Yemeni forces have not yet entered the Khawr Umayrah settlement, but they are deployed around it and on the Kharaz heights and can target the coastal road with anti-armor missiles and artillery munitions. Therefore, Saudi coalition forces in Ras al-Arah and on the eastern front of the Bab al-Mandab Strait have officially been encircled.
In recent days, Ansarallah forces had repeatedly cut the aforementioned road with guerrilla attacks and hit-and-run tactics, but since yesterday this route has been completely cut off. It should be noted that a number of Saudi coalition forces fled toward Aden in recent days from the areas that were being besieged. However, after the encirclement was completed, a significant number of forces have been trapped in the Yemeni Army’s siege. No final decision has yet been made regarding the fate of these forces. It is possible that the coalition forces will withdraw from the area with the Yemeni Army’s permission, or there is the possibility of their complete capture.
According to the latest field reports in southwestern Lahij Governorate, Yemeni armed forces and popular committees, after pushing back Al-Amaliqa and Tariq Saleh’s forces from the al-Sarih junction, succeeded in clearing the al-Fasayha area. Tariq Saleh’s forces have currently withdrawn from this axis, and Al-Amaliqa forces are resisting Yemeni Army attacks in the Huwayrib and Kharaz areas.
Yemeni forces have also attacked from the Durad axis toward the Ghayl al-Barir and al-Adidiyah areas, which has not yet yielded definitive results.
On the eastern axis of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the 17th Brigade of the Al-Amaliqa forces has withdrawn from the al-Saqiya area, and as of this moment, no reliable news has been received of Yemeni forces entering this area.
Last night’s Yemeni Army operation on this axis was a combination of media warfare, missile attacks on the Kharaz and Ras al-Arah bases, and a ground assault. The dissemination of news of a large-scale withdrawal from Ras al-Arah was in this context, and this has not materialized on the battlefield as of this moment.
Yemeni armed forces are currently 25–30 kilometers from the coastal road and the waters of the Gulf of Aden.
If Yemeni armed forces succeed in securing the three aforementioned points, Saudi coalition forces in the Ras al-Arah area and the eastern front of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait will be completely encircled, with no option but to surrender or flee to the sea!
The Saudi coalition is not in a favorable position on the western axis of Lahj Governorate. This dire situation stems from successive defeats in the Kahbub heights, effective missile and drone strikes on military gatherings and equipment, and the wounding of Major General Hamdi Shukri, commander of the Fourth Military Region of the forces of the resigned government, in a Yemeni Army missile attack on the Madariba district administration building in the Ras al-Arah area. In one of the Yemeni Army’s drone attacks, Bilal Shakir Shukri, one of the commanders of the Al-Amalika forces and nephew of Hamdi Shukri, was also killed. Therefore, the collapse of this front in the coming days is certain, and we will soon witness another victory for the resilient people of Yemen.
Brigadier General Yahya Saree, in a statement on this operation, announced that Saudi fighter jets this week carried out more than 450 airstrikes using F-15 and Typhoon fighter jets from the Khamis Mushait and Taif bases against the areas of Taiz, Lahij, Al-Jawf, Hajjah, Marib, Saada, and Al-Bayda, which led to the martyrdom and wounding of civilians.
The Yemeni armed forces, in the face of this brutal aggression, succeeded in downing an F-15 fighter jet in the skies over Marib province, which was carrying out hostile operations to support the enemy’s military movements in Taiz and Marib. This fighter jet was downed using a Yemeni surface-to-air missile.
Also, the Yemeni armed forces, during an air defense operation, targeted two groups of Saudi fighter jets that were searching for the wreckage of the downed fighter jet and drove them away from the skies over Marib.
Brigadier General Yahya Saree also rejected the false claims of the Saudi regime regarding targeting Mecca, and stated that it is the Saudis who have polluted this holy site with corruption and immorality, and there is no danger from Yemen to the holy sites, because Yemen’s operations only target oil facilities and military bases.
