AI-enabled combat operation”—a characterization that raises serious questions about the ethical considerations of AI-based targeting and the adequacy of civilian protection mechanisms. These very concerns about protective safeguards have also led to the recent controversy between Anthropic and the Department of Defense.

    C. The History of Maven

    Project Maven is one of the U.S. Department of Defense’s programs in the field of applying artificial intelligence to military data analysis, launched in 2017. Its official name was the “Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team,” and its primary objective was to use machine learning for the automated analysis of images and videos from reconnaissance drones. The project was initially designed to accelerate the processing of vast battlefield data, particularly in Middle Eastern operations. Early sources about the program’s inception were published in Department of Defense statements in 2017. Project Maven focused specifically on drone imagery analysis—using machine vision algorithms to detect individuals, vehicles, and suspicious objects in aerial footage. Previously, such imagery had to be analyzed manually by human personnel, a highly time-consuming process. The project’s goal was to reduce the workload on analysts and increase the speed of operational decision-making. Pentagon official reports emphasized that the system played a “decision-support” role and was not a complete replacement for human personnel. The name Palantir Technologies has frequently been associated with U.S. defense data analysis projects. Palantir is a major government contractor in the fields of big data analytics and intelligence software, with its products such as “Palantir Gotham” used in defense and security agencies. Although Project Maven was broadly executed with the participation of multiple contractors, media attention was largely focused on Google’s initial partnership with the Pentagon, while companies like Palantir were also active in the defense technology ecosystem related to data analysis and AI.

    According to statistics released by the White House on April 8, the U.S. military struck over 13,000 targets in Iran during the first 38 days of the war—including more than 2,000 command-and-control centers, 1,500 air defense targets, and 1,450 targets related to industrial infrastructure.

    The White House emphasized that “all these targets were legitimate and military in nature.” However, the New York Times and other media outlets, through reports and images, have documented the destruction of civilian facilities. These reports have sparked a wave of criticism and raised the question of whether over-reliance on AI systems has led to targeting errors and increased civilian casualties.

    During operations against Iran, the Maven Smart System—a Palantir product—played a central role in gathering and analyzing battlefield intelligence. According to Cameron Stanley, the Pentagon’s senior official for digital and artificial intelligence, the system collected data on enemy force positions from various sources, including radar signals, satellite and drone imagery, electronic communications, and other intelligence feeds, combining them all into a unified operational picture of the battlefield.

    Stanley, who presented these remarks at Palantir’s “AIPCon 9” conference on March 12, stated that Maven is not limited to target identification. According to him, the system can also determine the most suitable friendly unit to engage each target and provide U.S. combat units with specific operational options—including attack routes, required munitions types, and other relevant information for mission execution. He explained that previously, commanders had to consult eight or nine different systems simultaneously to make battlefield decisions, but Maven now aggregates all this information into a single visual interface. In this way, a commander can identify a target, select the appropriate attack package, and initiate the operational process with just a few clicks.

  • Turkey’s Engagement with Regional Actors in Shaping Energy Corridors

    Turkey’s Engagement with Regional Actors in Shaping Energy Corridors

    In West Asia and North Africa, oil and its transmission routes have never been merely economic matters; they have always been defined in close connection with politics, national sovereignty, and survival calculations. Every decision in the energy sector carries profound geopolitical messages capable of altering the balance of power among regional actors. Within this framework, Ankara’s announcement to terminate the Kirkuk–Ceyhan oil pipeline agreement with Iraq by 2026 once again demonstrated that energy lies at the heart of Turkey’s security and strategic calculations. From the Erdogan government’s perspective, this decision is not merely a revision of a technical contract but part of a broader effort to redefine the future of energy, reduce costly dependencies, and consolidate Turkey’s role as a regional energy hub. Simultaneously, the cautious resumption of Iraqi oil exports through this pipeline after a long hiatus reflects both parties’ awareness of the geopolitical costs of obstructing energy arteries—an obstruction that, beyond inflicting heavy economic losses on Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, exposed the depth of legal and sovereignty disputes among Baghdad, Erbil, and Ankara. Meanwhile, developments in Syria and the prospect of a post-Assad order represent a key variable in Turkey’s energy and geopolitical calculations. From Ankara’s perspective, post-Assad Syria is not only a security issue but also a geopolitical opportunity to diversify and complete energy and transit corridors—corridors that could link Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean, and even European markets. In this context, the central question is how Turkey is attempting, through the simultaneous use of energy tools, transit corridors, and Syria’s geopolitical shifts, to redefine its position in West Asia’s transitional order. This situation raises a fundamental question: Will energy and its transit routes in the coming decade become a factor intensifying competition and divisions among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, or can they serve as a lever for cooperation, integration, and the definition of shared regional interests? The answer to this question will shape not only the future of Turkey’s relations with its neighbors but also the configuration of the region’s energy and geopolitical order.

    Background

    Among all foreign actors active in the Syrian crisis, Turkey has been the most steadfast supporter of opposition currents against the Damascus government, continuing this support despite heavy security, political, and economic costs. The consequences of this policy, particularly in the form of millions of Syrian refugees, have placed additional pressure on Turkey’s economy and social fabric, gradually becoming one of the most contentious domestic issues in the country. In past years, domestic critics of the Erdogan government repeatedly questioned this policy, calling for normalization of relations with Bashar al-Assad’s government and an end to support for opposition groups. From these factions’ perspective, the continuation of conflict neither guaranteed Turkey’s national security nor imposed long-term costs on Ankara. However, Assad’s fall transformed the equation, and the Erdogan government views this development as validation of its strategy. Ankara now believes its long-term investment in Syrian opposition groups has yielded effective leverage within Damascus’s new power structure. The groups and actors with which Turkey has established political, security, and field ties during the crisis years now find themselves in a position to play a significant role in Syria’s political future, thereby strengthening Turkey’s position as a decisive actor. Prior to Assad’s fall, Turkey’s policy in Syria was based on four core objectives:

    • Facilitating the return of a portion of Syrian refugees
    • Securing its southern borders
    • Containing and rolling back the political and territorial gains of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces
    • Securing concessions for its allied opposition groups in any negotiation process with Damascus.

