Tag: Saudi

  • Destruction of a Saudi F-15 fighter jet by the Yemeni army’s air defense

    Destruction of a Saudi F-15 fighter jet by the Yemeni army’s air defense

    Brigadier General Yahya Saree, in a statement on this operation, announced that Saudi fighter jets this week carried out more than 450 airstrikes using F-15 and Typhoon fighter jets from the Khamis Mushait and Taif bases against the areas of Taiz, Lahij, Al-Jawf, Hajjah, Marib, Saada, and Al-Bayda, which led to the martyrdom and wounding of civilians.

    The Yemeni armed forces, in the face of this brutal aggression, succeeded in downing an F-15 fighter jet in the skies over Marib province, which was carrying out hostile operations to support the enemy’s military movements in Taiz and Marib. This fighter jet was downed using a Yemeni surface-to-air missile.

    Also, the Yemeni armed forces, during an air defense operation, targeted two groups of Saudi fighter jets that were searching for the wreckage of the downed fighter jet and drove them away from the skies over Marib.

    Brigadier General Yahya Saree also rejected the false claims of the Saudi regime regarding targeting Mecca, and stated that it is the Saudis who have polluted this holy site with corruption and immorality, and there is no danger from Yemen to the holy sites, because Yemen’s operations only target oil facilities and military bases.

    According to statistics collected by the IWN, this fighter jet is the third F-15 of its kind to be downed during the Yemen war. Therefore, the number of aircraft destroyed by the Saudi-American coalition during the Yemen war has reached 133.

  • Missile and Drone Attack on Sharorah Military Base in Saudi Arabia

    Missile and Drone Attack on Sharorah Military Base in Saudi Arabia

    Yahya Saree, spokesman for the Yemeni armed forces, stated that in this operation, weapons depots and command-and-control rooms that were managing the aggression against Yemen and its people were targeted at the Saudi military base in the Sharorah area with a large volley of ballistic missiles and combat drones, and—thanks to God—the strikes were precise and direct.

    The Al-Wadiah crossing and the Sharorah area north of it, in northern Yemen, constitute the primary land route for logistical supply of Saudi coalition forces in the occupied areas of Yemen. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Yemeni army has, through precise monitoring of coalition force movements and gatherings, delivered accurate and effective blows to the enemy’s rear. These targeted strikes undermine the operational capability of Saudi mercenaries to conduct any offensive operations.

  • Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline Stations Shut Down Until Further Notice; Riyadh Points Finger at Iraqi Groups!

    Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline Stations Shut Down Until Further Notice; Riyadh Points Finger at Iraqi Groups!

    Newly released satellite imagery of the targeted facilities reveals extensive damage. The damage is so severe that repairs and reopening will require a considerable amount of time. Therefore, the Saudi Energy Ministry’s claim attributing the shutdown to precautionary measures is fundamentally incorrect!

    For example, the imagery you are viewing pertains to Al-Dhukra station and Al-Masba’ah station southeast of Medina. In the image, Al-Masba’ah station has sustained very heavy damage.

    ‼On the other hand, in a surprising move, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement accusing Iraqi groups of attacking the East-West pipeline! In the released statement, it is claimed that the East-West pipelines in the Riyadh and Medina regions were attacked by drones launched from Iraqi territory. It is also claimed that the Saudi kingdom will currently not respond to the attacks by Iraqi groups, in order to give the Iraqi government an opportunity to deal with these groups.

    Regardless of who carried out these attacks, the reality of the matter is that there is no difference between the Yemeni army and Ansar Allah, Iraqi resistance groups, Iran, and others. They all stand together as a single hand on one front, jointly fighting against their enemies. Wherever necessary, tactics change, and each component will carry out its duties as required. It is not acceptable for Saudi Arabia to be a partner and accomplice with America in oppressing the people of Iran and Yemen, and on the other hand, escape this war unscathed! If it diverts the Strait of Hormuz to serve America, then it should expect the missiles and drones of the Resistance—no matter from which direction they come, it makes no difference. The tactics of war have changed!

