Tag: Saudi Arabia

  • Yemeni Armed Forces Destroyed Two More Saudi Drones

    Yemeni Armed Forces Destroyed Two More Saudi Drones

    With these downings, the number of drones destroyed by the Yemeni army during the recent clashes has reached 11 units. This tally includes four Wing Loong drones (Chinese-made), three MQ-9 drones (U.S.-made), one CH-4 drone (Chinese-made), one Karayel drone (Turkish-made), one Akıncı drone (Turkish-made), and one ScanEagle drone (U.S.-made).

    Furthermore, according to estimates by Islamic World News (IWN), the total number of aircraft downed during the Yemen war has reached 131 units, of which 13 are Wing Loong drones and 17 are CH-4 drones.

  • Digital Infrastructure Diplomacy in West Asia

    Digital Infrastructure Diplomacy in West Asia

    Saudi Arabia is considering replacing the Zionist regime route with a Syrian route for the fiber optic cable connecting the kingdom to Greece via the Mediterranean Sea—a decision that goes beyond a mere technical or economic choice, reflecting a shift in the region’s geopolitical alignments. Riyadh’s insistence on routing the cable through Syria indicates its intention to bolster Damascus’s regional standing while simultaneously politically distancing itself from Israel in the wake of the Gaza war developments.

    Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has adopted a tough stance against Israel, which has provided the political groundwork for this shift. At the same time, the growing disagreements between Riyadh and the UAE over issues such as Yemen, Sudan, and Red Sea security have added a new competitive dimension to this decision.

    The selection of Syria could contribute to the country’s economic reintegration into the region and enhance its geo-economic position in the Eastern Mediterranean, while Israel’s exclusion from this potential corridor would weaken its standing in the race to become an energy and data hub. On the other hand, Greece—particularly Athens—is striving to position itself as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East in the fields of energy, real estate, and artificial intelligence, and this project could strengthen its role in the new regional connectivity architecture. Overall, this plan symbolizes the transition from traditional energy geopolitics to data geopolitics and digital infrastructure, and could influence the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arab world.

    Background
    Within the framework of the broader “East-to-Mediterranean Data Corridor” strategy, a joint fiber optic cable project between Saudi Arabia and Greece has been designed. The project is being pursued with the participation of major companies, including STC, PPC, OTA, and TTSA. The aim of this initiative is to establish a high-capacity data transmission route between the Persian Gulf and Europe via the Mediterranean, providing complementary digital infrastructure for energy and technology cooperation between the two regions.

    The key development in this project is Riyadh’s shift from the proposed route through Israel to the alternative option via Syria. This change is not merely technical or economic, but rather a reflection of the geopolitical realignment in Saudi Arabia’s peripheral environment. In recent years, growing rifts have emerged between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over issues such as Yemen, Sudan, and Red Sea security.

    From a Saudi perspective, the increasing convergence between the regime and the UAE could shift the regional influence balance against Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the selection of a new route for the fiber optic cable is seen as part of a strategy to reduce dependence on the Israel–UAE axis. This decision also carries multi-layered implications for Greece. Athens has established close strategic ties with Israel in recent years and has pursued extensive cooperation in energy and Eastern Mediterranean security. However, Greece is simultaneously seeking to position itself as a hub connecting Europe and West Asia in the fields of energy, real estate, logistics, and artificial intelligence. Thus, whether Athens accepts or rejects Riyadh’s proposed new route could affect the balance of its relations with the Zionist regime and place Greece in a geopolitical dilemma. From a technical perspective, fiber optic cables—transmitting data in milliseconds via optical pulses—form the backbone of the global digital economy. With the expansion of artificial intelligence and the growing need for big data processing, Gulf countries are making substantial investments in data centers and communication infrastructure to transform themselves, beyond their traditional role as oil and gas exporters, into key players in Europe’s data and digital services market.