According to statistics collected by the IWN, this fighter jet is the third F-15 of its kind to be downed during the Yemen war. Therefore, the number of aircraft destroyed by the Saudi-American coalition during the Yemen war has reached 133.
Yahya Saree, spokesman for the Yemeni armed forces, stated that in this operation, weapons depots and command-and-control rooms that were managing the aggression against Yemen and its people were targeted at the Saudi military base in the Sharorah area with a large volley of ballistic missiles and combat drones, and—thanks to God—the strikes were precise and direct.
The Al-Wadiah crossing and the Sharorah area north of it, in northern Yemen, constitute the primary land route for logistical supply of Saudi coalition forces in the occupied areas of Yemen. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Yemeni army has, through precise monitoring of coalition force movements and gatherings, delivered accurate and effective blows to the enemy’s rear. These targeted strikes undermine the operational capability of Saudi mercenaries to conduct any offensive operations.
Ansar Allah Yemen has announced that the passage of all vessels—except Saudi vessels—through this waterway is unimpeded. This decision was made within the framework of the “siege for siege” equation, and as long as the oppressive siege by the Saudi kingdom against the Yemeni people continues, the Yemeni army will likewise continue its siege and pressure on Saudi Arabia.
The latest field reports indicate that Saudi coalition forces, following widespread retreats, have now concentrated along the coastline approximately 40 kilometers east of Bab al-Mandab, around Ras al-Arah. Today, Yemeni armed forces and Ansar Allah struck a gathering of forces at Ras al-Arah with a ballistic missile, resulting in an unspecified number of Saudi coalition forces being killed and wounded in the area.
On the other hand, Saudi warplanes are heavily bombarding important areas recently liberated by Yemeni armed forces in order to prevent further advances by the Yemeni army. Today, they once again bombed Mount al-Omari near Dhubab, Dhubab town, the Khalid ibn al-Walid base at the Al-Mokha junction, Al-Mokha port, and Al-Khawkhah.
Newly released satellite imagery of the targeted facilities reveals extensive damage. The damage is so severe that repairs and reopening will require a considerable amount of time. Therefore, the Saudi Energy Ministry’s claim attributing the shutdown to precautionary measures is fundamentally incorrect!
For example, the imagery you are viewing pertains to Al-Dhukra station and Al-Masba’ah station southeast of Medina. In the image, Al-Masba’ah station has sustained very heavy damage.
‼On the other hand, in a surprising move, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement accusing Iraqi groups of attacking the East-West pipeline! In the released statement, it is claimed that the East-West pipelines in the Riyadh and Medina regions were attacked by drones launched from Iraqi territory. It is also claimed that the Saudi kingdom will currently not respond to the attacks by Iraqi groups, in order to give the Iraqi government an opportunity to deal with these groups.
Regardless of who carried out these attacks, the reality of the matter is that there is no difference between the Yemeni army and Ansar Allah, Iraqi resistance groups, Iran, and others. They all stand together as a single hand on one front, jointly fighting against their enemies. Wherever necessary, tactics change, and each component will carry out its duties as required. It is not acceptable for Saudi Arabia to be a partner and accomplice with America in oppressing the people of Iran and Yemen, and on the other hand, escape this war unscathed! If it diverts the Strait of Hormuz to serve America, then it should expect the missiles and drones of the Resistance—no matter from which direction they come, it makes no difference. The tactics of war have changed!
With these downings, the number of drones destroyed by the Yemeni army during the recent clashes has reached 11 units. This tally includes four Wing Loong drones (Chinese-made), three MQ-9 drones (U.S.-made), one CH-4 drone (Chinese-made), one Karayel drone (Turkish-made), one Akıncı drone (Turkish-made), and one ScanEagle drone (U.S.-made).