  • Infographic: Saudi Coalition And US Aircraft Losses In Yemen War

    Infographic: Saudi Coalition And US Aircraft Losses In Yemen War

    The details of the downed aircraft are as follows:

    1- Saudi F-15S fighter jet – March 27, 2015 – Gulf of Aden
    2- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – May 7, 2015 – Al-Baqa’, Saada Governorate
    3- Moroccan F-16C fighter jet – May 10, 2015 – Wadi Nashur, Saada Governorate
    4- Saudi Seeker 400 drone – July 3, 2015 – Al-Baqa’, Saada Governorate
    5- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – August 5, 2015 – Jizan
    6- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – August 21, 2015 – Jizan
    7- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – August 25, 2015 – Mukayras, Abyan Governorate
    8- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – October 25, 2015 – Al-Abdiyah, Ma’rib Governorate
    9- Bahraini F-16C fighter jet – December 30, 2015 – Jizan
    10- UAE MQ-1 Predator drone – January 19, 2016 – Sana’a
    11- Saudi Selex ES Falco drone – February 3, 2016 – Midi, Hajjah Governorate
    12- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – February 27, 2016 – Dhubab, Taiz Governorate
    13- UAE Mirage 2000 fighter jet – March 13, 2016 – Al-Burayqah, Aden
    14- UAE AH-64D helicopter – June 12, 2016 – Gulf of Aden
    15- UAE NSA407 helicopter – June 13, 2016 – Al-Burayqah, Aden
    16- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – July 25, 2016 – Bir al-Maraziq, Al-Jawf Governorate
    17- Saudi Seeker 400 drone – August 16, 2016 – Kataf, Saada Governorate
    18- UAE Wing Loong drone – September 26, 2016 – Khawlan, Sana’a Governorate
    19- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – December 30, 2016 – Najran
    20- U.S. V-22 Osprey helicopter – January 29, 2017 – Al-Bayda Governorate
    21- Saudi SA 365F helicopter – January 30, 2017 – Al-Hudaydah coast (aboard the Al-Madinah vessel)
    22- UAE MQ-1 Predator drone – February 14, 2017 – Al-Munin, Ma’rib Governorate
    23- Jordanian F-16A fighter jet – February 24, 2017 – Najran
    24- Saudi S-70A helicopter – April 18, 2017 – Ma’rib
    25- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – June 21, 2017 – Dhubab, Taiz Governorate
    26- UAE AH-60L helicopter – August 11, 2017 – Wadi Amqin, Shabwah Governorate
    27- Saudi Seeker 400 drone – August 15, 2017 – Al-Baqa’, Saada Governorate
    28- U.S. UH-60M helicopter – August 25, 2017 – Gulf of Aden
    29- UAE AT-802U aircraft – September 11, 2017 – Gulf of Aden
    30- Saudi Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet – September 13, 2017 – Abyan Governorate
    31- U.S. MQ-9 drone – October 1, 2017 – Sana’a city
    32- UAE AH-64D helicopter – October 17, 2017 – Khabb wa al-Sha’af, Al-Jawf Governorate
    33- Saudi S-70A helicopter – November 5, 2017 – Abha
    34- Saudi Panavia Tornado fighter jet – January 7, 2018 – Kataf, Saada Governorate
    35- Saudi F-15S fighter jet – March 21, 2018 – Saada
    36- Saudi CH-4B drone – July 12, 2018 – Al-Rabu’ah
    37- Saudi Panavia Tornado fighter jet – July 12, 2018 – Asir
    38- Saudi CH-4B drone – August 30, 2018 – Jizan
    39- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – September 2, 2018 – Al-Jah, Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    40- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – September 14, 2018 – Al-Mahrah