    With the collapse of Assad’s government, the last objective has effectively become obsolete. Under the new circumstances, Ankara is attempting to pursue the remaining three objectives through more indirect and complex paths. Influencing Damascus’s new leadership, establishing active communication with Syria’s Arab community and local tribes, while simultaneously maintaining military and security pressure on the Syrian Democratic Forces, are Turkey’s primary tools for shaping the post-fall order in Syria. However, this strategy’s scope is not limited to Syria alone. Turkey is simultaneously attempting to translate its growing influence in Syria into leverage for increasing geopolitical pressure on Iraq—particularly in areas sensitive to Ankara in terms of border security, energy, and the presence of actors aligned with the Axis of Resistance. In this framework, Turkey is using political, economic, and security tools to shift the balance of influence in Iraq in its favor and limit the role of actors close to the Axis of Resistance. Pressuring Baghdad on security matters, cross-border operations, and managing Kurdistan Region files are part of this multi-layered strategy to consolidate Turkey’s regional position. Overall, Turkey’s policy in the post-Assad era can be seen as a coordinated effort to translate field gains in Syria into sustainable geopolitical influence across West Asia’s northern axis—a strategy encompassing both Syria and Iraq, with the ultimate goal of redefining Turkey’s role against the Axis of Resistance and solidifying Ankara’s position as a decisive regional actor.

    Analysis and Findings:

    Major projects in Iraq

    Ankara’s Strategy Toward Baghdad:
    Iraq, which until recently was primarily viewed by Ankara as an unstable security belt on Turkey’s southern periphery, has now become one of the focal points of Turkey’s regional strategy. This shift in perspective has been shaped following the transformation of regional dynamics after the events of October 7—developments accompanied by the relative weakening of Iran’s influence across several fronts, increased economic and diplomatic weight of Arab Gulf states, and regional actors’ search for new stability models in West Asia. In this context, Turkey’s renewed engagement with Iraq is not limited to containing the PKK but reflects broader ambitions to redefine Ankara’s regional role. This new approach encompasses a combination of security cooperation with Baghdad and Erbil, advancing a fragile internal peace process in Turkey, and a targeted effort to integrate Iraq into trade, transit, and energy networks between Turkey and the Gulf states. At the heart of this strategy lies geoeconomic logic. Ankara seeks to consolidate its position as a regional trade and energy connectivity hub by investing in shared infrastructure and creating sustainable interdependencies. Projects such as oil pipelines, medium-term gas export plans, and electricity grid development are key tools for Turkey to link Iraq to the region’s emerging energy architecture. The implications of this approach extend beyond Iraq as well. For Europe, redefining connectivity routes and access to energy resources, alongside strengthening stability in the continent’s southeastern neighborhood, holds strategic importance—and developments in Iraq, within this framework, are part of Europe’s larger energy security equation.

    Turkey’s policy shift toward Baghdad has occurred concurrently with a series of profound regional transformations, from the Gaza war and escalating Iran-Israel tensions to the fall of the Assad regime, which are collectively rearranging the balance of power in West Asia. These developments have heightened Ankara’s concerns about the spillover of insecurity and the expansion of crisis into its periphery. In such an atmosphere, Turkey feels an urgent need for cooperation with Baghdad to contain PKK threats and recalibrate relations with Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces—particularly given fears that Iraq might become the next arena for indirect confrontation between Iran and Israel. This concern has turned Ankara’s more active engagement with Baghdad into a security and political necessity. At the same time, this renewed engagement is meaningful within the broader context of Turkey’s rapprochement with Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Ankara seeks to position Iraq within a network of emerging regional frameworks that pursue trade, connectivity, and stability simultaneously. Overall, this new alignment strengthens Turkey’s strategic influence in Iraq while reducing Iran’s weight and centrality in shaping Baghdad’s regional dependencies. Thus, from Ankara’s perspective, Iraq is not only a security issue but a geopolitical and geoeconomic opportunity for redefining the regional order in West Asia.

    Turkey’s Strategies in Iraq in Confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran:
    Strategic estrangement between Turkey and the United States effectively began in March 2003, when Ankara opposed opening a northern front for U.S. forces during the invasion of Iraq. This decision marked a turning point in bilateral relations and laid the groundwork for a series of mutual tensions and mistrust that deepened over the years. In the months following Iraq’s occupation, field incidents further intensified this rift. The detention of a truck belonging to Turkish special forces in April 2003 and the arrest of Turkish military personnel in July of that year in Sulaymaniyah—an event known as the “Hood Incident”—dealt a serious blow to mutual trust and hardened Ankara’s security outlook toward developments in Iraq. The PKK’s return to armed activities in 2004 further exacerbated Turkey’s threat perception. Simultaneously, widespread opposition from Iraqi Shiite Arabs and Kurds to any Turkish military role—rooted in concerns over the revival of Ottoman ambitions—marginalized Ankara from effective participation in post-war reconstruction and Iraq’s political transition. In this tense atmosphere, Iran’s growing influence in Iraq after 2003 further strengthened Turkey’s security-driven perspective. The expansion of Popular Mobilization Forces into disputed areas such as Tal Afar and Sinjar during the fight against ISIS brought Iran’s influence closer to Turkey’s borders, overlapping with PKK presence and bases—a situation Ankara perceived as a “dual security threat.” In response to this linkage between the PKK, Shiite militias, and Iran, Turkey gradually shifted since 2016 toward a strategy based on unilateral military actions. This strategy included cross-border operations, establishing operational bases in northern Iraq, and deepening security and political cooperation with the Kurdistan Regional Government. However, in recent years, Ankara has sought to recalibrate its approach, redefining its military activities within the framework of “joint security arrangements” with Baghdad rather than unilateral authorities. The stated goal of this shift is to reduce political estrangement in Iraq and gain greater legitimacy for Turkey’s military presence, while addressing Baghdad’s sovereignty sensitivities. Despite this rhetorical shift, Turkey’s cross-border operations and the legal status of its bases in Iraq remain contentious, complicating bilateral relations. Nevertheless, efforts to establish shared institutional frameworks indicate both sides’ willingness to manage disputes through formal cooperation. In this regard, in 2024 Turkey and Iraq agreed to establish a joint security coordination center in Baghdad and transform the controversial Bashiqa base into a center for joint training and cooperation under Iraqi command. Turkish officials describe this move not as a retreat but as a strategic shift toward a “shared security” model—one that, while maintaining Ankara’s operational presence, grants greater formal authority to the Iraqi government.
    Over the past years, Ankara has continuously sought to reduce its strategic estrangement from Baghdad. The turning point in this process dates back to the Kurdistan Region’s independence referendum in September 2017, when Turkey aligned with Iraq’s central government against Kurdish separatism, supported Baghdad’s recapture of Kirkuk, and thereby opened the path to gradual engagement with Iraq’s federal structure. This process accelerated with the shift of U.S. forces from combat to advisory roles from 2021 onward—a change shaped under internal Iraqi pressure for U.S. withdrawal following the assassinations of General Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. From Ankara’s perspective, this situation simultaneously contained a threat and an opportunity: the threat of a potential vacuum being filled by Iran, and the opportunity to institutionalize security, economic, and political cooperation with Baghdad before that could occur. Recent geopolitical developments, including the fall of Assad’s regime, the weakening of Iran’s regional position, and mounting pressure on the Axis of Resistance, have created new room for maneuver for Turkey. Ankara views these developments as an opportunity to expand its influence through institutional mechanisms and emerging regional alignments. In this framework, Turkey seeks to integrate Iraq into its broader strategy by linking security cooperation to infrastructure development and positioning Baghdad within regional energy, trade, and stability equations—a strategy aimed at establishing a new balance against Tehran. One tool of this policy is the multilateral security framework involving Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, launched in 2025 to manage the ISIS threat. At the Amman summit in March 2025, Turkey, Syria, and Jordan agreed to establish a joint operations center for counterterrorism coordination and managing ISIS-linked camps and prisons. Ankara views this framework as a tool to limit the role of the Syrian Democratic Forces—which it considers the Syrian branch of the PKK—and hopes that by transferring management of camps such as Al-Hol and Roj to Syria’s new government, the logistical links between the PKK and these forces, particularly along the strategic Sinjar corridor, will be severed. The Sinjar corridor, once part of Iran’s ground bridge connecting its allied networks in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, retains its geopolitical significance.

