Article - Islamic World News

In recent months, the passage of legislation recognizing Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) has become one of the country’s most contentious political issues. Under this law, PMF units would be formally integrated into Iraq’s armed forces, with standardized recruitment, retirement, and ranking procedures aligned with the national military framework.

In this text, we examine Al-Sudani’s efforts to establish ties with Al-Jolani’s administration and outline the reasons behind them. Overall, ten factors can be identified, grouped into four categories. In recent years, several security-related files have emerged between the two countries, with the following being the most notable.

In recent months, Iraq’s state-owned Rafidain Bank has come under U.S. pressure for various reasons, aimed at increasing financial strain on the Iraqi government regarding the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). In the latest round of accusations, Washington claims the bank processed payments and foreign currency transfers for Yemen’s Ansarallah movement through its branch in Sana’a.

A recent report has exposed an Arabic-language religious app that was, in reality, a covert surveillance tool developed by the Zionist regime to infiltrate Palestinian users’ devices and extract sensitive data. This operation relied on social engineering and cultural-religious camouflage, underscoring the urgent need for stronger cybersecurity awareness and tighter scrutiny of suspicious software.

Balochistan, a region straddling the borders of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, has become a focal point in the geopolitical rivalry among major powers such as China, Russia, and India. These nations view its ports and infrastructure corridors as strategic assets to counter Western influence. Despite facing separatist movements and severe human rights violations, Balochistan plays a critical role in shaping an alternative bloc to the Euro-Atlantic hegemony, acting as a crossroads for trade routes, strategic investments, and military cooperation within the Eurasian sphere.

The Druze minority—spread across Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the occupied territories—follows a secretive, independent faith rooted in Islam but infused with diverse teachings. In Syria, they number over half a million, making up roughly 3% of the population. Known for loyalty to their host nations, Druze communities have played mediating roles in Lebanon and even serve in Israel’s military, unlike other Arab minorities. Despite political differences, strong familial and cultural ties sustain a shared sense of identity across borders.

A group of tribal leaders in Hebron has reportedly submitted a proposal to Israeli authorities, seeking to break away from the Palestinian Authority and join the Abraham Accords. The plan, which has received partial backing from the Israeli government, centers on economic cooperation, localized self-governance, and formal recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.

In the second part of this analysis, we explore key defensive strategies for countering threats posed by the Israeli regime.

In recent decades, both overt and covert tensions between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Israeli regime have escalated into a new level of strategic complexity and confrontation. Israel’s renewed attacks ranging from precision strikes and cyber operations to targeted assassinations of key commanders, demonstrate its advantage in intelligence, modern air power, electronic warfare, and a strong alliance with the United States. This report, based on studies from RAND Corporation, CSIS, the Washington Institute, and IISS, first explores Israel’s core advantages and then proposes suitable defensive countermeasures.

The recent meeting in Damascus between Abu Mohammad al-Julani (Ahmed al-Sharaa), head of Syria’s interim government, and Ibrahim Kalin, chief of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT), has reignited attention on Syria’s evolving political landscape and the flurry of regional and international negotiations surrounding it. The timing of this meeting—just days after Israel proposed a no-fly zone in southern Syria and following visits by U.S. envoy Tom Barrack and Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi—suggests a coordinated diplomatic effort rather than coincidence.

Among Islamic countries, Turkey’s current government is unfortunately considered one of the main economic and commercial suppliers to the Zionist regime. Over the past two years, following the military aggression of the Zionist regime against Gaza and the rise of public protests, the Turkish government—under pressure from public opinion—has intensified its so-called anti-Israel stance. However, based on available evidence, these positions appear more symbolic than genuine. Despite loud statements from Turkish and Israeli officials about cutting economic and trade ties, in practice, cooperation between the two countries continues both secretly and openly.

This analysis outlines the “mini-state governance model” as the most probable scenario for Syria’s future. In this model, the state remains legally unified, but in practice, powerful local entities dominate specific regions, effectively holding real power. The central government is compelled to cooperate with these influential local forces. Although this scenario has received limited public attention, it aligns more closely with Syria’s historical context and social fabric.