    41- UAE Seeker 400 drone – November 26, 2018 – Al-Jubayliyah, Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    42- Saudi CH-4B drone – December 23, 2018 – Saada
    43- U.S. MQ-9 drone – June 6, 2019 – Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    44- Saudi CH-4B drone – April 11, 2019 – Hadramawt Governorate
    45- UAE Wing Loong drone – April 19, 2019 – Saada
    46- UAE MQ-1 Predator drone – May 15, 2019 – Bani Matar, Sana’a Governorate
    47- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – June 2, 2019 – Hays, Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    48- U.S. MQ-9 drone – August 21, 2019 – Dhamar Governorate
    49- U.S. MQ-9 drone – March 23, 2021 – Ma’rib Governorate
    50- UAE Schiebel Camcopter S-100 drone – November 1, 2019 – Ras Isa, Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    51- Saudi AH-64D helicopter – November 29, 2019 – Asir
    52- Saudi Wing Loong drone – November 30, 2019 – Hayran, Hajjah Governorate
    53- Saudi Luna X2000 drone – December 4, 2019 – Baqim, Saada Governorate
    54- Saudi Karayel drone – December 30, 2019 – Al-Salif, Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    55- Saudi CH-4B drone – January 7, 2020 – Khabb wa al-Sha’af, Al-Jawf Governorate
    56- Saudi Panavia Tornado fighter jet – February 14, 2020 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    57- Saudi RQ-20 drone – August 2, 2020 – Haradh District, Hajjah Governorate
    58- Saudi CH-4B drone – December 21, 2020 – Ma’rib Governorate
    59- Saudi Karayel drone – January 6, 2021 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    60- Saudi CH-4B drone – February 12, 2021 – Ma’rib Governorate
    61- Saudi Karayel drone – March 7, 2021 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    62- Saudi CH-4B drone – March 23, 2021 – Sirwah, Ma’rib Governorate
    63- Saudi Wing Loong drone – May 21, 2021 – Najran
    64- U.S. MQ-9 drone – May 23, 2021 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    65- Saudi ScanEagle drone – June 19, 2021 – Ma’rib Governorate
    66- Saudi ScanEagle drone – June 21, 2021 – Ma’rib Governorate
    67- Saudi ScanEagle drone – August 14, 2021 – Madghal, Ma’rib Governorate
    68- Saudi Wing Loong drone – September 13, 2021 – Kataf, Saada Governorate
    69- Saudi ScanEagle drone – September 27, 2021 – Madghal, Ma’rib Governorate
    70- Saudi CH-4 drone – October 6, 2021 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    71- Saudi RQ-20 drone – October 7, 2021 – Jizan border
    72- Saudi ScanEagle drone – November 9, 2021 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    73- Saudi ScanEagle drone – November 13, 2021 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    74- Saudi CH-4 drone – December 1, 2021 – Al-Umashiyah, Amran Governorate
    75- Saudi ScanEagle drone – December 4, 2021 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    76- Saudi ScanEagle drone – December 8, 2021 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    77- Saudi CH-4 drone – December 8, 2021 – Al-Wadi, Ma’rib Governorate
    78- Saudi ScanEagle drone – December 10, 2021 – Sirwah, Ma’rib Governorate
    79- Saudi CH-4 drone – December 14, 2021 – Asaylan, Shabwah Governorate
    80- Saudi ScanEagle drone – December 16, 2021 – Al-Wadi, Ma’rib Governorate
    81- Saudi ScanEagle drone – December 25, 2021 – Al-Yatamah, Khabb wa al-Sha’af, Al-Jawf Governorate
    82- UAE Wing Loong drone – January 5, 2022 – Asaylan, Shabwah Governorate