    Turkey’s Strategic Objectives in Establishing Economic Agreements with Iraq:
    Turkey’s new approach toward Iraq is not solely a product of geopolitical competition with Iran but also a direct reaction to Ankara’s marginalization in the U.S.-led India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) initiative. In response, Turkey is promoting the Iraq-based “Development Road” project as a strategic alternative to IMEC—a project aimed at preserving Turkey’s geoeconomic position, balancing against Iranian influence, and deepening ties with Gulf Arab partners. This major logistics project, by connecting Basra to Turkish territory, transforms Iraq into the cornerstone of Ankara’s east–west connectivity vision, while complementing the central corridor passing through Central Asia and Turkey. The Grand Faw Port, as a regional logistics hub, stands at the center of this project, covering a corridor of approximately 1,200 kilometers from southern Iraq to the Turkish border. Simultaneously, Ankara is upgrading its domestic infrastructure and border crossings, including Habur–Fishkhabur and Ovaköy, to better align with EU customs zones. Regionally, this initiative is part of Turkey’s broader strategy to create interconnected networks and temporary economic alliances along the Turkey–Iraq–UAE–Qatar axis. Given domestic financial constraints, Turkey relies on Gulf state investments, particularly from the UAE and Qatar, to share costs, reduce political risks, and secure regional support. Beyond financing Iraq’s infrastructure, this support lends political legitimacy to the project and integrates Baghdad into broader regional economic frameworks—while enabling Ankara to compete with Iran’s east–west corridors that bypass Turkey.

    Turkey-Iraq Energy Agreement:
    By placing Iraq at the center of its regional connectivity strategy, Ankara has extended the same logic to the energy sector—a domain where pipelines and transit routes are not merely economic assets but effective instruments of geopolitical influence. Iraq’s vast oil and gas reserves, if integrated into regional infrastructure, play a key role in Turkey’s vision of becoming an energy hub—a goal that leads to increased regional influence, supply route diversification, and enhanced Turkey’s position in European energy security. In this regard, Turkey seeks to strengthen and synergize its existing network, including the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, TurkStream, and Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipelines, to connect West Asian and Caspian resources to European markets while reducing dependence on Russia and Iran. Within this framework, resuming oil flows through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline has become a primary priority for Ankara. The pipeline was halted in March 2023 following an international arbitration ruling in favor of Iraq, imposing a $1.5 billion fine on Turkey for unauthorized oil exports from the Kurdistan Region between 2014 and 2018. In response, Ankara terminated the 50-year pipeline agreement in July 2025 and announced its readiness to negotiate a new framework—one that would recognize Baghdad’s sovereignty over oil exports, establish a clear revenue-sharing mechanism, and ensure supply stability. In September 2025, Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government reached an agreement to begin oil exports through this pipeline—a pilot move to restore oil flows toward Turkey. Although Ankara still contests the arbitration ruling, it has signaled willingness to restore oil flows under redesigned arrangements that integrate the pipeline into a broader regional infrastructure vision. Continuing this process, Turkey has submitted a comprehensive draft of a new agreement to Baghdad to expand bilateral energy cooperation. This proposal extends beyond oil to include natural gas, petrochemicals, and electricity—reflecting the expanded scope of Ankara’s energy diplomacy. Crucially, the plan is designed to align energy transit infrastructure with regional connectivity corridors, complementing the “Development Road” project. Turkey’s energy minister has emphasized that the program also envisions extending the pipeline to southern Iraq’s oil fields—a move that would increase export capacity and establish a direct link between southern Iraq and Turkish ports. From Ankara’s perspective, this strategy not only diversifies Iraq’s export routes but also embeds the country more deeply into Turkey-centric regional energy networks—thereby strengthening Turkey’s ambition to become a regional energy hub and enhancing its geoeconomic influence during a period of widespread regional instability from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea.