Furthermore, according to estimates by Islamic World News (IWN), the total number of aircraft downed during the Yemen war has reached 131 units, of which 13 are Wing Loong drones and 17 are CH-4 drones.
1- On January 29, Danny Danon, the representative of the Israeli regime to the United Nations, stated during a United Nations Security Council session that resistance groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Ansar Allah, are sources of exporting violence, hatred, and terrorism, claiming they operate with Iran’s financial support. Danon went on to display the flag of the Ansar Allah movement and alleged that Yemenis are not fighting for land or borders, but that their actions are ideologically motivated. He argued that this is clearly reflected in their flag and slogans (“God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse upon the Jews, Victory to Islam”).
2- Aden: On January 31, a military convoy composed of Saudi commanders and American diplomats arrived in recent days at Aden International Airport and Al Anad Air Base in Lahij Governorate. The purpose of the visit was reportedly to clear both sites of any old Russian weapons or technologies and to prepare the bases for the deployment of modern defense systems, as well as the establishment of a joint operations room to support the new security structure of the American-Saudi coalition. Saudi and American estimates suggest that the Yemeni Armed Forces may enter the fray in the event of a potential U.S.–Iran confrontation and carry out military operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian and Red Seas.
On February 15, Hani Masour, a media figure affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council and based in Abu Dhabi, claimed that STC forces remain deployed at their military positions in Ras Abbas, Al-Jalaa, and Badr base, as well as at the port of Aden, the city’s exit gates, and government institutions in Khormaksar district.
Officials of the resigned Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia have not addressed the remaining positions under STC control or clarified their status. Only some of their affiliated media outlets have spoken of full control by government forces over the southern regions. The continued presence of STC fighters in and around Aden indicates a cessation of hostilities between the resigned government and southern factions, with the situation formally under government control; however, this arrangement remains fragile, and renewed southern action could once again drag Aden and southern Yemen into unrest and conflict.
3- Hizam al-Assad, a member of the political bureau of Ansar Allah, stated that “the movement’s patience regarding the crimes of the Zionist regime in Gaza is nearing its end, and they will deliver an unexpected response.” He warned that continued violations of the Gaza ceasefire could lead to a broad escalation of tensions across the region and return the situation to conditions more dangerous than before.
4- Abyan: On February 1, unidentified gunmen attacked a vehicle belonging to the 6th Saeqa Brigade, affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council, in Al-Mahfad district in eastern Abyan Governorate. The individuals targeted were reportedly residents of Al-Dhale Governorate who were returning to their hometown following the dissolution of the STC. The attack was most likely carried out by elements linked to the terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Southern factions have consistently alleged that Al-Qaeda receives support from Saudi Arabia and that current efforts are aimed at suppressing tribes in Al-Dhale, Lahij, and Abyan—considered key backers of southern movements—to prevent any party or faction from reviving the idea of South Yemen.
5- Al-Bayda: On February 3, Sheikh Hazam al-Aji al-Mansouri, one of the prominent sheikhs of the Al-Ghanim tribes in the Qayfa area of Al Bayda Governorate, was assassinated after performing the Maghrib prayer. Some local sources claim the killing was carried out by an individual named Hassan Qarda al-Mansouri, reportedly active within security institutions affiliated with the Sana’a government. Sheikh al-Mansouri was regarded as a moderate tribal leader who played an important role in mediating peace among tribes in Al-Bayda and in preventing extremist infiltration in areas under his influence. The assassination does not appear to be directly linked to Ansar Allah, but rather seems to have resulted from a personal dispute or possible extremist infiltration within local forces aligned with the Sana’a authorities.
6- Taiz: On February 2, officials of the Yemeni government (backed by Ansar Allah) prevented an aircraft from landing at Al Mokha (Mocha) Airport, which is under the control of forces loyal to Tareq Saleh. This move was in line with a decision by Yemenia Airways in Sana’a banning flight operations at Al Mokha Airport and rejecting its designation as an alternative to Taiz Airport. Al Mokha Airport had been built with support from the United Arab Emirates to strengthen Tareq Saleh’s forces against Ansar Allah. However, Ansar Allah forces maintain significant oversight of Yemen’s western coastline and, through limited military measures, could easily suspend the airport’s operations.