    83- UAE Wing Loong drone – January 11, 2022 – Ain, Shabwah Governorate
    84- Saudi ScanEagle drone – January 29, 2022 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    85- Saudi CH-4 drone – February 10, 2022 – Haradh, Hajjah Governorate
    86- UAE MQ-1 drone – February 25, 2022 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    87- Saudi ScanEagle drone – February 25, 2022 – Al-Jubah, Ma’rib Governorate
    88- Saudi ScanEagle drone – February 28, 2022 – Haradh, Hajjah Governorate
    89- Saudi ScanEagle drone – March 8, 2022 – Haradh, Hajjah Governorate
    90- Saudi ScanEagle drone – March 29, 2022 – Al-Wadi, Ma’rib Governorate
    91- Saudi CH-4 drone – May 4, 2022 – Haradh, Hajjah Governorate
    92- Saudi Karayel drone – May 21, 2022 – Hayran, Hajjah Governorate
    93- Saudi CH-4 drone – May 23, 2022 – Sana’a Governorate
    94- Saudi Wing Loong drone – May 24, 2022 – Kataf, Saada Governorate
    95- U.S. MQ-9 drone – November 8, 2023 – Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    96- U.S. MQ-9 drone – February 19, 2024 – Northern Al-Hudaydah Governorate
    97- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 25, 2024 – Saada Governorate
    98- UAE Wing Loong 1 drone – April 29, 2024 – Al-Rawdah District, Shabwah Governorate
    99- U.S. MQ-9 drone – May 16, 2024 – Al-Wadi District, Ma’rib Governorate
    100- U.S. MQ-9 drone – May 21, 2024 – Al-Bayda Governorate
    101- U.S. MQ-9 drone – May 29, 2024 – Ma’rib Governorate
    102- U.S. MQ-9 drone – August 4, 2024 – Saada
    103- U.S. MQ-9 drone – September 7, 2024 – Ma’rib
    104- U.S. MQ-9 drone – September 10, 2024 – Saada
    105- U.S. MQ-9 drone – September 30, 2024 – Saada
    106- U.S. MQ-9 drone – November 8, 2024 – Al-Jawf
    107- U.S. MQ-9 drone – November 28, 2024 – Al-Bayda
    108- U.S. MQ-9 drone – December 2, 2024 – Ma’rib
    109- U.S. F/A-18F fighter jet – December 21, 2024 – Red Sea
    110- U.S. MQ-9 drone – March 3, 2025 – Al-Hudaydah
    111- U.S. MQ-9 drone – March 31, 2025 – Ma’rib
    112- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 3, 2025 – Al-Hudaydah
    113- Saudi Giant Shark F-360 drone – April 5, 2025 – Saada
    114- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 9, 2025 – Al-Jawf
    115- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 13, 2025 – Hajjah
    116- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 18, 2025 – Sana’a
    117- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 19, 2025 – Sana’a
    118- U.S. MQ-9 drone – April 22, 2025 – Hajjah
    119- U.S. F/A-18E fighter jet – April 29, 2025 – Northern Red Sea
    120- U.S. F/A-18F fighter jet – May 6, 2025 – Northern Red Sea
    121- U.S. MQ-9 drone – March 3, 2026 – Maraqishah Mountains, Abyan Governorate
    122- U.S. MQ-9 drone – May 17, 2026 – Ma’rib Desert
    123- U.S. MQ-9 drone – May 29, 2026 – North of Ma’rib city
    124- Saudi Wing Loong drone – July 14, 2026 – Al-Bayda Governorate
    125- Saudi Bayraktar Akıncı drone – July 26, 2026 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    126- Saudi Karayel drone – July 29, 2026 – Saada Governorate
    127- Saudi ScanEagle drone – August 23, 2026 – Hajjah Governorate
    128- Saudi Wing Loong drone – September 6, 2026 – Al-Jawf Governorate
    129- Saudi Wing Loong drone – September 6, 2026 – Maqbanah District, Taiz Governorate
    130- Saudi Wing Loong drone – September 7, 2026 – Al-Bayda Governorate
    131- Saudi CH-4 drone – September 7, 2026 – Al-Jawf Governorate

