Category: Graphics

  • A Look Into New Clashes Between Israeli Regime, Resistance Movement; From South Lebanon To Gaza

    A Look Into New Clashes Between Israeli Regime, Resistance Movement; From South Lebanon To Gaza

    Some 34 rockets were fired from southern Lebanon to the Zionist settlements in northern occupied land of Palestine on April 6, 2023. 25 rockets out of that number were intercepted by air defense of the Israeli regime, and at least four rockets hit the usurped territories.

    A few hours later, Israeli fighter jets bombed certain positions of the Palestinian resistance groups in different areas of the Gaza Strip with the aim of creating deterrence. Not too much later, Palestinian resistance groups reacted to the Israeli strikes, firing 44 rockets to Sderot, Ivim and Nir Am settlements in several occasions on Thursday.

    Following the air strikes on the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army fired six missiles to al-Qlaileh town in Tyre district of southern Lebanon early Friday. Images released of the incident show that the Israeli missiles hit farmlands, two bridges and other points in al-Qlaileh plain areas, which did not leave remarkable damages.

    The issue of targeting abandoned headquarters of the resistance groups in the Gaza Strip has its roots in the Zionists’ open announcement that they want to attack the Palestinian enclave. 

    Furthermore, the recent air strikes by Israel on farms and plains in southern Lebanon indicate that the regime has not only carried out the attacks to pacify public opinion in the occupied territories, but also it does not have the capability and intention to prolong the confrontations.

    Taking into account the realities on the ground, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed his cabinet members, underlining that given the ongoing internal disagreements, Tel Aviv should not be turn into a scene of confrontation between Israel on one side and the Palestinian resistance group Hamas and the Lebanese resistance movement Hezbollah on the other side.

    Read more:
    Rocket Attack From Southern Lebanon To Northern Occupied Palestine; Four Zionists Wounded (Video)
    Israeli Missile Attack On Southern Lebanon

    Timeline of recent conflicts in occupied Palestine
  • Military Knowledge: Shahed-149 (Gaza) Reconnaissance Combat Drone

    Military Knowledge: Shahed-149 (Gaza) Reconnaissance Combat Drone

    Shahed-149 or Gaza drone is one of the most advanced and largest Iranian drones ever built by the Iranian Armed Forces, and the specifications and equipment used in it show the significant progress of Iran in increasing the country’s capabilities in the field of UAVs.

    The Shahed-149 reconnaissance combat drone, capable of carrying 13 bombs and 500 kilograms of equipment, as well as a 35-hour flight duration up to a radius of 2,000 kilometers, and is capable of conducting a variety of combat and intelligence operations and greatly enhances and promotes Iran’s military capability in the region.

    This drone is very similar to the US MQ-9 Reaper drone and is compared to this drone in terms of operational level. According to the published images, it seems that Iranian experts have succeeded in building such a drone by using past experiences and studies on American captured drones.

    Shahed-149 (Gaza) drone with a wingspan of 21 meters and a length of 11 meters has a speed of about 350 kilometers per hour and its maximum takeoff weight is 3100 kg and is capable of carrying cargo weighing at least 500 kg and its flight altitude is about 35,000 feet. Therefore, due to the large size and heavy weight of this drone, a turboprop engine has been used. This is the first time that a turboprop engine with this power is used on an Iranian drone. Exact information about the power of this engine has not been published yet; But according to the published images and general information of the drone, it seems that the Shahed-149 drone uses a turboprop engine with a nearly 650 shaft horsepower.

    Another noteworthy point in this drone is the use of a more advanced electro-optical system than previous drones. This system, which seems to be one of the most advanced Iranian electro-optical systems, in addition to a day-vision camera with a zoom power of at least 100 to 120 times, also has a infrared sensor system, laser designation and laser illumination capabilities. One of the highlights of this system is the use of a catadioptric lens that increase the magnification ability several times and this is the first time that it has been used in Iranian drones.

    Shahed-149 Gaza drone electro-optical system

    Amir Ali Hajizadeh, Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, regarding the weapons capability of the Gaza drone, stated that this drone is capable of carrying 13 bombs. In the published images, a device similar to the rotating bomb system used in bombers is seen. And given the space under the drone’s fuselage, the Gaza drones appears to be using a Rotary Bomb Launcher under its fuselage that can carry up to five bombs. If this is true, this is the first Iranian drone to use this mechanism. Due to this improvement, 5 bombs will be installed inside the bomb bay and 8 bombs will be installed under the wings, and in total, this drone is capable of carrying 13 bombs.

    Iranian Sadid “Fire-and-Forget” missiles weighing up to 34 kg, 13 of which weigh up to 442 kg, can be one of the types of missiles that can be used in the Gaza reconnaissance combat drone.

    Shahed-149 (Gaza) drone specifications:
    Length: 11 m
    Wingspan: 21 m
    Height: 3.8 m
    Range: 2,000 km
    Service ceiling: 35,000 ft (10,668 m)
    Endurance: 35 hours
    Powerplant: Turboprop ~ 650 shp
    Speed: 350 km/h
    Gross weight: 3,100 kg
    Armament: Up to 13 missiles
    Origin: Iran

    More Images:

    Read more:
    Iran’s IRGC unveils new reconnaissance combat drone ‘Gaza’ + Images and video
    Video: Gaza reconnaissance combat drone

    Shahed-149 (Gaza) drone posters in Arabic, Russian, Farsi, Hebrew, Azeri and Kurdish:

  • Infographic: 2920 days of Saudi coalition aggression on Yemen

    Infographic: 2920 days of Saudi coalition aggression on Yemen

    The Ayn al-Ansaniyah Research and Statistics Center has released statistics on the crimes and atrocities committed by the Saudi coalition against Yemen during the 2920 days of war.

    Statistics of the Saudi coalition aggression on Yemen after 2920 days:
    The total number of martyrs and wounded in these 8 years is 48,349 people, including 18,140 martyrs and 30,254 wounded. Out of this number, the total number of martyrs and injured children is 4079 martyrs and 4790 injured. The number of men martyrs and wounded is 11,603 martyrs and 22,476 wounded. The number of women martyrs and wounded is 2458 martyrs and 2988 wounded.

    During the 2,920 days of aggression and siege, the Saudi coalition has damaged or destroyed 15 airports, 16 ports, 346 power stations and generators, and 617 communication networks and stations. Also, 3095 reservoirs and water supply stations, 2105 government facilities and 7293 roads and bridges have been targeted or destroyed.

    During the eight years of aggression, 409 factories, 390 fuel tankers, 12,088 commercial units, 466 poultry and livestock farms, 10,279 means of transportation, 485 fishing boats, 1,020 food stores, 427 fuel stations, 704 markets and 1,040 food trucks were damaged or destroyed.

    The number of destroyed and damaged civilian houses has also reached 603,110. 182 academic centers, 1714 mosques, 384 tourist centers and 417 hospitals and health centers have been damaged or destroyed by the Saudi coalition.
    The attacks of the Saudi coalition have also led to the destruction and damage of 1,265 schools and educational centers, 11,350 agricultural lands, 141 sports centers, 258 historical places, and 61 media centers.

    Read more:
    Infographic: 2555 days of Saudi coalition aggression on Yemen
    Infographic: 2400 days of Saudi coalition aggression on Yemen
    Infographic: 2100 days after the Saudi coalition aggression on Yemen

    Click to view full size
  • Infographic: Eight Years of Steadfastness

    Infographic: Eight Years of Steadfastness

    The spokesman for the Yemen Armed Forces, Brigadier General Yahya al-Sari’, on the occasion of National Resistance Day presented the statistics of eight years of fighting with the Saudi coalition.

    General Yahya al-Sari’:
    “With God’s help, our forces were able to stand firmly by our people and neutralize the declared and undeclared goals of the aggressors.

    The number of attacks by aggressor fighter jets has been more than 274,302 attacks, including 59 attacks last year.

    The invasion and siege of our country was carried out under the leadership and supervision of the US and with the participation of Westerners. In the past years, we have monitored the participation of each country in the aggressor coalition. We ask the educational, media and cultural institutions of our country to document all the crimes of the aggressors and the resistance of our people.

    Our forces performed more than 13,229 military operations during the battle against the enemy’s brutal attack. Among these operations, we can mention 6702 offensive operations, 6527 defensive operations, neutralizing offensive efforts and enemy advances.

    The missile force has carried out 1,828 military operations, including 1,237 operations targeting enemy gatherings inside Yemeni territory. 589 missile operations against the enemy were targeted outside of our geography, which included operations in the depth of the Saudi and Emirati enemies.

    We continue to multiply our strategic missile stockpile as a deterrent that has proven effective over the years.

    In the last 8 years, the Air Force has conducted 1,2009 operations, including 3,264 offensive operations and 8,745 reconnaissance operations. UAVs have carried out 2,267 operations inside Yemen and 997 operations abroad.

    The total air defense operations in the last 8 years reached 4585 operations, including 2022 destruction and hits and 2565 defensive operations. Air defense managed to shoot down 165 reconnaissance and offensive drones.

    13 fighter jets, 10 Apaches and 6 helicopters, including the Black Hawk helicopter, were shot down.

    48 US Air Force drones were shot down and 123 other spy drones were shot down.

    The Navy and Coastal Defense have carried out 38 special operations in the last 8 years, targeting Saudi and UAE naval vessels was a part of it.

    The total number of operations performed by ground units in their different units has reached 25,000 different operations.

    The total number of sniper operations since entering the battle line reached 71128 operations. The operations of the eighth year amounted to 5213 sniper operations, of which 3374 operations were recorded in audio and video form.

    Among the operations of engineering units, 22,854 were enemy gatherings and 24,907 offensive and defensive operations.
    The number of operations of the engineering unit that targeted enemy tanks, personnel carriers and military vehicles was more than 4414 operations.

    The total number of operations of the anti-armor unit during the last eight years amounted to 7942 operations.

    From anti-armor operations, 3082 enemy fortifications, gatherings and barracks and 4860 vehicles were targeted by the enemy.

    The total number of operations carried out by the artillery Unit during the last eight years amounted to 85,634 operations. Out of this number of operations, 1150 joint operations were carried out with UAVs and 15269 operations were carried out with Zilzal-1 missiles.

    The losses of the Saudi enemy army have been more than 10,840 people killed and injured in eight years. We announce the killing of 36 Saudi officers and soldiers and the wounding of 45 others in the eighth year of the aggression.
    The losses of the Emirati enemy are more than 1,251 killed and wounded, including senior officers.
    The number of dead and wounded of the Sudanese army reached more than 9545. More than 40 Sudanese officers and soldiers were killed and 65 others were wounded in the eighth year of the aggression.

    The casualties of Yemeni mercenaries have been more than 261,243 killed and injured in eight years. In the eighth year, the number of dead Yemeni mercenaries exceeded 2,500 and more than 5,550 were injured.

    Our forces managed to destroy or set fire to more than 18,397 armored personnel carriers, tanks, vehicles, bulldozers and weapons. More than 10,618 cases have been documented including the operations that led to the destruction, damage and burning of enemy vehicles, bulldozers and armored vehicles.

    During the eighth year, more than 1,000 vehicles, armored vehicles and military equipment were destroyed or damaged.

    Continued aggression and blockade means that the aggressor countries and their followers will suffer more losses.
    Continuing the battle will only lead to more conflict and work on other legal options to defend our country.
    The regimes that started the aggression should learn lessons from the strengthening of Yemen and what happened in these years.
    We emphasize on redoubled efforts to prepare for future developments and increase combat readiness to deal with aggressor and enemy forces.