    Scenarios for the Turkey-Iraq Energy Agreement:
    Several potential scenarios may emerge as a result of Turkey’s decision:
    Scenario 1: Successful Negotiation of a New Agreement
    In this scenario, Ankara and Baghdad will successfully sign a new, comprehensive, and extensive oil agreement. Supporting factors include the Iraqi parliament’s readiness to vote on a draft law regulating the renewable energy sector and encouraging local and international investment. Washington’s support further reinforces these prospects, with U.S. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce confirming U.S. backing for the understanding among Baghdad, Erbil, and Turkey.
    Scenario 2: Continuation of the Status Quo
    In this scenario, oil relations between Iraq and Turkey will remain largely unchanged. The full-capacity restart of the oil pipeline remains out of reach, particularly as estimates indicate Iraq currently lacks the capacity to export 1.5 million barrels per day to Turkey.
    Scenario 3: Failure of New Agreement Negotiations
    Various technical and diplomatic challenges between Ankara and Baghdad could hinder finalizing a new agreement. Critics argue that a new deal might restrict oil exports through the State Organization for Marketing of Oil, potentially undermining the Kurdistan Region’s autonomy.
    Scenario 4: Revised Extension of the Original Agreement
    Many analysts consider this scenario more likely, whereby both countries extend their original oil agreement but with enhanced cooperation, coordination, and increased export quotas. Turkey’s Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has affirmed Turkey’s willingness to extend the 1973 agreement with legal amendments and expanded activities. Kemal Etrushi, advisor to the Kurdistan Region’s Prime Minister, has also suggested the likelihood of an extension, provided that maintenance and transit costs are economically viable for all parties.

  • US Aircraft Flights Around Iran; A Sign of Distrust in the MoU or Preparation for Resuming War?

    US Aircraft Flights Around Iran; A Sign of Distrust in the MoU or Preparation for Resuming War?

    The simultaneous presence of aircraft such as the MQ-4C Triton, KC-46A Pegasus, KC-135R Stratotanker, C-5M Super Galaxy, and C-130 around Iran is not considered merely a routine flight pattern. The MQ-4C Triton drone, designed for intelligence, surveillance, and maritime reconnaissance missions, operates within the framework of monitoring coastal movements, military bases, defense lines, and air defense systems . Given this level of activity, it appears that preparations for naval and amphibious operations aimed at occupying certain areas and islands in southern Iran are underway. The repetition of such flights near the region’s sensitive waterways indicates that, despite entering the path of understanding, the US is still preparing for the possibility of the political process failing or tensions quickly resuming.

    On the other hand, the Lebanon file has become one of the main points of contention in this understanding. Iran emphasizes that the continued occupation of southern Lebanon and Israeli attacks on the country constitute a violation of the spirit and framework of the understanding. In contrast, Israeli officials have stressed the continuation of their presence in the occupied areas of southern Lebanon, and no sign of withdrawal is visible. This gap effectively represents one of the most significant threats to the durability of the agreement; because if Israeli attacks continue, Tehran will view it as a sign of the understanding’s invalidity and Washington’s inability to restrain its ally.

    In such circumstances, US behavior appears dual: on the one hand, at the diplomatic level, Washington is advancing the understanding with Tehran, but on the other hand, at the military and intelligence level, it has not reduced its presence around Iran. This situation could carry the message that the US is trying both to benefit from the advantages of the agreement and, in the event of its collapse, to maintain its informational and operational upper hand . In other words, the recent flights can be seen as part of a policy of negotiation accompanied by field pressure .

    Recent developments show that the US-Iran understanding has not yet entered a stabilization phase and, rather than being a lasting agreement, is more of a temporary pause on the path of confrontation. The continuation of Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon, daily attacks on that country, and simultaneously, the increase or continuation of US reconnaissance flights around Iran have formed a set of risk factors that could at any moment divert the agreement process from the diplomatic path. From this perspective, the failure of the understanding is not only not unexpected but, if provocative Israeli behavior continues and the US maintains its heavy military posture in the region, it will become a highly probable scenario .

  • Digital Infrastructure Diplomacy in West Asia

    Digital Infrastructure Diplomacy in West Asia

    Saudi Arabia is considering replacing the Zionist regime route with a Syrian route for the fiber optic cable connecting the kingdom to Greece via the Mediterranean Sea—a decision that goes beyond a mere technical or economic choice, reflecting a shift in the region’s geopolitical alignments. Riyadh’s insistence on routing the cable through Syria indicates its intention to bolster Damascus’s regional standing while simultaneously politically distancing itself from Israel in the wake of the Gaza war developments.

    Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has adopted a tough stance against Israel, which has provided the political groundwork for this shift. At the same time, the growing disagreements between Riyadh and the UAE over issues such as Yemen, Sudan, and Red Sea security have added a new competitive dimension to this decision.

    The selection of Syria could contribute to the country’s economic reintegration into the region and enhance its geo-economic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, while Israel’s exclusion from this potential corridor would weaken its standing in the race to become an energy and data hub. On the other hand, Greece—particularly Athens—is striving to position itself as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East in the fields of energy, real estate, and artificial intelligence, and this project could strengthen its role in the new regional connectivity architecture. Overall, this plan symbolizes the transition from traditional energy geopolitics to data geopolitics and digital infrastructure, and could influence the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arab world.

    Background
    Within the framework of the broader “East-to-Mediterranean Data Corridor” strategy, a joint fiber optic cable project between Saudi Arabia and Greece has been designed. The project is being pursued with the participation of major companies, including STC, PPC, OTA, and TTSA. The aim of this initiative is to establish a high-capacity data transmission route between the Persian Gulf and Europe via the Mediterranean, providing complementary digital infrastructure for energy and technology cooperation between the two regions.

    The key development in this project is Riyadh’s shift from the proposed route through Israel to the alternative option via Syria. This change is not merely technical or economic, but rather a reflection of the geopolitical realignment in Saudi Arabia’s peripheral environment. In recent years, growing rifts have emerged between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over issues such as Yemen, Sudan, and Red Sea security.