    (Last updated: September 8, 2026)

    Casualties of Saudi and American Coalition Aircraft in the Yemen War
  • U.S. Central Command Releases Images of Joint Exercises in Saudi Arabia and Qatar

    U.S. Central Command Releases Images of Joint Exercises in Saudi Arabia and Qatar

    At the same time, at Al Udeid Air Base, U.S. and Qatari personnel participated in a parade and a 25-kilometer endurance exercise hosted by the U.S. Army’s 25th Strategic Signal Battalion.

    CENTCOM stated that the purpose of these activities is to strengthen operational capability and joint readiness with regional partners.

  • The Role of Yemen in the Competition in the Horn of Africa

    The Role of Yemen in the Competition in the Horn of Africa

    In the 21st century, Persian Gulf countries have set ambitious geopolitical objectives, heavily relying on their rich oil revenues. As this trend continues and the oil market remains volatile, diversifying income sources becomes essential. Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030,” which focuses on expanding the non-oil sector and investing in foreign assets, aligns with this goal.
    Consequently, as oil resources decline, the Persian Gulf nations are aiming to diversify their economies and safeguard key assets like ports and farmland. The 2008 global financial crisis further accelerated this effort, prompting the Gulf countries to make significant investments in the Horn of Africa to broaden their economic bases.

    Recently, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Gateway Terminal (RSGT) signed a 30-year contract with Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA) to operate and develop the port of Tajoura. RSGT aims to turn Tajoura into a major multi-purpose terminal, expecting it to handle five million tons of cargo annually, strengthening its role as a gateway for Ethiopian imports and exports. However, there has been a shift from purely economic involvement to more direct political and military actions, with Gulf states establishing military bases and brokering peace in the region. Saudi Arabia’s strategy in the Red Sea focuses mainly on security, evident in its diplomatic and military moves such as a 2017 defense agreement with Djibouti and a 2018 peace treaty between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Its leadership in creating the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Council in 2020 underscores its commitment to regional security cooperation. Riyadh’s presence in the Horn of Africa appears aimed at controlling the Red Sea to counter threats, especially from Yemen’s Ansarullah. It’s noteworthy that Western media claim Yemen’s Ansarullah and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab are cooperating in arms shipments.

    UAE Movements
    While the UAE and Saudi Arabia often pursue Western strategies in various regions, this has occasionally caused rivalry, as seen in Sudan and eastern Yemen. Consequently, much of the UAE’s effort to expand influence in the Horn of Africa revolves around controlling western Yemen to attain its objectives in the oil-rich Hadramaut area. This region has recently become a conflict zone involving tribes near Saudi Arabia.
    The UAE has adopted a more assertive approach, establishing a strong military and economic footprint across the Horn of Africa. Over the last ten years, it has developed military bases in Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Its air base in Assab, Eritrea, symbolizes Abu Dhabi’s commitment to maintaining a lasting presence in the area. Although this base was later dismantled, the UAE’s control over port rights in Mukalla, Aden, and Berbera indicates its strategic goal of dominating maritime routes and influencing the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden regions.

    In fact, the events in Yemen and the Horn of Africa are closely linked. Growing influence in this region could enhance Yemen’s power by diminishing Ansar Allah’s influence. Interestingly, the Emirates’ ambitions appear more aggressive and far-reaching than Riyadh’s. They are even prepared to collaborate closely with the Zionist regime in this area.
    Recently, Western media have reported that Iran and Yemen’s Ansar Allah are gaining influence in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. This situation has prompted the Emirates and the Zionist regime to adopt a more coordinated strategy to address the issue. Some sources suggest that, along with Ethiopia, these two regimes have formed a secret alliance in the region.

    Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki recently made surprising statements, blaming the current Yemen crisis on the militarization of the country’s islands. He also emphasized that coastal nations should be responsible for securing the Red Sea, rather than relying on foreign military bases. His primary concern is the potential establishment of a military base on Yemen’s “Zaqr” island by the Emirates, which could pose a serious threat to Eritrea if completed. The presence of the Zionist regime via the Emirates on Yemeni islands threatens regional sovereignty and international interests. These actions form a dangerous shadow alliance that endangers Yemen’s sovereignty and risks transforming it into a shared military domain of the regime and Abu Dhabi.

    Another key point near the Emirates axis involves Somaliland, which is strongly supported by the Zionists and Ethiopia, each with different aims. Ethiopia sees Somaliland as a route to the sea to further its economic ambitions. Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv aim to establish a base there, possibly to target Yemen’s Ansarullah.

    Along with security concerns, the Emirates also aims to achieve its economic objectives, emphasizing food security. The region’s potential for agriculture and its proximity to the Gulf states make it appealing as a source of essential foods. The Horn of Africa plays a critical role in the Gulf states’ food security due to its fertile land and established trade routes. The Gulf region relies heavily on food imports, obtaining 85 percent of its staple foods from other countries.