    Overall, the rerouting of the cable is not merely an infrastructure decision but part of the geo-economic and geopolitical competition in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. This development could affect coalition formations, digital connectivity routes, and even regional security equations, serving as an indicator of a new phase in Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with the UAE–Israel axis over strategic data infrastructure.

    Analysis and Findings:

    • Strategic Shift: Saudi Arabia’s efforts to include Syria in major infrastructure projects—particularly in telecommunications and data connectivity—are part of Riyadh’s broader strategy to reshape the regional order. By leveraging its financial capacity and foreign investment, Saudi Arabia aims to turn Damascus into a hub for road, rail, and digital transit between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. This approach pursues two simultaneous goals: strengthening potential allies and rebuilding Syria’s geopolitical position, while creating a balance against the growing influence of the UAE and the Zionist regime around the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, the announcement by Saudi Arabia’s Investment Council of approximately $800 million in telecommunications infrastructure investment in Syria carries an important geopolitical message. According to Saudi Arabia’s official news agency, the project involves establishing a fiber optic network spanning over 4,500 kilometers aimed at “regional and international connectivity for Syria.” Such a project is not merely an economic endeavor but a redefinition of Syria’s role as a connectivity node in the new regional connectivity architecture. Trend analysis shows that from Riyadh’s perspective, Damascus lies at the heart of a “connectivity-oriented” strategy—roads, rail lines, and fiber optic cables must pass through Syrian territory to solidify the link between the Persian Gulf and Europe. This perspective transforms Syria from a security dossier into a geo-economic asset. In other words, Riyadh is seeking to revive Syria’s role in the regional value chain by investing in both hard infrastructure (roads, rail, cables) and soft infrastructure (data networks). From a regional competition perspective, the inclusion of Syria in these projects comes at the expense of excluding or downplaying the Zionist regime’s role in data connectivity routes. This signifies a tangible shift in Saudi Arabia’s strategic calculations. In 2022, discussions on normalizing relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv were at their peak, but subsequent regional developments—particularly escalating geopolitical rivalries and shifting coalition alignments—have moderated this approach. Today, Saudi Arabia’s priority is not symbolic convergence with Israel but consolidating its independent position in the regional connectivity architecture.
    • Widening Saudi–UAE Rift: According to narratives close to decision-making circles in Riyadh, including statements by Al-Tuwaijri, the rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is not a transient disagreement but the result of accumulated strategic grievances across several regional files. From a Saudi perspective, Abu Dhabi—through its financial power and proxy networks—has sought to become a small state with outsized influence in its immediate environment, which has conflicted with Riyadh’s geopolitical interests. In the Yemen file, the Saudi narrative holds that the UAE’s presence within the Arab coalition began with Riyadh’s invitation, but Abu Dhabi gradually deviated from declared objectives and supported separatist movements in the south. This perception is echoed in Sudan, where documented UAE military support for the Rapid Support Forces is seen as an effort to deepen internal divisions and consolidate Abu Dhabi’s influence. Likewise, in Somaliland, UAE support for quasi-state structures in northern Somalia is viewed by Saudi Arabia as another indication of a policy of environmental influence independent of Arab coordination. In Tunisia, concrete instances include the provision of armored equipment to opposition movements to undermine democratic processes. This narrative, within the Saudi framework, portrays the UAE as an interventionist actor in the internal affairs of Arab countries—an approach Riyadh considers contrary to the principles of Arab solidarity. In terms of identity and relative power, this narrative depicts the UAE as a smaller actor geographically, demographically, and economically that has at times sought to punch above its weight. This perspective is linked to recent economic developments in Saudi Arabia, where major economic transformation programs have led to a gradual shift of capital and international companies from Dubai and Abu Dhabi to Riyadh. In this context, economic competition is said to have fueled geopolitical rivalry and heightened mutual sensitivities. Regarding the relationship between the two leaders, recalling Mohammed bin Zayed’s role in bolstering Mohammed bin Salman’s standing in Washington prior to his crown prince status points to a period of strategic convergence. However, according to this narrative, divergence intensified when Mohammed bin Zayed found the rapid growth of Saudi economic power and capital concentration unacceptable. From Al-Tuwaijri’s viewpoint, this shift in the economic balance became a psychological-political factor in intensifying personal and strategic rivalry between the two leaders.
    • The Role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Saudi Arabia’s New Architecture: Saudi Arabia is redefining its regional orientation—a shift that not only involves distancing from Abu Dhabi but also includes strengthening ties with Turkey and maintaining the détente process with Iran. This realignment should be analyzed within Riyadh’s broader efforts to consolidate its independent position in regional security equations and avoid becoming entangled in costly scenarios of direct confrontation with Tehran. On the international level, speculation about the possibility of renewed U.S. military action against Iran under the Trump administration has heightened uncertainty. The deployment of U.S. naval and military capabilities in the region sends a clear deterrent message; however, reports simultaneously indicate that at least nine Arab leaders have contacted Washington to allow more time for ongoing negotiations in Muscat. This diplomatic movement suggests that a significant portion of the Arab world views a full-scale war scenario as a threat to regional stability and its economic interests. In this framework, Al-Tuwaijri’s narrative emphasizes that Iran is a different actor than examples like Venezuela and, if faced with an existential threat, would employ extensive and potentially destructive deterrence tools. From this analytical perspective, Iran’s capacity to target U.S. bases in the region, disrupt Persian Gulf energy security, and even block the Strait of Hormuz is assessed as Tehran’s “strategic cards.” Such a scenario could have far-reaching economic and security consequences for the Gulf Arab states. The findings indicate that Saudi Arabia’s pivot toward Turkey and the continuation of détente with Iran are part of an active balancing strategy against three simultaneous variables: competition with the UAE, U.S. pressure for full alignment against Iran, and the risk of widespread instability in the event of military conflict. Riyadh seeks to avoid being drawn into a comprehensive confrontation that could target the region’s energy infrastructure and economy by diversifying its regional partners and maintaining diplomatic channels. This approach reflects Saudi Arabia’s move from rigid alliances toward a more flexible, multi-balancing foreign policy.
  • Aidarus al-Zoubaidi’s escape to Al-Dhale has angered the Saudis!