    From a Saudi perspective, the increasing convergence between the regime and the UAE could shift the regional influence balance against Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the selection of a new route for the fiber optic cable is seen as part of a strategy to reduce dependence on the Israel–UAE axis. This decision also carries multi-layered implications for Greece. Athens has established close strategic ties with Israel in recent years and has pursued extensive cooperation in energy and Eastern Mediterranean security. However, Greece is simultaneously seeking to position itself as a hub connecting Europe and West Asia in the fields of energy, real estate, logistics, and artificial intelligence. Thus, whether Athens accepts or rejects Riyadh’s proposed new route could affect the balance of its relations with the Zionist regime and place Greece in a geopolitical dilemma. From a technical perspective, fiber optic cables—transmitting data in milliseconds via optical pulses—form the backbone of the global digital economy. With the expansion of artificial intelligence and the growing need for big data processing, Gulf countries are making substantial investments in data centers and communication infrastructure to transform themselves, beyond their traditional role as oil and gas exporters, into key players in Europe’s data and digital services market.

    Overall, the rerouting of the cable is not merely an infrastructure decision but part of the geo-economic and geopolitical competition in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. This development could affect coalition formations, digital connectivity routes, and even regional security equations, serving as an indicator of a new phase in Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with the UAE–Israel axis over strategic data infrastructure.

    Analysis and Findings:

    • Strategic Shift: Saudi Arabia’s efforts to include Syria in major infrastructure projects—particularly in telecommunications and data connectivity—are part of Riyadh’s broader strategy to reshape the regional order. By leveraging its financial capacity and foreign investment, Saudi Arabia aims to turn Damascus into a hub for road, rail, and digital transit between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. This approach pursues two simultaneous goals: strengthening potential allies and rebuilding Syria’s geopolitical position, while creating a balance against the growing influence of the UAE and the Zionist regime around the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, the announcement by Saudi Arabia’s Investment Council of approximately $800 million in telecommunications infrastructure investment in Syria carries an important geopolitical message. According to Saudi Arabia’s official news agency, the project involves establishing a fiber optic network spanning over 4,500 kilometers aimed at “regional and international connectivity for Syria.” Such a project is not merely an economic endeavor but a redefinition of Syria’s role as a connectivity node in the new regional connectivity architecture. Trend analysis shows that from Riyadh’s perspective, Damascus lies at the heart of a “connectivity-oriented” strategy—roads, rail lines, and fiber optic cables must pass through Syrian territory to solidify the link between the Persian Gulf and Europe. This perspective transforms Syria from a security dossier into a geo-economic asset. In other words, Riyadh is seeking to revive Syria’s role in the regional value chain by investing in both hard infrastructure (roads, rail, cables) and soft infrastructure (data networks). From a regional competition perspective, the inclusion of Syria in these projects comes at the expense of excluding or downplaying the Zionist regime’s role in data connectivity routes. This signifies a tangible shift in Saudi Arabia’s strategic calculations. In 2022, discussions on normalizing relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv were at their peak, but subsequent regional developments—particularly escalating geopolitical rivalries and shifting coalition alignments—have moderated this approach. Today, Saudi Arabia’s priority is not symbolic convergence with Israel but consolidating its independent position in the regional connectivity architecture.
    • Widening Saudi–UAE Rift: According to narratives close to decision-making circles in Riyadh, including statements by Al-Tuwaijri, the rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is not a transient disagreement but the result of accumulated strategic grievances across several regional files. From a Saudi perspective, Abu Dhabi—through its financial power and proxy networks—has sought to become a small state with outsized influence in its immediate environment, which has conflicted with Riyadh’s geopolitical interests. In the Yemen file, the Saudi narrative holds that the UAE’s presence within the Arab coalition began with Riyadh’s invitation, but Abu Dhabi gradually deviated from declared objectives and supported separatist movements in the south. This perception is echoed in Sudan, where documented UAE military support for the Rapid Support Forces is seen as an effort to deepen internal divisions and consolidate Abu Dhabi’s influence. Likewise, in Somaliland, UAE support for quasi-state structures in northern Somalia is viewed by Saudi Arabia as another indication of a policy of environmental influence independent of Arab coordination. In Tunisia, concrete instances include the provision of armored equipment to opposition movements to undermine democratic processes. This narrative, within the Saudi framework, portrays the UAE as an interventionist actor in the internal affairs of Arab countries—an approach Riyadh considers contrary to the principles of Arab solidarity. In terms of identity and relative power, this narrative depicts the UAE as a smaller actor geographically, demographically, and economically that has at times sought to punch above its weight. This perspective is linked to recent economic developments in Saudi Arabia, where major economic transformation programs have led to a gradual shift of capital and international companies from Dubai and Abu Dhabi to Riyadh. In this context, economic competition is said to have fueled geopolitical rivalry and heightened mutual sensitivities. Regarding the relationship between the two leaders, recalling Mohammed bin Zayed’s role in bolstering Mohammed bin Salman’s standing in Washington prior to his crown prince status points to a period of strategic convergence. However, according to this narrative, divergence intensified when Mohammed bin Zayed found the rapid growth of Saudi economic power and capital concentration unacceptable. From Al-Tuwaijri’s viewpoint, this shift in the economic balance became a psychological-political factor in intensifying personal and strategic rivalry between the two leaders.
    • The Role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Saudi Arabia’s New Architecture: Saudi Arabia is redefining its regional orientation—a shift that not only involves distancing from Abu Dhabi but also includes strengthening ties with Turkey and maintaining the détente process with Iran. This realignment should be analyzed within Riyadh’s broader efforts to consolidate its independent position in regional security equations and avoid becoming entangled in costly scenarios of direct confrontation with Tehran. On the international level, speculation about the possibility of renewed U.S. military action against Iran under the Trump administration has heightened uncertainty. The deployment of U.S. naval and military capabilities in the region sends a clear deterrent message; however, reports simultaneously indicate that at least nine Arab leaders have contacted Washington to allow more time for ongoing negotiations in Muscat. This diplomatic movement suggests that a significant portion of the Arab world views a full-scale war scenario as a threat to regional stability and its economic interests. In this framework, Al-Tuwaijri’s narrative emphasizes that Iran is a different actor than examples like Venezuela and, if faced with an existential threat, would employ extensive and potentially destructive deterrence tools. From this analytical perspective, Iran’s capacity to target U.S. bases in the region, disrupt Persian Gulf energy security, and even block the Strait of Hormuz is assessed as Tehran’s “strategic cards.” Such a scenario could have far-reaching economic and security consequences for the Gulf Arab states. The findings indicate that Saudi Arabia’s pivot toward Turkey and the continuation of détente with Iran are part of an active balancing strategy against three simultaneous variables: competition with the UAE, U.S. pressure for full alignment against Iran, and the risk of widespread instability in the event of military conflict. Riyadh seeks to avoid being drawn into a comprehensive confrontation that could target the region’s energy infrastructure and economy by diversifying its regional partners and maintaining diplomatic channels. This approach reflects Saudi Arabia’s move from rigid alliances toward a more flexible, multi-balancing foreign policy.
  • GCC in Turmoil Over the Strait of Hormuz

