Turkey’s Engagement with Regional Actors in Shaping Energy Corridors

In West Asia and North Africa, oil and its transmission routes have never been merely economic matters; they have always been defined in close connection with politics, national sovereignty, and survival calculations. Every decision in the energy sector carries profound geopolitical messages capable of altering the balance of power among regional actors. Within this framework, Ankara’s announcement to terminate the Kirkuk–Ceyhan oil pipeline agreement with Iraq by 2026 once again demonstrated that energy lies at the heart of Turkey’s security and strategic calculations. From the Erdogan government’s perspective, this decision is not merely a revision of a technical contract but part of a broader effort to redefine the future of energy, reduce costly dependencies, and consolidate Turkey’s role as a regional energy hub. Simultaneously, the cautious resumption of Iraqi oil exports through this pipeline after a long hiatus reflects both parties’ awareness of the geopolitical costs of obstructing energy arteries—an obstruction that, beyond inflicting heavy economic losses on Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, exposed the depth of legal and sovereignty disputes among Baghdad, Erbil, and Ankara. Meanwhile, developments in Syria and the prospect of a post-Assad order represent a key variable in Turkey’s energy and geopolitical calculations. From Ankara’s perspective, post-Assad Syria is not only a security issue but also a geopolitical opportunity to diversify and complete energy and transit corridors—corridors that could link Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean, and even European markets. In this context, the central question is how Turkey is attempting, through the simultaneous use of energy tools, transit corridors, and Syria’s geopolitical shifts, to redefine its position in West Asia’s transitional order. This situation raises a fundamental question: Will energy and its transit routes in the coming decade become a factor intensifying competition and divisions among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, or can they serve as a lever for cooperation, integration, and the definition of shared regional interests? The answer to this question will shape not only the future of Turkey’s relations with its neighbors but also the configuration of the region’s energy and geopolitical order.

Background

Among all foreign actors active in the Syrian crisis, Turkey has been the most steadfast supporter of opposition currents against the Damascus government, continuing this support despite heavy security, political, and economic costs. The consequences of this policy, particularly in the form of millions of Syrian refugees, have placed additional pressure on Turkey’s economy and social fabric, gradually becoming one of the most contentious domestic issues in the country. In past years, domestic critics of the Erdogan government repeatedly questioned this policy, calling for normalization of relations with Bashar al-Assad’s government and an end to support for opposition groups. From these factions’ perspective, the continuation of conflict neither guaranteed Turkey’s national security nor imposed long-term costs on Ankara. However, Assad’s fall transformed the equation, and the Erdogan government views this development as validation of its strategy. Ankara now believes its long-term investment in Syrian opposition groups has yielded effective leverage within Damascus’s new power structure. The groups and actors with which Turkey has established political, security, and field ties during the crisis years now find themselves in a position to play a significant role in Syria’s political future, thereby strengthening Turkey’s position as a decisive actor. Prior to Assad’s fall, Turkey’s policy in Syria was based on four core objectives:

• Facilitating the return of a portion of Syrian refugees
• Securing its southern borders
• Containing and rolling back the political and territorial gains of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces
• Securing concessions for its allied opposition groups in any negotiation process with Damascus.
  

With the collapse of Assad’s government, the last objective has effectively become obsolete. Under the new circumstances, Ankara is attempting to pursue the remaining three objectives through more indirect and complex paths. Influencing Damascus’s new leadership, establishing active communication with Syria’s Arab community and local tribes, while simultaneously maintaining military and security pressure on the Syrian Democratic Forces, are Turkey’s primary tools for shaping the post-fall order in Syria. However, this strategy’s scope is not limited to Syria alone. Turkey is simultaneously attempting to translate its growing influence in Syria into leverage for increasing geopolitical pressure on Iraq—particularly in areas sensitive to Ankara in terms of border security, energy, and the presence of actors aligned with the Axis of Resistance. In this framework, Turkey is using political, economic, and security tools to shift the balance of influence in Iraq in its favor and limit the role of actors close to the Axis of Resistance. Pressuring Baghdad on security matters, cross-border operations, and managing Kurdistan Region files are part of this multi-layered strategy to consolidate Turkey’s regional position. Overall, Turkey’s policy in the post-Assad era can be seen as a coordinated effort to translate field gains in Syria into sustainable geopolitical influence across West Asia’s northern axis—a strategy encompassing both Syria and Iraq, with the ultimate goal of redefining Turkey’s role against the Axis of Resistance and solidifying Ankara’s position as a decisive regional actor.