    Aidarus al-Zoubaidi’s escape to Al-Dhale has angered the Saudis!

    According to the Saudi-led coalition, the strikes came after the escape of Aidarus al-Zoubaidi — head of the Southern Transitional Council — from Aden, along with the movement of large numbers of STC forces toward Al-Dhalea with armored vehicles and military convoys. They claim al-Zoubaidi skipped his flight to Riyadh and avoided peace talks with the Yemeni government-in-exile, choosing instead to flee and prepare for renewed unrest.

    In response, Rashad al-Alimi revoked al-Zoubaidi’s membership in the Presidential Leadership Council and referred him to the attorney general on charges of forming an armed group and acting against the government.

    There’s little doubt al-Zoubaidi knew what awaited him in Riyadh — and that his fate would be no different from figures like Saad Hariri, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and others who ended up under house arrest or worse. That’s why he chose to retreat to his hometown, hoping Southern tribal backing might preserve his power. Yet this bet also seems to be failing: Saudi aircraft are reportedly hunting for his whereabouts, and although he may try to flee to the UAE, current conditions in Aden make escape by air or sea nearly impossible.

  • Clashes Continue Between Saudi‑Backed Tribal Coalition and UAE‑Backed Hadhrami Elite Forces

    Clashes Continue Between Saudi‑Backed Tribal Coalition and UAE‑Backed Hadhrami Elite Forces

    Reports indicate at least four members of the Hadrami Elite Forces have been killed in the clashes. (image)

    Saudi warplanes continue conducting airstrikes on open, uninhabited areas as a warning to UAE‑aligned forces, aiming to deter further attacks and advances in Hadramaut.