    GCC in Turmoil Over the Strait of Hormuz

    During the war imposed by the U.S. and the Zionist regime against Iran, the GCC countries as a unified bloc demonstrated a common official stance on certain issues, such as condemning Iranian attacks on their countries, expressing concern over economic damage to oil, trade, and tourism, fearing becoming secondary targets, and welcoming ceasefires. In an emergency meeting of foreign ministers on March 1, 2026, and in subsequent statements, Council members described Iran’s attacks as a “clear violation of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the principles of good neighborliness.” They reserved their right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter and declared they would take “all necessary measures” to protect their security, citizens, and territory. However, the forty-day war gradually deepened the internal organizational and structural divisions among the six GCC states — divisions that had been shaped in recent years, particularly after the 2017 Qatar crisis and the emergence of geopolitical rivalry (2025) between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, especially in Yemen. The main axes of the recent GCC rift can be divided into three spectra based on the type and level of each country’s relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States, and the Zionist regime. Within this framework, the six Arab states of the Gulf have adopted three different approaches and strategies. This raises the key question: how can the three strategies adopted by the six GCC member states toward the Ramadan War lead to the deepening or even the breakup of this regional organization?

    Theoretical Framework: Balance of Threat

    In classical realist theory, states are assumed to seek maximum security and to balance against threatening powers. However, the Balance of Threat theory revises this model. According to Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory, states react not merely to “power” but to “perceived threat.” This theoretical framework explains why GCC members, in response to the forty-day war, moved toward divergences and differences in reactions and strategies. The core point of Walt’s theory is that, contrary to popular belief, states do not balance solely in response to increases in others’ power; rather, it is the level of perceived threat that drives states toward balancing. By distinguishing between power and threat, Walt introduces four components as threat factors: 1) aggregate capabilities (population, economic and military power, etc.); 2) geographic proximity (a direct relationship exists between threat perception and proximity); 3) offensive capabilities (the greater a country’s offensive capabilities, the greater the security concerns it raises); and 4) aggressive intentions (states with aggressive intentions pose greater threats than status quo powers). According to Balance of Threat theory, what encourages states to engage in balancing is their perception of one another as threats, not merely the degree of their power. For example, the increase in Iran’s military power is tangible for Oman, but unlike the UAE or Saudi Arabia, Oman has not taken balancing measures because it does not perceive Iran as a threat. In fact, each actor within the GCC has a specific perception of the Iranian threat. Some see Iran as an existential, long-term, and broad threat and call for balancing or strengthening defensive capacities, while others view Iran as a more limited threat and lean toward diplomacy and mediation. The result of these differences is a duality of threat perception and the intensification of internal rifts within the Council.

    Key Findings and Analysis

    Part One: The Ramadan War and the Three Strategies of GCC States

    A. War Containment Strategy: Oman and Qatar

    Qatar and Oman, while condemning attacks against Iran as well as Iranian attacks on Arab countries, consider war escalation dangerous and place primary blame on the war’s instigators — the Zionist regime and the United States. Qatari and Omani officials have argued that Tel Aviv’s strategy is to draw Arab countries into direct confrontation with Iran to wear down both sides and ultimately shift the balance of power in its favor. In essence, Qatar and Oman fall into the category of mediating actors who criticize the continuation of war and escalation of tensions. Among them, Oman holds a more critical view of U.S. and Israeli policies toward Iran. Omani media and officials blamed Washington and Tel Aviv for starting the war without consulting regional countries and criticized the influence of the Zionist regime and regional parties unwilling to censure the United States. Throughout the war and afterward, Muscat has emphasized a policy of diplomacy and maintaining good relations with Tehran. Until Iran’s naval blockade, Oman was even introduced as Tehran’s potential partner in monitoring the Strait of Hormuz. However, while Qatar falls within this spectrum, it has adopted a more contradictory and paradoxical policy compared to Oman. On one hand, it allowed the U.S. to conduct operations from its soil; on the other, it maintained historical ties with Iran, avoided directly condemning the U.S. and Israel, and pursued mediation between Iran and the U.S. In this context, it described the ceasefire as an initial step toward de-escalation and called for immediate dialogue between the two sides.

    B. War Escalation Strategy: United Arab Emirates and Bahrain

    Among the six GCC states, the UAE adopted the harshest stance during the forty-day war and also suffered the most attacks. The UAE closed its embassy in Tehran and emphasized strengthening ties with the U.S. and Israel. Abu Dhabi concluded during the war that past efforts to re-engage with Tehran were insignificant and that there was no value in moving away from the Abraham Accords. The UAE also called for war escalation and declared its readiness to join military efforts to confront Tehran and end Iran’s ability to control and manage the Strait of Hormuz. Yousef Al-Otaiba, UAE ambassador to Washington, wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in the midst of the Ramadan War titled “The UAE Stands Up to Iran,” calling for a more decisive approach. He claimed, “Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been damaged and its allies weakened, but more must be done to completely eliminate its missile and drone threat,” arguing that the current war requires an end that eliminates Iran’s long-term threat. He also announced his country’s readiness to join an international initiative to reopen and secure the Strait of Hormuz. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to the UAE president, also stated, “We did not want the war, but we won it,” and called for long-term guarantees against Iran’s nuclear, missile, and regional allies. In recent years, the UAE has had its eyes on the three islands — Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa — and views weakening or defeating Iran in war as the best option to gain control of these strategic islands. Therefore, it sought to draw the U.S. into a war in the southern Persian Gulf to occupy the three islands. The UAE had previously conducted extensive military exercises to seize similar points. A ceasefire and the end of the war would thus thwart its ambitions to control these islands. In this regard, the UAE’s Mirage fighter jet attack on Lavan Island, carried out hours after the ceasefire announcement, can be seen as an attempt to sabotage the de-escalation and ceasefire process.