7- Hadhramaut: On February 3, unidentified gunmen attacked positions of the Al-Dera’ Al-Watan forces and Saudi army personnel in the Al-Kharkhir area along Yemen’s northeastern borders. This marked the first armed attack on forces affiliated with the resigned government in these areas and resulted in several Al-Dera’ Al-Watan fighters being killed and wounded. The identity of the attackers remains unknown, though tribal fighters opposed to Saudi Arabia are suspected to have carried out the assault.
8- Al-Dhale: On February 4, following a drone strike by the Saudi army targeting Southern Transitional Council militants at a base in the city of Al-Dhale in southern Yemen, one southern fighter was killed and two others were wounded. Despite the forced dissolution of the Southern Transitional Council, its militants remain active in various southern provinces, including Al-Dhale, Lahij, and Abyan. So far, these forces have not engaged in armed confrontation or opposition against Saudi-backed officials or the resigned government, though they still maintain a presence in certain positions. This was the second Saudi airstrike against southern positions and gatherings in Al-Dhale province, indicating close monitoring of their movements by Saudi aircraft.
9- Sana’a: On February 3, according to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries of the Yemeni government, Eritrean naval forces directly opened fire with live ammunition on Yemeni boats and fishermen within Yemen’s territorial waters in the Red Sea. The attack resulted in several fishermen being killed or wounded and others detained. Separately, Somalia detained Yemeni fishermen from Hadhramaut province while fishing off the coast of Bosaso and confiscated their boats and catch. The Sana’a government described the actions of Eritrea and Somalia as a dangerous escalation and held the governments of those countries responsible for the detained fishermen.
Such actions by Eritrea and Somalia in Yemen’s maritime boundaries—particularly against Yemeni fishermen—have occurred repeatedly in the past.
10- Oman: On February 7, new round of negotiations between representatives of the Yemeni government, Saudi Arabia, and the resigned government, under the supervision of the United Nations, was held in Amman, the capital of Jordan. During this round, the parties reviewed the list of prisoners to be exchanged under the December 2 agreement. According to the agreement reached in Oman, in the first phase, 1,700 Ansar Allah prisoners will be exchanged for 1,200 prisoners of the resigned government, along with seven Saudi and 23 Sudanese detainees. In light of recent regional developments and escalating tensions between Iran and the United States, implementation of the agreement has effectively become tied to the resolution of those tensions. Arab countries view the Iran–U.S. issue as fundamental and beyond the Yemen file, and their alignment with Western policies has led to their agreements being defined within that broader framework.
On February 10, Ali Ardeshir Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, met and held talks with Mohammed Abdulsalam, head of the Yemeni government’s negotiation delegation. The two sides discussed the latest regional developments, the situation in Yemen, and ways to enhance stability and security in the region.
In the 21st century, Persian Gulf countries have set ambitious geopolitical objectives, heavily relying on their rich oil revenues. As this trend continues and the oil market remains volatile, diversifying income sources becomes essential. Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030,” which focuses on expanding the non-oil sector and investing in foreign assets, aligns with this goal. Consequently, as oil resources decline, the Persian Gulf nations are aiming to diversify their economies and safeguard key assets like ports and farmland. The 2008 global financial crisis further accelerated this effort, prompting the Gulf countries to make significant investments in the Horn of Africa to broaden their economic bases.