    The Southern Transitional Council’s sinister plan for Ansar Allah
    Besides the explanations about the UAE’s regional influence, the Times reports that a delegation from the Southern Transitional Council recently visited Tel Aviv. They expressed willingness to recognize the “Israeli regime” (supporting the Zionist regime) and to sign the “Abraham Pact” in favor of Trump. However, this is conditional on the Zionist regime and the US participating in a joint ground (Southern Transitional Council) and air (Zionist regime and US) attack on Yemen’s Ansar Allah as a “common problem,” and on the Southern Transitional Council being able to establish the country of “South Yemen.”

    Conclusion
    Generally, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s roles in the Horn of Africa involve both competition and cooperation. While they share the goal of countering Iran and Yemeni AnsarAllah’s influence, they also have significant disagreements, as dominance in this region can boost their rivalry over Yemeni oil resources. The main reasons for their presence in the Horn of Africa can be summarized as follows:

    1- As the new global order emerges with multipolarity and diminishing US influence, Washington is delegating its objectives to other regions. Boosting the presence of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the Zionist regime aligns with US interests. Similarly, recognizing Somaliland in exchange for permission to establish a military base fits this pattern.

    2- The Persian Gulf countries’ involvement in the Horn of Africa and the broader Red Sea region is driven by security needs and economic ambitions. Heightened security concerns have increased the region’s importance, especially as Iran’s influence, supported by the “axis of resistance” and strengthened by the Yemeni war, extends to the Horn of Africa. Naval bases serve as strategic footholds, broadening the Persian Gulf’s influence over regional politics and economics. Recently, Western media have suggested cooperation between Ansar Allah and Somali al-Shabaab, despite their differing motives.

    3- Gaining control over the Horn of Africa allows influence into East, North, and even the Sahel regions of Africa. For instance, without Eritrean cooperation, access to trade routes leading to the Sudanese port would be difficult. Cooperation with Ethiopia could expand influence in Central and East Africa. However, Egypt, an Arab country typically aligned with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, often holds opposing views in this region, which may impact future political dynamics.

  • Where Is the Third Major U.S. Base in Saudi Arabia?

    Where Is the Third Major U.S. Base in Saudi Arabia?

    This base serves a logistical and supply role for U.S. forces in western Saudi Arabia and has recently undergone expansion. Development began in early 2025 and includes the construction of underground storage facilities, ammunition depots, new logistics and support infrastructure, as well as housing for U.S. personnel.

    Given its capabilities, the base could potentially serve as an alternative to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Qatar’s proximity to Iran and the presence of Iran’s short-range missile stockpiles have highlighted Al Udeid’s vulnerability, prompting the U.S. to consider substituting it with other bases. That said, the mission profile of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia is largely defensive and training-oriented. For instance, during the Saudi-Emirati coalition’s war in Yemen, these forces repeatedly took part in air defense operations, intercepting Yemeni missiles and drones and thereby indirectly engaging in the conflict.

    Overall, despite Saudi Arabia’s neutral stance in recent Iran–U.S. tensions, L.S.A. Jenkins could be considered a potential target of Iranian missile strikes. The base is approximately 1,300 km from Iran’s Ahvaz and 990 km from Saada.

  • Capture of Aden and Abyan by Saudi-backed government forces (Map)

    Capture of Aden and Abyan by Saudi-backed government forces (Map)

    After consecutive defeats of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra — and their withdrawal without fighting from the Balhaf gas facility and the strategic Marra base in Shabwah — the focus of pro-government forces shifted to southern Yemen. In initial negotiations, local authorities in Abyan agreed to hand over their positions to Al-Dara’ Al-Watan forces. Southern militants and allied tribes have not yet surrendered their positions, but they also have not shown resistance.

    In Aden, government and service facilities — including the Presidential Palace (Al-Ma’ashiq) and Aden Airport — had already been evacuated by STC fighters and handed over to representatives of the government-in-exile. Early this morning, Al-Dara’ Al-Watan forces entered Aden via the coastal road and Al-Anad base, taking control of military and security sites. Elements of the Giants Brigades also assumed control of parts of Aden at the order of the Saudi-led coalition. Their commander, Abu Zarah Al-Muharrami, officially split from the STC yesterday and pledged allegiance to Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman.