    We reject any presence of foreign forces inside our territory and emphasize that the presence of foreigners is illegal and in line with the attempt to occupy our country. We emphasize that any foreign military presence inside the territory of Yemen is a legitimate goal for our forces and for all Yemeni people.

    We send greetings to all the free people of our country and among them the proud tribes who rose up for defense.

    We renew our agreement with our beloved people that the armed forces remain loyal to their duties and responsibilities, the most important of which is the liberation war.

    We tell our Seyed leader that your people are more determined today to see the battle through to its end.

    We emphasize our readiness to implement any order against foreign military presence in Yemen. We are ready to deal decisively with any scenario and neutralize any movement of the aggressors and their mercenaries.

    We will continue to develop our military capabilities and increase our combat expertise. We will continue to monitor and deal appropriately with all attempts to loot the national wealth within the framework of our duties and responsibilities.”

    Read more:
    Infographic: Seven Years of Steadfastness
    Infographic: Six years of steadfastness
    Infographic: Five years of steadfastness

    Click to view full size
  • Military Knowledge: Bavar-373 Long-Range Air Defense System

    Military Knowledge: Bavar-373 Long-Range Air Defense System

    Bavar-373 is an Iranian long-range air defense system build to engage with hostile air targets at a range of more than 300 kilometers. The Bavar-373 missile system can be prepared for launch easily. It features anti-stealth capability that allows it to detect hidden targets with a very low radar cross-section. This system was unveiled for the first time in 2016 And later in 2019, it was added to the Air Defense Force of the Iranian Army. The Ministry of Defense of Iran has unveiled an upgraded missile of the Bavar-373 defense system dubbed Sayyad-4B. With this update, the range of Bavar-373 air defense system increased to more than 300 km.

    The Bavar-373 missile system is more advanced than its Russian counterpart S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile system. Several studies and tests conducted by the Iranian military showed that the system is superior to the US Patriot PAC-3 air defence system.

    After the American invasion of Iraq, Iran analyzed the US’s operational measures and then according to the needs and deficiencies it had in the field of defense systems, made extensive purchases in the field of air defense systems. The purchase of several types of radar and detection systems, electronic warfare system and short-range defense systems such as TOR-M1 and BUK-M2 and the purchase of the long-range S-300 PMU1 system were among Iran’s measures to fill the gaps in its air defense systems.

    It should be noted that before 2016, some of these purchases entered Iran, and some others were not delivered to Iran by Russia under the pretext of Western and American sanctions against Iran. For this reason, Iran began to reform the air defense structure and seriously started the domestic production of air defense systems.

    The process of production and localization of air defense systems first started with the update of S-200, And Iran started to modify and localize the missile of this system. The efforts of Iran’s military industry in this field resulted in the production of Taer missiles. Following the localization of missiles of air defense systems, missiles of the Sayyad family such as Sayyad 1, 2 and 3 and a wide range of indigenous air defense systems such as Sevom Khordad, Tabas and Talash reached the operational level.

    In radar, with the purchase of Gamma radar, Iran started the production and localization of phased array radars. According to the commander of Iranian Army’s Air Defense Force, this was the result of the studies between the Air Defense Force, the Ministry of Defense and some universities, which despite all the ups and downs it had reached the stage of test firing in 2018 and finally in 2019, it was handed over to the Air Defense Force of the Iranian Army.

    To name this system, “belief in internal power” was shown in the word “belief” (Bavar) and “373” is the Abjad letter of “Ya Rasulullah”.

    Operational test of Bavar-373 system

    Introduction of units of Bavar-373 system:

    Bavar-373 is an impenetrable, anti-hacking surface-to-air missile defence system comprising a vertical launching system, two acquisition and engagement radars, Sayyad-4 missiles, and a command-and-control center. The design minimises the need for additional support equipment and systems. The vertical launching system features square launchers that are identical to the launchers utilised by naval warships for air defence.

    Each Bavar-373 battalion has a command, control and communication unit, which, as the brain of Bavar-373, is responsible for managing and establishing communication between the system’s components, in addition to communicating with the country’s integrated defense network. One battery of this system has four Sayyad-4 transporter erector launchers (TELs) ready-to-launch missiles and has the ability to destroy targets at a range of 300 km. Also, instead of a Sayyad-4 TELs, the other TELs of Sayyad missile family can also be used.

    Bavar-373 control and command unit

    Meraj-4 radar is the longest range radar of this system. This radar works similar to the large 64N6E2 radar in the S-300 system, but has superior features. For a better comparison, we will first describe the specifications of the 64N6E2 radar, and then we will discuss the Meraj-4 radar:

    64N6E2 is a 3D S-band air surveillance radar that has a maximum range of 300 km and the ability to detect 200 targets. The interceptor radar is also capable of intercepting 12 targets at the same time and assigns these targets to the engagement radar for targeting. The S-300 system is capable of engaging targets at a distance of 200 km.

    Meraj-4 radar is a long-range 3D active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar made of 40 rows of waveguides. The research, development and production of this radar has been done in Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI). Meraj-4 can track up to 300 targets simultaneously. The maximum range of this radar is 450 km, the maximum detection height is 130 km and the maximum range for ballistic targets is 1200 km.

    The engagement radar of this system also belongs to Shiraz Electronics Industries. This radar is an active electronically scanned array (AESA) type with a low probability of interception (LPI). The maximum detection range of this system is 320 km and the detection height is 65 km. It has the ability to detect up to 300 targets simultaneously and has the ability to intercept up to 60 targets and engage with 6 targets and simultaneously guide two missiles towards one target.

    The engagement radar of Bavar-373

    The Hafez multipurpose and phased array radar is also available as a search and tracking radar for low-altitude scanning, which has track while scan (TWS) capabilities. Its maximum range is 300 km and has the ability to detect up to 100 targets.

    Hafez acquisition radar

    Another radar of Bavar-373 system is the Alim radar, which is a passive radar. Passive radars are used to resist electronic warfare and increase the detection range of stealthy targets. These types of systems passively track 3D waves of aircraft systems, such as Link 16, identification friend or foe waves (IFF) and waves from aircraft navigation systems (GPS). In case of interference in the interception on the radars, existing passive systems have the ability to accurately track or help to track the hostile aircraft or identify the source of the interference, which, by finding the source, provides the possibility to attack and eliminate the interference.

    Alim radar

    The Saegheh electronic warfare system is an enhancement system for Bavar-373 that operates in the X and Ku bands and is used to detect specific targets such as AWACS radars, classify the waves emitted by airborne radar and disrupt fire control radars and ground tracking radars that is used in cruise missiles and all types of aircraft. This Saegheh system effectively increases the possibility of dealing with enemy AWACS radars.

    Saegheh electronic warfare system

    The tactical vehicles used in Bavar system are of two types Zafar and Zoljanah. However, it seems that Zoljanah was excluded from the Bavar-373 system over time.

    Zafar-8824 heavy tactical vehicle is 8×8 carrier truck, And it has 4 moving axes and its maximum load carrying capacity is 24 tons. The chassis of this truck is similar to MAZ-537 truck. The Zafar truck has been used as the carrier of the radars and command and control equipment of Bavar-373 system. Also, in the new tests of Bavar-373 system, it has been used as a carrier of two box launchers.

    Zafar-8824 heavy tactical vehicle

    Zoljannah heavy tactical vehicle is a 10×10 carrier truck. Like the Zafar truck, this truck uses the MAZ-537 chassis. Its maximum load capacity has not been announced, but due to the change in the chassis and the addition of an axle, it should be able to carry more weight than Zafar. The important point is the controllability of the last axis of Zoljanah, which provides the possibility of better maneuvering in difficult conditions. Zoljanah is used to carry Sayyad-4 launcher. Zoljanah will be more expensive than Zafar due to its complexities.

    Zoljanah tactical vehicle

    Sayyad-4 launcher is another component of Bavar-373 system. This launcher, unlike the Russian models that have round tubes, is designed similar to the Patriot system launchers. Each Zoljanah vehicle can carry four Sayyad-4 launchers.

    Sayyad-4 launcher

    Bavar-373 can use several types of missiles. This capability allows Bavar-373 to cover the range and altitude of different targets like the S-400 system. Nevertheless, so far only the Sayyad-4 missile has been officially introduced for use in the Bavar-373 system, but the use of Sayyad family missiles such as Sayyad 2 and 3 is also very likely.

    The Sayyad-4 missile can engage targets at a range of 200 km and up to an altitude of 27 km, similar to the 48N6E2 missile of the S-300 system. Sayyad-4 missile uses stabilizer fins and thrust vector control system, which has significantly increased the maneuverability of the missile. These features have made the Sayyad-4 missile similar to the S-400 48N6DM missile, which has anti-ballistic properties.
    The main difference between the Sayyad-4 missile and the 48N6DM missile is the fins of the thrust vector control system. In Sayyad-4, these fins protrude from the body, and this causes more changes in the exhaust gases of the missile, and as a result, creates a sharper angle for the missile to turn. So, the high turning power shows that the missile has a high G-pressure tolerance. When the missile gains altitude and enters the thin atmosphere, the control fins at the end of the missile lose their effectiveness, and this is another reason for using the thrust vector control system.

    The Sayad-4 missile has the ability to engage targets at a speed of 4800 m/s. Meanwhile, the 48N6E2 missile has the ability to engage targets at a speed of up to 2800 m/s. It is interesting to know that the Antey-2500 anti-ballistic system missile can engage targets with a speed of 4500 m/s.

    As the numbers show us, the Sayyad-4 missile is superior to the S-300’s missiles and Antey-2500 in terms of anti-ballistics and is near to the S-400’s 48N6DM missile. It also has the ability to engage targets such as fighter jets and cruise missiles. Another type of Sayyad-4 missile called Sayyad-4B has been introduced lately, which has a range of up to 250 km. In the latest tests, the Sayyad-4B missile has managed to hit targets at a distance of 304 kilometers.

    Considering that the Bavar system is modeled after the S-300, the guidance method of the Sayyad-4 missile should also be similar to the S-300 system. The desired guidance method is Track-via-missile. In this guidance method, the missile combines the characteristics of semi-active radar homing (SARH) and radio command guidance. This method has been used on a number of long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), including the MIM-104 Patriot.

    In an interview with the commander of the Iranian Army Air Defense Force in 2022, it was said about the “300 km test”:

    “Bavar 373 system in this test detected the target at a distance of 450 km. When this target is detected, the initial lock is performed at a distance of 400 km and a stable lock is performed at a distance of 360 km. It takes a minute to hit it. In this test, we chose a UAV with a small cross-sectional area, and by this we wanted to say that this system is able to identify and destroy the smallest target with a very small cross-sectional area, which it succeeded in destroying at a range of 304 km. The target drone, which was produced by a joint effort by the Ministry of Defense and Air Defense of the Army, reached a height of 43,000 feet (13,716 km) in this test, and was hit by the Bavar-373 system. If other countries want to produce a system with this capability, sometimes they need up to 20 years, but we were able to improve this system over time until we achieved a range of more than 300 kilometers; Immediately after this shot, we also conducted the ballistic test, of course, if we had not been obsessive in this test, we could have destroyed the target at a range of 320 km.”

    The cases mentioned by the then commander of Iranian Army Air Defense Forces show that the upgrade in Bavar-373 was not limited to the Sayyad-4 missile, but all the subsystems were also upgraded to perform complex operations and hunting ballistic missiles, and the speed of the Sayyad-4B missile was also increased.