Analysis and Findings:

Ankara’s Strategy Toward Baghdad:
Iraq, which until recently was primarily viewed by Ankara as an unstable security belt on Turkey’s southern periphery, has now become one of the focal points of Turkey’s regional strategy. This shift in perspective has been shaped following the transformation of regional dynamics after the events of October 7—developments accompanied by the relative weakening of Iran’s influence across several fronts, increased economic and diplomatic weight of Arab Gulf states, and regional actors’ search for new stability models in West Asia. In this context, Turkey’s renewed engagement with Iraq is not limited to containing the PKK but reflects broader ambitions to redefine Ankara’s regional role. This new approach encompasses a combination of security cooperation with Baghdad and Erbil, advancing a fragile internal peace process in Turkey, and a targeted effort to integrate Iraq into trade, transit, and energy networks between Turkey and the Gulf states. At the heart of this strategy lies geoeconomic logic. Ankara seeks to consolidate its position as a regional trade and energy connectivity hub by investing in shared infrastructure and creating sustainable interdependencies. Projects such as oil pipelines, medium-term gas export plans, and electricity grid development are key tools for Turkey to link Iraq to the region’s emerging energy architecture. The implications of this approach extend beyond Iraq as well. For Europe, redefining connectivity routes and access to energy resources, alongside strengthening stability in the continent’s southeastern neighborhood, holds strategic importance—and developments in Iraq, within this framework, are part of Europe’s larger energy security equation.

Turkey’s policy shift toward Baghdad has occurred concurrently with a series of profound regional transformations, from the Gaza war and escalating Iran-Israel tensions to the fall of the Assad regime, which are collectively rearranging the balance of power in West Asia. These developments have heightened Ankara’s concerns about the spillover of insecurity and the expansion of crisis into its periphery. In such an atmosphere, Turkey feels an urgent need for cooperation with Baghdad to contain PKK threats and recalibrate relations with Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces—particularly given fears that Iraq might become the next arena for indirect confrontation between Iran and Israel. This concern has turned Ankara’s more active engagement with Baghdad into a security and political necessity. At the same time, this renewed engagement is meaningful within the broader context of Turkey’s rapprochement with Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Ankara seeks to position Iraq within a network of emerging regional frameworks that pursue trade, connectivity, and stability simultaneously. Overall, this new alignment strengthens Turkey’s strategic influence in Iraq while reducing Iran’s weight and centrality in shaping Baghdad’s regional dependencies. Thus, from Ankara’s perspective, Iraq is not only a security issue but a geopolitical and geoeconomic opportunity for redefining the regional order in West Asia.