    The Saudi-backed forces captured Aden and Abyan provinces

    The disappearance of Aidarus al-Zoubaidi — head of the Southern Transitional Council — at dawn today, and his failure to travel to Riyadh, has angered the Saudis and escalated tensions between the STC and the government-in-exile. Rashad Al-Alimi has revoked his membership in the Presidential Leadership Council. This situation suggests instability will continue in the occupied regions of Yemen — and it is likely that Al-Dhale and Lahij will soon witness Saudi attacks and further Southern capitulations.

  • Saudi–UAE Rift Surfaces as Mukalla Strike Targets Emirati Military Gear

    Saudi–UAE Rift Surfaces as Mukalla Strike Targets Emirati Military Gear

    The strikes followed a warning message urging civilians to stay away from the port area. The northern parking lot of Mukalla port was hit, with the main objective being recently imported Emirati military vehicles. These vehicles had arrived aboard two cargo ships from Fujairah port to supply fighters of the Southern Transitional Council (STC).

    Brigadier General Turki al‑Maliki, spokesperson for the Saudi‑led coalition, stressed that the transfer of Emirati military equipment to Mukalla port constitutes a clear violation of efforts to reduce tensions, pursue a peaceful solution, and breaches UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015).

    This strike marks the first official and overt Saudi action against the STC and its Emirati backers. By escalating their warnings, the Saudis signaled to southern forces and the UAE that they are capable of fighting them if necessary. However, Riyadh’s primary objective in Yemen remains confronting Ansar Allah, with southerners considered allies in that effort. In reality, the alliance in Yemen has been challenged by Emirati moves, while the Saudis remain reluctant to deepen conflict with their long‑time partner.

  • Southern Transitional Council Withdraws from Areas in Northern Hadhramaut

    Southern Transitional Council Withdraws from Areas in Northern Hadhramaut

    In addition to this withdrawal, the Southern Transitional Council has issued directives to prepare for an exit from the Hadhramaut Valley and to transfer control of the area to the Saudi-backed al‑Dara‘ al‑Watan forces.

    As expected, Saudi warnings prompted the southern forces to retreat from their recent advances in Hadhramaut and to hand over the valley to Saudi‑aligned factions. However, the withdrawal process is still in its early stages, and it remains unclear how far the retreat—or the tensions between Emirati‑backed and Saudi‑backed groups—will go.

    It appears the southern forces, through cautious and calculated maneuvers, are seeking to secure a larger share of Hadhramaut’s oil wealth and intend to continue these moves as long as possible.

  • Joint Meeting of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China Held in Tehran

    Joint Meeting of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China Held in Tehran

    Following a preliminary meeting of experts and diplomats from the three countries, a trilateral session was held to review progress on implementing the Beijing Agreement signed in March 2023. The meeting was attended by Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed Al-Khereiji, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Miao Diao, and Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi.

    In their final statement, the three countries welcomed the continued improvement in Iran–Saudi relations, called for an end to Israeli attacks on Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, condemned violations of Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, highlighted advances in consular cooperation—especially regarding the Hajj—and reaffirmed support for an inclusive political solution in Yemen based on recognized international principles and under UN supervision.

  • Al‑Wadi‘ah Border Crossing Closed

    Al‑Wadi‘ah Border Crossing Closed

    At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s closure of the crossing coincided with the deployment of Al‑Dara‘ al‑Watan forces and armed groups loyal to Hashem al‑Ahmar (a parliament member and former Yemeni army officer under Ali Abdullah Saleh) along the road in the al‑Abr area, blocking vehicles from heading toward the border.

    Currently, the al‑Abr region and the 23rd Mika Brigade base are under the control of Al‑Dara‘ al‑Watan forces. Saudi Arabia is reportedly fortifying this position to support unspecified security measures. It appears Riyadh is preparing to counter the recent advances of the Southern Transitional Council in Hadhramaut and Shabwa provinces and to reclaim oil‑rich areas.