    Alignment of Bahrain

    On the other hand, Bahrain, which joined the Abraham Accords alongside the UAE in 2020, pursued a policy fully aligned with the UAE during the war. Bahrain, which hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet, called Iran’s attacks on its territory “treason” and pursued a Chapter VII Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force, which was vetoed by Russia and China. In effect, Bahrain and the UAE pursued a strategy of crisis escalation and weakening Iran during the forty-day war.

    C. War Insulation Strategy: Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

    Saudi Arabia and Kuwait adopted a risk coverage and insulation strategy during the forty-day war. They avoided open alignment but facilitated U.S. military operations behind the scenes. Saudi Arabia, which had improved its ties with Tehran after the Beijing agreement, followed a dual approach but one leaning closer to the UAE. Nevertheless, Riyadh adopted a more balanced approach compared to Abu Dhabi. Although Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. forces to use its bases, it refrained from directly responding to Iran. Saudi officials condemned Iranian attacks on Riyadh and eastern Saudi Arabia, expelled some Iranian diplomats, and issued limited diplomatic warnings, but unlike the UAE, did not call for continuing or escalating the war, nor did they promise to join the U.S. and Israeli campaign. In fact, Riyadh pursued a regional diplomacy approach, maintaining dialogue with Iran to prevent escalation, and implicitly supported Pakistan’s mediation efforts to reduce tensions.

    Kuwait Following Saudi Arabia

    Kuwait also followed a policy aligned with Saudi Arabia, adopting a strategy of compliance and accompaniment with the U.S. Although Kuwait, like the other five GCC members, denies that the U.S. launched military operations from its soil or airspace on February 28, according to France 24, after Iran’s attacks, Kuwait allowed the U.S. to use its facilities for missile strikes. As a result, after the UAE, Kuwait suffered the heaviest blows from Iranian attacks during the conflict among Gulf states. Hence, to insulate itself and manage risk, Kuwait sought to reduce the intensity of the war. In this regard, Kuwait’s crown prince, in a phone call with Pakistan’s prime minister, supported Islamabad’s mediation efforts between Iran and the U.S. to stop the war.

    Part Two: Impact of the Three Strategies on the GCC’s Internal Rift

    Disagreements among the six states over relations with the Zionist regime, level of cooperation with the U.S., and how to deal with Iran have made solidarity and unity nearly impossible. On one hand, Oman and Qatar insist on engagement and mediation, viewing Iran as a neighbor manageable through diplomacy. On the other hand, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and to some extent Kuwait, regard Iran as a threat to their national security and interests. Therefore, it appears that in the medium term, further rifts may emerge among GCC countries as a single bloc, including between the UAE and Oman.

    Divergent Stances of Kuwaiti and Omani Celebrities

    The worldviews of GCC states regarding the war have also differed. Mishari Al-Afasi, a Kuwaiti reciter, produced an anti-Iranian work titled “Tabbat Yada Iran wa Man Ma’aha” (Perish the hands of Iran and those with them), attempting to shape public opinion in GCC states against Iran. However, the video’s release was met with widespread backlash from Arab social media users, who responded with similar language, writing, “Perish the hands of Israel, America, and those with them.” On the other hand, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Khalili, the Grand Mufti of Oman, expressed support for the Resistance Axis led by Iran in its all-out battle against American-Zionist aggressors. Meanwhile, on Eid al-Fitr, the people of Sur in southeastern Oman gathered in a public rally, reciting poetry to express their support and solidarity with the Iranian nation and fighters in their battle against the U.S. and the Zionist regime.

    Emirati and Saudi Criticism of U.S. Policy

    While some GCC states have asked the U.S. to find an exit from the war, others have advised intensifying strikes to overthrow the Iranian government. These contradictory preferences among Council members indicate a process of fragmentation. There is also sharp disagreement among Gulf Arab elites regarding the future of U.S. bases in the region and hosting them. Some argue that these bases, rather than guaranteeing GCC security and stability, have become a source of instability. Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, a UAE university professor and former advisor to the UAE president, said, “The UAE no longer needs America to defend itself… What the UAE needs is merely to obtain the best and newest weapons that America has. So, it is time to think about closing U.S. bases, because they are a liability, not a strategic asset.” In contrast, Mamdouh Al-Muhaini, director of Saudi Arabia’s Al-Arabiya and Al-Hadath networks, wrote in an article in Asharq Al-Awsat titled “Destroying Relations Between Gulf Countries and America”: “Relations with America are important and strategic, and this relationship must extend not only to military and political dimensions but also to all economic and cultural aspects.”

    Joining External Alliances

    After the start of the Ramadan War, some GCC states have taken steps to join alliances outside the GCC framework. Saudi Arabia and Qatar seek to join an Islamic bloc comprising Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt. Although the Saudi kingdom will continue to seek U.S. support, it is also trying to complement this dependence by deepening regional ties with Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, as well as increasing reliance on China. Shortly after the war began, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey held an emergency meeting of foreign ministers of Islamic countries. If this axis’s cooperation deepens, it could create strategic weight beyond the GCC and the U.S. security umbrella for Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

    The Zionist Tinge of Abu Dhabi and Manama

    The UAE and possibly Bahrain may officially join Netanyahu’s envisioned “Hexagon” axis or the “Abraham Bloc” in the future. In any case, the Zionist regime and the level of ties with it have been a source of division within the GCC. Although the UAE and Bahrain have maintained their relations, other GCC members view the Zionist regime’s hegemonic ambitions with serious concern. This conflict of interests and clash of perspectives makes strategic convergence and unity among the six countries nearly impossible.