Recently, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Gateway Terminal (RSGT) signed a 30-year contract with Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA) to operate and develop the port of Tajoura. RSGT aims to turn Tajoura into a major multi-purpose terminal, expecting it to handle five million tons of cargo annually, strengthening its role as a gateway for Ethiopian imports and exports. However, there has been a shift from purely economic involvement to more direct political and military actions, with Gulf states establishing military bases and brokering peace in the region. Saudi Arabia’s strategy in the Red Sea focuses mainly on security, evident in its diplomatic and military moves such as a 2017 defense agreement with Djibouti and a 2018 peace treaty between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Its leadership in creating the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Council in 2020 underscores its commitment to regional security cooperation. Riyadh’s presence in the Horn of Africa appears aimed at controlling the Red Sea to counter threats, especially from Yemen’s Ansarullah. It’s noteworthy that Western media claim Yemen’s Ansarullah and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab are cooperating in arms shipments.
UAE Movements While the UAE and Saudi Arabia often pursue Western strategies in various regions, this has occasionally caused rivalry, as seen in Sudan and eastern Yemen. Consequently, much of the UAE’s effort to expand influence in the Horn of Africa revolves around controlling western Yemen to attain its objectives in the oil-rich Hadramaut area. This region has recently become a conflict zone involving tribes near Saudi Arabia. The UAE has adopted a more assertive approach, establishing a strong military and economic footprint across the Horn of Africa. Over the last ten years, it has developed military bases in Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Its air base in Assab, Eritrea, symbolizes Abu Dhabi’s commitment to maintaining a lasting presence in the area. Although this base was later dismantled, the UAE’s control over port rights in Mukalla, Aden, and Berbera indicates its strategic goal of dominating maritime routes and influencing the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden regions.
In fact, the events in Yemen and the Horn of Africa are closely linked. Growing influence in this region could enhance Yemen’s power by diminishing Ansar Allah’s influence. Interestingly, the Emirates’ ambitions appear more aggressive and far-reaching than Riyadh’s. They are even prepared to collaborate closely with the Zionist regime in this area. Recently, Western media have reported that Iran and Yemen’s Ansar Allah are gaining influence in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. This situation has prompted the Emirates and the Zionist regime to adopt a more coordinated strategy to address the issue. Some sources suggest that, along with Ethiopia, these two regimes have formed a secret alliance in the region.
Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki recently made surprising statements, blaming the current Yemen crisis on the militarization of the country’s islands. He also emphasized that coastal nations should be responsible for securing the Red Sea, rather than relying on foreign military bases. His primary concern is the potential establishment of a military base on Yemen’s “Zaqr” island by the Emirates, which could pose a serious threat to Eritrea if completed. The presence of the Zionist regime via the Emirates on Yemeni islands threatens regional sovereignty and international interests. These actions form a dangerous shadow alliance that endangers Yemen’s sovereignty and risks transforming it into a shared military domain of the regime and Abu Dhabi.
Another key point near the Emirates axis involves Somaliland, which is strongly supported by the Zionists and Ethiopia, each with different aims. Ethiopia sees Somaliland as a route to the sea to further its economic ambitions. Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv aim to establish a base there, possibly to target Yemen’s Ansarullah.
Along with security concerns, the Emirates also aims to achieve its economic objectives, emphasizing food security. The region’s potential for agriculture and its proximity to the Gulf states make it appealing as a source of essential foods. The Horn of Africa plays a critical role in the Gulf states’ food security due to its fertile land and established trade routes. The Gulf region relies heavily on food imports, obtaining 85 percent of its staple foods from other countries.
The Southern Transitional Council’s sinister plan for Ansar Allah Besides the explanations about the UAE’s regional influence, the Times reports that a delegation from the Southern Transitional Council recently visited Tel Aviv. They expressed willingness to recognize the “Israeli regime” (supporting the Zionist regime) and to sign the “Abraham Pact” in favor of Trump. However, this is conditional on the Zionist regime and the US participating in a joint ground (Southern Transitional Council) and air (Zionist regime and US) attack on Yemen’s Ansar Allah as a “common problem,” and on the Southern Transitional Council being able to establish the country of “South Yemen.”