Turkey’s Strategies in Iraq in Confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran:
Strategic estrangement between Turkey and the United States effectively began in March 2003, when Ankara opposed opening a northern front for U.S. forces during the invasion of Iraq. This decision marked a turning point in bilateral relations and laid the groundwork for a series of mutual tensions and mistrust that deepened over the years. In the months following Iraq’s occupation, field incidents further intensified this rift. The detention of a truck belonging to Turkish special forces in April 2003 and the arrest of Turkish military personnel in July of that year in Sulaymaniyah—an event known as the “Hood Incident”—dealt a serious blow to mutual trust and hardened Ankara’s security outlook toward developments in Iraq. The PKK’s return to armed activities in 2004 further exacerbated Turkey’s threat perception. Simultaneously, widespread opposition from Iraqi Shiite Arabs and Kurds to any Turkish military role—rooted in concerns over the revival of Ottoman ambitions—marginalized Ankara from effective participation in post-war reconstruction and Iraq’s political transition. In this tense atmosphere, Iran’s growing influence in Iraq after 2003 further strengthened Turkey’s security-driven perspective. The expansion of Popular Mobilization Forces into disputed areas such as Tal Afar and Sinjar during the fight against ISIS brought Iran’s influence closer to Turkey’s borders, overlapping with PKK presence and bases—a situation Ankara perceived as a “dual security threat.” In response to this linkage between the PKK, Shiite militias, and Iran, Turkey gradually shifted since 2016 toward a strategy based on unilateral military actions. This strategy included cross-border operations, establishing operational bases in northern Iraq, and deepening security and political cooperation with the Kurdistan Regional Government. However, in recent years, Ankara has sought to recalibrate its approach, redefining its military activities within the framework of “joint security arrangements” with Baghdad rather than unilateral authorities. The stated goal of this shift is to reduce political estrangement in Iraq and gain greater legitimacy for Turkey’s military presence, while addressing Baghdad’s sovereignty sensitivities. Despite this rhetorical shift, Turkey’s cross-border operations and the legal status of its bases in Iraq remain contentious, complicating bilateral relations. Nevertheless, efforts to establish shared institutional frameworks indicate both sides’ willingness to manage disputes through formal cooperation. In this regard, in 2024 Turkey and Iraq agreed to establish a joint security coordination center in Baghdad and transform the controversial Bashiqa base into a center for joint training and cooperation under Iraqi command. Turkish officials describe this move not as a retreat but as a strategic shift toward a “shared security” model—one that, while maintaining Ankara’s operational presence, grants greater formal authority to the Iraqi government.
Over the past years, Ankara has continuously sought to reduce its strategic estrangement from Baghdad. The turning point in this process dates back to the Kurdistan Region’s independence referendum in September 2017, when Turkey aligned with Iraq’s central government against Kurdish separatism, supported Baghdad’s recapture of Kirkuk, and thereby opened the path to gradual engagement with Iraq’s federal structure. This process accelerated with the shift of U.S. forces from combat to advisory roles from 2021 onward—a change shaped under internal Iraqi pressure for U.S. withdrawal following the assassinations of General Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. From Ankara’s perspective, this situation simultaneously contained a threat and an opportunity: the threat of a potential vacuum being filled by Iran, and the opportunity to institutionalize security, economic, and political cooperation with Baghdad before that could occur. Recent geopolitical developments, including the fall of Assad’s regime, the weakening of Iran’s regional position, and mounting pressure on the Axis of Resistance, have created new room for maneuver for Turkey. Ankara views these developments as an opportunity to expand its influence through institutional mechanisms and emerging regional alignments. In this framework, Turkey seeks to integrate Iraq into its broader strategy by linking security cooperation to infrastructure development and positioning Baghdad within regional energy, trade, and stability equations—a strategy aimed at establishing a new balance against Tehran. One tool of this policy is the multilateral security framework involving Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, launched in 2025 to manage the ISIS threat. At the Amman summit in March 2025, Turkey, Syria, and Jordan agreed to establish a joint operations center for counterterrorism coordination and managing ISIS-linked camps and prisons. Ankara views this framework as a tool to limit the role of the Syrian Democratic Forces—which it considers the Syrian branch of the PKK—and hopes that by transferring management of camps such as Al-Hol and Roj to Syria’s new government, the logistical links between the PKK and these forces, particularly along the strategic Sinjar corridor, will be severed. The Sinjar corridor, once part of Iran’s ground bridge connecting its allied networks in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, retains its geopolitical significance.

Turkey’s Strategic Objectives in Establishing Economic Agreements with Iraq:
Turkey’s new approach toward Iraq is not solely a product of geopolitical competition with Iran but also a direct reaction to Ankara’s marginalization in the U.S.-led India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) initiative. In response, Turkey is promoting the Iraq-based “Development Road” project as a strategic alternative to IMEC—a project aimed at preserving Turkey’s geoeconomic position, balancing against Iranian influence, and deepening ties with Gulf Arab partners. This major logistics project, by connecting Basra to Turkish territory, transforms Iraq into the cornerstone of Ankara’s east–west connectivity vision, while complementing the central corridor passing through Central Asia and Turkey. The Grand Faw Port, as a regional logistics hub, stands at the center of this project, covering a corridor of approximately 1,200 kilometers from southern Iraq to the Turkish border. Simultaneously, Ankara is upgrading its domestic infrastructure and border crossings, including Habur–Fishkhabur and Ovaköy, to better align with EU customs zones. Regionally, this initiative is part of Turkey’s broader strategy to create interconnected networks and temporary economic alliances along the Turkey–Iraq–UAE–Qatar axis. Given domestic financial constraints, Turkey relies on Gulf state investments, particularly from the UAE and Qatar, to share costs, reduce political risks, and secure regional support. Beyond financing Iraq’s infrastructure, this support lends political legitimacy to the project and integrates Baghdad into broader regional economic frameworks—while enabling Ankara to compete with Iran’s east–west corridors that bypass Turkey.