    Bavar-373 Long Range Air Defense System specifications:
    Range: + 300 km
    Number of missiles: 4 missiles
    Missile variants: Sayyad-4 and Sayyad-4B
    Radars:
    – Meraj-4 active phased array radar with a range of 450 km
    – SEI active electronically scanned array radar
    – Hafez multipurpose phased array radar
    – Alim passive radar
    Carrier chassis: Zafar or Zoljanah tactical vehicle
    In service: Since August 22, 2019
    Target types: Warplane, helicopter, drone, cruise missile, ballistic missile
    Origin: Iran

    Sayyad-4 missile specifications:
    Range: + 200 km
    Speed: Unknown
    Altitude of fire: 27 km
    Diameter: 515 mm
    Length: 7.5 meters
    Warhead weight: 180 kg

    Sayyad-4B missile specifications:
    Range: + 300 km
    Speed: Mach 6.1
    Altitude of fire: 32 km
    Diameter: 515 mm
    Length: ~ 8 meters
    Warhead weight: Unknown

    Click to view full size

    The poster collection of Bavar-373 long-range air defense system in Farsi, Russian, Arabic, Azeri and Kurdish:

    Source:
    Bavar-373 Surface-to-Air-Missile System

  • Infographic: The Saudi Coalition Aggression On Yemen In 2022

    Infographic: The Saudi Coalition Aggression On Yemen In 2022

    The “Ayn Al-Insaniyah Research and Statistics Center” published statistics and figures of the crimes and aggression of the Saudi coalition against Yemen during the year 2022. The damage statistics on Yemen in 2022 show that despite the peace agreement between the Saudi coalition and Ansar Allah, Saudi Arabia continues to violate the ceasefire and aggression on Yemen.

    Statistics of the Saudi coalition aggression on Yemen in 2022:
    The total number of martyrs and wounded is 3,083, of which 643 are martyrs, of which 27 are women and 102 are children. 2440 people were injured, of which 97 were women and 353 were children.

    In 2022, the Saudi coalition has attacked 1 airport, 1 port, 22 power stations and generators, and 46 networks and communication stations.
    Also, 334 reservoirs and water distribution system, 57 government facilities and 974 bridges and roads were targeted or destroyed.

    4 factories were destroyed or damaged, 13 fuel tankers, 25 gas stations, 229 business establishments, 29 poultry and livestock, 1022 transport means, 3 fishing boats, 37 food stores, 5 markets and 95 food trucks were also destroyed or damaged.

    The number of destroyed and damaged civilian houses has reached 14,367. One university center, 134 mosques, 5 tourist centers and 12 hospitals and health centers were destroyed and damaged.
    The Saudi coalition attacks also destroyed and damaged 64 schools and institutes, 1987 agricultural lands, 2 sports facilities, 3 historical sites and 7 media centers were destroyed or damaged.

    Read more:
    Infographic: 2555 days of Saudi coalition aggression on Yemen
    Infographic: 2400 days of Saudi coalition aggression on Yemen

    Click to view full size image
  • Military Knowledge: Ka-52 Attack Helicopter

    Military Knowledge: Ka-52 Attack Helicopter

    The development of this helicopter started in 1996 and its first flight was successfully completed in June 1997. The serial production of Ka-52 began in 2008 at Progress Arsenyev Aviation plant in the Primorye region of Russia. In December 2010, the Russian Air Force’s 334th Tactical Deployment Centre in Torzhok received three Ka-52s. The twin-seat Ka-52 serves in the air force as a special mission helicopter.
    The Russian Air Force began fielding Ka-52 helicopters in April 2011. In the same year, Russia’s defence ministry signed a contract with the company to procure 140 Ka-52 helicopters. In February 2018, the Russia’s defence ministry expressed interest in procuring 114 upgraded versions of Ka-52 attack helicopters as part of the new State Armament Programme for 2018–2027.

    However, The limited production of this helicopter has caused only 127 units (each unit between 10 and 13 aircraft) of this helicopter to enter service in the Russian air fleet by 2020.

    The Ka-52 has a wider nose and an extended fuselage compared to the Ka-50, however, the commonality of the airframe, components and systems of the two variants is about 85%. The Ka-52 attack helicopter has a length of 15.8 meters, height of 4.93 meters and main rotor diameter of 14.5 meters. The maximum take-off weight of the Ka-52 is 12,200 kg.

    General view of Ka-52 helicopter – click to view in larger size

    The Ka-52 helicopter is capable of performing a wide range of missions, such as attacking armored and non-armored vehicles, attacking low-speed air targets, attacking enemy infantry in the front line and in the tactical depth of the enemy, providing fire support for the front line forces and etc. Ka-52 can also be used as a monitoring platform and air command post for a group of attack helicopters.

    The Ka-52 helicopter has unique capabilities in terms of maneuverability and agility and is known as one of the most maneuverable helicopters in the world. This high maneuverability is obtained from its coaxial rotors. Coaxial rotors or coax rotors are a pair of helicopter rotors mounted one above the other on concentric shafts, with the same axis of rotation, but turning in opposite directions (contra-rotating), which eliminates the vibration and rotation of the tail; so there is no need for rotors in the tail section.
    In general, one of the problems with any single set of rotor blades is the torque (rotational force) exerted on the helicopter fuselage in the direction opposite to the rotor blades. This torque causes the fuselage to rotate in the direction opposite to the rotor blades. In single rotor helicopters, the antitorque rotor or tail rotor counteracts the main rotor torque and controls the fuselage rotation. Coaxial rotors solve the problem of main rotor torque by turning each set of rotors in opposite directions.

    The use of coaxial system in Ka-50 and Ka-52 has significantly increased the stability and maneuverability of these helicopters; which is very necessary and important for an attack helicopter. High turn speed and fast change of position, performing military maneuvers such as flat turns in the direction of the target, side ways motions at high speeds, which is less seen in heavily armored aircraft, and deep glides of the high pitch angle of up to 30 degrees or 35 degrees are other capabilities of this highly maneuverable helicopter.

    Coaxial system in Ka-52 and significant increase of stability and maneuverability

    Kamov helicopters have been present in many wars and have shown very good survivability so far. In the Ukraine war, there are cases where the Ka-52 was hit by the enemy but was able to continue on its way, or in many cases where the helicopter was shot down, the helicopter pilots were saved. One of the reasons for the survival of this helicopter on the battlefield is the existence of the coaxial system, which was explained above about how it works. In conventional helicopters, the rotor in the tail section plays a role as a stabilizer, but it is highly vulnerable and in case of a hit, the balance of the helicopter will be lost. Removing the rotor in the tail section of Kamov helicopters and using an coaxial rotor has solved this problem, and if the tail section is damaged, the Kamov helicopter is still able to move. Another reason for Kamov’s survival is the possibility of flying with one engine. If one of the engines is targeted on the battlefield, Ka-52 is able to operate with other engine.

    Engine:

    The Ka-52 helicopter uses two Klimov VK-2500 turboshaft engines. It is worth noting that this engine is developed from the TV3-117 engine used on the Ka-50 helicopter. The VK-2500 engine has three different types, the first type has 2000 horsepower, the second type has 2200 horsepower, and the third type has 2400 horsepower. There is also another example of this engine known as VK-2500P and it has 2500 horsepower. The interesting thing about these engines is that they have an emergency power mode with a power of 2700 horsepower. This feature is used in case of failure of one of the engines and significantly improves flight safety in emergency situations.

    The main difference between the VK-2500 and VK-2500P/PS engine is the use of a modern automatic electronic control system of the FADEC type and anti-overheat protection. Thanks to the new design, the VK-2500P ensures more reliable operation of helicopters in areas with moderate climates and even high temperatures and in high mountains. The existence of two separate gearboxes to transfer the power of each engine is an important factor in the operation of the helicopter in critical conditions. This power transmission system, in addition to the power of 2700 horsepower, is an important factor in the survival and preservation of the lives of the pilots in case of loss of one of the engines. Also, the engines have a filter to prevent dust from entering the engine and have a fire extinguishing system.

    Cabin:

    The Ka-52 twin-seat cockpit accommodates two crew members in side-by-side arrangement. Both the crew members are seated on identical K-37-800M ejection seats. The helicopter has a modern bulletproof glass cockpit equipped with a head-up-display (HUD), four SMD 66 multifunction displays, helmet-mounted sight display, image intensifiers and a GPS receiver. The helicopter also integrates a PHAZOTRON cabin desk radio-locator and navigation and attack system for helicopters (NASH).

    The SAU-800 automatic control system, created by Radioelectronic Technologies’ facilities in Saratov, enables the Alligator to be piloted in manual, automated and automatic modes. The SAU-800 is integrated with the SIVPV-52 aerometric data recording and processing system developed by Radioelectronic Technologies’ Moscow-based company Aeropribor Voskhod. The SUO-806P weapons control complex for the Ka-52 has been designed and produced by Radioelectronic Technologies’ Kursk-based Aviaavtomatika company.

    SUO-806P weapon control system

    The helmet-mounted display was signed and delivered in a long-term contract with Ramenskoye Design Company (RDC) as part of the avionics equipment required for the Ka-52 attack helicopter and the Ka-52K advanced ship-based variant between 2013 and 2020.

    Ka-52 pilot’s helmet

    The cockpit of the Ka-52 helicopter is armored and provides good protection for the pilots. The armor of this section is a 3 hardlinered armor; the inner cockpit section made of a full single titanium alloy “bathtub” covering both pilots, followed by a middle liner of ceramic plates, which caused trouble first after a single shot they break apart and lost all its protective abilities, they avoided that by covering this ceramic plates with kevlar/aramid that was glued on tightened and the outer liner which gives the aerodynamic shape and is made of aluminium alloy with a part carbon in it.  Also, to further protect the cabin, in addition to the 44 mm bulletproof glass, two armored plates have been used in the side of the cabin next to the pilots.

    Ka-52 armor and protective armored plates

    The outer part of the cabin and the bottom of the fuel tanks are also made of aluminum and carbon alloy with a thickness of 20 mm. The total amount of armor that could be installed for each pilot of the Ka-50 helicopter is about 300 kg. For the Ka-52 helicopter, this number has been reduced to 150-200 kg per pilot. This is despite the fact that about 90 kg of armor is used for each pilot in the American Apache helicopter. Ka-52 armor is (at least theoretically) resistant to 23 mm bullets.

    Ka-52 body close-up – click to view in larger size

    The helicopter has four separate fuel tanks, three in the rear and one just behind the cockpit. All four fuel tanks are plated and separate from each other.

    Quadruple fuel tanks in Ka-52

    As mentioned, the Ka-52 has 85% of the same parts as the Ka-50. But in terms of appearance, it has a wider nose and in the cabin, two pilots sit next to each other. Both pilots are able to fully control the helicopter; Such an arrangement simplifies the operation of the helicopter during the battle. Also, there is no need for a dedicated training version for this helicopter and it is possible to use this helicopter as a training helicopter.

    Ejection seats and eject system:

    Another unique feature of this helicopter is being equipped with ejection seats. The Ka-52 helicopter, along with the Ka-50, are the only active helicopters in the world that have this capability.
    The Ka-52 CAS K-37-800M ejection seats consists of two parts, an armchair and a side part, designed to perform the functions of the pilot’s seat of the Ka-50 and Ka-52 helicopter and providing in combination with the ZSh-7VS helmet and oxygen equipment of the KCO-VK-LP safe emergency exit by bailout with the help of a towing rocket engine at an indicated flight speed from 90 to 350 km/h in the altitude range from 0 to 5000 m and reducing the loads acting on the pilot during an emergency landing using the energy-absorbing cushioning suspension of the chair.