  • Saudi-Backed Militias Mobilize to Protect Oil Fields in Northern Hadhramaut

    Saudi-Backed Militias Mobilize to Protect Oil Fields in Northern Hadhramaut

    This move aims to prevent a possible offensive by Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces against the Hadhramaut desert and the province’s oil-rich regions.

    Al-Dara’ Al-Watan (Shield of the Nation) militias were formed in late November 2022 with Saudi backing and the involvement of Sagheer bin Aziz and Tariq Saleh. They were assembled from Hadhramaut tribal fighters, Yemen Al-Saeed forces (aligned with Sagheer bin Aziz), and elements of Tariq Saleh’s units in western Lahj province. Saudi Arabia has equipped these forces to counter the STC and secure control over Hadhramaut’s oil fields and ports.

    Tensions between Hadhramaut tribes and STC factions stationed along the province’s southern coast are escalating as both sides mobilize reinforcements from other regions to gain dominance over oil resources. Despite their alliance against Ansar Allah, Saudi-backed proxy groups are locked in fierce competition to divide the wealth and resources of Yemen’s occupied territories.

  • Pegasus in Saudi Hands; Leaked Documents Reveal Extensive Saudi–Israeli Cooperation!

    Pegasus in Saudi Hands; Leaked Documents Reveal Extensive Saudi–Israeli Cooperation!

    The documents identify Haim Tomer as the intermediary and contractor for the deal — a figure said to have a long background in Israel’s security and intelligence institutions.

    According to the group’s disclosures, the purpose of acquiring these systems was surveillance of opponents and monitoring domestic and regional activities. The leaks once again draw attention to Tel Aviv’s expanding role in exporting cyber weapons and surveillance tools to Middle Eastern countries, as well as Saudi Arabia’s covert collaboration with entities such as Mossad.

  • UAE and Saudi Arabia Mobilize Forces to Seize Hadhramaut

    UAE and Saudi Arabia Mobilize Forces to Seize Hadhramaut

    At the same time, reinforcements from the Southern Transitional Council (STC), consisting of hundreds of fighters and military vehicles, have entered the city of Mukalla. In addition, a battalion from Tariq Saleh’s forces has been deployed to a camp west of Mukalla, the provincial capital of Hadhramaut.

    Given the large-scale deployment of STC fighters to Hadhramaut over the past two weeks, the likelihood of a southern military offensive against the Hadhramaut tribes has increased. The province’s oil-rich areas remain under tribal control, and tribal leaders — backed by Saudi Arabia — have refused to transfer revenues to the exiled government or the STC. This has fueled sharp tensions and rivalry between UAE- and Saudi-backed factions in Yemen’s occupied territories.

  • The Second Shipment of Saudi Crude Oil Arrives in Syria

    The Second Shipment of Saudi Crude Oil Arrives in Syria

    Syrian officials stated that the crude will be processed at the Banyas refinery to help ease the country’s chronic fuel shortages, which in recent months have placed heavy strain on the economy and daily life.

    The continuation of Saudi oil deliveries is not merely an economic measure, but a calculated step toward gradual engagement with the Syrian government. It reflects a cautious warming of ties and a testing of energy diplomacy by Riyadh, particularly at a time when the Arab world is redefining its level of interaction with Damascus and slowly restoring economic exchanges.

    Overall, while the volume of imports cannot fully resolve Syria’s energy crisis, sustained shipments may provide short-term economic relief and carry long-term political significance, paving the way for deeper cooperation in the future.

  • Taliban’s Economic Chief Meets with Saudi Executive and Zalmay Khalilzad Over Gas Pipeline Project

    Taliban’s Economic Chief Meets with Saudi Executive and Zalmay Khalilzad Over Gas Pipeline Project

    The meeting focused on cooperation in gas exploration, extraction, and pipeline development across Afghanistan. Al-Taqi expressed strong interest in investing in the country’s energy sector.