Turkey-Iraq Energy Agreement:
By placing Iraq at the center of its regional connectivity strategy, Ankara has extended the same logic to the energy sector—a domain where pipelines and transit routes are not merely economic assets but effective instruments of geopolitical influence. Iraq’s vast oil and gas reserves, if integrated into regional infrastructure, play a key role in Turkey’s vision of becoming an energy hub—a goal that leads to increased regional influence, supply route diversification, and enhanced Turkey’s position in European energy security. In this regard, Turkey seeks to strengthen and synergize its existing network, including the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, TurkStream, and Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipelines, to connect West Asian and Caspian resources to European markets while reducing dependence on Russia and Iran. Within this framework, resuming oil flows through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline has become a primary priority for Ankara. The pipeline was halted in March 2023 following an international arbitration ruling in favor of Iraq, imposing a $1.5 billion fine on Turkey for unauthorized oil exports from the Kurdistan Region between 2014 and 2018. In response, Ankara terminated the 50-year pipeline agreement in July 2025 and announced its readiness to negotiate a new framework—one that would recognize Baghdad’s sovereignty over oil exports, establish a clear revenue-sharing mechanism, and ensure supply stability. In September 2025, Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government reached an agreement to begin oil exports through this pipeline—a pilot move to restore oil flows toward Turkey. Although Ankara still contests the arbitration ruling, it has signaled willingness to restore oil flows under redesigned arrangements that integrate the pipeline into a broader regional infrastructure vision. Continuing this process, Turkey has submitted a comprehensive draft of a new agreement to Baghdad to expand bilateral energy cooperation. This proposal extends beyond oil to include natural gas, petrochemicals, and electricity—reflecting the expanded scope of Ankara’s energy diplomacy. Crucially, the plan is designed to align energy transit infrastructure with regional connectivity corridors, complementing the “Development Road” project. Turkey’s energy minister has emphasized that the program also envisions extending the pipeline to southern Iraq’s oil fields—a move that would increase export capacity and establish a direct link between southern Iraq and Turkish ports. From Ankara’s perspective, this strategy not only diversifies Iraq’s export routes but also embeds the country more deeply into Turkey-centric regional energy networks—thereby strengthening Turkey’s ambition to become a regional energy hub and enhancing its geoeconomic influence during a period of widespread regional instability from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea.

Scenarios for the Turkey-Iraq Energy Agreement:
Several potential scenarios may emerge as a result of Turkey’s decision:
Scenario 1: Successful Negotiation of a New Agreement
In this scenario, Ankara and Baghdad will successfully sign a new, comprehensive, and extensive oil agreement. Supporting factors include the Iraqi parliament’s readiness to vote on a draft law regulating the renewable energy sector and encouraging local and international investment. Washington’s support further reinforces these prospects, with U.S. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce confirming U.S. backing for the understanding among Baghdad, Erbil, and Turkey.
Scenario 2: Continuation of the Status Quo
In this scenario, oil relations between Iraq and Turkey will remain largely unchanged. The full-capacity restart of the oil pipeline remains out of reach, particularly as estimates indicate Iraq currently lacks the capacity to export 1.5 million barrels per day to Turkey.
Scenario 3: Failure of New Agreement Negotiations
Various technical and diplomatic challenges between Ankara and Baghdad could hinder finalizing a new agreement. Critics argue that a new deal might restrict oil exports through the State Organization for Marketing of Oil, potentially undermining the Kurdistan Region’s autonomy.
Scenario 4: Revised Extension of the Original Agreement
Many analysts consider this scenario more likely, whereby both countries extend their original oil agreement but with enhanced cooperation, coordination, and increased export quotas. Turkey’s Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has affirmed Turkey’s willingness to extend the 1973 agreement with legal amendments and expanded activities. Kemal Etrushi, advisor to the Kurdistan Region’s Prime Minister, has also suggested the likelihood of an extension, provided that maintenance and transit costs are economically viable for all parties.