    How the ejection seats work in Ka-52

    Radar:

    The Ka-52 helicopter is fitted with a mast-mounted radome nose mounted housing a Phazotron FH-01 Millimeter Wave Radar (MMW), known as the Arbalet radar with two antennas for aerial and ground targets. This radar is manufactured by Phazotron-NIIR, Russia’s largest developer of military and avionics radars.

    Arbalet radar on Ka-52 nose

    The Ka-52 radar is an Arbalet-52 dual-band pulse doppler radar weighing 140 kg, which allows the helicopter to effectively carry out combat missions at any time of day or night in all weather conditions, even in the presence of organized or natural electronic jamming. The maximum range of the Arbalet-52 radar is 37 km.
    In general, Ka-52 uses two radars, Arbalet-52 or Arbalet-M, which are more powerful versions of the Arbalet radar and use the Baguet series processor. In this radar, Ts181F processor is responsible for data processing and Baget-55-04.01 processor is responsible for signal processing.

    The air-to-surface capabilities of this radar include various mapping modes, mapping range up to 32 km, azimuth coverage of 120°, the ability to detect ground targets such as bridges at 25 km and tanks at 12 km, the ability to detect ground-based obstacles and terrain detection/avoidance- Electricity cables at 400 meters and the ground with a slope of 10 degrees at 1.5 km, the ability to detect moving target selection of ground and air targets, determination of priority of objects, missile approach warning, support/cueing of EO targeting systems, detection of dangerous weather conditions, nvigation systems update and correction, missile and rocket control, target type classification (in conjunction with IFF) and tracking of 20 targets simultaneously.

    The air-to-air capabilities of this radar include the azimuth coverage of 360° with elevation ±30°, the tracking limits with azimuth of ±60° with elevation±30°, the ability to detect hostile aircraft at a range of 15 km and a Stinger missile at a range of 5 km, the ability to engage with a variety of targets such as cruise and drones, the ability to track up to 20 targets.

    Observation and electro-optical system section:

    In terms of observation and electro-optical system, Ka-52 is equipped with GOES-451 optical system. The GOES-451 system is gyro-stabilized optronic station designed to provide detection, targeting and missile guidance for the Ka-52 attack helicopter. The GOES-451 sensor package includes visible and infrared cameras, laser rangefinder and laser designator.

    GOES-451 visible camera has a maximum range of 83.3 km, infrared range of 55.6 km, laser range finder with a range of 18.5 km and laser point designator with a range of 14.8 km.

    GOES-451 electro-optical system

    It should be noted that a version of the Ka-52 Katran (Marine version of the Ka-52) was displayed at the MAKS 2015 exhibition, which used the OES-52 (ECO-52) electro-optical system instead of the GOES-451 electro-optical system. Also, in 2016, another version of the Ka-52 was seen in the sky of Moscow, which was equipped with the OES-52 electro-optical system. It was later revealed that the OES-52 electro-optical system will be used for the Ka-52M helicopters, which are a more powerful and updated version of the Ka-52. Nevertheless, the possibility of installing this system on older and current Ka-52 versions is expected.
    Also, the export versions sold to Egypt, namely the Ka-52 Nile Crocodile (Ka-52E) are equipped with the OES-52 electro-optical system.

    The OES-52 system is functionally similar to the GOES-451 system. The OES-52 developed by Moscow-based NPK SPP and houses five sensors: a thermal imaging camera, TV camera, laser rangefinder/designator, laser beam riding for anti-tank guided missiles, as well as a laser spot tracker. However, the weight of this system is 177 kg, which is 43 kg lighter compared to the GOES-451 system, which is 220 kg.

    OES-52 electro-optical system on Ka-52 Katran in MAKS exhibition 2015
    Ka-52 equipped with OES-52 system in the sky of Moscow

    Protection system and electronic warfare:

    In terms of protection systems and electronic warfare, the Ka-52 is equipped with the President-S integrated protection system. The President-S system is made by KRET and Ekran Scientific Institute and includes a set of various countermeasures such as active IR and electronic jammers, radar warning receiver (RWR), laser detection system, IR missile approach warning sensor, etc. Next, we will introduce the President-S system components :

    Components of the President-S integrated protection system on the Ka-52

    – “L370-0 control unit” is a digital computer module which is responsible for managing the entire electronic warfare package, as it receives all data from the warning sensors deployed on the helicopter’s structure and says it is integrated, analyzed and presented to the pilot to take defensive countermeasures.

    – “L-136 MAK-UFM missile approach warning (MAWS) system” as its name suggests, is a system that detects and warns the approach of missiles fired at the helicopter. This system can detect shoulder-launched missiles such as the Stinger and Igla from a distance of 10 km, and air-to-air missiles launched from aircraft such as the Sidewinder and the R-73 from a distance of 30 km to 50 km.

    L-136 MAK-UFM warning system, two in the front and two in the back of the helicopter

    – “L-140 Otkilk laser warning receiver (LWR) system” is specialized in intercepting and monitoring laser beams emitted from distance measuring devices for anti-aircraft missile guidance systems, and provides integrated protection at an angle of 90° horizontally and 360° vertically.

    L-140 Otkilk system on the right wing tip and in the rear at the very end of the helicopter

    – “SPO-32 / L150 Pastel radar warning receiver (RWR) system” is a system that detects and receives radio waves emitted by enemy aircraft radar systems, and if a threat is detected, such as the presence of a fighter jet’s fire control radar or a missile launcher’s radar seeker, issues a warning about the existence of a threat. This system has a range equivalent to 222.2 km.

    The SPO-32 / L150 Pastel system on the left wingtip and lower end of the helicopter

    – “L370-3 radar jammer or electronic countermeasures (ECM) system” are systems installed inside the Kamov-52 helicopter and their task is to perform a wide range of jamming measures against surface-to-air, air-to-air missile search radars, etc. This system works in integration with the L150 Pastel system. The L150 Pastel system is responsible for intercepting radar waves and determining their source and the L370-3 jams them.

    – “L-370-5 Vitebsk directional infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) system” is a jamming system to protect the helicopter against anti-aircraft missiles. This system is installed under the belly of Ka-52 in both sides of the helicopter in a rotating turret. This system is responsible for jamming missile seekers operating in the ultraviolet and infrared ranges. The L-370-5 Vitebsk system shines laser beams on the missile’s thermal / electro-optical seekers to confuse it and mislead it away from the helicopter. This system is able to track missiles fired at the helicopter within a radius of several kilometers.

    L-370-5 Vitebsk infrared jamming system

    It should be noted that, based on the available evidence, in the new and updated version of the Ka-52, the Kamov Ka-52M, instead of the L-370-5 Vitebsk system, a more advanced system called the L418-5 DIRCM has been used. The possibility of installing this system on the older and current Kamov 52s is also not far from expected. Also, in the export versions sold to Egypt, i.e. Ka 52E, the L418-5 DIRCM system is used.

    Ka-52E exported and sold to Egypt, equipped with new L418-5 DIRCM sensor and new OES-52 optics.

    – In Ka-52, the UV-26 flare and chaff dispensers is used. This system is placed in two double positions at the wingtips of Ka-52, and each of them contains 32 pieces of chaff and flare.

    UV-26 flare and chaff dispensers in Ka-52

    Ka-52 armaments:

    In the armament section, the Ka-52 helicopter is equipped with a 30mm Shipunov 2A42 automatic cannon on the right side of its body. This cannon has low mobility and only moves up and down. The 30mm Shipunov 2A42 cannon is designed to shoot at lightly armored targets at a distance of 1500 meters, non-armored targets at a distance of 4000 meters, as well as low-flying subsonic aerial targets at a distance of 2000 meters. This cannon has the ability to operate in harsh conditions, such as the temperature range from +50 degrees to -50 degrees Celsius in rain, dust, frost and in a very dry environment. The firing speed of this cannon is 550 rounds per minute and its weight reaches 115 kg.

    Shipunov 2A42 30 mm automatic cannon

    Also, there are 6 external hardpoints under the two wings, which can be used to install different combinations of weapons up to the weight of 2,942 kg. There are also 2 dual slots on the wingtips for chaff and flare dispensers.

    6 external hardpoints under the two wings of Ka-52

    The Ka-52 has 3 hardpoints under each wing, which can carry an APU-6 rack along with an unguided rocket pod and an anti-tank missile on the third hardpoint and two UV-26s on the wingtip, each of which contains 32 pieces of chaff and flare. The APU-6 rack is actually a shelf for storing and firing 6 anti-tank missiles, which is designed to increase the carrying capacity of the Ka-52 helicopter.

    Also, to increase the range, Ka-52 is able to carry four external fuel tanks up to 500 liters in its hardpoints.

    External fuel tank for Ka-52

    The pods of unguided rockets on Kamov are two types of S-8 80mm rockets (S8/80mm) containing 20 rockets and S-13 122mm rockets (S13/122mm) containing 5 rockets, which can be installed one on each wing and a total of two of them are in addition to 6 anti-tank missiles on the APU-6 rack in each wing and a total of 12 anti-tank missiles. This combination gives a lot of power to the Ka-52 helicopter in suppressing armor and infantry on the battlefield.

    S-8 80mm rocket pod (S8/80mm) containing 20 rockets and S-13 122mm rocket pod (S13/122mm) containing 5 rockets
    B8V20A pod for 80mm S-8 rocket and B-13L pod for 122mm S-13 rocket

    It is also possible to install anti-tank missiles such as 9K121 Vikhr and 9M120 Ataka on APU-6 racks. The Vikhr missile can destroy targets at a distance of 10 to 12 km, and the Ataka missile provides the Ka-52 helicopter with an operational range of 400 meters to 6 km to target armored targets.

    Right: Vikhr missile – Left: Ataka missile

    A video from inside the Ka-52 cabin recorded during the operation of the Russian army to seize the Antonov (Gostomel) airport near the city of Kiev on February 24, 2022. In this video, the Ka-52 is flying low and providing fire support for Russian infantry and a Russian Mil-8 transport helicopter. The Ka-52 escapes from being hit by several rockets and is finally forced to make an emergency landing due to the impact of a missile.

    Video from inside the cabin of Kamov-52 during the capture of Antonov airport

    Introduction of other versions of Ka-52:

    Updated version of Ka-52: Ka-52M helicopter
    In recent years, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the production of a new version of the Ka-52, which was finally known as the Ka-52M in 2018. Ka-52M is actually an updated version of Ka-52, which has undergone changes in terms of system and some equipment. According to the information of the Russian Ministry of Defense, 114 aircraft of this model are to be put into service, and according to the latest information, on January 4, 2023, the Russian army received 10 Ka-52M helicopters.

    The updated version of the Ka-52M helicopter is equipped with the GOES-451M electro-optical system with greater range and better performance. Also, the new OES-52 electro-optical system is used in the Ka-52M helicopter.
    The OES-52 system is functionally similar to the GOES-451 system. The OES-52 houses five sensors: a thermal imaging camera, TV camera, laser rangefinder/designator, laser beam riding for anti-tank guided missiles, as well as a laser spot tracker. However, the weight of this system is 177 kg, which is 43 kg lighter compared to the GOES-451 system, which is 220 kg.

    GOES-451M and OES-52 electro-optic system for Ka-52M

    Stronger undercarriage, improved cockpit ergonomics and better night vision goggles compatibility are other changes and updates to the Ka-52M.

    In terms of armament, the Ka-52M is equipped with Light Multipurpose Guided Surface-to-Air (LMUR) missiles. This missile, which is also known as Izdeliye 305 and Item 305, has a range of 14.5 kilometers and is used to destroy a wide range of ground targets.