    As negotiations over American prisoner exchanges progress, Khalilzad’s role in shaping Afghanistan’s future has become increasingly prominent. With backing from the Trump administration and Saudi firms, Khalilzad is leveraging Taliban interests—such as gas development—to advance U.S. strategic goals in the region.

    While his exact objectives remain unclear, speculation includes potential military and intelligence use of Bagram Airbase. The evolving cooperation between the Taliban and the U.S., with Khalilzad as a key facilitator, appears to be gaining momentum.

  • Saudi Arabia and Pakistan Sign Strategic Defense Pact

    Saudi Arabia and Pakistan Sign Strategic Defense Pact

    The agreement was formalized during Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to Riyadh, marking a significant and symbolic step toward deepening bilateral defense ties. It encompasses broad collaboration in defense and security, with a mutual defense clause that binds the two nations to respond collectively to external aggression.

    This joint accord reflects a shift in regional dynamics, especially following Israel’s recent attack on Qatar. It signals growing disillusionment among regional leaders with the security guarantees offered by global powers, prompting emerging nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to forge independent security alliances.

    Saudi-Pakistani relations have historically been close since Pakistan’s separation from India, with extensive cooperation across political, economic, and military domains. Pakistan’s military has played a pivotal role in training Saudi forces and has been actively involved in Saudi military operations, notably in Yemen. Conversely, Saudi Arabia has supported Pakistan during economic crises through loans and financial aid.

    What sets this agreement apart is its formalization of the longstanding relationship into an organized and binding commitment. It strategically aligns both countries against perceived threats from India, Israel, and potentially Iran.

    Despite the public announcement of the pact, its detailed provisions remain classified. A key question looms: does the agreement extend to Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities? If so, the regional implications could be profound, potentially reshaping the balance of power across the Middle East and South Asia.

  • Damascus and Riyadh Establish Official Ties; Syrian Transitional Government’s FM Visits Saudi Arabia

    Damascus and Riyadh Establish Official Ties; Syrian Transitional Government’s FM Visits Saudi Arabia

    The Syrian delegation was welcomed at Riyadh International Airport by Walid bin Abdulkarim Al-Khuraiji, Saudi Arabia’s deputy foreign minister.

    The interview of Abu Muhammad Al-Julani, the leader of Tahrir Al-Sham, with Saudi Arabia’s Al-Arabiya channel—his first with a foreign media outlet since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government—along with Asaad Al-Shaybani’s choice of Riyadh for his first foreign visit, highlights the level of relations between the new Syrian rulers and Saudi Arabia.

    After severing ties with the Syrian government in 2012, Saudi Arabia became a significant supporter of the militant groups in the Syrian war, providing financial and military support. The first official foreign trip by Al-Julani government officials to Saudi Arabia sends important signals to regional countries.

    Saudi Arabia, a strong opponent of the Muslim Brotherhood, designates the group as a terrorist organization. In contrast, Turkey has traditionally supported the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and its associated militia factions. Al-Julani officials’ visit to Saudi Arabia indicates a strategic move to balance Turkey’s influence in Syria by increasing cooperation and bringing Saudi Arabia into the equation of the new Syria.

  • Chief Of Saudi Military To Visit Iran For Talks On Defense Cooperation

    Chief Of Saudi Military To Visit Iran For Talks On Defense Cooperation

    Bilateral and defense cooperation between the two countries are expected to increase after this trip. Increasing relations, especially military cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, will have an important effect on increasing the security of the region.

    It should be noted that last year, Major-General Bagheri had a telephone conversation with Saudi Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman regarding developments in the region, upgrading the level of defense cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries, and important issues in the Islamic world.

    Tehran and Riyadh agreed in March 2023, via Chinese intermediation, to re-establish relations after seven years of hostility. Now the efforts of the two countries to get closer to each other continue much more than before.