Conclusion Generally, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s roles in the Horn of Africa involve both competition and cooperation. While they share the goal of countering Iran and Yemeni AnsarAllah’s influence, they also have significant disagreements, as dominance in this region can boost their rivalry over Yemeni oil resources. The main reasons for their presence in the Horn of Africa can be summarized as follows:
1- As the new global order emerges with multipolarity and diminishing US influence, Washington is delegating its objectives to other regions. Boosting the presence of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the Zionist regime aligns with US interests. Similarly, recognizing Somaliland in exchange for permission to establish a military base fits this pattern.
2- The Persian Gulf countries’ involvement in the Horn of Africa and the broader Red Sea region is driven by security needs and economic ambitions. Heightened security concerns have increased the region’s importance, especially as Iran’s influence, supported by the “axis of resistance” and strengthened by the Yemeni war, extends to the Horn of Africa. Naval bases serve as strategic footholds, broadening the Persian Gulf’s influence over regional politics and economics. Recently, Western media have suggested cooperation between Ansar Allah and Somali al-Shabaab, despite their differing motives.
3- Gaining control over the Horn of Africa allows influence into East, North, and even the Sahel regions of Africa. For instance, without Eritrean cooperation, access to trade routes leading to the Sudanese port would be difficult. Cooperation with Ethiopia could expand influence in Central and East Africa. However, Egypt, an Arab country typically aligned with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, often holds opposing views in this region, which may impact future political dynamics.
On February 12, a passenger vehicle was struck by an unidentified drone along the coast of the city of Al-Ghaydah, the capital of Al-Mahrah province. As a result of the attack, one or two unidentified individuals were killed. It is believed that one of them may have been a Somali national with a background in either Al-Qaeda or ISIS. A Yemeni source identified the two individuals as Abdullah Abdulrazzaq, originally from Somalia, and Mohammed al-Hammami, a resident of Sana’a.
Images released by local sources indicate that the missile used in the strike was a Ninja missile (AGM-114 Hellfire), reportedly deployed by U.S. drones. The United States uses this missile in highly specific targeted operations. Previously, it had only been employed in assassinations in Syria and in one case in Lebanon. Therefore, this marks the first reported use of the Ninja missile in U.S. operations in Yemen.
U.S. drones also conducted two additional operations in Marib province on 25 January and 4 February, though official details have not been released. According to local sources, the first strike involved three missiles fired at a house in the Al-Kharashi area north of Marib city, killing three Al-Qaeda members from the Al-Qayfa area in Al-Bayda province. The second attack targeted a gathering of four Al-Qaeda members — Idris al-Masri, Abu Saleh Ibrahim al-Banna, Battar al-San’ani, Homam al-San’ani, and the son of Khaled Batarfi — in the Arq Al Shabwan area northeast of Marib city.
According to statistics reported by Western media regarding U.S. airstrikes in Yemen over the past two decades, more than 390 operations have been carried out against Al-Qaeda members in the country.
The pace of U.S. air operations in Yemen over the past three months has increased significantly compared to the previous two years, including the period following the inauguration of Donald Trump. Over the last three months alone, seven operations have been conducted — six in Marib and one in Al-Mahrah. In terms of timing, one operation took place in November, three in December, and three up to February 12. Since the beginning of these operations — marked by the assassination of Abu Ali al-Harithi on November 5, 2002 — the stated objective of the United States has been to counter Al-Qaeda activities. Since then, more than 1,600 individuals have reportedly been killed under this pretext.
Media outlets aligned with the exiled government claim that STC supporters fired toward the governorate building and attempted to seize it, prompting security forces to respond.
Protests by supporters of the Southern Transitional Council against the exiled government have spread across most southern Yemeni cities after the council—and the United Arab Emirates—announced opposition to the newly formed cabinet headed by Shaea al-Zindani. Ataq is among the cities where these demonstrations escalated into clashes and the reported killing of protesters.