    Izdeliye 305 (Item 305) multipurpose air-to-surface guided missile

    In the radar section, the Ka-52M is equipped with the V006 Rezets (cutter) active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar instead of the Arbalet-52 radar. This radar has a fixed 900×300 mm AESA antenna with 640 transceiver modules.
    This radar can detect a group of tanks from 45 km, a railway bridge from 100 km, and a destroyer-class warship from 150 km, according to the manufacturer. In the air-to-air mode, it can detect a fighter aircraft with a radar cross section of 3 sq m from up to 50 km head-on and a hovering helicopter from 20 km. The Rezets radar weighs 130 kg, 10 kg less than the current Ka-52’s FH01 radar and is air-cooled, with an air scoop for cooling seen on the helicopter’s nose fairing.

    V006 Rezets active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar

    In the field of countermeasures and electronic warfare, the Ka-52M President-S integrated protection system has undergone changes and its various components have been improved. In one of the most important components of this section, instead of the L-370-5 Vitebsk system, a more advanced system called L418-5 DIRCM has been used.

    New L418-5 DIRCM system for Ka-52M

    Finally, and perhaps the most important part of the helicopter’s upgrade, is the installation of new systems for the helicopter to adapt to work in the new battlefield command and control system.

    Naval version of Ka-52: Ka-52K Katran helicopter:
    The Ka-52K Katran helicopter is the naval version of the Ka-52 helicopter and is based on the Ka-52 Alligator; But the equipment and systems of this helicopter have been modified according to sea operations and its body is also covered with elastic anti-corrosion coating. Since this helicopter is designed for use on aircraft carriers and warships, its dimensions have become smaller and it has folding blades and wings to occupy less space in the hangar. The length of this helicopter is 13.8 meters and its wingspan is 6.3 meters. The reduction of the wing length in this helicopter has caused the weapon hardpoints to be reduced from 6 to 4.
    The rotor system of Ka-52K is equipped with elastic bearings between the blade and the mast to bear more weight.

    The Ka-52K helicopter is equipped with radio and satellite navigation equipment and provides the possibility of independent landing from the watchtower on the ship’s deck. The helicopter is also optimized with an air conditioning system to perform missions in the humid marine atmosphere. By equipping the KA-52K with advanced avionics systems and powerful weapons, it can be configured for different roles.

    Ka-52K helicopter is equipped with laser beam guidance system and Okhotnik video processing system developed by KRET. The Okhotnik system increases the range of detection and identification for the helicopter.

    Ka-52K helicopters are equipped with Arbalet radar system in early versions. In newer versions, this radar has been changed to active phased array radar. Russian defense contractor Radio-Electronic Technologies’ Active Phased Array (AESA) radar has been developed for the naval version of the Kamov 52 to replace the Arbalet radar. This radar gives the Ka-52K helicopter the ability to fire the Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missile and the Kh-38 missile. The detection range of this radar for large sea targets reaches 180 km.

    It should also be noted that this version, like the regular Ka-52 versions, will be known as the Ka-52KM when it receives new upgrades. The M suffix is used for versions that have received the latest updates.

    Pros and cons of Ka-52 helicopter:

    Pros:
    It’s a multipurpose helicopter and very fast, agile and flexible.
    It provides a good level of armor protection in the cockpit for the pilots.
    It has a wide range of countermeasures and electronic warfare.
    It has 6 hardpoints to carry a wide variety of ammunition.
    It has effective anti-tank capabilities with Vikhr and Ataka missiles.
    It has a very good electro-optical system and a strong weapon management system.
    Cons:
    Small area for locking on with Igla air-to-air missiles
    The firing arc and performance of the 30 mm gun is limited due to its placement on the right side of the helicopter.
    High angles of attack can result in fuel starvation to the engine

    Specifications of K-52 attack helicopter:
    Role: attack helicopter
    First flight: 25 June 1997
    Produced: since 2008
    Length: 15.8 meters
    Height: 4.93 meters
    Large wingspan: 7.8 meters
    Small wingspan: 2.6 meters
    Main rotor diameter: 2 x 14.5 meters
    Main rotor area: 330.3 square meters
    Crew: 2 people
    Empty weight: 7,700 kg
    Maximum take-off weight: 12,200 kg
    Engine: 2 Klimov VK-2500 turboshaft engines, 2,400 horsepower each.
    Internal fuel: 1,870 liters
    External fuel tank: up to 4 tanks and a total of 4,070 liters
    Maximum speed: 315 km/h
    Combat range: 460 km (with internal fuel tank)
    Maximum range: 1100 km (with external fuel tanks)
    Flight ceiling: 5,500 meters (18,000 feet)
    Rate of climb: 12 m/s

    Armament:
    30 mm Shipunov 2A42 cannon, it is possible to mount a 23 mm UPK-23-250 cannon pod (with 240 rounds) on the wings.
    Hardpoints: 6 under-wing hardpoints with capacity of 2,942 kg + 2 double slots at the wingtips for chaff and flare dispensers.

    It is possible to carry a combination of the following weapons:
    Rockets: S-8 80mm rocket pod containing 20 rockets and S-13 122mm rocket pod containing 5 rockets.
    Missiles: Using the APU-6 racks, allows the use of a variety of anti-tank missiles such as the 9K121 Vikhr and Ataka.
    Up to 12 laser guided missiles
    Two Kh-25 laser guided missiles
    In Ka-52K version, anti-ship missile kh-31 and kh-35
    R-73 air-to-air missile
    Bombs: up to 4 bombs weighing 250 kg or 2 bombs weighing 500 kg

    Click to view full size image

    More pictures of Ka-52 attack helicopter:

    “Ka-52 Attack Helicopter” posters in English, Russian, Arabic, Azeri and Kurdish:

    Sources:
    Kamov Ka-50
    Klimov VK-2500
    Npk-spp.ru
    Rostec.ru
    Te.legra.ph
    Cmano-db.com
    Naval technology
    Airforce technology
    Russian helicopters
    Ka-52KM: possible modernization of “Katran
    Thai Military and Asian Region
    Radar warning receiver
    Red Samovar
    Russian Ka-52 with new OES-52
    Egypt Defense Portal
    Russia – Egypt military contracts
    Russian-made Ka-52 in Egypt
    The KA-52 Gunship at Army 2019
    Russia’s Ka-52M to receive AESA radar
    KA 52 How Military Coaxial Helicopter Works
    Wiki.warthunder.com/Ka-52
    Coaxial rotors
    GOES-451

  • Infographic: Airstrikes On Taliban Positions In Afghanistan

    Infographic: Airstrikes On Taliban Positions In Afghanistan

    The sudden withdrawal of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan led to a new chaos in this country, which, in addition to the collapse of Ashraf Ghani’s government and the rise of the Taliban, led to the strengthening of ISIS and increase of the activities of this terrorist group in Afghanistan. Although the US and NATO have apparently left Afghanistan, their previous and current actions are still plaguing this region, and the occasional attacks and flights of their drones have taken away peace from the people of Afghanistan.

    These attacks and flights have started since the spring of 2022 and have been carried out 11 times against different targets in different regions of Afghanistan. The exact cause and details of these attacks have generally not been disclosed to the media by the Taliban and the United States. However, according to available information and ISWNEWS reviews, the details of these attacks are as follows:

    1- Drone attack on Shurabak base (Camp Bastion) in Helmand province, date: March 30, 2022.
    This attack led to several explosions in the weapons warehouse of this base and killed and wounded 30 members of the Taliban. (Possible attacker: the US)

    2- Air attack by unknown fighters on Spera district in Khost province and the border areas of Paktika province, date: April 16, 2022.
    These attacks were carried out on the residences of Pakistani refugees from the North Waziristan region in the villages of Mir Safar and Kurai, and the positions of Pakistani Taliban militants in the areas of Mandete, Amir Sapar, Pakhi Mili and Shakuni in the Spera district of Khost province, which resulted in the death and injury of 40 people from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants. There are no details about the casualties and damages of the air attack on the border areas of Paktika province. (Possible attacker: Pakistan Army)

    3- Drone attack on Tohidabad and Hydarabad bases in Ghazni province, date: May 6, 2022.
    Tohidabad base was called PRT and US troops base during the previous regime and was under the control of NATO forces. This attack was probably carried out to destroy the warehouse of ammunition and military equipment left by foreign forces.
    The Hydarabad base is also the headquarters of the Taliban reserve forces, and this attack has resulted in the death and wounding of 15 armed members of the Taliban reserve unit. (Possible attacker: the US or Pakistan)

    4- Drone attack on Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda terrorist group, in Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood located in the second district of Kabul, date: July 31, 2022
    According to the US claim and the report of local sources, this attack was carried out to assassinate Ayman al-Zawahiri, which led to his death and the wounding of two officials of the Taliban Ministry of Interior. (Attacker: the US).

    5- Drone attack on the Taliban governorate building in Chahar Diwar village located in Andar district of Ghazni province, date: August 6, 2022
    During the previous regime, this place was the joint base of foreign troops and Afghan army soldiers, and during the Taliban period, it became the governorate of Andar district. The casualties and damages of this attack are unknown. (Possible attacker: the US)

    6- Drone attack on Dahouz village in Watapur district in Kunar province, date: August 10, 2022
    According to local sources and considering the previous US attacks on these areas, this village is the hideoutse of the members of Al-Qaeda group or Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. (Possible attacker: the US or Pakistan)

    7- Drone attack on a vehicle carrying “Molavi Haji Ahmad”, the head of the 10th intelligence department of the Taliban, in the three-way of the Habibie school located in the third district of Kabul city, date: September 2, 2022
    This attack led to the death of five Taliban militants, including “Molavi Haji Ahmed”, the head of the 10th intelligence department of the Taliban, and five others, including “Abu Hassan Al-Mujahid” alias “Molavi Hanzala”, a prominent Egyptian member of the Al-Qaeda terrorist group. In this attack, four other members of al-Qaeda, namely Seyyed Mohammad Mobarez, Jahadollah Farahi, Hejrat Qureishi and Abu Omar Logari, who were accompanying “Abu Hasan Al-Mujahid” were also killed. (Possible attacker: the US)

    8- Drone attack on Darghad and Khajeh Bahauddin disricts in Takhar province, date: September 2, 2022
    These attacks were carried out in support of Ahmad Massoud’s forces and led to the death and wounding of several Taliban militants. (Possible attaker: the US or Tajikistan)

    9- Drone attack on the headquarters of the Azam 215th Division in Gereshk district in Helmand province, date: September 8, 2022
    This attack led to the death and wounding of several Taliban militants, including the general commander of the 215th Azam division. (Possible attacker: the US or Pakistan)

    10- Drone attack on Mansouri base 203 in the outskirts of Gardiz, the capital of Paktia province, date: September 8, 2022
    This attack led to an explosion in the weapons warehouse of this base and killed or wounded 10 Taliban militants. (Possible attacker: the US or Pakistan)

    11- Drone attack on Goshtah district in Nangarhar province, date: January 5, 2023
    This attack was carried out on the hideouts of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in Salala village located in Goshtah district in Nangarhar province. The casualties and damages of this attack are unknown. (Attacker: Pakistan Army)

    Read more: Infographic: Anti-Taliban Groups in Afghanistan

    Click to view full size

    “Airstrikes On Taliban Positions In Afghanistan” posters in Persian, Arabic, Kurdish, Azerbaijani, Russian:

  • Infographics: ISIS Operations In 2022

    Infographics: ISIS Operations In 2022

    Publishing infographics is one of the methods that extremist armed groups use in the best way to prove their existence. Meanwhile, it can be said that ISIS is both the pioneer and the most creative in this field. Every week, ISIS publishes an infographic of the results of its operations in the “Al-Naba” weekly newspaper, which seems to have a vital aspect for ISIS, because ISIS can say that it is still present in the field through this weekly constant infographic.