    Strategic Conclusions and Recommendations

    While GCC states quickly aligned at the start of the Ramadan War under a common crisis, the sustained pressure and cost of war have driven them toward divergent paths. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait have moved toward a policy of “hard containment,” while Qatar and Oman continue to insist on “engagement and mediation.” This rift directly serves Iran’s interest in creating division. Another major consequence of the war for GCC states is the absolute discrediting of the U.S. security umbrella. U.S. bases, long seen as sources of deterrence and protection, have now become a liability, turning Arab countries into direct targets. Donald Trump’s erratic and unpredictable behavior reinforces the feeling that Washington is no longer reliable. Therefore, it is plausible that the leaders of these countries, after witnessing America’s inability to prevent the destruction of critical infrastructure, may seek new partners such as Russia and China. They may also turn to countries like Ukraine, Turkey, Canada, and South Korea to bolster their defense capabilities, including in the drone sector. It is worth noting that this search for new allies to reduce absolute dependence on the U.S. aligns with Iran’s national interests and security. Finally, it must be noted that GCC unity has always been reactive and has rarely translated into long-term strategy. Although the GCC is not currently disintegrating or collapsing, it is revealing the limits of the organization’s cohesion and solidarity as a strategic concept.

    Regarding strategic recommendations for deepening the rift and preventing GCC cohesion, Iran can take the following steps: expanding political, economic, and military ties with Oman and improving relations with Qatar; preventing convergence and attempting to sow discord between the UAE and Saudi Arabia through social media; and threatening GCC countries over granting military bases to the U.S. or the Zionist regime.

  • The Confrontational Geometry of the Zionists with the Resistance

    The Confrontational Geometry of the Zionists with the Resistance

    Strategic Reconfiguration
    Despite enduring severe military pressure after the Gaza war, the “Axis of Resistance” not only did not collapse but entered a phase of strategic reconfiguration. The weakening of certain field capabilities—particularly in Hezbollah and the Syrian front—has been offset by strengthening the networked model. By intelligently distributing capacity among actors such as Hashd al-Shaabi and Ansarallah, the costs of confrontation decreased and operational flexibility increased. The use of informal economic and logistical mechanisms also helped maintain operational continuity. Within this framework, the deeper integration of Hamas into the Axis structure led to enhanced cohesion and field synergy. The outcome of these developments has been the formation of an axis that, despite external pressures, evolved from a centralized structure into a multi-layered, recoverable resistance network capable of preserving its strategic initiative.

    Multi-Front Confrontation and Controlled Escalation
    During the Ramadan War, the Axis of Resistance implemented a strategy of “layered pressure” against the Zionist regime and its allies by simultaneously activating the Lebanese, Iraqi, and Yemeni fronts, although the level of coordination among actors was not fully unified. Hezbollah created direct military pressure by firing hundreds of rockets, missiles, and drones and expanding hostilities along the northern borders. Concurrently, Iraqi resistance groups carried out dozens of drone and rocket attacks on American and Zionist-linked targets, drawing the conflict deeper into Iraq, while Ansarallah activated the strategic-economic dimension of the war through missile strikes on southern occupied territories and disrupting shipping in the Red Sea. In response, the regime, relying on air superiority, conducted hundreds of precision strikes on the infrastructure of these actors, attempting to curb their operational capacity. However, both sides’ behavior demonstrated that the conflict remained within a framework of “controlled escalation”: despite the intensity of the attacks, neither moved toward all-out regional war, keeping casualty levels and operational scope within limits that preserved deterrence while preventing a slide into a full-scale conflict.

    The Future of the Axis of Resistance
    In the post-war period, the trajectory of the Axis of Resistance can be formulated within three main scenarios: In the optimistic scenario, the axis, by returning to its flexible, networked logic—rather than relying on vulnerable centralized structures—reconstructs multi-layered deterrence through deepening military, economic, and logistical ties in Iraq, Yemen, and other peripheral arenas, consolidating its position by leveraging the ongoing transition of the international system. In the intermediate scenario, the axis remains within a “crisis management” framework: a certain level of operational cooperation is maintained, but internal limitations of the actors (in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen) and regional divisions prevent full strategic cohesion, with the axis operating in a semi-coordinated, reactive mode. In the pessimistic scenario, however, the process of erosion and external pressure leads to divergence, with each group acting based on its own local capacities and the axis’s operational cohesion diminishing. As a result, collective deterrence weakens, and coordinated responses in future crises will no longer be guaranteed.

  • Iran’s Retaliatory Strikes Against U.S. Bases in the Region, June 11

    Iran’s Retaliatory Strikes Against U.S. Bases in the Region, June 11

    The operation involved at least 12 solid-fuel missiles from the Fateh and Kheibar Shekan families, along with dozens of suicide drones. Targets included the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters, an early warning radar site, and Shaikh Issa Air Base in Bahrain; Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan; and Ali Al Salem and Ahmad Al Jaber air bases in Kuwait .

    According to released documentation, the AR-327 early warning radar at Jabal al-Dukhan in Bahrain was precisely struck by an Iranian drone. Footage showing fire at the site confirms the destruction of the early warning radar .

    Furthermore, video and images released from the missile strikes on Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base show two large fires at the facility, indicating successful and precise hits on intended targets. Some media also reported that three Jordanian F-16 fighter jets were destroyed as a result of the Iranian attacks.

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  • Iran’s Retaliatory Strikes on US Bases in the Region, June 10

    Iran’s Retaliatory Strikes on US Bases in the Region, June 10

    The targets included the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, the Camp Buehring and Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, and the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan.

    Based on videos released of the attacks, Iranian missiles penetrated multiple defensive layers and successfully struck their targets in Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait.

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  • Kata’ib Imam Ali Begins the Process of Transferring Weapons to the Iraqi Government

    Kata’ib Imam Ali Begins the Process of Transferring Weapons to the Iraqi Government

    Emphasizing that the current responsibility requires that weapons be placed in the hands of the state, the resistance group announced the formation of committees to inventory and hand over its equipment under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

    This decision follows a meeting of the Shiite Coordination Framework attended by Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaydi, during which support was expressed for the plan to monopolize weapons in state hands and to sever the Popular Mobilization Forces’ ties with all political, party, and social frameworks.

    Kata’ib Imam Ali is the third armed Iraqi group, after Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Saraya al-Salam, to officially announce the implementation of the process of transferring weapons to the state.