    At the end of each year, one of the media activities of extremist groups is to publish annual statistics in the form of infographics. ISIS, as the leader of these groups, annually publishes a detailed infographic of its operations and their results, which can provide good information compared to previous years’ statistics. Accordingly, at the beginning of 2023, Amaq news agency (affiliated to ISIS) has published a detailed infographic of its operations during the past year (from 2022 to 2023).

    According to the statistics, this terrorist group has carried out 2,058 terrorist operations in different regions of the world in 2022. These operations have killed and injured 6,881 people, including 154 officers and field commanders. The statistics included in this infographic are:

    According to their types, ISIS operations include 579 bombing and roadside bombs, 840 attacks and armed conflicts, 230 assassinations, 152 ambushes, 25 inghimasi and suicide operations and 232 other types. Other results of these operations include the destruction and disabling of 765 vehicles, looting of 100 vehicles, the destruction of 2,310 houses and churches, and the destruction of 156 night vision cameras.

    Most operations have been carried out in Nigeria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Its details by region are as follows:
    Nigeria: 517 operations, 1412 killed and wounded
    Iraq: 484 operations, 833 killed and wounded
    Afghanistan: 181 operations, 1188 killed and wounded
    Syria: 297 operations, 887 killed and wounded
    Congo: 167 operations, 607 killed and wounded
    Mozambique: 156 operations, 331 killed and wounded
    Egypt: 95 operations, 263 killed and wounded
    Pakistan: 58 operations, 118 killed and wounded
    Mali: 22 operations, 827 killed and wounded
    Somalia: 32 operations, 61 killed and wounded
    Niger: 11 operations, 55 killed and wounded
    Chad: 10 operations, 70 killed and wounded
    Cameroon: 7 operations, 29 killed and wounded
    Philippines: 6 operations, 54 killed and wounded
    Burkina Faso: 4 operations, 46 killed and wounded
    Libya: 3 operations, 9 killed and wounded
    Benin: 2 operations, 7 killed and wounded
    India: 2 operations, 4 killed and wounded
    Iran: 1 operation, 60 killed and wounded
    Palestine: 1 operation, 12 killed and wounded
    Yemen: 1 operation, 5 killed and wounded
    Uganda: 1 operation, 3 killed and wounded

    Read more: Infographic: ISIS activity in Syria in 2020

    At the first look at the statistics of 2021 and 2022, we notice that the number of ISIS operations in 2022 is 690 less than in 2021, and this is a sign of the weakening of ISIS in 2022. Also, the number of ISIS victims in 2022 is 1,158 less than in 2021. This decrease also shows that not only the quantity but also the quality of ISIS operations has declined compared to last year.

    In the section of types of operations, we can see that ISIS had a better situation in various types of operations in 2021; The only thing in 2022 that is more than 2021 is the suicide and inghimasi operations, which are only two more. The most important difference in this section is the use of bombs and roadside bombs between 2021 and 2022. In 2022, ISIS used bomb and roadside bombs 486 times less than in 2021. This issue is worthy of consideration considering the significant reduction of ISIS operations in Iraq, because ISIS mostly uses roadside bombs in Iraq.

    With the decrease of using roadside bombs by ISIS, it is natural that the number of vehicles destroyed by ISIS in 2022 will be much less than in 2021, a fact that is clearly visible when comparing the statistics of 2022 and 2021.

    In the meantime, what attracts more attention, is the statistics of destroyed houses and churches in 2022. This increase is due to the targeting of Christians in Mozambique, Congo and Nigeria.

    Another important aspects of the statistics about the regions is the significant reduction of ISIS operations in Iraq. Although ISIS operations in Iraq have increased in recent days, we can see that these operations have decreased in a long-term process. During 2022, ISIS has conducted 643 operations in Iraq less than in 2021. The number of ISIS victims in Iraq this year was 1,260 less than the previous year. This statistic clearly shows that the ISIS strength has decreased in Iraq.

    It is noteworthy, although ISIS operations in Afghanistan, Syria and some other areas have decreased, but this trend has been insignificant. Therefore, the number of “operations” in Nigeria, and the number of “operations and victims” in Chad, Mozambique, Mali, Congo and Pakistan, and the number of “victims” in Syria, Egypt, the Philippines, Burkina Faso, and Libya have increased in 2022.

    In the end, it should be said that despite the reduction of ISIS “operations” in Syria, the number of “victims” in Syria has increased, undoubtedly, this increase is due to ISIS operation on Ghuwairan prison in Hasakah and other ISIS operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The high number of victims in Mali and Burkina Faso is also due to the confrontation of ISIS with Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin and the overall increase of operations and victims in Mozambique, Congo, and Nigeria is also due to the new approach of ISIS to Sub-Saharan Africa, meanwhile, the increase of victims in Egypt and the increase of operations and victims in Pakistan is also interesting.

    ISIS Operations In 2022
  • Military Knowledge: Sukhoi Su-35 Multirole Fighter Jet

    Military Knowledge: Sukhoi Su-35 Multirole Fighter Jet

    The upgrade of the Su-35 kicked off from 1980s, when the Russians started developing the Su-27. The fighter jet was introduced as the Su-27 in the first place; in fact, the Russians sought to manufacture a more powerful version of the Su-27 to improve its maneuverability, Avionics (Aviation Electronic), longer range and more powerful engine of the jet. Thus, the first version of the fighter jet conducted the initial flight in June 1988, and then, 15 Su-27 were manufactured prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

    Following the downfall of the Soviet Union, the Sukhoi Company changed the name of the fighter jet to Su-35 with the aim of attracting purchasers from the global export markets. In 2003, the company initiated the second big upgrade of the fighters and the first flight of the new version took place in February 2008. The aim was to maintain the Russian Air Force fleet up-to-date in order to fill the gap between the fourth and fifth generations of fighter jets as long as the fifth generation of fighters of Russia’s Sukhoi PAK FA would be ready.

    The Su-35 fighter jet is considered as the “fourth generation ++” of the fighter jets, which was seen as the most powerful and the most advanced fighter of Russian aerial superiority before the fifth generation Su-57 in order to carry out different defensive and offensive missions.

    Performing a combined maneuver of the Sukhoi-35, which is a combination of the three techniques of the Cobra maneuver, the hook maneuver to the left and an additional back, shows off the agility and maneuverability of the Sukhoi-35.

    Read more: Military Knowledge: Sukhoi Su-27 Multirole Fighter Jet

    Design and development of Su-35
    The first design of the Su-35 dates back to early 1980s, at the same time when the Su-27 entered service with the Soviet Army. The final version of the Su-27 is identified with the name T-10S. The operation to upgrade the Su-27M began in 1982 and the design was accepted in 1983 with the name T-10M.

    The design of the Su-27M is widely similar to the Su-27; however, when it comes to manufacturing the fuselage of the Su-27M, they used small canards in the fighter jet cabin, which is located slightly ahead of main wings. The usage of canards gives the fighter jet an opportunity to carry out maneuvers of higher intensity, while it does not need any revamp and amplification of the key structure.
    The other transformations to the version comprise longer tail fins, aerial refueling system as well as larger wheels on the front of fuselage of the fighter jet. Other than the abovementioned issues, one of the distinguishing features of the fighter jet is the usage of an up-to-date fire control system.

    The extra powerful turbofan engines and the usage of lightweight composite materials as well as aluminum and lithium alloys are among other features applied in the fighter jet.

    The radar installed on the fighter jet is multi-purpose and able to spot targets on the ground.

    When the N011 Bars radar was installed on the Su-27M for the first time, it transformed the fighter jet from an air defense jet to a multirole fighter. Contrary to the N001 Myech radar, the N011 Bars radar is being installed on the Su-27 and is capable of detecting 10 targets as well as at the same time directing two missiles against merely one target; furthermore, the radar, which is installed on the Su-27M, can detect 15 targets and is capable of engaging with six targets.

    N011 Bars radar

    The Russians installed radar named N012 on the back of the fighter plus the main radar in order to detect missiles fired at the fighter jet. The design was applied on the Su-27M first, and the fighter jet is the first combat plane to be equipped with this sort of capability. In succeeding designs, the radar was detached from the rear of the Su-35 fighter, and the existing Sukhoi-35 fighters do not possess such radars; however, the fighters were equipped with the electronic warfare and jamming systems in the rear section.

    Test and operation of Su-35
    The Sukhoi Company kicked off manufacturing the first aircraft called the T10M-1 in 1987 that was alike in appearance to the T-10S. Sukhoi’s chief pilot Oleg Tsoi carried out the first flight of the aircraft on June 28, 1988.

    Following the manufacturing of two prototypes, the design of the fighter jet was handed over to Russia’s Far East region to be manufactured at the KnAAPO factory. The first real edition of the fighter jet is identified as T10M-3. Actually, the version is the first original edition of Su-27M, which was manufactured by KnAAPO and the aircraft made its first flight in April 1992. At that time, the Soviet Union collapsed and political developments caused delay of the manufacture of the fighter jet, and they manufactured merely two test editions and nine main versions of the fighter until 1995.

    The Su-27M (T10M-3) design was first shown to the public at the Farnborough Airshow in 1992. A third prototype, the T10M-3, was unveiled at the Dubai Air Show in 1993, at which time Sukhoi renamed the fighter to Su-35. The Sukhoi-35 made several air shows over the next few years, including at the MAKS Airshow in 1993 and 1995, as well as the ILA Berlin Air Show in 1994.

    During the Su-35’s flight test and test programs, it was found that the aircraft did not have good control during the cobra and tailslide maneuvers. Therefore, the 11th version of the Su-27M with the model number T10M-11 was made by KnAAPO in 1995 exclusively for the installation of an engine equipped with a thrust vectoring nozzle. Finally, this change ended in the construction of the first and only Su-37 fighter.

    The first and only Sukhoi-37 model

    15 prototypes of the Su-35 fighter (i.e. Su-27M)
    15 prototype versions of Su-27M have been made, which are described in the following order:

    Sukhoi with body number 88

    There is no image of the two prototypes with body numbers 86 and 87.

    Sukhoi with body number 704 was a test bed and there is no picture of it.

    It should be noted that the tenth version of the Su-27M fighter, named T10M-10, was equipped with AL-41F1S engines to perform tests related to the Sukhoi Su-57 fighter. The picture of Sukhoi with body number 710 above is related to this model.

    Sukhoi with body number 711 – this model was equipped with an engine with thrust vectoring nozzle, which eventually became known as the Su-37 fighter.
    Sukhoi with body number 712 – along with 703 were owned by Russian Knights acrobat team for some time.

    First official version: Su-27M/Su-35
    It is a single-seat version known by the code T-10M. The two initial versions of this model are equipped with a different structure in the front part of the body.

    Second official version: Su-37
    It is a technology proof version and it is actually the 11th version of Su-27M which is equipped with flight control system, new cabin, N011M radar and AL-31FP engines equipped with thrust vectoring nozzle.

    Sukhoi 37 fighter engine equipped with a thrust vectoring nozzle

    Third official version: Su-35UB
    It is a two-seat and training version designed and manufactured by KnAAPO factory. This version is known as T-10UBM-1 and is equipped with the same body as Su-30MKK. Also, the tail fins of this fighter are longer than the Su-27M version. The Su-35UB fighter is equipped with the electronic systems of the Su-30MKK fighter. The engines of this version are of AL-31FP type and are equipped with thrust vectoring nozzle. Although the Su-35UB fighter is a trainer aircraft, it has all the capabilities of a full fighter jet.

    Su-35UB fighter

    Fourth official version: Su-35BM
    It is a single-seat version and a redesign of the Su-27. This version has significant changes in the air intakes, the radar of this version has been updated to the N035 Irbis-E type, and also the engines of this version are AL-41F1S, which is equipped with a thrust vectoring nozzle. Another name of this version is T-10BM.

    Fifth official version: Su-35S
    The Sukhoi-35S is a redesign of the T-10BM design for the Russian Air Force and the main operational version of this fighter. “S” stands for the Russian word Stroyevoy meaning “Combatant”.

    Salient features of Sukhoi-35 fighter
    The AL-41F1S Sukhoi-35 engine is equipped with thrust vectoring nozzle. The Su-35’s thrust vectoring system and integrated thrust and flight control systems allow the aircraft to achieve “super-maneuverability” and enable it to perform post-stall maneuvers at low speeds.
    The AL-41F1S engine gives the Su-35 the ability to maintain supersonic speed without the use of afterburners. According to Carlo Kopp of the Australian Air Power think tank, such a “supercruise” feature allows the Su-35 to engage with the enemy at a higher speed and altitude and increase the range of its long-range missiles by 30 to 40 percent.

    The Su-35 fighter uses the powerful N035 Irbis-E passive electronically scanned array radar. This radar has the ability to detect targets from a distance of 400 km. This radar has the ability to identify 30 targets and can engage with 8 targets simultaneously. In addition to the above, the radar has the ability to identify ground targets by providing high-resolution images using synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) mode.

    N035 Irbis-E radar
    The range and ability of the Sukhoi 35 radar to detect other fighters

    According to some sources, the Su-35 fighter has the ability to identify and destroy the F-15 fighter from a distance of 400 km, the F-16 F/A-18 fighter and the Typhoon from a distance of 300 to 350 km, the F-35 fighter from a distance of 60 and the F-22 fighter from a distance of 35 km. The pulse doppler radar of the F-15 fighter has a range of about 175 km.

    The Su-35 fighter is equipped with the L175M Khibiny-M electronic warfare system to deal with the enemy. The system is designed for radio direction-finding and probing signal source irradiation allowing it to distort reflected signal parameters. This system helps to delay aircraft detection; mask the true subject against false reflections; cause range finding difficulties namely in speed and angular positions; degrading maintenance mode TWS when scanning antenna beam radar; and increase the time and difficulty of capturing an object during real-time active scanning.

    Khibiny-M electronic warfare system installed on the wing tips of Sukhoi-35

    In May 2024, new images of the Sukhoi-35 fighter jet were published, which show that this fighter jet is also equipped with the newer L-420 Khibiny-U electronic countermeasures system.

    Read more: Khibiny Electronic Countermeasures System; Russia’s Secret Technology!

    Su-35 is equipped with an OLS-35 optoelectronic targeting system ahead of the cockpit to provide other forms of tracking including infra-red search and track. OLS-35 comprises a heat-seeker, a laser rangefinder/designator and a TV camera along with new algorithms and advanced software to outperform its predecessor installed on the Su-27/Su-30 aircraft family. The OLS-35 provides a coverage of +/-90 in azimuth and +60/-15 in elevation with a target acquisition range for non-afterburning aerial targets of 50 km facing up to target’s front hemisphere and 90 km facing up to rear hemisphere. The laser rangefinder features a five-meter Circular Error Probable (CEP) and ranges up to 20 km for aerial targets and 30 km for targets on the ground.

    OLS-35 advanced infrared search and track (IRST)

    In the cabin section, while the design of the Su-27M cabin had avionics equipment suitable for a multipurpose fighter, but in the flight tests, the inefficiency of the cabin for the effective use of the fighter’s weapons was determined. Therefore, the cockpit and its systems were redesigned and optimized.
    In the new design, the information management system of aircraft’s avionics suite had been changed so that it now has two digital computers which process information from the flight- and weapons-control systems. The information is then displayed on two 9 in × 12 in (23 cm × 30 cm) multi-function liquid crystal displays, which replaced the smaller multi-function cathode-ray tube displays found on the Su-27M. The pilot can also view critical flight information on the head-up display,[42] and is equipped with Hands On Throttle-And-Stick (HOTAS) controls.

    Su-35S cockpit layout: a head-up display, two multi-function liquid crystal displays, and a control stick with HOTAS controls
    A view of the cabin of an early Sukhoi-35

    Sukhoi-35 is equipped with a GSh-30-1 30 mm automatic cannon in the armament section. This fighter has 12 external hardpoints for loading all types of missiles for air, land and sea targets as well as anti-radar missiles. These hardpoints can also load a variety of guided bombs. The arrangement of 12 Hardpoints is as follows: 2 wingtip rails, and 10 wing and fuselage stations with a capacity of 8,000 kg.

    12 hardpoints of the Sukhoi-35 fighter
    The Su-35’s 30 mm GSh-30-1 automatic cannon

    Su-35 export market
    The Sukhoi-35 fighter to attract export customers in Dubai in 1993 and piloted by Viktor Pugachev engaged in an aerial battle with the Su-30MK fighter. After this, the fighter once again flew in air shows in Berlin, Paris and Moscow and showed its features to the public.

    In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Sukhoi had negotiations with South Korean officials to sell the fighter, but the negotiations were unsuccessful. The company also presented its designs to Brazil, China and the UAE.

    Egypt was one of the main customers of Su-35 and ordered 24 of this aircraft to Russia. But this order was canceled due to US threats. The US had threatened Egypt that if it buys fighters from Russia, it will be subject to US sanctions. Also, Indonesia, which had ordered 11 planes of this fighter, along with Algeria, canceled the order and purchase plans of Sukhoi-35 for similar reasons.

    Currently, Russia with 88 and China with 24 planes are among the main users of this fighter.

    According to Sukhoi’s estimate, this company has the ability to sell 160 of these fighters to Latin American countries, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The first order of this fighter was made by the Ministry of Defense of Russia in 2009, which was 64 aircraft.

    A video of the taxi, takeoff, flight and performing a number of maneuvers and landings of the Russian Air Force Sukhoi-35

    Sukhoi Su-35 Specifications:
    Role: Multi-role fighter, air superiority fighter
    Manufacturer: Soviet Union/Russia
    Year of manufacture: Su-27M version from 1987 to 1995 and Su-35S version from 2007 until now
    First flight: Su-27M version in 1988 and Su-35S version in 2008
    Length: 21.9 meters
    Wing length: 15.3 meters
    Height: 5.9 meters
    Crew: 1
    Empty weight: 19,000 kg
    Maximum take-off weight: 34.500 kg
    Engine: 2 Saturn AL-41F1S afterburner turbofan engines
    Maximum speed: 2.400 km/h
    Maximum range: 3.600 km
    Flight ceiling: 18,000 meters (59,000 feet)

    Su-35 Armament:
    Guns: 1 × internal 30 mm Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-30-1 autocannon with 150 rounds

    KAB-500KR and KAB-1500KR and GBU-500T and GBU-1000T TV guided bombs
    KAB-500L, KAB-1500L, GBU-500, and GBU-1000 laser guided bombs
    KAB-500OD guided bomb
    KAB-500S-E satellite guided bomb

    S-25 340 mm rocket

    Vympel R-73 short-range air-to-air missile with a range of 30 km
    All versions of the Vympel R-27 medium-range air-to-air missile with a range of 40 to 170 km
    Vympel NPO R-77 medium-range air-to-air missile with a range of 80 to 200 km
    Vympel R-37M air-to-air missile with a range of 400 km
    Kh-29 air-to-surface missile with a range of 10 to 12 km
    3M-14AE surface-to-air missile with a range of 300 km

    Kh-36 cruise missile with a range of 120 km
    Kh-65SE cruise missile with a range of 600 km
    Kh-SD cruise missile with a range of 300 to 1,900 km

    Kh-31A/AD anti-ship missile with a range of 25 to 105 km
    Kh-59 anti-ship missile with a range of 290 km
    Kh-35U anti-ship missile with a range of 300 km
    3M-54AE1 anti-ship missile with a range of 300 km
    Kh-61 anti-ship missile with a range of 300 to 600 km

    Kh-25MP anti-radar missile with a range of 60 km
    Kh-31P anti-radar missile with a range of 110 km
    Kh-58 anti-radar missile with a range of more than 120 km

    Read more:
    Sukhoi Su-30 Multirole Fighter Jet
    Sukhoi Su-33 Multirole Fighter Jet
    Sukhoi Su-34 Multirole Fighter Jet

    Click to view full size

    More images of Su-35:

    Collection of Sukhoi-35 fighter posters in English, Russian, Arabic, Azeri and Kurdish languages:

    Sources:
    Su27flankerfamily
    Russia’s Su-35 Air Defense Fighter Is a Real Killer
    Sukhoi Su-35

    Key.Aero
    Khibiny (electronic countermeasures system)
    OLS-35

  • Infographic: Saudi Coalition And US Aircraft Losses In Yemen War

    Infographic: Saudi Coalition And US Aircraft Losses In Yemen War

    1- Saudi F15S fighter on March 27, 2015, Gulf of Aden
    2- Saudi AH-64D helicopter on May 7, 2015, Al-Boqa, Saada area
    3- Moroccan F16C fighter on May 10, 2015, Wadi Nashur
    4- Saudi Seeker400 UAV, July 3, 2015, Al-Boqa
    5- Saudi AH-64D helicopter, August 5, 2015, Jizan
    6- Saudi AH-64D helicopter, August 21, 2015, Jizan
    7- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100, August 25, 2015, Makiras, Abyan Province
    8- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100, October 25, 2015, Al-Abdiyah, Marib Province
    9- Bahrain F16C fighter, December 30, 2015, Jizan
    10- UAE MQ-1 Predator UAV, January 19, 2016, Sanaa
    11- Saudi Selex ES Falco UAV, February 3, 2016, Midi, Hajjah province
    12- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100, February 27, 2016, Dhubab, Taiz province
    13- UAE Mirage 2000 fighter, March 13, 2016, Al-Bariqa, Aden
    14- UAE AH-64D UAE helicopter, June 12, 2016, Gulf of Aden
    15- UAE NSA407 helicopter, June 13, 2016, Al-Bariqa, Aden
    16- Saudi AH-64D helicopter, July 25, 2016, Beer Al-Maraziq, Al-Jawf
    17- Saudi Seeker400 UAV, August 16, 2016, Kataf, Saada province
    18- UAE Wing Loong UAV, September 26, 2016, Kholan, Sanaa province
    19- Saudi AH-64D helicopter, December 30, 2016, Najran
    20- US V-22 Osprey Helicopter, January 29, 2017, Al-Baydha province
    21- Saudi SA 365F Helicopter, January 30, 2017, Al-Hudaydah coast (on the Al-Madinah frigate)
    22- UAE MQ-1B Predator UAV, February 14, 2017, Al-Manin, Marib province
    23- Jordanian F16A fighter, February 24, 2017, Najran
    24- Saudi S-70A helicopter, April 18, 2017, Marib province
    25- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100, June 21, 2017, Dhubab, Taiz province
    26- UAE AH-60L helicopter, August 11, 2017, Wadi Amaqin, Shabwa province
    27- Saudi Seeker 400 UAV, August 15, 2017, Al-Boqa, Saada province
    28- US UH-60M helicopter, August 25, 2017, Gulf of Aden
    29- UAE AT-802U aircraft, September 11, 2017, Gulf of Aden
    30- Saudi Eurofighter Typhoon fighter, September 13, 2017, Abyan province
    31- US MQ-9 UAV, October 1, 2017, Sanaa
    32- UAE AH-64D Helicopter, October 17, 2017, Khab and Shaaf, Jawf province
    33- Saudi S-70A helicopter, November 5, 2017, Abha
    34- Saudi Panavia Tornado fighter, January 7, 2018, Kataf, Saada province
    35- Saudi F-15S fighter, March 21, 2018, Saada province
    36- Saudi CH-4B UAV, July 12, 2018, Al-Rabu’ah
    37- Saudi Panavia Tornado fighter, July 12, 2018, Asir
    38- Saudi CH-4B UAV, August 30, 2018, Jizan
    39- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100, September 2, 2018, Al-Jah, Hudaydah province
    40- Saudi AH-64D helicopter, September 14, 2018, Al-Mahra province
    41- Seeker 400 UAE UAV, November 26, 2018, Al-Jabaliya, Hudaydah province
    42- Saudi CH-4V UAV, December 23, 2018, Saada province
    43- US MQ-9 UAV, March 23, 2019, Hamdan, Saada province
    44- Saudi CH-4B UAV, April 11, 2019, Hadhramaut province
    45- UAE Wing Loong, April 19, 2019, Saada province
    46- UAE RQ-1E Predator UAV, May 15, 2019, Bani Matar, Sanaa
    47- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100, June 2, 2019, Hays, Hudaydah area
    48- US MQ-9 UAV, June 7, 2019, Al-Zaafran, Hudaydah province
    49- US MQ-9 UAV, August 20, 2019, Al-Dhamar province
    50- UAE Shiebel Camcopter S-100, November 1, 2019, Raas Issa, Hudaydah province
    51- Saudi AH-64D helicopter, November 29, 2019, Asir
    52- Saudi Wing Loong UAV, November 30, 2019, Hayran, Hajjah province
    53- Saudi Luna X2000 UAV, December 4, 2019, Saada province
    54- Saudi Karayel UAV, December 30, 2019, Al-Salif, Hudaydah province
    55- Saudi CH-4V UAV, January 7, 2020, Khab and Shaaf, Jawf province
    56- Saudi Panavia Tornado fighter, February 14, 2020, Jawf province
    57- Saudi RQ-20 UAV, August 2, 2021, Haradh, Al-Hajjah province
    58- Saudi CH-4B UAV, December 21, 2020, Marib Province
    59- Saudi Karayel UAV, January 6, 2021, Jawf province
    60- Saudi CH-4B UAV, February 12, 2021, Marib province
    61- Saudi Karayel UAV, March 7, 2021, Jawf province
    62- Saudi CH-4B UAV, March 23, 2021, Sarwah, Marib province
    63- Saudi Wing Loong UAV, May 21, 2021, Najran
    64- Saudi CH-4B drone, May 23, 2021, Jawf province
    65- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, June 19, 2021, Marib province
    66- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, June 21, 2021, Marib province
    67- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, August 14, 2021, Madghal, Marib province
    68- Saudi Wing Loong UAV, September 13, 2021, Kataf, Saada province
    69- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, September 27, 2021, Madghal, Marib province
    70- Saudi CH-4 UAV, October 6, 2021, Jubah, Marib province
    71- Saudi RQ-20 UAV, October 7, 2021, at the Jizan border
    72- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, November 9, 2021, Al-Juba, Marib province
    73- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, November 13, 2021, Al-Juba, Marib province
    74- Saudi CH-4 UAV, December 1, 2021, in Al-Amshia area, Amran province
    75- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, December 4, 2021, Al-Juba, Marib province
    76- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, December 8, 2021, Al-Juba, Marib province
    77- Saudi CH-4 UAV, December 8, 2021, Al-Wadi, Marib province
    78- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, December 10, 2021, Sarwah, Marib province
    79- Saudi CH-4 UAV, December 14, 2021, Usaylan, Shabwa province
    80- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, December 16, 2021, Al-Wadi, Marib province
    81- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, December 25, 2021, Yatmah, Khab and Al-Shaaf, Al-Jawf province
    82- UAE Wing Loong UAV, January 5, 2022, Usaylan, Shabwa province
    83- UAE Wing Loong UAV, January 11, 2022, Ain Shabwah province
    84- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, January 29, 2022, Al Juba, Marib Province
    85- Saudi CH-4 UAV, February 10, 2022, Harad, Hajjah province
    86- UAE MQ-1 UAV, February 25, 2022, Al-Jawf province
    87- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, February 25, 2022, Al Juba, Marib Province
    88- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, February 28, 2022, Harad, Hajjah province
    89- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, March 8, 2022, Harad, Hajjah province
    90- Saudi Scan Eagle UAV, March 29, 2022, Al-Wadi, Marib province
    91- Saudi CH-4 UAV, May 4, 2022, Harad, Hajjah province
    92- Saudi Karayel UAV, May 21, 2022, Hayran, Hajjah province
    93- Saudi CH-4 UAV, May 23, 2022, Sana’a, Sana’a province
    94- Saudi Wing Loong UAV, May 24, 2022, Kataf, Saada province

    (Last update on 16 January 2023)

    Click to view full size

    “Saudi Coalition and US Aircraft Losses in Yemen War” poster in Persian, Arabic, Kurdish, Azerbaijani, Russian:

  • Infographic: Iraqi Resistance Groups Operations Against the US in 2022

    Infographic: Iraqi Resistance Groups Operations Against the US in 2022

    In 2022, Iraqi resistance groups carried out 102 IED, drone and rocket attacks against positions, logistical and military convoys of the American occupiers in Iraq, the details of which are as follows:

    Statistics of attacks in different provinces:
    Babil province: 13 attacks
    Qadisiyah Province: 13 attacks
    Baghdad Province: 16 attacks
    Dhi Qar Province: 11 attacks
    Anbar Province: 11 attacks
    Salahuddin Province: 17 attacks
    Muthanna Province: 17 attacks
    Basra Province: 4 attacks
    Erbil Province: 0 attack

    Details of attacks in different parts of Iraq:

    1- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Baghdad and Muthanna by Ulu al-Azm group. Date: 2022-01-04

    2- Drone attack on Ain Al-Asad Airbase with two drones by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-04

    3- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Babil by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-04

    4- Rocket attack on Camp Victory in Baghdad by Saraya Ababil group. Date: 2022-01-04

    5- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Samawah by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-05

    6- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Babil by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-05

    7- Rocket attack on Ain Al-Asad Airbase by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-05

    8- Drone attack on Ain Al-Asad Airbase by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-06

    9- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Basrah by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-06

    10- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Babil and Qadisiyah by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-01-06

    11- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Baghdad’s Yusufiyah and Nabai’ by Liwa Thar al-Muhandis group. Date: 2022-01-09

    12- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Dhi Qar by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-09

    13- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Babil by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-09

    14- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Baghdad’s Abu Ghuraib by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-09

    15- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Qadisiyah by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-01-09

    16- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Muthanna by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-11

    17- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Baghdad’s Yusufiyah by Ulu al-Azm group. Date: 2022-01-11

    18- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Qadisiyah by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-11

    19- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Babil by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-12

    20- IED and rocket attacks on the US logistical convoys in Baghdad by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-13

    21- Drone attack on Balad Airbase in Salahuddin by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-15

    22- IED attack on the US logistical convoy near Jarishan crossing in Basrah by Saraya Olia al-Dam group. Date: 2022-01-16

    23- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Babil and Qadisiyah by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-01-23

    24- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Muthanna by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-23

    25- Rocket attack on Camp Victory in Baghdad by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-28

    26- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Dhi Qar by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-01-30

    27- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Muthanna by unknown group. Date: 2022-01-30

    28- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Dhi Qar by unknown groups. Date: 2022-02-01

    29- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Dhi Qar by unknown groups. Date: 2022-02-06

    30- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Qadisiyah by unknown group. Date: 2022-02-06

    31- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Muthanna by unknown groups. Date: 2022-02-10

    32- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by Liwa Thar al-Muhandis group. Date: 2022-02-10

    33- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by Liwa Thar al-Muhandis group. Date: 2022-02-13

    34- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Dhi Qar and Anbar by unknown groups. Date: 2022-02-22

    35- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Babil by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-02-22

    36- Rocket attack on Camp Victory in Baghdad by unknown group. Date: 2022-03-01

    37- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Muthanna by unknown groups. Date: 2022-03-01

    38- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by unknown group. Date: 2022-03-04

    39- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Dhi Qar by unknown group. Date: 2022-03-08

    40- Three IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Qadisiyah and Dhi Qar by unknown groups. Date: 2022-03-13

    41- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Basrah and Muthanna by unknown groups. Date: 2022-03-15

    42- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by unknown group. Date: 2022-03-17

    43- Rocket attack on Balad Airbase in Salahuddin by unknown group. Date: 2022-03-17

    44- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Dhi Qar by unknown group. Date: 2022-03-27

    45- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Muthanna by unknown group. Date: 2022-04-02

    46- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Babil by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-04-04

    47- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Baghdad and Anbar by Liwa Thar al-Muhandis group. Date: 2022-04-05

    48- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Baghdad by unknown group. Date: 2022-04-05

    49- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Anbar by unknown group. Date: 2022-04-07

    50- Three IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Babil, Dhi Qar and Qadisiyah by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-04-07

    51- Drone attack on Ain al-Asad Airbase in Anbar by unknown group. Date: 2022-04-08

    52- Three IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Salahuddin, Dhi Qar and Qadisiyah by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-04-10

    53- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Baghdad and Babil by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-04-14

    54- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Muthanna and Babil by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-04-18

    55- Two IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Baghdad and Qadisiyah by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-04-21

    56- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Muthanna by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-04-23

    57- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Anbar by Ashab al-Kahf group. Date: 2022-04-24

    58- Rocket attack on Ain al-Asad Airbase in Anbar by International Resistance Faction group. Date: 2022-04-30

    59- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Qadisiyah by unknown group. Date: 2022-05-11

    60- Three IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Muthanna and Qadisiyah by Katibat al-Sabequn group. Date: 2022-05-15

    61- Four IED attacks on the US logistical convoys in Muthanna, Babil and Dhi Qar by unknown group. Date: 2022-05-19

    62- Drone attack on Camp Victory in Baghdad by unknown group. Date: 2022-05-24

    63- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by unknown group. Date: 2022-05-26

    64- Rocket attack on Ain al-Asad Airbase in Anbar by International Resistance Faction group. Date: 2022-05-31

    65- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by Liwa Thar al-Muhandis group. Date: 2022-06-05

    66- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Baghdad by unknown group. Date: 2022-06-09

    67- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by unknown group. Date: 2022-06-12

    68- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by International Resistance Faction group. Date: 2022-06-12

    69- IED attack on the US logistical convoy near Jarishan crossing in Basrah by unknown group. Date: 2022-06-26

    70- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by unknown group. Date: 2022-07-03

    71- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by International Resistance Faction group. Date: 2022-07-19

    72- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by unknown group. Date: 2022-07-21

    73- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by unknown group. Date: 2022-07-31

    74- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by Liwa Thar al-Muhandis group. Date: 2022-08-21

    75- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Salahuddin by unknown group. Date: 2022-08-23

    76- IED attack on the US logistical convoy in Muthanna by unknown group. Date: 2022-08-25

    Click to view full size

    Read more:
    Infographic: Iraqi Resistance Groups Operations Against the US in 2021
    Infographic: Iraqi Resistance Groups

    “Iraqi Resistance Groups Operations Against the US in 2022” collection of posters in Arabic, Kurdish, Azeri, Russian: